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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the long-term political economy of public health work in 
northern Ghana, and of the contingent application of medical knowledge under 
different political regimes. Covering the period from 1900 to 2000, the thesis asks how 
the north and its people’s enduring peripherality – defined in various ways – shaped the
evolution of public health institutions and conditioned the state’s attention to particular 
diseases. It assesses key public health transitions across the century, including the 
creation of the north’s Native Authority health system in the 1930s, the entrenchment of
church authority for healthcare in the 1950s, and the government’s gradual cession of 
medical oversight to international organisations from the late 1960s, a process which 
was partially reversed in the late 1990s. It examines specific disease control 
programmes against sleeping sickness, onchocerciasis, and guinea worm, for what they 
reveal about the social history of medical work on the margins of the state, and about 
the political contexts for population-level health interventions. Colonial-era tsetse 
control inadvertently contributed to the serious prevalence of onchocerciasis in the 
north at independence, and this high prevalence of onchocerciasis made northern 
Ghana a focus of international health fundraising ahead of the WHO Onchocerciasis 
Control Programme, which began in 1974. In the urban south, guinea worm disease 
was substantially reduced in the early twentieth century, but in the north the disease 
only received concerted attention from the 1980s. In the historical literature on health 
in Ghana, there are few studies which adequately disaggregate the north and its 
particular experiences of public health work. Using sources from northern regional 
archives, the archives of the World Health Organisation, and interview testimony from 
government health officials and village communities, the thesis aims to make a 
contribution to this area.
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INTRODUCTION
 
This thesis examines the long-term history of public health work among 
communities in northern Ghana, a region that has remained on Ghana’s geographical, 
political and economic margins since it was first enclosed as part of the British Gold 
Coast. Covering the century from 1900 to 2000, it asks how this peripherality 
conditioned the development of the region’s public health institutions over time, and 
how it shaped research and control programmes related to particular diseases. 
Conversely, it examines the extent to which healthcare provision and medical advocacy,
which linked local practitioners to transnational health organisations, research networks
and donor agencies, acted to reconfigure the north’s marginal relationship to Ghana’s 
political centres. 
The thesis addresses these broad questions about the relationship between 
public health work and peripherality, conceived of in various ways, through two 
distinct strands of analysis.1 Three of the six chapters deal with the evolution of public 
health institutions in the north. They discuss the allocation of funds and resources from 
colonial and postcolonial governments based in southern Ghana; the creation, decline, 
and regeneration of local healthcare infrastructure; the role of local advocacy and 
particular individuals in shaping the provision of health services to northern peoples; 
1 Here and throughout the thesis, unless otherwise indicated, I use the terms ‘public health’ and ‘public
health work’ in their broadest possible definition, meaning all activities or institutions related to 
improving health at a community or population level.  I use a similarly accommodating definition of 
‘health system’, meaning an interacting network of facilities, organisations, policies and individuals 
acting on the health of a population, and ‘healthcare’, meaning facilities and activities aimed at 
supporting or improving health. Although private clinical healthcare clearly plays an important part 
in maintaining public health, this thesis is principally concerned with public health activities either 
carried out directly by the state (even at some remove, through local officials or traditional leaders, 
for example), or carried out in collaboration with the state (at least notionally, for example in the 
case of WHO campaigns or church-based healthcare).
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and the shifting balance between local, national and transnational sources of medical 
authority. These chapters are interspersed with a further three chapters that approach 
public health in northern Ghana from the perspective of specific diseases and their 
related control programmes, using these as a lens to examine the interplay between 
medical knowledge and regional peripherality, as mediated by individuals and 
groupings involved in work against a particular disease. The chapters deal with 
sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), onchocerciasis (sometimes called ‘river 
blindness’), and guinea worm disease (dracunculiasis). For example, I discuss how 
disease control priorities were determined by local officials working in tension or 
collaboration with the economic priorities of the central administration, and how these 
programmes were also shaped by the shifting political concerns of successive colonial 
and postcolonial governments at Accra, in tension with theories about disease control 
and public health propounded by transnational health organisations.
In other words, in one group of chapters (Chapters 2, 4 and 6) I focus 
closely on particular areas of health work, as a way of examining the unstable 
application of medical knowledge under different economic and political conditions. In 
the other group of chapters (Chapters 1, 3 and 5), I develop a long-run account of the 
political economy of public health institutions in northern Ghana.2 These institutions 
include physical facilities like hospitals and clinics, networks of people involved in 
disease surveillance or research, and policies regarding which communities, health 
practices or diseases would be the chief beneficiaries of state-supported healthcare. 
Although I have attempted to chart the most significant developments, these chapters 
2 Throughout the thesis I use the term 'political economy' in an accommodating, atheoretical and 
distributional sense, to mean the interplay between sociopolitical and economic factors in shaping a 
particular situation or outcome. For example, a government decision to allocate funding for the 
construction of a clinic in a particular district (and not another), or to devote personnel and resources
for the control of a disease affecting a certain group of people (and not another), may indicate the 
prevailing political economy of public health at the time the decision was made.  
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are not intended to be a comprehensive chronicle of the north’s healthcare capacity over
time (in terms of the annual construction of new clinics, changing numbers of doctors 
and nurses, or individual outbreaks of disease, for example). Instead, they examine the 
relative provision of health services in the north and south over different periods, and 
account for the influence of national and international events on local healthcare, in a 
rural inland region which at first glance might appear relatively isolated from 
developments elsewhere. In Chapter 1, I assess the provision of health services from 
1900-1945, from the outset of colonial rule in the north to the end of the Second World 
War. In Chapter 3, I discuss how public health priorities shifted over the transition to 
independent rule and under the first postcolonial African government, from 1945 to 
1966. In Chapter 5 (1966-2000), I examine how the north’s health services were shaped
by the successive political disruptions that followed the deposal of Kwame Nkrumah in
1966, and by Ghana’s adoption of an IMF-World Bank structural adjustment 
programme from 1983.
This kind of institutional history is perhaps less immediately engaging, from 
both a researcher’s and reader’s perspective, than many other aspects of the history of 
health in Africa. A principal focus on institutions and policies can elide the finer details 
of lived experience for both medical practitioners and the recipients of healthcare. I 
would nevertheless argue that an analysis of institutional change can be valuable, 
particularly in countries or regions where histories of this kind remain relatively 
uncommon. When I began this project, I had initially planned to devote all chapters to 
case studies of particular disease control programmes, and to local regimes for medical 
research and experimentation in different periods. But in the course of my preliminary 
research, it became clear that there was no adequate ‘foundational’ historical account of
northern health services on which to base these focused case studies. This stands in 
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evident contrast to a country like Britain, for example, where there are many available 
histories of national health policy, the National Health Service, and regional public 
health institutions. This is largely explained by the extensive funding and support 
available for historical research in a wealthy country like Britain. But it is also perhaps 
a product of the rapid evolution of historiographical approaches to health in Africa, 
which has meant that some aspects of healthcare have received less attention. As a 
crude summary, it might be said that the materialist histories of the 1970s and early 
1980s gave way to cultural or ethnographic histories and discourse analyses from the 
late 1980s, which have more recently been joined by histories that situate health work 
in Africa in its global context – by approaching ‘public health’ as a transnational 
endeavour, or by examining the informational networks that connected local 
researchers and physicians to theories and ideas elsewhere. Perhaps because of these 
rapid transitions, because of the relative difficulty in accessing some postcolonial 
sources, and because of the predominant direction of research funding towards Western 
departments where these historiographical approaches had become entrenched, the 
long-term history of government health institutions in Africa has arguably been of 
greater interest to economists or development studies researchers than it has to 
historians, certainly for the postcolonial era. 
The three institutional chapters in this thesis cannot claim to be a 
comprehensive history of northern Ghana’s public health institutions. But it is hoped 
that by bringing together a range of new sources, and by examining key moments of 
transition across the twentieth century, these chapters make an ‘excavatory’ 
contribution towards a history of this kind. During interviews with retired health 
practitioners in Ghana, it was often emphasised that histories which assess the 
development of regional health institutions might be useful in the country itself, 
14
particularly in regard to periods where in-country record keeping was disrupted – for 
example during the successive coup d’etats and changes in government which took 
place from 1966 to 1981.3
By interspersing the institutional chapters with three focused studies of 
particular disease control programmes, I aim to explore the central questions outlined 
above (about the interplay between regional peripherality and the provision of health 
services) at various levels of detail, from state policies to healthcare in specific valleys 
or villages. I also attempt to chart connections between public health interventions in 
distinct periods, and to assess the role of individuals and their medical beliefs in 
shaping the outcome of particular disease control initiatives. In Chapter 2, I discuss the 
evolution of control programmes against human and animal sleeping sickness, 
observing the particular ways in which medical work in the north was responsive to, 
and constrained by, the economic preferences of the central Gold Coast administration. 
In Chapter 4, I give an account of how colonial-era tsetse control programmes 
unwittingly contributed to the serious prevalence of onchocerciasis in northern 
communities – a problem which was first acknowledged shortly before the transition to 
independence rule, when northern Ghana was found to have the worst onchocerciasis-
related blindness of any region in Africa. In Chapter 6, I discuss attempts to control 
guinea worm across the century: a disease which was brought under control in many 
southern settlements by 1920, but which only received concerted attention in the north 
from the late 1980s.
3 See, for example, Dr J. Koku Awoonor-Williams, Interview, Navrongo, 2 July 2015; Professor 
Frances Nkrumah, Interview, Accra, 15 July 2015; Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2015; Dr
Moses Adibo, Interview, Accra, 17 June 2015; Professor Fred Binka, Interview, Ho, 21 July 2015
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The north as place and periphery
Modern-day northern Ghana covers an area of approximately 98,000 square 
kilometres, or 41 percent of the Republic of Ghana’s total land area, and is presently 
divided into three administrative divisions: the Northern, Upper East and Upper West 
regions.4 Geographically and climatically the north is a savanna, with low hills and 
grassland plains punctuated by many trees, occasional rock outcroppings, and the 
tributaries of the Red, White and Black Volta rivers. Made up of dry tropic shrubland 
and dry tropic forest ecological zones, it lies between the West African forest belt to the
south and the arid Sahel to the north.5 The peak of the rainy season runs from July to 
October, when temperatures remain moderate (daytime temperatures average around 
30°C in Tamale, the administrative capital of the Northern Region), followed by a 
period of relatively cool dry weather and dusty harmattan winds that reach peak 
strength in December. From January to April the weather remains dry, but daytime 
temperatures increase sharply (averaging 37°C in Tamale), until the first rains begin in 
April.6 
With approximately 20 percent of Ghana’s total population in 2010 (4.2 
million people), the north is home to a large number of ethnic communities, with most 
people speaking languages of the Niger-Congo Gur family.7 Yakubu Saaka identifies 
more than thirty different ethnic groups in the north, noting that ‘unlike most areas in 
Africa, linguistic boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with ethnic zones. There 
is a great deal of ethnic and linguistic fluidity in the area, and most of the larger ethnic 
4 Government of Ghana, ‘Regional Information’, accessed 22 May 2017, 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/about-ghana/regions/.
5 United Nations Food & Agriculture Organisation, ‘Global Ecological Zones for Forest Reporting: 
2010 Update’ (Rome: FAO, 2012), ch.12.
6 Climate-data.org, ‘Climate Data: Tamale’, accessed 24 July 2017, https://en.climate-
data.org/location/667/.
7 Jean Allman and John Parker, Tongnaab: The History of a West African God (Bloomington, Ind.: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), 27; Government of Ghana, ‘2010 Population & Housing Census Of 
Ghana’ (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012), 40.
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groups consist of more than one linguistic group’.8 Large ethnic groups include the 
Dagomba, Mamprusi, Konkomba and Gonja peoples of the Northern Region; the 
Frafra, Nabdam, Kusasi, Kassena, Builsa, and Bimoba peoples of the Upper East; and 
the Dagaaba, Lobi, Sisaala and Wala peoples of the Upper West.9 The fluidity of 
ethnicity and the use of variable nomenclature across the century mean that some of 
these terms remain the subject of debate.10 The main religions are Islam (Sunni and 
Ahmadiyyah) and Christianity (principally Catholic), although a large number of 
people follow traditional religions, and there is significant variation in religious 
adherence between regions. The Northern Region has the highest proportion of 
Muslims of any administrative division in Ghana, at 59 percent of the population in 
2010, while Christians are more slightly more numerous than Muslims in the Upper 
East and Upper West regions, at 41 percent and 44 percent of the population 
respectively. Adherents of traditional religions make up an average 18 percent of the 
population across the three regions, reaching 28 percent in the Upper East.11 
Given the size of the region and the diversity of its peoples, is it possible to 
treat the north as a discrete unit between 1900 and 2000?  Although I discuss intra-
regional differences where appropriate, this thesis generally approaches the north as a 
conceptual whole, and this evidently requires some justification. By ‘the north’, I mean 
the lands and communities which were (often violently) incorporated by Britain into 
the Gold Coast in 1902, as the Northern Territories Protectorate. This area remained 
part of the same administrative division across the transition to independent rule, and 
persisted in broadly the same geographical boundaries at the end of the twentieth 
8 Yakubu Saaka, ed., Regionalism and Public Policy in Northern Ghana (New York: Peter Lang, 
2001), 6.
9 Ibid., 6–7; Government of Ghana, ‘Regional Information’.
10 See, for example, Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), Introduction and ch.1.
11 Calculated from Government of Ghana, ‘2010 Population & Housing Census Of Ghana’, p.40 Table 
16.
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century, as the region commonly called northern Ghana or simply ‘the north’ by people 
across the country (See Maps 1 and 2). In this study I use ‘the north’ both as a useful 
shorthand metonym for the whole region and its inhabitants (whom I sometimes refer 
to as ‘northerners’), and as a marker of comparison with ‘the south’, which is also 
discussed as a discrete unit, as explained below. By ‘the south’, I mean all of Ghana (or
the Gold Coast) south of the current-day Northern Region. Under British rule, the Gold 
Coast comprised three administrative divisions: the Northern Territories, Ashanti, and 
what was then often simply called ‘the Colony’, made up of coastal settlements and 
inland districts that had first been declared a crown colony in 1874.12 Modern-day 
Ghana comprises ten administrative regions – seven in the south, and the three regions 
of the north. 
In addition to its large geographical area and wide range of ethnicities, the 
idea of a northern whole is complicated by several redrawings of the region’s internal 
boundaries after 1902. Districts were rearranged in 1921, when the Territories' three 
provinces were reduced to a large Southern Province and a smaller but more populous 
Northern Province, and in the 1950s when the Northern Territories was divided into the
Upper and Northern Regions. At the end of the twentieth century the major 
administrative divisions of northern Ghana were again more spatially aligned to those 
at the beginning of colonial rule, with Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions, 
and of course the north was no longer administered as a separate protectorate within a 
larger colonial possession. The total area of the north fluctuated slightly during the 
colonial period, falling when some frontier districts were moved from the Northern 
Territories to Ashanti, and rising quite substantially after the First World War, when part
12 To avoid confusion, I use ‘the Colony’ with a capital C when referring to this area; all other uses of 
colony refer to the Gold Coast as a whole. 
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of German Togoland became a British mandate and was subsequently merged into the 
Gold Coast. 
Despite its internal variations, there is a strong case to be made for treating 
the north as a discrete whole over the twentieth century, in relation to the south. Some 
arguments stem from natural factors related to geography and climate. Separated from 
the coast by the West African forest belt, the region’s weather patterns, terrain, 
ecological systems and agricultural potentials were (and are) substantially different to 
the rest of the country. Crucially, unlike the south, the north was not a zone of cocoa 
production, the single crop most valued and consistently supported by different colonial
and postcolonial governments. Nor did it have any significant gold mines, the second 
most important source of state-  and private-sector revenues. Instead, for much of the 
century the north’s principal agricultural exports were various products of the shea-nut 
tree, a plant which does not grow in bulk further south, and which attracted little 
interest from southern governments. Partly as a result of its different climate and 
ecology, the north was host to diseases that had less impact in the forest belt or at the 
coast: notably epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis, a disease which only reaches 
epidemic proportions in the dry savanna or Sahelian climates of the ‘African meningitis
belt’, which does not extend into southern Ghana.13 As I discuss in the following 
chapters, the relatively high northern prevalence of some diseases was sometimes a 
result of the same ecological and climatic differences, but was often also a product of 
the region’s subordinate status within the overall political economy of the Gold Coast. 
13 Despite its significant impacts in the north, meningitis is not the focus of an individual chapter in this
thesis, in part because I had examined the disease in previous research. See David Bannister, 
Epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis and its treatment in colonial northern Ghana, 1900-1957, 
Masters dissertation, (University of Cambridge, 2013); and see Anna Molesworth et al., ‘Where Is 
the Meningitis Belt? Defining an Area at Risk of Epidemic Meningitis in Africa’, Transactions of the
Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 96, no. 3 (2002): 242–49;    
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Ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences further sustain the idea of a discrete
north and south. At the time of the north’s incorporation into the colonial Gold Coast in 
1902, some northern communities were centralised under a hierarchy of leaders, but 
many others were arranged in decentralised or 'acephalous' political formations – 
perhaps a result of the years of the Atlantic slave trade, which promoted and profited 
from decentralisation.14 The north saw intense slaving activity during the years of the 
Atlantic trade, when slaving raids were conducted by the southern Asante Confederacy,
and after abolition, when the region became a focus of raids by Samori Toure and the 
Zabarima fighters of Babatu Zatu.15  The intensity of slaving in the north may to some 
extent be responsible for the relatively low penetration of Islam at the advent of 
colonial rule, relative to other parts of the West African interior. Natalie Swanepoel has 
argued that prohibitions on enslaving Muslims meant that the north’s communities 
became broadly designated as 'pagan' and therefore suitable for enslavement by 
surrounding Muslim communities. Jean Allman and John Parker similarly note that the 
blanket terms Gurunsi and nnonkofoo (suggesting ‘an identity outside of jural 
corporateness and indeed on the fringe of perceptions of humanity’) were applied by 
the southern Akan states of the nineteenth century to many decentralised societies in the
Northern Territories, and that these states also saw the region as a slaving reserve.16 
Over the course of the twentieth century, Islam spread more extensively across the 
north than in any other region of Ghana, and became the predominant religion across 
the north as a whole (at 42 percent of the region’s total population in 2010).17 The south
14 Martin Klein, ‘The Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies.’, Journal of African History 42 (2001): 
49–65.
15 Natalie Swanepoel, ‘Every Periphery Is Its Own Center: Sociopolitical and Economic Interactions in
Nineteenth-Century Northwestern Ghana’, International Journal Of African Historical Studies 42, 
no. 3 (2009): 411–32.
16 Allman and Parker, Tongnaab, ch.1; Swanepoel, ‘Every Periphery Is Its Own Center’, 419.
17 Calculated from Government of Ghana, ‘2010 Population & Housing Census Of Ghana’, p.40 Table 
16.
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became increasingly Christianised over the same period, and in 2010 approximately 90 
percent of the southern population were Christian.  This evolving twentieth-century 
religious difference between north and south overlay an older ethnolinguistic division. 
In the south, most people speak languages of what has been called the Kwa family of 
the Niger-Congo group – Ga, Ewe and the mutually intelligible Akan languages of 
Fante and Twi – while most northern communities speak languages of the Niger-Congo
Gur family.18
Beyond these differences, which in themselves would arguably justify 
approaching the north as a distinct region relative to the south, the most important 
divisions between the two regions lie in the north’s peripheral political and economic 
situation within Ghana (or the Gold Coast) as a whole.  In much of the existing 
scholarship on northern Ghana, the north has been identified as a periphery of both the 
colonial and postcolonial state: in terms of the relative administrative attention and 
spending the region received from central governments, in light of relative access to 
educational or economic opportunities, and regarding its peoples’ political influence in 
the country as a whole.19 Located far from the coast and its trading centres, and a focus 
of slave-raiding by surrounding societies before the colonial period, northern 
communities were to some extent on the margins of West Africa’s regional economic 
systems before the imposition of colonial rule, when the region known to British 
officials as the ‘Ashanti Hinterland’ was annexed to the Gold Coast.20 But 
18 Niger-Congo language map, and Classification of the Eastern Kwa Languages, Figure 3 in Roger 
Blench, ‘Do The Ghana-Togo Mountain Languages Constitute A Genetic Group?’ (Paper presented 
at the GTML Workshop, Ho, 25 July 2006), http://www.rogerblench.info/PubOP.htm.
19 See, for example, Rhoda Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana. (London: Croom 
Helm, 1978); Inez Sutton, ‘Colonial Agricultural Policy: The Non-Development of the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 22, no. 4 (1989): 
637–69.
20 Allman and Parker, Tongnaab, 28–37; and see Swanepoel, ‘Every Periphery Is Its Own Center’.
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developments during the colonial period both altered and entrenched this peripherality, 
which has persisted to the present day.  
If the Gold Coast was a model home for British colonialism in Africa, then 
the north was the skeleton in its closet. The economic relationship between Britain and 
the Gold Coast’s coastal African societies went back further than for almost any other 
African colony, given the long presence of British forts during and after the Atlantic 
slave trade. Colonial administrators in the twentieth century sometimes voiced the 
opinion that the Gold Coast was a less coercive and more 'natural' colony as the result 
of this long relationship:
The Gold Coast Colony differs from the majority of British tropical 
possessions. The authority of the Government of Great Britain has not been 
established here through conquest or cession, but instead has asserted itself 
throughout the country, at present included within the boundaries of the Colony 
proper, by a process of natural and more or less fortuitous growth.21
Along with Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Ashanti (incorporated into the colony
in 1896) were Britain's most profitable possessions in Africa, and a popular destination 
for visiting princes, ministers and other metropolitan notables.22 But distributional gulfs
between the 'Colony proper' and Ashanti, on the one hand, and the adjunct regions of 
the north, on the other, became increasing apparent over the years of colonial 
administration.  
When early attempts to promote cotton and other export crops ‘almost to the 
point of coercion’ were unsuccessful, the Accra government elected to develop the 
north as a labour reserve, supplying low-cost migrant workers for the gold mines and 
21 1917 Gold Coast Annual Report [hereafter GCAR], 8.
22 Gareth Austin, ‘The “Reversal of Fortune” Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives 
from African and Comparative Economic History’, Journal of International Development 20, no. 8 
(2008): 1011; and for an interesting visual example, see H. Woolfe, Official Record Of The Tour Of 
H.R.H. The Prince Of Wales, Part 3 (British Instructional Films, 1925), 
http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/1705.
22
cocoa farms of the south.23  Migrant labour became seen as the 'principal asset of the 
dependency', and reports from the 1920s onwards observed that the southern economy 
had become ‘largely dependent’ on Northern Territories labour, as had the Gold Coast 
Regiment: the region supplied the majority of its troops in both world wars.24 By the 
late 1920s, checkpoints on river crossings to Ashanti recorded approximately 60,000 
northerners migrating annually for work on the gold mines and cocoa farms. This was 
almost 10 percent of the region’s total population at the time, and a larger proportion of 
its work-capable adults.25 The extraction of migrant labour disrupted local agriculture 
and social cohesion, and made the welfare of northern peoples sensitive to economic 
changes in the south and in the broader imperial economy. Shifts in the world gold 
price which reduced local mining activity, or events like the hold-up of the cocoa crop 
by southern smallholders in 1937, in resistance to the cartel behaviour of European 
buyers, could have serious impacts on a region with falling subsistence production and 
few alternative sources of trade income.26 As a political officer observed in the 1930s, 
‘The protectorate's problems relate not to the development of an export crop, but to the 
production of sufficient food for the sustenance of the population’.27 
The colonial-era economic marginalisation of the Northern Territories has 
been attributed to a number of contributory factors. Inez Sutton proposes that the early 
failure of commercial agriculture led to the broader neglect of the region, while Roger 
Thomas argues that the loss of local labour through migrancy – and the persistent use 
23 See 1924-1925 Northern Territories Annual Report [hereafter NTAR], 3.
24 1922-1923 NTAR, 3; 1923-1924 NTAR, 3; 1930-1931 NTAR, 1–4; Roger Thomas, ‘Military 
Recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World War’, Cahiers D’études Africaines 15 (1975): 
57–83; Wendell P Holbrook, ‘British Propaganda and the Mobilization of the Gold Coast War Effort,
1939-1945’, Journal of African History 26, no. 4 (1985): 347–61.
25 1928-1929 NTAR, 12; See also Roger Thomas, ‘Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of 
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 1906–1927’, Journal of African History 14, no. 1 (1973): 
79; Meyer Fortes, ‘Culture Contact as a Dynamic Process: An Investigation in the Northern 
Territories of the Gold Coast’, Africa 9 (1936), 37.
26 See, for example, 1917 NTAR, 2; 1922-1923 NTAR, 20; 1923-1924 NTAR, 21; 1927-1928 NTAR, 
4–6.
27 1937-1938 NTAR, 37–39.
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of forced labour for northern infrastructure projects, which continued into the 1930s – 
contributed to increasingly local poverty during the colonial period.28  This poverty was
also the result of geographical isolation, through the uneven development of transport 
infrastructure. The region was never linked to the railway line which connected Ashanti
to the coast from 1903, and in 1918 it still took 12 days to travel from Accra to the 
north's administrative headquarters at Tamale.29  As other more efficient trade routes 
became available, the north lost its precolonial economic access as a transit zone for 
salt, kola and cattle caravans from the Sahelian interior. By 1929 it was observed that 
the region’s older desert trade had ‘all but succumbed to the competition of the 
steamship, railway and motor traffic to the south’.30 
Colonial-era neglect also stemmed from the north’s lack of political influence
within the Gold Coast’s formal and informal systems of governance. With little access 
to the southern centres of government, which had imposed policies that explicitly 
limited northern educational provision and restricted the presence of missionary groups,
the region was kept at a political arm’s length for most of the colonial period.31 British 
officials in the Northern Territories only received a seat on the Gold Coast's legislative 
council in 1948, while the north’s African representatives were excluded from the 
colony’s African Assembly when it was created in 1946, as a first step towards self-
rule.32 For most of the colonial period, therefore, there was little opportunity for African
advocates or northern officials to counter critical views of the region among officials 
and traders at Accra. These groups sometimes argued that the north and its peoples 
28 Sutton, ‘Colonial Agricultural Policy’; Thomas, ‘Forced Labour’.
29 1920 GCAR, 95; For an early recognition of the health implications of the railway extension, see 
1903-1904 Medical Department Annual Report [hereafter MDAR], 2.
30 1929-1930 NTAR, 29.
31 For a discussion of educational policy and missions, see Roger Thomas, ‘Education in Northern 
Ghana, 1906-1940: A Study in Colonial Paradox’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 7, no. 3 (1974): 427–67.
32 Yakubu Saaka, ‘North-South Relations and the Colonial Enterprise in Ghana’, in Saaka, Regionalism
and Public Policy, ch.7; Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 40–42.
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were of 'negligible' importance, or that the region 'imposes a burden upon the Gold 
Coast for which it makes no adequate return'.33 Among the African people of the Gold 
Coast, wealth and political strength were also concentrated in the south, where there 
was an established popular press, and a network of coastal elites who had forged 
trading relationships with Europe over the preceding century.
Over the first decades of the north’s incorporation into the Gold Coast, 
poverty, disease and poor living conditions begin to appear more regularly in 
descriptions of the region's inhabitants – contributing to an enduring discourse that 
represented northerners as unhealthy, second-class citizens. By the mid-1920s, the 'wild
tribes' who 'leapt out with twanging bows and bloodcurdling yells, in apparent ecstasies
of joy' had been replaced in colonial reports by 'the immigrant labourer from the North, 
who generally reaches the cocoa areas in poor physical condition and is often 
diseased'.34 The above details give an idea of how northern peripherality was 
entrenched over the colonial period, setting a pattern which persisted across the 
transition to independence and intro the present. As Alexander Moradi has noted in a 
study of colonial-era nutrition in Ghana, childhood malnutrition rates across the 
country, recorded from 1980-2000 and showing that the three northern regions have the
most serious prevalence, ‘essentially follow the spatial pattern that evolved 1920-
1950’.35
In 1999, it was estimated that 26 percent of people were living in extreme 
poverty across Ghana as a whole, defined as the inability of a family group or 
individual to meet their minimum subsistence needs. This national average was 
substantially shaped by the far greater extent of extreme poverty in the three northern 
33 1918 NTAR, 2–3.
34 1910 NTAR, 12; 1923-1924 NTAR, 21.
35 Alexander Moradi, ‘Confronting Colonial Legacies-Lessons from Human Development in Ghana 
and Kenya, 1880-2000’, Journal of International Development 20, no. 8 (2008): 1115.
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regions, where 68 percent of all people were considered unable to meet these needs.36 
These figures were recorded after two decades of an IMF-World Bank structural 
adjustment programme in Ghana. Ostensibly intended to reduce urban-rural 
inequalities, and praised internationally for raising Ghana’s headline GDP growth, the 
negative effects of structural adjustment were consistently passed northwards. Extreme 
poverty increased sharply during the structural adjustment era, as it decreased in most 
other regions of the country, forcing an accelerated migration of northerners to informal
satellite settlements on the fringes of coastal towns.37  Economic migrancy remains 
central to the north-south relationship in the present, and is one of several key thematic 
currents in the chapters which follow – the attention given to a particular northern 
health problem or disease was often related to its impact on the southwards supply of 
labour.38
By the year 2000, the north’s peripheral status had become a commonplace 
among development planners and bilateral donor agencies, although it was less often 
discussed in state documents. But widespread recognition of northern peripherality has 
not necessarily entailed any historicisation of the problem, or a recognition of southern 
neglect in determining local privation. As Karl Botchway argues in his critical reading 
of a development report on the north, ‘the region's poverty is perceived primarily as a 
function of inadequate bio-physical characteristics and a poor application of economic 
principles ... this mystifies the causes of poverty and, in the process, depoliticizes 
contentious issues about the sociopolitical and structural causes of poverty within the 
36 DFID, ‘Economic Growth in Northern Ghana, Report for United Kingdom Department for 
International Development’ (London: The Overseas Development Institute, October 2005), 13; 
Ghana Institute of Statistical, Economic & Social Research, ‘Ghana Human Development Report 
2007’ (Accra: Government of Ghana and UNDP, 2007), 100–102.
37 See Samuel Agyei-Mensah and Ama de-Graft Aikins, ‘Epidemiological Transition and the Double 
Burden of Disease in Accra, Ghana’, Journal of Urban Health 87, no. 5 (2010): 887; Sara Krüger 
Rasmussen, ‘Pro-Poor Health Care in Northern Ghana’ (Thesis, Roskilde University, 2009), 15.
38 For a discussion of contemporary labour migration and its social impacts in the north, see Lentz, 
Ethnicity, 14.
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region’.39 For example, a relatively recent report from the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) argued that because of an 
unspecified ‘failure’ to achieve economic growth in the past, the three northern regions 
now ‘need to find ways of moving from being the periphery to being centres of 
economic activity’. Having ‘scoured the literature’, the report’s optimistic 
recommendations included some of the same policies that contributed to northern 
impoverishment during the colonial period, including the promotion of cotton as an 
export crop and ‘better’ labour migration to the south.40 
The paragraphs above give some overview of the north and its peoples, and 
offer a justification for treating the region as an analytical whole – because of its 
distinct geography, climate and cultural/linguistic differences with the south, but more 
centrally in light of the north’s enduring relative peripherality. It is not necessary to 
embrace the prescriptions of any particular 'core and periphery' theory to find the idea 
of a core and a periphery analytically useful, or to observe that political and economic 
power have consistently been concentrated in some places and not others, even if this is
not the product of inexorable economic or spatial laws. There were certainly districts 
and communities in the rural south that experienced comparable levels of privation to 
the north over the period under study, and a similar lack of influence on colonial and 
postcolonial health policy. These included some northern areas of the rural Volta 
Region on Ghana’s eastern border, and parts of the Brong-Ahafo Region to the north-
west of Ashanti.41 But in aggregate, and from an early point in the history of the 
Northern Territories Protectorate of the Gold Coast, the north diverged from the 
39 Karl Botchway, ‘Are Development Planners Afraid of History and Contextualization? Notes on 
Reading a Development Report on Northern Ghana’, Canadian Journal of African Studies. 35 
(2001): 34.
40 DFID, ‘Economic Growth’, 5–10.
41 See Map 2
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southern regions in terms of governance, political access and economic opportunities, 
and in the resultant provision of health services. 
Literature, sources and historiographical context
In a survey of the historical literature on disease, medicine, health and 
healing in Africa, published in 2000, Maureen Malowany argued that from the 1970s 
there were two broad divides in the historiography on African health. She proposed that
much previous scholarship fell within the ‘political economy of health paradigm’, 
including ‘country-specific histories of medical services, and socio-cultural and 
economic explorations of medical or disease crises … as windows through which 
broader social, cultural, political and economic relations may be reassessed’.42 The 
second subset of historical studies were informed by the work of medical 
anthropologists, and focused on indigenous systems of health and healing ‘in an 
attempt to balance a corpus seen to be dominated by western biomedical frameworks’.43
These proposed historiographical divisions were perhaps overly broad, and unable to 
account for work which approached biomedical practices or state health services in 
Africa from other critical perspectives – for example Megan Vaughan’s Curing Their 
Ills,  published in 1991, which sought to ‘provide for biomedicine the kind of account 
that is normally reserved for “indigenous” healing systems’.44 Malowany’s article was 
itself written as a call to arms for further research in another area: ‘history which 
recognizes that the role and nature of science and research are significant in meeting 
the challenges imposed by the burden of disease in Africa’.45  
42 Maureen Malowany, ‘Unfinished Agendas: Writing the History of Medicine of Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
African Affairs 99, no. 395 (2000): 328.
43 Ibid., 329.
44 Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991),
ix.
45 Malowany, ‘Unfinished Agendas’, 349.
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Influenced by the emergent field of Science and Technology Studies, this 
branch of African health history has grown rapidly. In a more recent survey of the 
literature, published in 2013, Nancy Rose Hunt identifies four contemporary divisions 
in the historiography. These are the ‘political economy of health’ approach, focused on 
what the particular distributions and interactions of a healthcare system reveal about 
broader social, political and economic relationships; the ‘health and healing approach’, 
concerned with indigenous medicine, vernacular systems of health, and the local 
integration of ‘traditional’ and biomedical approaches; the critical theory or discourse 
analysis approach, which interrogates the ways that health systems and medical science
represent both themselves and their subjects, and the resulting distribution of power 
within these systems; and finally the ‘Science and Technology Studies approach: 
concerned with flows of knowledge, experimental practice, and the relationship 
between technology and society, and with global networks that have shaped the history 
of health in Africa.46 
To these, a fifth emergent subsection of the historiography might be added: 
histories concerned with the ideas and practices of ‘public’ and/or ‘global’ health. A 
number of recent edited volumes take public or global health, defined broadly, as their 
starting point for an examination of the relationship between African governments, 
African publics and transnational health institutions. In Making and Unmaking Public 
Health in Africa, Ruth Prince and Rebecca Marsland collect studies that aim ‘to take 
the histories and legacies of biomedical modernization and associated public health 
initiatives seriously, in attention to how African publics – including medical 
professionals, scientists, government officials, staff of non-governmental organisations,
community health workers, “volunteers”, patients and their families – seek to provide 
46 Nancy Rose Hunt, ‘Health and Healing’, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History, ed. 
John Parker and Richard J. Reid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 378–87.
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or receive medical care’.47 In another collection, Para-States and Medical Science: 
Making African Global Health, Paul Wenzel Geissler and contributors explore the role 
of the ‘para-state’ in African medical science and the provision of healthcare: ‘the ways 
in which the state, albeit changed or in unexpected ways, continues to work as 
structure, people, imaginary, laws and standards’.48  The collected studies in these 
volumes represent the full range of historiographical approaches outlined above, and 
are concerned with many of the same themes and subjects as earlier scholarship. What 
unites this recent work, however, is a relative foregrounding of government and the 
state, and its notional responsibilities either as the direct provider of ‘public health’, or 
as mediator between African publics and transnational health organisations, donors and 
NGOs.49 As Geissler argues:
While nation-building processes in African and Europe were obviously 
different, historical relativisation of the African state should not distract one 
from its promissory character. For generations of Africans the state has shaped 
what the world looks like, where one places oneself within it, and where one 
wants it to move. Its institutions and processes have proven surprisingly 
durable… in particular state medicine and medical science continue to emanate 
not simply power and sometimes fear, but civic purpose and hope for (better) 
life.50 
Conversely, Prince and Marsland observe that the gap between the state’s ‘promissory 
character’ and its intervention into the health of African people has been uneven, 
contingent, and dependent on political factors:
Despite the hopes placed in the developmentalist state, a national context in 
which public health is promoted by the government and extended to citizens on 
an equal basis has never really existed in Africa, either in the past or in the 
47 Ruth Prince and Rebecca Marsland, eds., Making and Unmaking Public Health in Africa: 
Ethnographic and Historical Perspectives (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), 4.
48 Paul Wenzel Geissler, ed., Para-States and Medical Science: Making African Global Health 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 2.
49 For further collected studies representing this trend in the historiography, see Tamara Giles-Vernick 
and James L. Webb, eds., Global Health in Africa: Historical Perspectives on Disease Control 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio Univ., 2013).
50 Geissler, Para-States, 4
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present. Moreover, conceptions of the public sphere, the public good, and the 
public itself have been plural, and cannot be taken for granted.51 
Through an assessment of the long-term evolution of public health 
institutions in northern Ghana, and with case studies that examine the links between 
state-supported disease control interventions in different periods, this thesis aims to 
make a contribution to this area of African health history. As far as possible, as with 
many of these recent studies on public health in Africa, I have employed a hybrid 
historiographical approach throughout the thesis, as the best means of imperfectly 
accommodating a range of relevant sources at different levels of detail over a long 
period of time. In some chapters I address the discursive aspects of public health, 
including the discourse of northern contagion that emerged during the early colonial 
period, the new rhetorical strategies that the Colonial Welfare and Development Acts 
offered to local officials advocating for improved northern healthcare in the year 
immediately before independence, and the idioms of disease-focused international 
fundraising developed by the British Empire Society for the Blind following the 
‘discovery’ of widespread onchocerciasis in northern Ghana. At other points I discuss 
the social history of medical work,  the networks which linked local practitioners to 
global health organisations, and the dissemination of new medical technologies in the 
context of northern peripherality. Throughout the thesis I return to the political 
economy of public health, while attempting to situate local developments in their 
national and global context. However, given the available sources, and a principal focus
on the state as a fulcrum for public health, some important aspects of the history of 
health and healing are not addressed in detail. In particular, the study does not engage 
closely with vernacular systems of medicine and healing, although these were an 
51 Prince and Marsland, Making and Unmaking Public Health, 6.
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important element of the overall healthcare system in the colonial and postcolonial 
north. Nor does it consistently use ethnicity, gender or intra-regional social class as an 
analytical lens. As discussed previously, the thesis instead approaches the north as a 
regional whole, asking how the aggregate public health experience of northern people 
was shaped by the relationship of their home region to Ghana's economic and political 
centres. 
Beyond this broader historiographical context for the study, the thesis 
engages as far as possible with the relatively substantial corpus of existing literature on 
health in Ghana as a whole, and with the smaller number of studies that focus on the 
north. For the colonial period there is K. David Patterson’s meticulous Health in 
Colonial Ghana: Disease, Medicine, and Socio-Economic Change, 1900-1955. 
Patterson makes occasional reference to the Northern Territories in his detailed, 
‘essentially epidemiological’ survey of disease in the Gold Coast, and his examination 
of colony-wide change provides useful context for this thesis – for example, he 
discusses the political strength of coastal African elites when advocating for 
improvements to local provision of health services.52 As with much other research on 
health in Ghana,  Patterson does not attempt systematically to disaggregate the north, or
to account for healthcare developments in light of the region’s particular political and 
economic situation. His study is nevertheless a foundational text in the historiography 
of health in the colonial Gold Coast, as is an earlier monograph by the retired Gold 
Coast Medical Officer David Scott. Scott’s Epidemic Disease in Colonial Ghana, 
1901-1960 also took an ‘essentially epidemiological’ viewpoint, by attempting to 
account for the transmission and prevalence of different diseases over the colonial 
period. Scott remained working as a medical officer in Ghana after independence, and 
52 K. David Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana: Disease, Medicine, and Socio-Economic Change : 
1900-1955 (Waltham, Mass.: Crossroads Press, 1981), 15–20.
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his book (published in 1965) functions as both primary and secondary source for this 
longer-term study of public health.53 
Drawing on these two monographs, Jeff Grischow has more recently 
sketched out details of a similar history for the colonial north. In a working paper 
released in 2009, Grischow sets out to respond to Maureen Malowany’s ‘call to arms’ 
published in 2000, calling for histories which locate African medical work in the 
context of global scientific exchange.54 Grischow touches on some themes found in this
thesis, including the development of international linkages and the epidemiology of 
particular diseases in relation to the economics of the north.. However, his working 
paper is largely a descriptive periodisation of colonial-era disease outbreaks in the 
north, based upon Patterson and Scott or drawn from the same sources. This is also an 
epidemiological history: one in which the seductive idiom of the biosciences is 
sometimes deployed at the expense of a more nuanced analysis of medical activity in 
the north.  With a reliance on a relatively narrow range of sources, there are also some 
errors. For example, in regard to smallpox in the colonial Northern Territories, it is 
incorrect to say that little attention was paid to the disease by local officials, or that 
vaccination campaigns in the Gold Coast only commenced in 1905.55 In comparison 
with other infectious diseases in the region, smallpox was a relatively consistent focus 
of preventative work in the north  – and in the southern Gold Coast, vaccination efforts 
against smallpox began in the early nineteenth century. The virulence of smallpox, 
posing a threat to cross-border trade and military recruitment, and the relatively low 
costs of vaccination in comparison with other diseases, meant that it formed a central 
53 David Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana 1901-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
54 Jeff Grischow, ‘Globalisation, Development And Disease In Colonial Northern Ghana, 1906-1960’, 
WOPAG, Working Papers on Ghana : Historical and Contemporary Studies No. 9 (January 2006); 
and see Malowany, ‘Unfinished Agendas’.
55 Grischow, ‘Globalisation, Development And Disease’, 23.
33
focus of Northern Territories medical activity in the early colonial period, and during 
the two world wars.56  
Although there are problems with this unpublished paper, this thesis is 
indebted to several of Grischow's other published works on the region – on tsetse-fly 
eradication in the 1930s-1940s, and his research on agricultural development projects 
in the colonial north.57 His study of the tsetse eradication programme led by 
entomologist K. R. S. Morris reveals the way that individual theories regarding disease 
transmission shaped a far-reaching prevention campaign, involving the clearing of 
riverine forest from large areas of the north. Grischow concludes that the campaign was
a developmental success. In Chapter 2, I approach the anti-tsetse campaign from a 
different perspective: as a vector for the economic preferences of the southern 
government, unrelated to disease control, and as an important contributory factor in the 
prevalence of onchocerciasis-related blindness. 
These studies cast light on aspects of Gold Coast disease and health provision
during the colonial period, and to a lesser extent on the north. However, the analysis in 
each case ends at the transition to independent rule, a critical moment for northern 
healthcare. In the rapid changes which accompanied to the shift towards independence 
in the north, many existing policies and projects were shelved, previously-ignored 
diseases were given renewed attention, and public health acquired a new political 
salience. These developments had implications which can only be understood by 
extending the examination beyond 1957, when the relatively accessible colonial archive
56 See, for example, PP 1825 XV [39], 'Vaccine Establishment': Copy of report received by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; PP 1889 LXXVI [C.5897] Gold Coast Sanitary and 
Medical Reports for 1887 and 1888; 1900 MDAR, 7; 1918 MDAR, 1–10; 1925-1926 MDAR, 14; 
1941 MDAR, 1,5; 1909 NTAR, Chicago CRL, 13.
57 Jeff Grischow, ‘K. R. S. Morris and Tsetse Eradication in the Gold Coast, 1928–51’, Africa 76, no. 
03 (2006): 381–401; Jeff Grischow, ‘Late Colonial Development in British West Africa: The Gonja 
Development Project in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1948-57’, Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 35, no. 2 (2001): 282–312.
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ceases to be of use. Some studies have bridged this gap with a focus on particular 
aspects of health or disease. Jérôme Destombes’ work in biostatistical history deals 
with nutrition in the north-east of Ghana, using colonial and post-independence data on 
heights and weights to draw conclusions about food security and nutritional health from
1930-2000.58 His study includes a close examination of the colonial-era scandal around 
the suppressed 1941 Purcell Report, which revealed widespread famine in the north. 
The thesis also draws on PhD research by Daniel Kojo Arhinful, which 
includes a chapter that examines government approaches to funding health services in 
Ghana over the long term, from 1850 to 2000.59 Arhinful’s central focus is the 
contemporary provision of rural health insurance, and his thesis does not aim to 
disaggregate the north in its assessment of previous national policies. The region 
consistently experienced shortfalls in healthcare funding as a result of its situation on 
the margins of Ghana’s economy and politics. The north’s budgetary allocations were 
paradoxically the most exposed to shifts in the global economy, and northern 
communities were most seriously affected by the various medical cost-recovery 
initiatives that Accra trialled from 1966 to 2000.  Arhinful’s research gives a valuable 
account of policy shifts in healthcare funding over the last century, and is one of few 
works to cover this whole period (with discussion of the independence transition) for a 
particular aspect of health in Ghana. Giovanni Carbone has recently completed a study 
of health policy reforms, with a similar Ghana-wide focus, for the period after 
independence, and particularly for the years that followed the turn to Structural 
Adjustment after 1983. His analysis extends beyond the implementation of the 
58 Jérôme Destombes, ‘From Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal Hunger to Changing Experiences of 
Everyday Poverty: Northeastern Ghana C. 1930–2000’, Journal of African History 47, no. 02 
(2006): 181.
59 Daniel Kojo Arhinful, ‘Health Care in Ghana and How It Was Paid for: An Historical Perspective 
(1850-2001)’, in The Solidarity of Self-Interest: Social and Cultural Feasibility of Rural Health 
Insurance in Ghana, Thesis (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2003), ch.2.
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country’s first National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003, and notes the process of 
healthcare policy diffusion from ‘core’ global economic regions towards the periphery, 
facilitated by organisations like the WHO.60 
Another relatively recent study, by Bernhard Bierlich, discusses ethnicity and
northern society in light of state healthcare, focusing on the commodification of 
healing, gender identities and changing conceptions of disease among the Dagomba 
people of the Northern Region. Bierlich's research offers a focused assessment of the 
way that private-sector pharmaceuticals, sold for profit, are integrated into Dagomba 
healing systems, and includes useful discussion of the way that a perceived local 
disease burden affects the uptake of state-sponsored medicine. However, Bierlich's 
insistence on the specificity and difference of African conceptions of healing and 
medicine is somewhat problematic. By arguing that Dagomba people of the 1990s 
necessarily experience 'Western' medicine as part of a 'magical' modernity, which 
'charms' them, his observations at times recall ethnographic modes employed for the 
north in the colonial era.61  This contrasts with observations from an anthropologist of 
the colonial period itself, Meyer Fortes, who proposed in the 1930s that biomedicine 
had been pragmatically integrated into local systems of healing in the north: 'Nothing in
the native system of medical beliefs and practices conflicts with the type of treatment 
given at the dispensary. Nobody has to renounce his ideas and habits in order to qualify 
for treatment.'62
In addition to the historical or anthropological studies mentioned in these 
previous paragraphs, for the last decades of the period covered by this thesis (1980 to 
2000) there are many health-related studies on the north in other fields: from 
60 Giovanni Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands and Social Policies: The Politics of Health Reform in 
Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 03 (2011): 381–408.
61 Bernhard Bierlich, The Problem of Money: African Agency and Western Medicine in Northern 
Ghana (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), 101.
62 Fortes, ‘Culture Contact’, 29.
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development studies, sociology, and healthcare economics. As I discuss in Chapter 6, 
the proliferation of research in these fields is to some extent a marker of the shift in 
Ghana’s healthcare system which took place after the turn to structural adjustment – a 
shift which particularly affected the north – as various donors and development 
organisations entered the region and assumed authority for some aspects of healthcare. 
A study on ‘Pro-Poor Healthcare in Northern Ghana’, by Sara Krüger Rasmussen, gives
an example of this kind of research: characterised by interviews or participant 
observation, with a focus on the present.63 Using an ethnographic method known as 
‘Rapid Rural Appraisal’, Rasmussen aims to determine the contemporary causes of 
poor healthcare in the north. Her work, and other similar studies, are potentially useful 
both as primary sources, to the extent that they include oral interview reflections on 
healthcare in the past, and for their observations about the state of northern healthcare 
at the end of the twentieth century. However, a focus on proximate causes means that 
studies of this kind may be blinded to longer-term processes that have more 
fundamentally determined the nature of public health services in the north.64 
Sources
The long period of this study means that there are many potentially relevant 
primary sources. Throughout the thesis I draw on material from national and regional 
archives in Ghana. The main collections of the Public Records and Archives 
Administration Department (PRAAD) in Accra include various Gold Coast annual 
reports, the CSO series of files on colonial-era health services, and the ADM series on 
the political and economic administration of the Northern Territories. PRAAD Accra 
also hosts the PD series of files, generated by the Pharmaceutical Services Division of 
63 Krüger Rasmussen, ‘Pro-Poor Health Care’.
64 See Botchway, ‘Are Development Planners Afraid’.
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the Ministry of Health, which include reports and memoranda that help to illuminate 
northern public health work in the period from 1957-1995. At PRAAD’s northern 
regional archive in Tamale, the NRG series contains numerous health-related files for 
the colonial period, and for the years from 1957 to 1980.  
The Gold Coast Annual Medical Reports were replaced by reports from the 
Ghana Ministry of Health from 1953 onwards.65 But although the Ministry of Health 
published intermittent national updates on disease and health after 1957, there are gaps 
of many years when recession or political turbulence affected the capacity of the state 
to maintain adequate records. There are relatively fewer sources available in Ghana for 
the years after independence, and particularly in the decades which followed the 
overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, when rapid changes in government meant that 
record-keeping was disrupted for almost two decades. Bruce Fetter has argued that the 
1970s saw a broad improvement in the source base for historians of African health, 
particularly for the availability of accurate health statistics.66 This was not the case for 
Ghana – in comparison with the colonial period, the source base from 1966-1981 
appears relatively thin, although current efforts to reorganise the archives of the Ghana 
Health Service may bring new documents to light.
An adequate picture of northern healthcare can arguably only be gained by 
reading documents generated by the central administration in Accra in tandem with 
files and correspondence in the northern national archive at Tamale, generated by 
officials who were often acting independently or in tension with the Accra government. 
I also make use of files from the archives of the World Health Organisation in Geneva. 
These include documents generated by Ghanaian or international consultants of the 
65 1953 MDAR, 9.
66 B. Fetter, ‘Health Care in Twentieth Century Africa: Statistics, Theories, and Policies’, Africa Today 
40, no. 3 (1993): 9.
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organisation, who observed and reported on public health activities in the north, and on 
the negotiation of state health policy. They contain correspondence from the Ghanaian 
state and its health personnel, and internal reports on public health and disease control 
initiatives overseen by the WHO in northern Ghana. 
A further set of sources (in addition to those collected by state archives and 
the WHO) were produced by health practitioners in research publications, letters and 
memoirs. In some cases these were overtly technical academic articles, relating to the 
biochemistry or pathology of certain northern diseases, while others take the form of 
commentary on disease prevalence, healthcare policy and general socio-economic 
conditions in the region. Even in technical articles, researchers based in the north often 
made general observations relating to broader public health work and its changing 
contexts. Articles from these journals throw light on state-sponsored healthcare and the 
relationship between north and south, from the perspective of individuals who were not
necessarily aligned with either the government or international health organisations. 
They reveal the evolving discourses of medical research and public health work in 
Africa, adjusting to a postcolonial world where the benevolence of European-led 
medical activity on the continent was no longer taken for granted. These research 
articles are complemented by a set of less formal sources: the collected notes, diaries 
and unpublished monographs of medical personnel stationed in the region. The archives
of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine contain the collected papers of
B.B. Waddy, for example, a British medical officer who became an advocate for 
improved northern healthcare, and who led an early investigation into onchocerciasis in
1949. 
In addition to these documentary sources, the thesis makes use of a number 
of interviews with retired or active public health officials in Ghana, and with northern 
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communities who were on the receiving end of health work from the late colonial 
period to the present. These include interviews with 15 health officials, including 
former directors-general of the Ghana Health Service, regional directors of healthcare, 
medical researchers, and individuals who worked on the onchocerciasis and guinea 
worm control programmes. I also met and interviewed small village groups in the three 
regions of the north – eight groups in the Upper East, six in the Upper West, and six 
groups in the Northern Region – to gather recollections about the provision of health 
services in different periods, the local impacts of disease control work, and about 
perceptions of northern healthcare relative to the south. These groups ranged in size 
from six to almost eighty participants in one particularly unwieldy session, arranged by 
a local political figure, for a total of approximately 450 participants. The interviews 
generally took the shape of a relatively informal gathering seated outside or in 
community meeting places, with semi-structured questions put forward through 
research assistants in local languages. The groups were mixed, with men and women 
aged from thirty to more than eighty years in age. Many of these interviews provided a 
fine-grained level of detail and texture regarding the perception of government health 
services over time, local conceptions of particular diseases, and the relative use of 
traditional and biomedical treatments. However, in a study which principally examines 
the relative development of regional public health in its national context, there were 
difficulties in integrating oral testimony of this kind. Not because these oral histories 
are necessarily less reliable or commensurable with other kinds of source material, but 
because my evolving research eventually led me to write a history more closely focused
on change within public health institutions, and on the relationship between local health
practitioners and central government, and on these subjects the interviews were 
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relatively silent. For this reason I have generally used the insights obtained through 
these interviews illustratively, and not as the foundation of my arguments.  
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Here and overleaf, Figs. 3-7. Group Interviews, northern Ghana, July and August 2015
Source: author
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CHAPTER 1
Making the north: northern healthcare and colonial rule
– 
Three chapters of this thesis develop a discursive narrative of public health 
work in northern Ghana over the twentieth century, identifying principal themes and 
key developments across roughly a hundred years of state-sponsored healthcare in the 
region. They discuss change in the contexts for state provision of public health and 
medical care in the north, and how these changes shaped policy and action, in a region 
where poor health and economic or political marginality have been mutually-
constitutive constants across the last century. Decisions taken in earlier years created 
path dependencies which, in combination with the fall-out from global or national 
events – including wars, coups, depressions and externally-imposed economic reforms 
– meant that the north diverged from the south in terms of the health and healthcare of 
its people. 
 Beyond this divergence, the north’s peripheral situation shaped healthcare in 
less-expected ways. Necessity was often the mother of invention: low funding and a 
lack of political leverage consistently forced local officials to find novel answers to 
problems of health provision. These innovations included the rapid growth of Native 
Authority healthcare in the colonial era, the creation of the Medical Field Units, which 
operated for decades before and after independence, and the co-opting of vertical 
donor-funded campaigns (notably the Carter Centre’s guinea worm eradication 
programme in the 1980s-1990s) to meet broader public health needs. In some cases 
these northern innovations were so successful that they were adopted nationally. 
Innovation was accompanied, in various periods, by sustained advocacy and 
44
vituperative criticism from groups of medical practitioners or political officials in the 
north: advocating for new health policies, improved facilities and treatments, more 
funds, or a focus on certain diseases. In the chapters which follow I examine the extent 
to which this advocacy was successful, and how more often it was not. Peripherality 
and the neglect of the north in Accra also meant that over time, a significant degree of 
healthcare authority passed to non-state organisations. In these chapters I discuss how 
healthcare and politics interacted in the accumulation of medical authority by Christian 
health groups (particularly by Catholic missions), and by the World Health 
Organisation in the years after independence.
This first chapter examines northern health services in the period 1902-1945, 
from the beginning of colonial rule to the end of the Second World War. In these 
decades the provision of healthcare was partly shaped by imperial policy, emanating 
from London, and more substantially by the internal politics and competing priorities of
the Gold Coast government and its constituent departments – but not yet by the 
nationalist politics which characterised the period from 1945 to 1957. Shifts in 
metropolitan attitudes towards the provision of healthcare and other social goods to 
African peoples, represented by the changing Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, 
were reflected in unexpected ways in the development of northern health systems, 
including in the new rhetorical strategies that ‘colonial development’ offered to 
northern critics of the Accra government. Successive attempts to expand the northern 
health system were undermined by events outside the Gold Coast, including the 1921 
and 1929 depressions and the two world wars, and received little support from the 
growth in healthcare internationalism over the interwar period. For many northern 
communities, the most significant expansion in access to basic healthcare came with 
the devolution of spending power to the region’s Native Authorities under indirect rule, 
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which gave rise to a striking expansion in the number of clinics, dispensaries, and local 
medical staff.
Part 1. Northern health in the early colonial period (c.1902-1930): Neglect, 
advocacy and depression
Health in the south, and disease across the colony
The north was incorporated into the Gold Coast as the Northern Territories 
Protectorate in 1902, and by 1906 it had become British policy to use the region as a 
migrant labour reserve for cocoa and mineral production in the south. With the rapid 
transition to a migrant-based economy, northern peoples were quickly exposed to the 
shifting disease patterns and new pathogens that accompanied the expansion of colonial
rule. Various researchers have noted how the altered transport routes and demographic 
dislocations of the early colonial period could expose people to new diseases, even over
very short distances.1 For the north, some health effects of this early colonial disruption
would only be felt in later decades, particularly in regard to nutrition, and from new 
diseases which took time to spread extensively among northern people. 
All regions of the Gold Coast were seriously affected by epidemic disease 
between 1900 and 1920, and particularly by the influenza pandemic of 1918. David 
Patterson estimated that approximately 3.9 percent of the southern Gold Coast’s 
population were killed by the disease, and 5.5 percent of all people in the Northern 
Territories (around 30,000 deaths), although reports from district officers suggest that 
this figure may have been significantly higher, with at least 23,000 deaths estimated for
1 See, for example, G.W. Hartwig, ‘Social Consequences of Epidemic Diseases’, in Disease in African
History: An Introductory Survey and Case Studies, ed. Mario Joaquim Azevedo, Gerald W. Hartwig, 
and K. David Patterson (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), 12, 27; Steven Feierman, 
‘Struggles for Control: The Social Roots of Health and Healing in Modern Africa.’, African Studies 
Review 28, no. 2–3 (1985): 88.
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the far north-western and north-eastern districts alone.2 The influenza epidemic 
overlapped with the first year of a serious meningitis epidemic in the north, which 
lasted from 1918 to 1920 and caused more than 4,000 recorded deaths, at a time when 
there were few medical officials available to observe and report on northern disease.3 
This was the second major meningitis epidemic in the colonial north – the first ran from
1906 to 1908, with more than 20,000 reported deaths.4 During the first two decades of 
colonial rule, therefore, it appears that 10 percent or more of the northern population 
were killed in influenza and meningitis outbreaks, from a population crudely estimated 
at 362,000 in the 1911 census.5 
The climate of the southern forest belt meant that meningitis never reached 
epidemic proportions in the rest of the Gold Coast, although the south was affected by 
smaller outbreaks of other epidemic diseases during this period: by the plague in 1907-
1908, and by yellow fever in 1910-1911.6  The uneven resources committed to research 
and control measures for these three diseases (plague, yellow fever, and epidemic 
meningitis) were indicative of the Gold Coast Medical Department’s emphasis on the 
south, and on diseases affecting Europeans during this early period. Although there 
were only two small outbreaks of plague (causing less than 500 deaths in total), 
substantial expenditures on anti-plague measures were maintained throughout the 
period of British administration.  Vaccines were remade annually, and from 1908 into 
the 1930s, approximately 100,000 rats were caught and killed by trained teams in 
2 ADM/56/1/223 (1918-1919) Influenza Epidemic, PRAAD Accra, calculated from correspondence 
between district officers and Chief Commissioner NTs, 1918, Enclosures. 7-55; 1918 MDAR, 4–6; 
K.D. Patterson, ‘The Influenza Epidemic of 1918-1919 in the Gold Coast.’, Journal of African 
History 24, no. 4 (1983): 497–99.
3 GB/0809/Ross Institute Vol.54 Doc.6 (1957), ‘African epidemic Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, by B.B.
Waddy, LSHTM Archive, London, 7–9.
4 Arthur E Horn, ‘Report on an Investigation of Cerebro-Spinal Fever in the Northern Territories of 
the Gold Coast in 1908’, Transactions of The Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 1908, 6–7; 
1906 MDAR, 1–7; 1908 NTAR, 18.
5 1913 MDAR, 38–39.
6 1908 GCAR, 4; 1910 MDAR, 49.
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coastal towns each year. The rat-killing came to be recognised as having no effect on 
vector control. ‘Little real value is attached to this activity’, observed one medical 
officer, while another considered that it had become an entirely circular exercise: ‘The 
number of rats caught and destroyed during the year is not sufficient to materially 
reduce the rat population, but the work ensures the training of a nucleus of skilled rat-
catchers’.7 Yellow fever, another of the most dreaded diseases in the European 
imaginary, was also accorded a disproportionate allocation of resources in relation to its
local effects. From 1910 into the late 1930s, yellow fever occupied a singularly 
prominent position in Gold Coast medical reports, taking up more page space than any 
other disease, with cases and deaths described individually. This fixation was shaped by
the availability of external research funding, giving an indication of the ways in which 
donor priorities can affect healthcare outcomes.8 From the mid-1920s, yellow fever 
research on the Gold Coast was funded by the Rockefeller Yellow Fever Commission, 
an international charitable organisation; the availability of external funds drew local 
medical officers into work that made significant research advances, but had relatively 
little application in the Gold Coast itself. A blood sample collected from an African 
resident of the Gold Coast was used to develop the world’s first yellow fever vaccine, 
in 1937, but the local mortality from yellow fever was low in relation to the attention 
the disease received. According to the annual disease returns, yellow fever was 
responsible for 635 recorded cases and 159 deaths across the Gold Coast from 1900 to 
1955.9 These figures are of course unlikely to be accurate, and the number of cases 
among African communities is likely to have been much higher. The impacts of yellow 
fever were nevertheless dwarfed by the scale of sleeping sickness and meningitis 
7 1931-1932 MDAR, 19; 1934-1935 MDAR, 16; 1937-1938 MDAR, 18.
8 For examples of the attention given to yellow fever, see 1922 MDAR; 1925-26 MDAR; 1926-1927 
MDAR.
9 Calculated from annual case-mortality totals in Gold Coast Medical reports, 1900-1955. 
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epidemics in the north, although meningitis in particular received little attention over 
the early colonial period.
These disease control priorities give some context to the early development 
of Gold Coast health services. Patterson has written about the expansion of medical 
facilities in the south, and there is no need to repeat his account in detail here.10 But it is
worth noting some particular developments, as comparatives for the discussion of 
northern healthcare which follows. By 1902, when the north was incorporated into the 
Gold Coast, the colony’s medical department (established in 1885) had gradually been 
expanding medical facilities at the coast for two decades.11 Some coastal societies, who 
had allied with the British in earlier periods, received some forms of preventive 
medicine for a much longer period. In the 1790s, the British began vaccinating 
thousands of Fante people against smallpox at the coastal forts, and regular 
vaccinations were maintained for some coastal communities from the 1820s.12 As 
Patterson argues, it is likely that a long exposure to ship-borne trade and in-migration 
had given coastal societies a measure of resistance to diseases that still posed a risk to 
people of the northern interior.13 This increased resistance, access to smallpox 
vaccination, and the inherent differences in climate and disease ecology between north 
and south mean that there may already have been a significant degree of divergence in 
each region’s total disease burden, well before colonial medical activity began to 
entrench this division. Given the difficulties in estimating the disease burden for 
contemporary societies, using current data, it is impossible to draw any definite 
conclusions about the relative disease burdens of the Northern Territories and southern 
10 Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana.
11 John Parker, Making the Town: Ga State and Society in Early Colonial Accra, (London: Heinemann, 
2000), 121.
12 PP 1825 XV [39], 'Vaccine Establishment'; and Eugenia W. Herbert, ‘Smallpox Inoculation in 
Africa’, Journal of African History 16, no. 04 (1975): 547.
13 Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana, 3–4.
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Gold Coast in 1900, or indeed at any point covered by this study.14 In any case, precise 
estimates are unnecessary. Instead I examine the relative attention and resources 
devoted to particular health problems in each region, and to the differential 
improvement of government healthcare, in light of the government’s own 
understanding of health needs at any particular time. 
By 1899, nine government hospitals had been established in the Colony, with 
another hospital at Kumasi in Ashanti. An additional five dispensaries, providing 
outpatient care, had been built in smaller southern settlements.15 Although health 
services were still oriented towards resident Europeans, a growing number of African 
patients received treatment. Hospitals at Accra, Axim and Keta treated over 8,000 
African outpatients in 1900, while Accra, Cape Coast and Keta hospitals treated more 
than 10,000 outpatients in 1902.16  By 1905 the Ashanti region’s central hospital, in 
Kumasi, was treating more than 8,000 outpatients a year.17 There was a steady growth 
in medical expenditure, with the intention of increasing health provision to African 
communities around the coastal settlements and Kumasi – a policy of successive Accra 
governments under governors Hugh Clifford (1911-1919) and Gordon Guggisberg 
(1919-1927).18 By 1907 the government was already spending £32,164 a year on 
medical services, against Medical Department revenues of £978.19 In 1909, the 
hospitals at Accra, Axim and Cape Coast treated a total of 31,769 new outpatients, 
while 9,703 new outpatients were treated at Kumasi Native Hospital (of 40,304 total 
outpatients treated there that year).20 In 1910, new native hospitals were built at 
14 For a discussion of disease burden measurements, see Christopher J.L. Murray and Alan D. Lopez, 
‘Measuring the Global Burden of Disease’, New England Journal of Medicine 369, no. 5 (1 August 
2013): 448–57.
15 1899 MDAR, (CRL Chicago), 316.
16 1900 MDAR, 7; 1902 MDAR, 2–3.
17 1939 MDAR, 25.
18 For a discussion of their healthcare policy see Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 40–43.
19 1907 MDAR, 5; This spending adjusts to £29,790,000 in 2017 pounds. See 
https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue.php (Accessed 24/03 2017).
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Tarkwa, Akuse and Winneba, and fly-proof hospitals capable of handling sleeping 
sickness patients were built at Anum, Kumasi and Kintampo – part of the creation of a 
sanitary frontier with the north, as I discuss in Chapter 4.20 By 1911 there were 22 
hospitals and 29 dispensaries operating in the colony as a whole, with 67 European 
medical officers and 86 African medical staff.21 At this time there were approximately 
2,500 Europeans living in the Gold Coast. In 1914 for example, at the outbreak of the 
First World War, there were 788 resident colonial employees, 733 merchants, and 1,080
European miners.22 
The expansion of southern medical services (treating primarily African 
patients) proceeded rapidly in the years before the war, and the war itself had little 
effect on total staffing numbers in the south.23 Significant staff cuts did take place after 
the depression of 1921, which reduced Britain’s GDP by more than 10 percent and 
brought a long period of raised unemployment in Britain itself.24 In 1922 the number of 
European medical officers in the Gold Coast fell to less than half of its 1915 peak (from
69 to 32 MOs) and total expenditure by the Medical Department was cut by almost 75 
percent from the previous year.25 But in Ashanti and the Colony these figures recovered
rapidly during the 1920s. By 1925 there were 72 European medical officers working in 
the colony, an increase on pre-war levels.26 An X-ray department was created to serve 
Accra in the same year, and the improvement of medical services and construction of 
new facilities continued steadily into the early 1930s.27 The Great Depression of 1929 
20 1910 MDAR, 13-14; 46-47.
21 1911 MDAR, 5–33 and 75; 1912 MDAR, 5–14.
22 1914 MDAR, 14.
23 1915 MDAR, 5; 1918 MDAR, 5–8.
24 J. C. R Dow, Major Recessions: Britain and the World, 1920-1995 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), ch.6.
25 1922 MDAR, 5–10.
26 1925-26 MDAR, 5–6.
27 Ibid., 73 Appendix G.
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also caused a temporary slump in southern health provision but, as I argue below, many
of its worst and longest-lasting effects were passed on to the north. 
By 1931 there were 26 African hospitals with 868 inpatient beds in the south, 
and six European hospitals with 68 beds. There were also thirty dispensaries providing 
outpatient treatment, five infant welfare clinics, and nine contagious disease hospitals 
for African patients.28 In the Northern Territories there was one European hospital, with 
six beds,  five African hospitals with 98 beds (one of these hospitals was 
decommissioned that year as a result of the depression), five dispensaries, and no 
contagious disease hospitals.29 At the census held that year, the total population of the 
Gold Coast was recorded as 3,163,568, with 717,275 people resident in the Northern 
Territories.30 In other words, after the first 30 years of British administration, the north 
was home to approximately one quarter of the Gold Coast’s population, down from an 
estimated third of the population at the 1911 census. But it had only 10 percent of the 
available hospital beds,  14 percent of dispensaries, and no facilities for contagious 
disease or maternal health.
28 1931-1932 MDAR, 86–89, Appendix A, ‘Government Hospital Bed Accommodation And 
Dispensaries’.
29 Ibid., 89.
30 Ibid., 14; 1930-1931 NTAR, 2.
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Figure 8. The Gold Coast African Hospital, Accra, 1925. Source: TNA, Colonial Office Photographic
Collection, CO 069-37 
Figure 9. Operating theatre at the Gold Coast African Hospital, 1925. Source: TNA, Colonial Office
Photographic Collection, CO 069-37
 
Figure 10. Contagious Diseases Hospital under construction, Cape Coast, c.1920. Source: TNA, Colonial
Office Photographic Collection, CO 1069-40-60
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Early health in the north
In the first ten years of British rule in the north, there was no consistent 
policy of extending healthcare to African peoples. Some northern communities were 
still undergoing ‘pacification’, and the local government’s aim was to maximise 
revenues through a tax on trade caravans passing south from French territory, while 
avoiding expenditures unrelated to the maintenance of British personnel. The 
organisation of northern healthcare may have actively deterred communities from 
seeking treatment – at northern stations from 1902-1914, medical officers were 
responsible for managing prisons and gathering fines.31  As Ines Sutton has argued, the 
north in this early period was more of an externality than a periphery to the Gold Coast 
economy: ‘the notion of “interior” did not in practical terms extend beyond Asante’.32 
This gradually changed, as low-cost northern migrant labour became central to 
southern production.33 But although the region’s labour made it an increasingly 
important component of the overall Gold Coast economy, this did not stimulate 
government investment in the region itself. As Roger Thomas argues in his study of 
northern schooling, the policy of developing the region as a labour reserve may have 
militated against investments that promoted local health and welfare, particularly those 
that diminished the migrant ‘push’ factor or otherwise reduced the labour supply.34   
This appears to have been the case for the provision of healthcare. The first 
decade established recurrent problems – or perhaps administrative principles – which 
contributed to the divergence of northern and southern healthcare over time.  Among 
the most enduring limitations was a consistently low allocation of funds from Accra. 
British colonialism of the early 1900s was not guided by the relatively vague 
31 See 1899 MDAR, 316; 1909 NTAR, 11; 1910 NTAR, 10.
32 Sutton, ‘Colonial Agricultural Policy’, 639.
33 See 1906 NTAR, 9–10; A. E. G Watherston, ‘The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast’, Journal of
the Royal African Society 7, no. 28 (1908): 344–73.
34 See Thomas, ‘Forced Labour’, 79–103; Thomas, ‘Education in Northern Ghana’.
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developmental principles of the later Colonial Welfare and Development Acts. But the 
principal of advancing some local welfare, by means of direct loans from Britain, had 
been established by the Colonial Office in 1895.35 As indicated above, people in the 
southern Gold Coast and Ashanti benefited from a rapid expansion in healthcare 
capacity under this dispensation, with expenditure far in excess of revenues collected 
by the Medical Department. The north, however, was governed with the idea that 
spending should not exceed revenues, and the Accra government was consistently 
reluctant to allocate the region a proportionate share of the annual budgetary vote for 
medical services. In 1907, for example, the Medical Department’s discretionary budget 
was £4,239,of which £3,977 was spent on the Colony and Ashanti, with £260 allocated 
to the Northern Territories.36 In some years the north’s funds were exhausted, all 
development was halted, and medical facilities were left half-built. In 1910, for 
example, soon after building commenced on the region’s first dedicated African 
hospital (at the new regional headquarters of Tamale), the region’s Chief Commissioner
recorded that:
Towards the end of the year under review, our vote was exhausted, and all work 
was shut down. This was most unfortunate as of course the last two months of 
the year and the first three are those most suitable for building. The dry weather 
has set in and labour is available ... The main portions of [the hospital] are 
finished; but numerous buildings, such as mortuary, dresser's quarters etc., 
remain to be done.37
In the years before the First World War, the pressure to generate revenues 
from the north meant that health services were seen as a source of income, especially 
when the north’s principal source of revenue – the caravan tax – was abolished in 1909,
under pressure from the Accra government and southern trading companies.38  When 
35 E. R. Wicker, ‘Colonial Development and Welfare, 1929-1957: The Evolution of a Policy’, Social 
and Economic Studies 7, no. 4 (1958): 172–75.
36 1907 MDAR, 9–10.
37 1910 NTAR, 17.
38 1909 NTAR, 7.
55
the ‘health’ or ‘sanitary’ branch of the Medical Department was created the following 
year, its system of sanitary fines was immediately co-opted as a source of northern 
revenues.  In 1910 the northern government earned £319 in sanitary fines from the new 
and relatively small settlement of Tamale, compared with £313 raised from sanitary 
fines in Accra, the Gold Coast’s largest town.39 
Figure 11. The town of Tamale in 1929. Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection CO 1069-
40-50
These fines were ostensibly intended to support the development of sanitary 
infrastructure: latrine systems, wells, water tanks, refuse collection, drains and sewers, 
or public slaughterhouses, among others, and improvements of this kind were 
underway in most larger settlements in the south. But the 1910 Annual Medical report 
reported no planned sanitary work for any settlement in the Northern Territories, and 
this continued to be the case in subsequent years: the north was consistently not 
39 1910 MDAR, 55.
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included in planning for sanitary improvements, nor in annual tours of inspection to 
assess regional sanitation needs.40 In 1914, the Colony and Ashanti spent £52,608 on 
sanitary improvements, while total sanitary spending for the Northern Territories 
(almost all of it in Tamale) was £1,496.41 In the years before the war, therefore, the 
central focus of public sanitation in the north was the generation of revenues by 
imposing fines. The revenue-generating aspects of colonial sanitation have been noted 
for other regions and colonies, but this appears to have particularly acute in the 
Northern Territories, where the only Health Branch officials employed before the war 
were ‘inspectors’, rather than technicians or Medical Officers of Health.42 ‘Health’ 
offences were the most common cases brought before northern magistrates in the mid-
1920s, and this focus on fines and revenues continued until the turn to Native 
Administration in the 1930s.43 In 1937, after the north’s Native Administrations had 
launched their own programmes of sanitary improvements, a northern official observed 
how the previous system had created a lasting distrust of government health work:
The people were fined, or in default of payment, imprisoned for acts of 
omission or commission which they did not know to be offences against our 
health laws. Punishment preceded education with the result that officers of the 
Health Department came to be regarded as pests and not benefactors to the 
community. The title “summer-summer” (summons-summons) which they 
acquired, accurately describes the attitude of the people towards them.44
In this early period, before the war, another pattern was established which 
would continue well into the 1930s: the inflation of northern healthcare provision in 
official reports published in Accra or London. The number of claimed health facilities 
or personnel fluctuated greatly from year to year, changing when more stringent 
definitions of an acceptable ‘hospital’ were applied, or when inspections revealed that 
40 Ibid., 55–56; And see, for example, 1912 MDAR; 1913 MDAR; 1914 MDAR.
41 1914 MDAR, 20.
42 1913 MDAR, 16–17.
43 1924-1925 NTAR, 10–11.
44 1937-1938 NTAR, 77.
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previously claimed facilities either did not exist, or had been built but never staffed. In 
1904, when the Northern Territories administration was still based at the north-eastern 
town of Gambaga, it was reported that there were four hospitals in the north: at 
Gambaga, Kintampo, Salaga and Wa.45 In 1909, the colony’s annual report claimed that
there were now eight hospitals, at Tamale, Salaga, Wa, Bole, Gambaga, Bawku, 
Navrongo and Lawra.46 By 1913, however, what counted as an acceptable African 
hospital had changed, and the number of facilities depended on which group of officials
compiled a particular report. The Medical Department recorded only one functional 
hospital in 1913, at Tamale, with a second under construction at Salaga: all other 
medical facilities were now considered ‘bush hospitals’, and not listed in official 
totals.47 But in 1917, towards the end of the war (during which no public works had 
been carried out in the region), the political administration again reported that there 
were nine government hospitals in the north. In fact only two of these (Tamale and 
Salaga) were permanent structures built by the colony’s Public Works Department, 
while the other seven hospitals were temporary structures made with mud ‘swish’ and 
grass roofs. The report observed that ‘little, if any, advantage is taken of them by the 
natives’, perhaps because there were no medical officers in residence.48  In 1922, the 
annual report listed only three staffed government hospitals at Tamale, Wa, and 
Gambaga (the apparently permanent facility at Salaga had fallen from the list), while in
1924 the north’s three permanent hospitals were reported to be at Tamale, Wa, and 
Zuarungu.49 In 1926, the government recorded that the only ‘good’ native hospitals 
were at Tamale and Salaga, which had returned to the list after being used as a school 
45 1903-1904 MDAR, 27–29.
46 1909 NTAR, 11.
47 1913 MDAR, 32–33.
48 1917 NTAR, 6.
49 1922-1923 NTAR, 22; 1924-1925 NTAR, 10–11.
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for some years. There were also ‘bush-type’ hospitals at Wa, Zuarungu, and Yendi.50 In 
1928, the administration reported that there were now native hospitals at Tamale, 
Salaga, Wa, Lawra, and Zuarungu, with an unstaffed hospital at Gambaga.51 These 
totals and locations continued fluctuating into the mid-1930s, when Gold Coast 
Governor Ransford Slater, having toured the north, concluded that the lack of adequate 
hospital facilities was ‘nothing short of a scandal’.52 Shifting and often inflated 
accounts of the north’s medical facilities, presented to colonial planners in official 
reports, may have influenced decisions to allocate an adequate share of budgetary 
funding to the region. 
Northern health after the First World War
The First World War slowed colonial development across the Gold Coast, 
including the provision of medical services. Some of the war’s farthest-reaching effects
were felt in the Northern Territories, as southern gold production was stepped up and an
increasing number of northern migrant workers were recruited for the mines. The 
region was also the colony’s central military recruiting ground, with men from the 
north making up approximately 90 percent of the total Gold Coast Regiment.53  In 
relation to other African communities of the Gold Coast, northerners were also 
disproportionately large financial contributors to the war, when Britain requested 
donations from African subjects through the Imperial Fund. Officials praised the 
Northern Territories, saying that the region’s contribution had been surprisingly 
generous, given its people’s known poverty in relation to the south.54  
50 1926-1927 NTAR, 6.
51 1928-1929 NTAR, 7.
52 Slater, quoted in Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana, 19.
53 1918 NTAR, 2–3.
54 Nana James Kwaku Brukum, ‘The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast under British Colonial 
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After 1913 there was a fall in food production, as more of the region’s most 
capable agricultural workers were recruited for the war or the mines, and the northern 
economy was also seriously damaged by outbreaks of epizootic diseases among cattle 
herds, related to the increase in demand for meat exports at the coast. It was estimated 
that up to 50 percent of cattle owned by communities in far north had died during the 
outbreaks, prompting a turn to guinea fowl as a principal source of protein.55 By the end
of the war many foodstuffs had become unavailable inland: officials reported that 
market goods at Kumasi had became prohibitively expensive for northern traders.56 It 
was against this background that first epidemic smallpox, then the influenza pandemic, 
and then epidemic meningitis took hold in the region. The ability of the Northern 
Territories medical service to respond, if only to the extent of recording the impacts of 
these diseases, was limited by staffing reductions that had been passed northwards after
the war began. By 1915, the Medical Department reported that for the north, ‘whole 
districts have been shut down as far as medical work is concerned, and sanitary 
inspection has come to a standstill’.57
At this stage in the administration of the Northern Territories, this was not 
necessarily of great concern. In 1918, the Chief Commissioner reported that ‘the 
reduction of the political and medical staffs of the Protectorate, owing to the exigencies
of the war, has effected a considerable saving in expenditure this year’.58 However, the 
need for healthy military recruits did lead to an expansion of smallpox vaccination in 
the north, administered by Native Vaccinators from the south.59 The sustained presence 
of southern personnel in the provision of northern health services would be another 
55 See 1917 NTAR, 3; 1918 NTAR, 5.
56 1918 NTAR, 6.
57 1915 MDAR, 19.
58 1928-1929 NTAR, 3.
59 1918 MDAR, 26; 1917 GCAR, 44; 1918 GCAR, 45.
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theme sustained across most of the century, resulting from the low priority and limited 
resources given to training local people as health practitioners.
The beginnings of local advocacy
The effects of the war were followed by the effects of the 1921 recession, 
which led to immediate reductions in the number of health and medical staff. Although 
there was a swift rebound to pre-war staffing numbers in the Colony and Ashanti, this 
was not the case in the north.60  ‘The Provincial Medical Officer reports that the 
Protectorate is understaffed with Medical Officers, and strongly recommends an 
increase as early as possible’, noted the Annual Medical Report in 1920. But the 
number of northern medical officers remained depressed into the late 1920s, and in 
1925 there were only three British medical officers at the region's hospitals (of 72 MOs 
in the colony), rising to five by 1928.61  However, this relatively mild official 
complaint, and others like it in the early 1920s, marked the first beginnings of sustained
local advocacy and criticism of the Accra government by northern officials, who were 
motivated by their perception of a growing disparity between northern needs and the 
actual allocation of government healthcare resources. These advocacy efforts increased 
steadily for 12 years following the war, until they were temporarily dissipated in the 
cuts and staff losses of the Great Depression.  
In the 1920s, rising local advocacy may to some extent have been shaped by 
a sense of obligation to communities that had made a disproportionate contribution to 
Britain’s war effort. Veterans returned in large numbers to the north after the war, many
of whom were co-opted to impose quarantine measures and seal off transport links 
60 1925-26 MDAR, 5–6.
61 1926-1927 NTAR, 6; 1928-1929 NTAR, 7.
61
during the meningitis epidemic of 1919-1920.62 But calls for government action were 
more clearly driven by the growing recognition that northern peoples were the most 
seriously affected by almost every major disease of the Gold Coast. The meningitis 
epidemic, which followed immediately after influenza, gave rise to initial advocacy 
efforts by concerned northern medical officers. These officers convinced the Gold 
Coast Medical Department that increased expenditures and expended healthcare 
provision were urgently needed, and the department took up the cause of northern 
health reform with the political administration at Accra. Because northern medical 
officers had raised a sanitary cordon using returned military recruits, which excluded 
trade caravans and closed all north-south roads running through the Northern 
Territories, the 1919 meningitis epidemic also put pressure on the southern food and 
mining labour supplies, at a time when Britain was seeking to maintain production and 
boost its gold reserves.63  These material effects of northern disease on the southern 
economy, which across the century were among the greatest determinants of increased 
budgetary allocations from Accra, arguably gave northern officials’ medical advocacy 
of the 1920s a greater political weight than it had carried previously. ‘The epidemic has
at least led to exposure of the medical and sanitary needs of that region,’ acknowledged 
the Medical Department’s annual report in 1920: 
It becomes apparent ... that a trained and fairly intelligent native staff working 
under adequate European direction both political and medical, is necessary, 
whether to limit an outbreak once started or to lay the foundations of a quiet but 
progressive campaign of enlightenment and sanitary improvement which may 
render future outbreaks less likely.64 
In light of advocacy following the influenza and meningitis epidemics, 
existing southern health legislation was extended to the north. The Infectious Diseases 
62 1919 MDAR, 11–15.
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Ordinance (1918) allowed medical officials to declare settlements or areas ‘infected’ 
and impose quarantine measures, while the Vaccination Ordinance (1919) permitted 
compulsory vaccination against smallpox and other diseases. Both laws enabled the use
of physical coercion against those who refused.65 As I discuss in Chapter 3, legislation 
of this kind also underpinned the Ghana-WHO campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 
1960s-1970s, perhaps the most far-reaching and coercive of all medical campaigns over
the century. In 1921 the local administration also created the Northern Territories 
Regulation of Towns and Villages Rules, the first laws regulating urban sanitation in 
the region.66  These new laws conferred substantially increased powers on northern 
medical officers, allowing them to segregate or detain people, destroy property, and use
other coercive measures over African subjects. Many attempts at disease control were 
physically coercive, and the use of these methods was sometimes shaped by the flawed 
medical reasoning or reputation-seeking of individual officers. From another 
perspective, however, the legislation gave local medics the power to shape northern 
healthcare with a reduced deference to southern political and economic concerns. As I 
discuss in Chapter 4, on sleeping sickness, commercial interests in Accra often lobbied 
against the imposition of public health measures that would diminish the southwards 
flow of labour. Despite their coercive qualities, laws of this kind arguably established 
the basis for expanded public health services in many states: in places which were 
never under colonial rule, and in Britain as much as its colonies. In some of the 
historiography on colonial medicine there is a tendency to adduce all medical activity 
to the particulars of the colonial environment, instead of considering developments in 
65 1918 NTAR, 9; 1919 MDAR, 11–12; 1920 MDAR, 15–17; Although it was enacted as a colony-
wide law, the Vaccination Ordinance was only officially gazetted for the Northern Territories in 
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colonial Africa (and elsewhere) as representative of generalised shifts in public health 
policy around the world.67  
The 1919-1920 meningitis epidemic gave rise to initial local advocacy about 
the neglect of health services in the north and, in the years that followed, this advocacy 
was sustained by successive revelations about the disease burden on northern societies. 
Medical officers protested about the rapid spread of tuberculosis among migrant 
labourers who had travelled to the southern gold mines, and the extent of mortality 
among these workers meant that mine recruiting was temporarily suspended in the 
north from 1924.68  Similar concerns were successively raised for other health problems
too, as indicated by the following quotes from reports between 1923 and 1932, which 
acknowledged that the north had the greatest burden of many common diseases:
1923: ‘Guinea Worm prevails mostly in the Northern Territories of the Gold 
Coast, or in persons who have come from these Territories’69
1926: ‘[Filariasis] is met with in small numbers throughout the Colony but is 
common among the Northern Territory tribes’70 
1926: ‘The higher incidence [of tapeworm] in members of the Northern 
Territory tribes was confirmed’71
1928: ‘Yaws is still most common in the Northern Territories’72
1928: ‘[Eye diseases] are very prevalent in the Northern Territories ... cases of 
severe conjunctivitis with corneal liberations leading to opacities and often to 
blindness are very common. In the forest and coastal belt eye diseases are 
fortunately not common.’73
1928: ‘[Skin diseases] are exceedingly common, especially in the Northern 
Territories’74
67 For a discussion of this tendency, see Michael Worboys, ‘The Colonial World as Mission and 
Mandate: Leprosy and Empire, 1900-1940’, Osiris 15 (2000): 207–18.
68 1924-1925 MDAR, 19–21; Thomas, ‘Forced Labour’, 97.
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74 Ibid., 14.
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1928: ‘[Hookworm] is met with for the most part within the Northern 
Territories’75
1928: ‘In the Northern Territories, [scabies] is ... almost universal. Starvation 
may play a part in predisposing to the disease in the Northern Territories though 
not in the Colony, further south.’76
1928: ‘The majority [of tuberculosis cases] are in labourers recently from the 
Northern Territories … the whole problem is beginning to assume serious 
proportions in this relatively non-immune population’77
1931: ‘Diseases of the respiratory system, apart from pulmonary tuberculosis, 
occupy first place amongst the list of the chief causes of registered deaths ... 
these diseases are particularly common in many tribes in the Northern 
Territories’78
1930: ‘In the Northern Territories, especially where water shortages occur ... the
craw craw is very prevalent, and there appears to be frequently a co-relation 
between the sites commonly affected by craw craw and the initial lesions of 
leprosy.’79
1932: ‘In the Northern Territories the case incidence [of leprosy] per mile is 
probably about six times as high as that of the Colony.’80
These reports give a strong indication of the divergence in disease burden and
health standards between the north and south by 1930, as government spending 
improved the south’s sanitation and water, and expanded its medical facilities.81 In 
relation to yaws, for example, it was observed in 1930 that ‘on the seaboard ... where 
improvements have been effected in village sanitation and where medical officers in 
charge of hospitals and welfare centres have been engaged in an anti-yaws campaign, 
the disease is rapidly being brought under control and is a fair way to being stamped 
out’.82 As criticism from medical officers and other northern officials became more 
75 Ibid., 27.
76 Ibid., 127 Appendix E, Report from officer for British Empire Leprosy Relief Association.
77 Ibid., 25–26.
78 1931-1932 MDAR, 33.
79 1930-31 MDAR, 155.
80 1932-1933 MDAR, 21.
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strident over the 1920s, the gap between north and south was increasingly recognised 
by the government at Accra, although there was little additional allocation of resources 
or personnel as a result. There was a persistent tension between the north as an 
apparently equal administrative division of the Gold Coast, with a justifiable claim on 
the developmental expenditures that the government had at its discretion, and its actual 
situation as the colony’s marginal labour reserve, not a site of export production or 
revenue generation in itself. Guggisberg, an activist governor in terms of 
developmental spending, made reference to this tension in 1925:
The country is more than fifty years behind Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony 
in progress from a primitive to a higher state of civilisation.  The difference 
between the peoples of the Northern Territories and those of the south is very 
marked. Drought, pestilence, famine and rare contact with Europeans have all 
tended to keep the Northern Territories tribes in a very primitive state ... the 
people, if not actually starving, are seriously underfed. The general effect of this
is not actually to a rise in the scale of civilisation. The races are hardy, however, 
and although they possess some weaklings through under-feeding and disease, 
they form the chief source of labour supply in the south.83
It is evident that early governments in the Gold Coast took little account of 
absolute need in their plans for the expansion of health services. With little response 
from Accra, action against northern health problems was instead often driven by the 
initiative of local medical officers: for example, the work of Dr W. Greer, stationed at 
Wa, who travelled to outlying villages and treated approximately 45,000 people for 
yaws in 1926-1927.84 In other cases, healthcare improvements were funded by northern 
people themselves. Locally-funded facilities included the Navrongo War Memorial 
Hospital, built in the north-east in 1930. Construction of the hospital was organised by 
local chiefs in collaboration with activist district officers, and financed by a one-
shilling payment from each compound in the surrounding communities. Perhaps 
83 Guggisberg, 1925, quoted in 1937-1938 NTAR, 53.
84 1926-1927 NTAR, 10.
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because the project was intended to commemorate the people’s contribution to the First 
World War, district officers were able to secure a further £100 in funding from the 
colonial government, and the commitment that an adequate medical staff would 
eventually be provided.85 The War Memorial hospital continued to be among the north’s
busiest medical hospitals for most of the following century, and contributed to the later 
development of Navrongo as Ghana’s principal centre for internationally-funded public
health research.86   
Rising internationalism in African health
In 1927, the staff of the government’s Medical Research Laboratory in Accra 
was larger than the total medical and sanitary staff of the northern Territories.87 This 
was not entirely the result of neglect of the north, however: it also pointed to the 
evolution of public health internationally, as transnational and non-governmental health
institutions began to proliferate in the interwar years. The 1926 International Sanitary 
Convention changed the way that states interacted with one another in terms of disease 
surveillance, placing an emphasis on the sharing of information, and the League of 
Nations health section attempted to coordinate disease control between states, including
African colonies.88 Its involvement had some immediate effects. In 1927, the Gold 
Coast Medical Department reported that ‘probably as the result of the activities of the 
Health Section of the League of Nations, the liaison between this Colony and 
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neighbouring administrations in matters affecting public health has improved out of all 
knowledge in the past year or so’.89 
Figure 12. The Japanese researcher and Nobel prize-winner Hideyo Noguchi conducting yellow fever
research in the Accra laboratory, funded by the Rockefeller Commission, c.1928. 
Source: Wellcome Library, V0030931
Work at the Accra laboratory was boosted by funding from the Rockefeller 
Yellow Fever Commission – the effects of this increasing public health internationalism
were most clearly felt in the south, where the British Red Cross also established a 
significant presence from the 1930s, as I discuss below.90  In the north,  the local 
provision of health services was influenced in the mid-1920s by the arrival of officers 
from the British Leprosy Relief Administration (BELRA). Employed by an 
independent organisation with influence in Britain itself, and not directly answerable to 
the government at Accra, BELRA’s northern medical staff were instrumental in 
89 1926-27 MDAR, 23.
90 1927-1928 MDAR, 46–50.
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publicising the extent of leprosy in the region, and in raising broader concerns about the
state of northern health. The presence of an independent medical observer of this kind 
may have encouraged local medical officers to share their concerns, as took place with 
onchocerciasis and the British Empire Society for the Blind in the 1950s.91 There is at 
least a correlation between the arrival of BELRA officers and the rapid official 
recognition of northern disease problems in 1928, many of which were reported both 
by these officers and by local officials.92 As Michael Worboys has argued, the 
organisation’s arrival in colonial Africa marked (and BELRA itself was a conduit for) a 
broader turn towards ‘medical humanism’ among some colonial medical staff, and an 
early manifestation of the development and welfare discourses that gained traction in 
some spheres of colonial activity over subsequent decades.93  
The Great Depression and northern healthcare
BELRA’s involvement in the north ended with the Great Depression, when its
medical officer was withdrawn from the region. ‘Since the abolition of that special 
post, leprosy has diminished, at least on paper, to a very considerable extent,’ noted the 
medical department: the number of northerners treated for leprosy fell by more than 50 
percent in 1931.94 This was one of many far-reaching effects of the depression, in which
the impacts of distant financial turmoil were rapidly felt in the provision of Northern 
Territories healthcare. Reductions in health services took place against a backdrop of 
general economic decline in the region. As trade collapsed, the employment available 
to northern migrants rapidly declined, as observed in a report from 1930:
91 See Chapter 5 on onchocerciasis
92 See, for example, 1928 MDAR, Appendix E, Report from officer for British Empire Leprosy Relief 
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There has been a lot of unemployment, especially in the large cacao centres, and
cases of destitution have been frequently met with. Wages have again been 
reduced, but prices of essential foodstuffs and rents have not decreased in 
proportion.  The majority of labourers are recruited from the Northern 
Territories and these labourers often arrive in Ashanti and the Colony in an unfit
condition. Owing to depression, there has not been the same exodus as in former
years from the Northern Territories.95
The costs of foodstuffs and other goods became prohibitively high in the 
north itself. Staffing cuts were made across all branches of the northern administration, 
and for two years no annual reports on the region were compiled. When reporting 
resumed in 1932, the North’s reports were not printed and bound for a broader colonial 
readership, as they had been in the past. From 1933-1937 there were only typewritten 
pages, submitted by northern officials and retained by the Accra government without 
formal publication. The depression had immediate impacts on healthcare, and it was 
anticipated that the provision of medical services might become a voluntary matter for 
regional administrations:  
The strain thrown on the ordinary Medical Officers remaining has not really 
been relieved by a drop in the number of cases treated. The unfortunate results 
of still further retrenchment are envisaged, and the possibility of fresh 
reorganisation and development on voluntary lines foreshadowed ... It is in the 
outlying areas that the effect of a reduced staff has been most severely felt. This 
curtailment of ordinary medical services involved a corresponding reduction in 
the health services in these areas, and the brunt of the economy measures fell 
therefore with a very serious double effect on the more remote stations.96
Because communities in the north-east had nearly completed construction of 
the Navrongo War Memorial Hospital, built with their own funds, the Accra 
government elected to close one of the north’s existing hospitals at Zuarungu, reporting
in 1931 that ‘the wretched building which has for long passed as a hospital will be 
evacuated as soon as Navrongo is opened’.97 But in 1935 there were still no trained 
95 1930-31 MDAR, 37.
96 1931-1932 MDAR, 5; See also 1935-1936 MDAR, 26.
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medical officers at the Navrongo hospital, leading to recriminations from northern 
officials who argued that surrounding communities had only built the hospital ‘on the 
understanding that there would be an MO posted there’.98 In 1933 a newly-built 
hospital at Lawra-Tumu was also closed as a cost-saving measure, although it had 
treated more people than any other northern facility in the year since it opened (10,112 
outpatients in 1932).99  A travelling dispensary scheme, introduced to fill the existing 
shortfall in health provision at fixed facilities in the north, was shelved in 1932.100 Most
medical postings in the north remained unfilled five years after the onset of the 
depression itself, and in 1934 there were only three British medical officers based at 
hospitals in the region.101  ‘It is realised that the financial position does not permit the 
employment of additional medical officers,’ reported the northern government, which 
complained that the sanitation budget allocated to the region by Accra represented only 
£1 of spending for every 1000 people. ‘The inadequacy of present medical facilities … 
is abundantly proved by the figures’.102 
These developments indicate the broad state of northern health provision over
the first thirty years of colonial rule (1902-1929). Relatively high government spending
(in excess of revenues) meant that permanent healthcare facilities had expanded rapidly
in the south, village sanitation had improved, and diseases like yaws and guinea worm 
had been brought under control in many districts. In the north, the disease burden 
instead appears to have increased over the first decades of colonial rule, while epidemic
disease and the development of the north as a migrant labour reserve reduced the labour
power needed to sustain adequate northern food production. Although the health needs 
of the region were increasingly recognised, at least within the Medical Department and 
98 1934-1935 NTAR, 86.
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by northern officials, this did not led to a concomitant increase in budget allocations by 
the political administration at Accra. Instead, when down-turns in the global economy 
(through war or economic depression) put pressure on Britain’s finances, the Gold 
Coast administration consistently made significant reductions in northern health 
services, relative to similar cuts in other regions.
The north as a zone of disease
There is another feature of this early period which deserves attention, as it 
continued to shape healthcare provision and the north-south relationship for the rest of 
the century. This was the enduring perception of the north as a zone of disease, and 
hence a threat to the southern economy, which emerged at the same time as the north 
was inducted into that economy as its principal labour reserve. When major disease 
outbreaks took place in the Northern Territories in these early decades, the principal 
medical response from Accra was often aimed at protecting or isolating the south from 
northern contamination, whilst preserving the flow of northern labour migrants and 
imported livestock from French West Africa. This was evident during the first major 
meningitis epidemic in 1906-1908, when the main response was the construction of a 
string of isolation camps linking the French border and Ashanti, intended to segregate 
trade caravans and cattle importers from northern communities.103 The same measures 
were used during the 1919-1920 epidemic, when trade was again kept flowing through 
the region while caravans were prevented from trading in the north itself.104 During this 
epidemic, a central government concern was the possibility that the disease could 
spread southwards into Ashanti, as some cases were found along the Northern 
Territories-Ashanti Border, and this received greater attention than the disease in the 
103 Horn, ‘Investigation of Cerebro-Spinal Fever’, 27; 1908 MDAR, 2–5; 1908 NTAR, 40.
104 1919 MDAR, 14–15.
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north itself. ‘It has not been possible to carry out tours of inspection with any degree of 
regularity, but the epidemic of Cerebro-spinal Fever in the north has necessitated a 
close investigation in North Ashanti,’ reported the medical department. ‘Its endemic 
existence in the Northern Territories is accepted... the most important new feature is the
extension of its range’.105  
A similar pattern took place during the Gold Coast sleeping sickness scare of 
1909-1912, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2. Although there were strong 
indications that the disease was most prevalent in the Northern Territories, the Medical 
Department instead focused efforts on determining its presence in northern Ashanti, and
subsequently on isolating Ashanti and the southern colonies. The possibility that 
sleeping sickness was spreading in Ashanti prompted an intensive investigation of rural
communities in the province, with the employment of additional medical officers and 
the construction of fly-proof isolation hospitals on the major trade routes from the 
north.106 The same process took place during the mid-1920s, at a time when sleeping 
sickness was spreading rapidly in the Protectorate – an intensive survey was carried out
on the Ashanti border, but did not extend further north.107 In each case, the disease did 
not generate significant concern once it was established that it did not threaten the 
south, even though it was recognised that the passage of people and livestock from 
French territory through the Northern Territories made local people vulnerable to 
infection. The extent of human sleeping sickness in the north was first discovered 
incidentally, by medical personnel tasked with examining imported livestock in transit 
at Yeji, on the borders with the south.108 The discovery generated relatively little interest
at the time, and investigations ceased with the 1929 depression. It was only in the mid-
105 1920 MDAR, 10; 18.
106 1909 MDAR, 34; 1910 MDAR, 46–47; 1911 MDAR, 34; 48-49.
107 1924-1925 MDAR, 45–51.
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1930s, when human sleeping sickness began to cause wholesale disruptions to the 
southwards flow of labour and cattle, that the northern prevalence of the disease was 
recognised in Accra. 
The same process took place in regard to diseases of cattle. The Northern 
Territories were the concentration point for an expansive livestock trade linking the 
West African interior to the southern ports of the Gold Coast, with animals driven from 
as far away as Morocco according to some reports.109 In 1910, a group of local medical 
officers conducted research to show that anthrax, bovine pleuropneumonia and 
rinderpest were being spread to the north by trade herds brought down from French 
West Africa, and the northern government requested an investigation to find ways of 
‘controlling the importation of cattle and the supervision of beasts in transit through the
Protectorate’.110 But priority was given to maintaining the import trade at the expense of
northern herds, particularly during the war. By 1917, it was argued that cattle disease 
was endemic in the north, and therefore it was unnecessary to control imports or limit 
the risks of disease transmission from incoming livestock, particularly since a sufficient
number of healthy cattle were still available to traders in Accra : 
In spite of outbreaks of rinderpest and anthrax among the herds owned by 
natives of the north-eastern and north-western provinces … which in many 
cases carried off over 50 per cent of the cattle, the number of beasts passing 
through the Protectorate into Ashanti and the Colony compares favourably with 
that of the preceding year.111
Northern communities continued to regularly lose a large proportion of their 
livestock to cattle diseases into the late 1920s, when the first vaccination programme 
109 In 1918, the District Commissioner of Salaga reported a trader who had brought 125 cattle into the 
Northern Territories after four month’s journey from Morocco, losing 115 of them to disease once 
corralled in the north. See ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927) NTs administration, reorganisation of, 
PRAAD Accra, Letter from District Commissioner, Salaga, to Chief Commissioner, Tamale, 6 
August 1918.
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began.112 In regard to diseases of both animals and humans, some colonial officials 
appear to have seen the north as a zone of irredeemable endemicity, which did not merit
health expenditures that could be more effectively used to limit the southwards spread 
of infection. This view of the north, as inherently diseased, was intensified as sick and 
destitute northerners became an increasingly common sight in the colony’s economic 
heartlands, although in many cases it was malnutrition and poverty which exposed 
them to infection by southern disease. During a relapsing fever epidemic in Accra in 
1923, for example, officials recorded that:
Infected males belong almost exclusively to an immigrant tribe who come into 
the Accra district from their Northern Territory villages in search of work and 
money … The great majority of the cases in Accra occurred in the Tudu and 
Zongo road areas where the inhabitants are almost entirely members of 
Northern Territory tribes or Hausas, both of whom live under unhealthy 
conditions, crowded together into insanitary corrugated iron structures lacking 
both light and ventilation.113
 For many northern men during this period, the most extensive medical 
attention they received was at the moment of labour recruitment in the north, when they
were examined and vaccinated, or at screening stations in the south for those who 
arrived without agreed employment. In 1924, for example, the only recommended 
sanitary work relating to the Northern Territories was a request for medical officers to 
be stationed at the town of Koforidua in the south, to inspect northern recruits before 
they were dispersed to mines or farms, and by the 1930s the main ‘disinfesting station’ 
was located just north of Kumasi.114 In conversations with many southern Ghanaians 
over the course of this research, it was clear that the north continues to be seen as a 
place of disease, and that northerners are still sometimes seen as inherently diseased or 
112 1920 NTAR, 6; 1927-1928 NTAR, 5; 1928-1929 NTAR, 3; 1929-1930 NTAR, 15.
113 1923-1924 MDAR, 12.
114 1924-1925 MDAR, 23; 1936-1937 MDAR, 4; And see Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British 
Rule’, 223.
75
lower class. Carola Lentz found that the word ntafo, a derogatory Twi term which she 
encountered in the late 1980s, was considered by some Twi-speakers to have evolved 
from the colonial-era abbreviation for Northern Territories – NTs – so that NTafo 
simply means ‘a person from the NTs’.115 Whether this etymology is correct or not, 
some enduring southern perceptions of the north were established in light of its health 
problems in the early colonial period, from 1902-1930, when it began to fall behind 
other regions in the provision of health services and the resultant burden of disease.
Part 2. Northern health from 1930 to 1945: Epidemics, renewed advocacy, and 
local inventions
Northern health and inter-war internationalism
In the decade which followed the Great Depression, both northern and 
southern health services grew: in the north from the mid-1930s, as a result of the 
advocacy and local initiatives which form the main focus of this section, and in the 
south as a continuation of the region’s pre-1929 expansion. A noticeable feature of this 
period was the slow turn towards an increasingly ‘developmental’ colonialism, which 
included the provision of better healthcare. This was to some extent the result of a 
policy shift in Britain, leading to the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. 
Britain had ostensibly accepted the principle of native paramountcy for its colonies – 
the idea that ‘the interests of the African natives must be paramount’ in colonial 
administration – after this principle was endorsed by the League of Nations in 1919 as 
the central responsibility of all colonial and mandate powers.116 However, as George 
Abbott has argued, paramountcy was negated in the drafting of the act itself, which 
115 Lentz, Ethnicity, 320.
116 George Abbott, ‘A Re-Examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act’, Economic History 
Review 24, no. 1 (1971): 69.
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formulated colonial governance in terms of a dual policy (or dual mandate).  A 
requirement to put African needs first was given equal weight with ‘a duty to humanity 
to develop the vast economic resources of a great continent’.117 As Abbott argues, ‘by 
extending the principle of trusteeship to include the whole of humanity, the dual policy 
put paid to the doctrine of native paramountcy. More than that, it effectively re-
established the status quo ante, since it did not envisage any change in either the nature 
or the form of colonial assistance’.118 The 1929 Act was more concretely formulated to 
serve domestic needs, having been passed ‘for the purpose of aiding and developing 
agriculture and industry in the colony or territory and thereby promoting commerce 
with or industry in the United Kingdom’.119 Sidney Webb, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies told the British parliament that ‘The principal motive for the introduction of 
this measure is connected with the lamentable condition of employment in this country,
and this is an attempt to stimulate the British export trade’.120 In his analysis of actual 
spending under the act, the economist Elmus Wicker found that during the 11 years that
the 1929 Colonial Development Act was in force, less than two-thirds of the funds 
allocated for development were actually spent.121 Expenditures to promote healthcare 
were only permitted if the spending had ‘the effect of providing immediate and 
substantial orders for British goods and materials’, and colonial officials complained 
that the act explicitly prevented them from considering projects ‘for which there has 
been pressing need’.122  Perhaps as a result, the expansion of healthcare in the Northern 
Territories does not appear to have been aided by any funding allocations made under 
117 The British Africa Commission’s report, quoted in ibid., 69.
118 Ibid., 70.
119 Colonial Development Act 1929, Section 1, quoted in ibid., 71.
120 Webb, quoted in Wicker, ‘Colonial Development’, 174.
121 Ibid., 175.
122 The Colonial Advisory Committee, quoted in ibid., 178.
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the act.123 However, as I discuss below, the developmental discourse surrounding the act
did offer new rhetorical strategies to northern officials, as they advocated for improved 
healthcare in the region.
Beyond the development acts, in the 1930s there were several other factors 
contributing to a developmental or internationalist shift in Gold Coast health provision. 
The Gold Coast’s accession to the 1930 Convention on Forced Labour (in 1935) meant 
that less coercive methods had to be found for implementing village sanitation work, 
and the colony’s quarantine laws were aligned with the 1926 International Sanitary 
Convention.124 The Gold Coast was increasingly represented at international health 
conferences, and the public health priorities of the League of Nations began to have an 
influence on the Medical Department’s attention to specific health problems in the 
colony, notably those related to nutrition.125  In the south there were significant 
advances in maternal and child health by the 1920s, which persisted to some extent 
when responsibility for these areas was devolved to the British Red Cross Society in 
1932. The Red Cross took over the south’s existing network of maternal welfare 
centres, and it began an extensive programme of health education in southern schools 
and adult training centres.126 The Medical Department recorded that ‘there has been an 
almost phenomenal development in welfare services in the Gold Coast, not only as the 
result of medical officers attached to welfare centres but also because of the work of 
voluntary helpers attached to the League for Maternal and Child Welfare, a section of 
123 For a discussion of overall Gold Coast spending policy during this period see Peter C. Sederberg, 
‘The Gold Coast under Colonial Rule: An Expenditure Analysis’, African Studies Review 14, no. 2 
(1971): 179–204.
124 1933-1934 MDAR, 7; 1935-1936 MDAR, 4.
125 See, for example, CSO/11/1/392 (1935) Conference of medical officers at LSHTM, PRAAD Accra; 
CSO/11/1/422 (1937-1938) 3rd International Congress on Tropical Medicine & Malaria, PRAAD 
Accra; CSO/11/14/166 (1932-1939) Congress of the Royal Sanitary Institute, PRAAD Accra; 
CSO/11/14/248 (1936) South African health congress at Cape Town, PRAAD Accra; And see 
Destombes, ‘Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal Hunger’, 44.
126 CSO/11/1/291 (1934) British Red Cross Society, Annual Reports, PRAAD Accra; 1932-1933 
MDAR, 34; 1934-1935 MDAR, 20–28; 1935-1936 MDAR, 24–31.
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the Gold Coast Branch of the British Red Cross Society’.127 This marked another point 
of divergence for northern health. Despite its lasting and extensive involvement in 
southern health care and education, neither the Red Cross nor other charities conducted 
any health work in the north until the very end of colonial rule, when the British 
Empire Society for the Blind conducted a West African blindness survey and selected 
northern Ghana as its central exemplar for international fundraising efforts.
Comparing healthcare in the north and south
In the southern Gold Coast, there was a new emphasis on expanding health 
education from the 1930s onwards, and a turn away from measures that were 
considered coercive. ‘The aim of the Health branch is to teach the causes of ill-health 
and the means of disease prevention rather than to rely upon coercion’, reported the 
Medical Department in 1934.128 By 1932, monthly ‘Health Days’ or annual ‘Health 
Weeks’ were being held in larger settlements in the Colony and Ashanti, intended to 
teach techniques for identifying and preventing common diseases, and for domestic 
hygiene.129  Alongside continued investment in fixed health facilities, there was an 
increase in broader preventative health work, including a scheme to distribute quinine 
tablets via post offices in the south from 1935, which saw an immediate and extensive 
uptake.130 The government’s smallpox vaccination programme steadily increased in 
scale; a free yaws treatment programme was offered at fixed medical facilities; and in 
1936 the government reported that the Gold Coast had reached an ‘epoch’  in water 
supply improvements to major settlements in the south, observing that ‘the benefit to 
the public health in these centres, and in villages on the pipe lines ... is hard to 
127 1933-1934 MDAR, 4.
128 1934-1935 MDAR, 25.
129 1932-1933 MDAR, 34.
130 1934-1935 MDAR, 13; 1937-1938 MDAR, 24.
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exaggerate’.131 By the mid-1930s the Gold Coast was spending more than 10 percent of 
its total budget on health services, the highest proportion in its history thus far.132 In 
those districts that were able to maintain a registry, the average annual birth rate more 
than doubled between 1913 and 1933, while the average death rate fell.133 From 1944, 
before the end of the Second World War, Gold Coast medical facilities were treating 
more than 500,000 patients a year, roughly one eighth of the colony’s total 
population.134 
These developments indicate the increased capacity and broadening scope of 
government healthcare in the Colony and Ashanti over the 1930s. Although the 
Northern Territories were often aggregated into these figures, the region’s experience of
healthcare provision was very different, as I discuss below.  In addition to the shift 
towards a more developmental health policy, Gold Coast medical services of the 1930s 
were also shaped by the successive introduction of new medical technologies, notably 
the sulphonamide class of anti-bacterial drugs, which allowed a number of the region’s 
most serious endemic and epidemic diseases to be reliably cured for the first time. As 
Donald Doonan has argued, in many parts of the world the availability of new drug 
cures led to a shift in focus away from broader environmental health.135 Gold Coast 
health services – particularly in the north and other less-urbanised areas – were 
increasingly developed on what local medical officers called the ‘campaign principal’: 
the idea that a curative mass treatment campaign was more health- and cost-effective 
131 1933-1934 MDAR, 23; 1932-1933 MDAR, 21; 1936-1937 MDAR, 28; 1942 MDAR, 3.
132 1938-1939 MDAR, 8.
133 1933-1934 MDAR, 4.
134 1944 MDAR, 5–7.
135 Donald Doonan, ‘Temperate Medicine and Settler Capitalism: On the Reception of Western Medical 
Ideas’, in Disease, Medicine, and Empire, ed. Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis (London: Routledge, 
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than the gradual improvement of sanitation, health services and fixed medical 
facilities.136  
In tandem with the introduction of new drugs, the 1930s were also a period in
which market forces came to bear more extensively on the health of African peoples. 
An increasing number of patent medicines from Europe and Asia came on sale in local 
markets, in the face of resistance from British medical officers and from the colonial 
administration more broadly, which respectively viewed these medicines as ineffective 
or as competition for British drug manufacturers.137 Some medical technologies passed 
into use beyond the state’s network of approved physicians and dispensers: laws were 
passed to control the use of injections, and to make the unlicensed distribution and 
possession of sulpha drugs illegal, particularly as demand in Europe increased over the 
late 1930s. The laws limited the self-treatment options available to rural northern 
communities during successive meningitis epidemics from 1939 to 1949, and led to the 
emergence of a thriving black market for imported pharmaceuticals.138
As in the 1920s, the north continued to face acute difficulties in terms of the 
general provision of health services relative to local needs, and from endemic and 
epidemic disease. The most significant epidemic diseases were sleeping sickness (from 
the early 1930s to 1950), meningitis (from 1939 to 1949), and bovine rinderpest. As I 
discuss in Chapter 4, the campaigns against sleeping sickness and meningitis would be 
the north’s most intensive episodes of human-focused medical activity during the 
136 It was also considered that mass cure campaigns brought additional political benefits, by generating 
support for the colonial administration. See 1933-1934 MDAR, 4, 39; 1945 MDAR, 8. 
137 See, for example, CSO/11/1/336 (1933) Sale of Hoffman La Roche products in the Gold Coast, 
PRAAD Accra; CSO/11/1/433 (1938) Medical products of India, Prohibition of Importation into the 
Gold Coast, PRAAD Accra; CSO/11/18/14 (1940) Drugs of British manufacture, patronage of 
colonial medical depts, PRAAD Accra.
138 See, for example, CSO/11/3/24 (1941-1946) Tablets M&B 693 – Loss of, PRAAD Accra; 
CSO/11/13/16 (1936-1939) Illicit traffic in drugs – control of, PRAAD Accra; CSO/11/13/30 (1943) 
Drugs in the sulphona group – control of sale of, PRAAD Accra; 1942 MDAR, 2; 1938-1939 
MDAR, 4; Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana, 28.
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colonial era. Rinderpest and bovine pleuropneumonia, on the other hand, were 
effectively brought under control in the region by the late 1930s. The north’s first 
medical laboratory and vaccine production facilities were established by 1933 at Pong-
Tamale, in an effort to limit cattle diseases that had killed local herds and also reduced 
the supply of livestock to the coast.139 An intensive rinderpest control programme 
continued in the Northern Territories throughout the 1930s, using vaccine made in the 
region, and the north hosted its first health conference at Pong-Tamale in 1936, when 
Chief Veterinary Officers from West Africa’s British and French colonies met to agree 
their respective responsibilities for vaccinating cattle bound for Accra.140 The 
programme was hailed as a success – here again, the requirements of the southern 
economy had at least partially underpinned the allocation of resources to a particular 
aspect of northern health work.141 It is interesting to consider the effects of the 
rinderpest campaign, as one of the most extensive early regional health programmes, on
the subsequent uptake of medical services in the north. Medical officers observed 
among some cattle-owning communities, forced rinderpest vaccination gave rise to an 
enduring ‘suspicion and mistrust’, as the locally produced vaccine killed around 2 
percent of innoculated cattle.142 
Rinderpest was largely brought under control in the north during the 1930s. 
But although the vaccination campaign had partly been intended to bolster the region’s 
food security, inadequate nutrition remained a central problem across the decade. 
Regular complaints from local officials about famine conditions in the region, and the 
influence of the Health Section of the League of Nations, led to a major nutritional 
139 1933-1934 NTAR, 61; And see also ADM/56/1/208 (1915-1929) Rinderpest cattle disease, 
correspondence, PRAAD Accra; ADM/56/1/231 (1918-1932) Cattle disease, PRAAD Accra; 
CSO/11/14/165 (1932) Village of Tamale near European headquarters at Pong-Tamale – removal of 
to a new site, PRAAD Accra.
140 1936-1937 NTAR, 107.
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142 1934-1935 NTAR, 117; 1937-1938 NTAR, 44.
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survey of the Northern Territories in 1940, conducted by Dr F.M. Purcell.143 As research
by Jérôme Destombes has shown, Purcell’s report revealed widespread starvation and 
malnutrition in the north, with conditions resembling ‘the poorer areas of India’.144 Its 
publication was suppressed by the government at Accra, and details only emerged after 
Purcell himself leaked them to the West African press: officials in Accra had told him 
that ‘nobody must be allowed to starve in the Empire’.145 Purcell’s survey found that 
low food security for northern peoples was determined by their peripheral status and 
lack of purchasing power within the Gold Coast economy, arguing that ‘in the north, 
nowadays food is usually available, but very many can ill afford to buy it’.146 
Beyond sleeping sickness and meningitis, inadequate nutrition and clean 
water constituted the north’s central public health problems during the 1930s and into 
the Second World War, and became a central focus of advocacy by local officials and 
the Gold Coast Medical Department.147  The pressure on existing northern health 
facilities increased rapidly over the decade. By 1934, Tamale hospital was treating 
more than 21,000 patients a year – almost a tenth of all people treated in the Gold Coast
in 1934, and more than the main African hospitals in Kumasi or Accra – and it 
remained one of the colony’s busiest hospitals.148 From the early 1930s the north 
received a gradually increasing allocation of government funds towards general health 
provision, apart from the large sums earmarked by Accra for sleeping sickness and 
rinderpest control. The government’s quinine tablet scheme was extended in to the 
north in 1936, although tablets had to be priced at one-sixth of the cost that the state 
143 1934-1935 MDAR, 7; 1936-1937 NTAR, 86; 1941 MDAR, 2.
144 Quote from article in West Africa (June, 1946) in Destombes, ‘Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal 
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sold them for in the south, an indication of relative northern poverty.149 A large-scale 
yaws treatment campaign was also commenced in the north-east soon after the outbreak
of the Second World War, with its own network of treatment camps and roving 
treatment units.150   
Although there was some expansion in government health services, the 
period from 1929 to 1939 saw the persistence of several north-south divisions 
discussed previously. Official reports continued to inflate the apparent extent of 
northern health provision by listing medical facilities that did not exist, or by claiming 
that southern sanitary initiatives had also been applied in the north. In 1935, for 
example, the Medical Department suggested that the occurrence of epidemic meningitis
(a disease almost exclusively of the north) had been reduced through a programme 
aimed at encouraging people to install louvred windows in their houses, a measure 
which had certainly not been taken up in the north by that time.151  From 1929 to 1934, 
the annual reports claimed that there were five government dispensaries offering basic 
treatments and medicines to rural communities in the north, but two of the claimed 
facilities were temporary mobile dispensaries which had broken down and become 
inoperable.152  In some years during the 1930s there were no recommendations made 
for sanitary work in the Northern Territories, at a time when other regions listed 
numerous major projects, and funds that were allocated (on paper) to improved 
drinking water provision were never made available for local spending.153 
The north was also still seen as a zone of disease, which posed a threat to the 
south even as it supplied essential labour. Successive reports noted the almost 
universally poor health of labour migrants from the north, who were found to 
149 1936-1937 MDAR, 5.
150 1944 MDAR, 2.
151 1935-1936 MDAR, 18.
152 1928 MDAR, 42–43; 1931-1932 MDAR, 111; 85; 1932-1933 MDAR, 5.
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‘generally arrive in an undernourished or diseased condition’.154 The Accra government 
continued to devote substantial resources to maintaining a sanitary curtain that had 
been raised between the north and Ashanti: in 1936, nearly 40,000 ‘half-starved 
creatures’ were examined and ‘disinfested’ on the Great North Road, which linked the 
Northern Territories to the south’s producing regions.155 The development of the motor 
transport network, which improved the flow of labour but also increased the threat from
northern disease, was a source of constant medical concern in Accra, although it was 
perhaps an even more effective conduit for southern diseases to the north.156 The 
incidence of tuberculosis in the Northern Territories continued to rise as migrant 
workers returned from the south and disseminated the disease into resident northern 
communities, and syphilis – now known by northerners as the ‘Kumasi Sickness’ – 
became increasingly prevalent north of Ashanti.157 
Advocacy and Native Authority Healthcare
Against these continued difficulties, however, the north of the 1930s also 
witnessed one of the most significant expansions in the provision of local health 
services anywhere in the Gold Coast. This was the creation of the Native Authority 
health system, which followed the region’s turn to indirect rule – it was developed in 
collaboration with northern health officials, who became increasingly direct and 
explicit in their criticism of Accra’s neglect of the region.  The pre-depression advocacy
of the 1920s (on the part of individual British officials in the north) re-emerged with 
new vigour in the 1930s, and criticism of the Accra government was informed by the 
154 1938-1939 MDAR, 4.
155 1937-1938 MDAR, 29.
156 See, for example, 1935-1936 MDAR, 5; 1937-1938 MDAR, 29.
157 1937-1938 NTAR, 75–77.
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‘developmental’ shift which emerged from inter-war internationalism and the 1929 
Colonial Development Act. In 1934, the north’s annual report observed:
Now that the policy of working for the moral and material advancement of the 
natives of the country under our trusteeship has been substituted for that of 
putting first and foremost the benefit of European trade and the production of 
raw materials for export, a certain amount of progress, little though it may be, 
can be recorded.158  
Indirect rule and Native Authority in colonial Africa have been the focus of 
academic and popular criticism, often concerned with the illegitimacy and venality of 
the institutions created when Britain transferred a measure of power to its preferred 
African leaders, based on their assumed connections to pre-colonial authority.  
Mahmood Mamdani’s well-known study proposes that indirect rule created a set of 
‘decentralised despotisms’ with little popular legitimacy, which maintained the 
impositions of colonial rule whilst extending new modes of coercion over African 
peoples, particularly through the entrenchment of patrimonialism.159 Terence Ranger 
argued that some indirect rule traditions were largely ‘invented’ as part of the 
hybridizing encounter between colonial-era Africans and Europeans, with leaders 
chosen in light of a ‘customary’ authority constructed by the British.160 Mamdani’s 
‘decentralised despotisms’ and Ranger’s ‘invented traditions’ were both represented in 
the Northern Territories’ transition to indirect rule, although the extent of both invention
and despotism varied considerably.  But there are other perspectives from which to 
assess the transition to Native Authority, evident in the sources for the colonial north. 
Here the Native Authorities emerge as relatively effective antagonists in a battle for 
158 1934-1935 NTAR, 108.
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(Basingstoke: Macmillan, in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1993), 62.
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improved local health services, prepared to allocate expenditures to areas of healthcare 
that had been neglected under centralised British administration. 
The institution of indirect rule in the Northern Territories followed a different
course from the southern Gold Coast, where prolonged disputes over traditional rights 
and jurisprudence impeded British plans to devolve local administration.161 In the north 
Native Authorities were only created from 1930, and the local British administration 
maintained control both over who qualified as a ‘customary’ leader, and the degree to 
which ongoing rule could be based on tradition – it was argued that ‘the principle 
differs fundamentally from that on which the Native Administration Ordinance of the 
Colony appears to rest’.162  Having observed the south’s earlier transition, the Northern 
Territories government argued that its revised approach to indirect rule was necessary 
for Native Authority councils ‘to perform their duties with a proper sense of service to 
those over whom they are placed in charge’.163 The new authorities, perhaps shaped by 
this maintenance of control over leaders and their legal capabilities, and motivated by 
the low penetration of existing government institutions, rapidly expanded to take on 
roles that in the south were fulfilled by various colonial departments, both in health and
education.164 Crucially, the Native Authority bureaucracies were not dependent on the 
Accra government’s largesse. They had their own treasuries, were able to raise and 
spend revenues locally, and were staffed by northerners, who appear to have been more 
responsive to problems with health and disease affecting their communities. 
Health services immediately became a priority of the region’s new Native 
Authorities, following their establishment from 1930 to 1934. Their central 
161 See R. S. Gocking, ‘Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast: Competition for Office and the Invention of 
Tradition’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 28, no. 3 (1994): 421; Brukum, ‘Northern 
Territories under British Rule’, 280–91.
162 1937-1938 NTAR, 6–8.
163 Ibid.
164 For a discussion of northern Native Authorities and education, see Thomas, ‘Education in Northern 
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achievement was the rapid creation of a network of rural dispensaries and smaller 
treatment centres, providing basic drugs and outpatient treatments for common 
diseases, and acting as surveillance posts for the spread of epidemic sickness. Ten 
Native Authority (NA) dispensaries were built between 1934 and 1937, and local 
British officials argued that the developments ‘provided an excellent illustration of the 
value of local government. The Native Administrations in the Protectorate, having 
funds at their disposal, completed the buildings as rapidly as the Medical Department 
was able to supply tin’.165 In that year, the north’s NA dispensary network treated more 
than 26,000 people, even though most dispensaries had only been open for a matter of 
months.166 At an average cost of £300 to build, the dispensaries represented a 
significant investment in local health by contributing communities, with more than 
£3,600 spent on structures alone over the first three years of NA operation.167 As a 
comparison, in 1936 the central government’s total allocation for regular medical and 
sanitary expenditures for the north was £1,640, although it voted a vastly greater sum 
(£7,653) for the campaign against sleeping sickness in the region, in part because the 
disease threatened the south and its labour supply.168 The number of patients treated at 
the north’s government hospitals began to decline as NA dispensaries were built and 
people were able to obtain healthcare closer to their homes. At Tamale Hospital, for 
example, the number of new outpatients fell from 18,411 in 1935 to 12,253 in 1937.169 
By 1938 there were 16 NA dispensaries and several additional treatment centres 
operating in the Northern Territories, while there were only nine comparable NA 
facilities across the rest of the Gold Coast.170  
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The construction of these rural facilities was accompanied by a rapid 
expansion in the local training of NA medical personnel. From 1934, the north’s native 
authorities contributed to a scheme for training ‘village overseers’, in charge of rural 
sanitation, by sending them to an existing school at Kumasi.171 In 1937, a larger School 
of Sanitation was built at Tamale using NA funds, ‘to train literate boys, recruited and 
paid by the Native Administrations, to supervise the work of the illiterate village 
overseers’.172 The Native Authorities also funded a scheme for training NA dressers in 
Tamale – the training included administering injections against yaws, treatments for 
round worm and scabies, and basic wound dressings.173 These dressers returned to their 
respective NA districts and began a programme of travelling health provision, with 
occasional inspections and supervision from British medical officers. They were hailed 
as an immediate success, particularly in delivering yaws injections to communities that 
lay beyond the reach of existing government healthcare. In 1937, for example, it was 
observed that a single travelling NA dresser in the Wa district had treated 1,170 people 
for yaws over the course of a month, with 75 percent completing the required course of 
four ‘sobita’ (sodium bismuth tartrate) injections. The government hospital in Wa had 
only treated 455 people for the disease over the same period, and only two had 
completed a full course. ‘So satisfied is the [medical director] with the work and 
potential value of the dressers,’ reported the north’s Chief Commissioner, ‘that he now 
proposes to enlarge their course of training so as to include vaccination, quinine 
propaganda and village sanitation’.174 
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172 1937-1938 NTAR, 77; 1940 MDAR, 16; and see NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enclosure 13 p. 28, 
‘Noted on a Meeting with the Director of Medical Services’, Undated 1949; and Enc.15: Letter from 
TA Mead, Chief Commissioner Northern Territories, to Asst. Director Medical Services, Tamale, 3 
October 1951.
173 1937-1938 NTAR, 69, 77; 1936-1937 NTAR, 16; 1934-1935 NTAR, 86.
174 1937-1938 NTAR, 69.
89
As they expanded physical medical facilities and basic health provision, the 
Native Authorities were also drawn into engagement with other northern health needs. 
Because the north had no network of post offices, which were used to distribute 
government quinine tablets in the south, NAs assumed responsibility for the scheme in 
1936. As the price of quinine in the south steadily increased, to eight shillings per tube 
of 15 tablets at the outbreak of the war,  the same tablets dispensed by northern Native 
Authorities remained on sale at the low price of one shilling per tube.175 The NAs 
helped to organise ‘poor relief’ during the late 1930s, when the cocoa hold-up caused 
mass unemployment among northern labour migrants.176 They also became a pivotal 
part of the northern medical department’s strategy for disease control. By the mid-
1930s, when there were only five British medical officers permanently stationed in the 
north, the bulk of the region’s active health staff was employed with NA funds. This 
staff, which comprised a mix of sanitary and medical personnel, in addition to NA 
labourers without medical training, was central to control and treatment programmes 
against sleeping sickness, epidemic meningitis and smallpox from 1933 until the early 
1950s.177 Native Authorities provided workers and funding for the bush-clearing teams 
operated by the Tsetse Control Department, and administered a network of camps 
where those infected with sleeping sickness could receive treatment.178 During the 
meningitis epidemics of 1939-1949, the NAs were similarly responsible for disease 
surveillance, maintaining a network of isolation camps, and for directly treating people 
with sulphonamide drugs. Their work in drug distribution was seen as pivotal to the 
success of the control campaigns, in which sulphonamides reduced the average 
mortality rate from 80 percent to 10 percent of people infected: the medical officer in 
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charge of the 1945 meningitis campaign reported that ‘the most noteworthy feature, one
whose effect was marked, was the handing over of responsibility to the Chiefs’.179  
Officials also commended the work done by Native Authorities to improve 
village sanitation and drinking water supplies. ‘Everywhere the villages are crying out 
for improved water supplies and the Native Administration is showing a commendable 
desire to answer appeals, even where the village concerned is far from its 
headquarters’, observed the north’s 1934 Annual Report. In that year thirty new wells 
were dug with NA funds, and a number of large dams were built, some supplying more 
than thirty villages each.180 Officials in the north increasingly criticised the Accra 
government’s ‘belated realization’ that clean water was a central requirement for 
improved northern health; their advocacy eventually lead to the short-lived creation of 
the Northern Territories Water Supply Section in 1937. These officials pointed out that 
by 1937, the Mamprusi and Dagomba Native Authorities had already committed £600 
to privately employ a European engineer to develop proposals for clean water provision
in their districts.181 This was part of a total allocation of £9,355 made by the north’s 
various Native Authorities that year towards expenditures on ‘health’ alone (including 
village sanitation and related training and salary costs, but excluding the dispensary 
system). ‘The Government vote for village sanitation,’ observed one northern official, 
‘is £664 for the whole Protectorate’.182   
These details indicate the success of some aspects of Native Authority health 
provision, and the renewed criticism of Accra by local officials during the 1930s. The 
growing NA healthcare system was roundly praised by members of the colony’s 
179 CO/859/108 (1945) Cerebro-spinal meningitis, Gold Coast, TNA London, Enc. 2: Typed note, 9 
August 1945; And for extensive details of NA involvement in epidemic control, see also CO/96/762 
(1939) ‘Outbreak of cerebro-spinal meningitis’, TNA London; CO/96/798 (1949) Outbreak of 
Smallpox and Cerebrospinal Meningitis, TNA London.
180 1934-1935 NTAR, 96–97.
181 1936-1937 NTAR, 30–38.
182 Ibid., 59.
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medical community, and the Accra medical department increasingly became an ally in 
advocacy for issues of northern health. The success of northern NA initiatives appears 
to have emboldened the region’s medical and political officers, already motivated by 
the new discourse and idioms of colonial development, in raising criticisms that had 
previously been made obliquely, if at all. In his study of healthcare in Ghana as a 
whole, Arhinful argues that Native Authority health provision was a ‘cosmetic’ and 
ineffectual response to rural health problems.183 But for the Northern Territories this 
assessment is incorrect. There, the turn to Native Authority brought a clear 
improvement in people’s access to healthcare, as suggested in the following quotes 
from British officials:
Little progress can be reported in rural sanitation during the year save in the 
Northern Territories, where a real advance is apparent. Here the Native 
Administration has made a good start on sound lines, and there is a very good 
prospect of a satisfactory sanitary standard being reached in the course of a few 
years.184
In the last five years there has been a tremendous increase in the provision of 
facilities for medical treatment, improvement in village sanitation, and water 
supplies.185
The fall in the [total number of recorded out-patients in the Gold Coast] is most 
probably due to the establishment of the village dispensary system in the north. 
These dispensaries, which are very popular, are no doubt dealing with a number 
of patients who would formerly have had to travel to a larger centre.186
The progress made [in medical provision] in the Northern Territories ... is 
largely due to the sound development there of Native Administrations, and 
affords an example worthy of emulation by the rest of the Colony.187
The Native Administrations do take an interest in Health measures … not only 
in insisting that rules are enforced, but in building a Dispensary, paying for the 
training and subsequent services of a travelling dispenser, and organising village
sanitation throughout the area.188  
183 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 42–45.
184 1936-1937 MDAR, 31.
185 1936-1937 NTAR, 71–73.
186 1936-1937 MDAR, 39.
187 Ibid., 40.
188 1936-1937 NTAR, 65.
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Our hope and trust must lie with the NA Dispensaries. These dispensaries will 
allow of the people getting regular and complete courses of treatment for 
disease.189  
The Northern Territories have seen the greatest advance in native administration
so far recorded in the history of the Gold Coast. Between the years 1902 and 
1932 there was little or no alteration in the legislation affecting the lives of the 
people of the Northern Territories ... This fact discloses the attitude of 
Government towards the people of the Protectorate. They were regarded as an 
amiable but backward people, useful as soldiers, policemen and labourers in the 
mines and cocoa farms; in short fit only to be hewers of wood and drawers of 
water for their brothers in the Colony and Ashanti.190
At least eighty per centum of [northern people given medical care] would not 
have received treatment but for the existence of the dispensaries. They are 
unquestionably a great boon to the people.191
Great progress can be reported in the Northern Territories, under the aegis of the
Native Administration, in all branches of rural sanitation. This steady advance is
most encouraging, and the progress already made should act as a stimulus to the
rest of the Gold Coast.192
No section of the Gold Coast’s population is in more urgent need of medical 
attention, than are the people of the Protectorate ... On reference to the map 
accompanying this report it will be realised how inadequate were the medical 
facilities [previously provided].193
The progress made by [The Dagomba Native Authority] has enabled them to 
obtain benefits which they would probably never have received, if they had 
waited on Government generosity.194
These quotes, at once critical of the Accra government and praising of the 
Native Authorities, indicate the success of the NA health system, and how it was seen 
locally as a way of overcoming southern neglect. From the available sources, it is 
difficult to gauge the extent to which the rapid expansion of Native Authority 
healthcare was the result of direction from northern officials – who now had a means to
enact proposals that had been refused when funding was centralised – and to what 
189 1936-1937 MDAR, 86.
190 1937-1938 NTAR, 2–3.
191 Ibid., 71.
192 1938-1939 MDAR, 36.
193 1937-1938 MDAR, 69.
194 1935-1936 NTAR, 30.
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extent it emerged from the actions and planning of African communities and their 
chiefs in the north. Both groups appear to have played an important part; the turn to 
indirect rule granted a new agency to local British officials and northern communities 
in the provision of healthcare, which had previously been dependent on decisions taken
in the south. 
This did not mean that the system was without problems. It is striking to 
think of the broader social and economic power which was conferred on Native 
Authority chiefs, and their assemblies of local elites, by giving them responsibility for 
the treatment of disease and the provision of health facilities: how medical power (or 
biopower) must have bolstered the institutions of indirect rule. As I discuss in Chapter 
3, this was similar to the enduring medical power conferred on missions and church 
groups in the independence era. During some disease outbreaks the Native Authorities 
were given the authority to determine who lived and died – notably during the 1945 
meningitis epidemic, when northern medical officers decided that sulphonamide 
antibacterials (the only available cure) would be distributed by the chiefs themselves. 
To obtain further treatment or care at medical facilities, the families of those infected 
had to first apply to their Native Authority leadership, who would decide whether they 
received the drugs and a referral to a treatment camp.195 
In another instance, during the 1939 meningitis epidemic, Native Authorities 
in the north-east imposed a quarantine cordon around the town of Bawku, preventing 
people from accessing their farms and traders from entering the settlement, leading to 
localised famine.196 The NAs passed their own quarantine regulations during the 
sleeping sickness epidemic of the 1930s, allowing them to imprison people for three 
195 See CO/859/108 (1945), Enc. 3: Report on the late stages of an epidemic of cerebrospinal 
meningitis, NTs, March to June 1945; GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 
11–12; 1945 MDAR, 6.
196 1937-1938 NTAR, 75–77.
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months and to forcibly administer a course of tryparsamide injections, which carried a 
high risk of blindness as a side-effect.197 Some Native Authority courts made 
enthusiastic use of sanitary fines as a means of raising revenues, replicating the 
approach of earlier Northern Territories administrations, and there were occasional 
indications of the nepotism and patrimonialism identified by Mamdani.198 Nevertheless,
the Native Authorities of the 1930s oversaw the creation of what was, at that time, 
almost the entire rural health infrastructure of the north. 
In 1934, the Northern Territories Chief Commissioner wrote that ‘it is to be 
hoped that the endeavours of the people to help themselves will be rewarded by the 
grant of generous assistance, either by the central government or from the Colonial 
Development Fund’.199 But perhaps because of the very success of Native Authority 
healthcare initiatives, no additional health funds were granted to the region during the 
1930s. Instead the Accra government’s budgetary allocations for the north were 
directed almost entirely at epidemic sleeping sickness. The NA healthcare system 
persisted for some years after the Second World War, but it was undermined in the 
1950s as the new African-led government in Accra sought to centralise the control of 
medical training. Before this, by 1939 there were already attempts to restrict northern 
Native Authority control of health services, which were considered to have expanded 
beyond the capacity for supervision by the central government. This met with 
resistance from the northern officials who had advocated for the health system’s 
expansion. With what seems to be a note of irony, the NTs 1939 annual report 
concluded: ‘Perhaps it is a matter for congratulation, that we have prevented them from
197 Ibid., 9.
198 1934-1935 NTAR, 86; and see, for example, 1938-1939 NTAR, 5–20; 1936-1937 NTAR, 23.
199 1934-1935 NTAR, 96–97.
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running the risk of having a bad fall by trying to walk, before they can creep 
properly’.200
The Second World War and northern health
Although the Native Authority health system declined from the late 1940s, 
the development of northern healthcare was more immediately restricted by the Second 
World War.  As conflict in Europe became imminent, some war-related developments 
brought ancillary health benefits. The Tamale Broadcast Station was opened in 1937, to
convince its listeners (those that had access to radio news through Native Authorities or
in urban centres) ‘that wars and the preparations for war are not the only interest of the 
inhabitants of European countries’.201 Wendell Holbrook has shown that the Gold 
Coast’s war-time broadcasting service was increasingly used to disseminate 
information about general health and disease control measures, including for the north’s
meningitis epidemics, and that it trained a core of African operators who would be 
instrumental in post-independence health information campaigns.202 Military recruiting 
also helped to draw attention to ongoing health problems in the north, particular the 
widespread famine that would be recognised in Purcell’s censored report of 1940.203 As 
David Killingray has observed, although the north was a focus of British recruiting 
(with many soldiers send to fight in the Burma campaign), its men had the Gold Coast’s
highest rejection rates on grounds of poor health, and recruiting had to be halted in the 
far north after some areas were considered ‘depleted’.204  Elderly members of Dagomba
communities near Tamale recalled that the meningitis epidemics of 1939-1945 were 
200 1938-1939 NTAR, 57.
201 1937-1938 NTAR, 50.
202 GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 9–11; and Holbrook, ‘British 
Propaganda’, 347–61.
203 See, for example, 1941 MDAR, 2–4.
204 1943 MDAR, 5; David Killingray, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast During the 
Second World War’, Journal of African History 23, no. 1 (1982): 83–95.
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enlisted as part of British recruitment propaganda – they were told that meningitis had 
been carried to the region in the ‘smoke’ from bombs dropped by Adolf Hitler.205
As the war intensified, spending on healthcare in the Gold Coast was cut 
back. The annual medical reports were reduced to six pages in length over the war 
years, from an average of more than 60 pages a year over the preceding decade, and 
significant staffing losses were recorded across all areas of the health service – the 
government passed a law allowing ‘unqualified persons’ to dispense drugs and provide 
treatments.206 In 1943, quinine became unavailable in the colony as it was requisitioned 
for troops in Asia, with a rapid increase in people requiring treatment for malaria, and 
Defence Regulations subsequently restricted the possession and sale of sulphonamide 
drugs.207 The ambitious plans of the new Northern Territories Water Supply Section, 
seen as the solution to a range of health problems, were shelved at the outbreak of the 
war, and various rural sanitation projects and dispensaries were closed.208 ‘Critical’ staff
shortages limited the ability of northern medical services to supervise control 
campaigns during the outbreaks of smallpox and meningitis that took place from 1939-
1949, and many quarantine measures were imposed independently by the Native 
Authorities or military units stationed in the region.209 By the time of the 1945 
meningitis epidemic, control of the north’s treatment camps had devolved to ‘anyone 
available’: even ‘a schoolboy on holiday’ might be called on to manage an entire 
camp.210 The war brought down a curtain on the expansion of rural health services that 
205 Group.18: Dagomba Community 3, Pong-Tamale, Interview, Northern Region, 11 August 2015; 
Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview, Northern Region, 10 August 2015.
206 1939 MDAR, 2; 1940 MDAR, 1–2; 1941 MDAR, 2.
207 1943 MDAR, 1–4; 1942 MDAR, 2; 1945 MDAR, 5.
208 See Chapter 6 on Guinea Worm, and 1941 MDAR, 6; 1942 MDAR, 1–3; 1943 MDAR, 6.
209 See CO/96/762 (1939), Encs.6-15: Undated handwritten notes April-May 1939; and Enc.16: 
‘Cerebrospinal Meningitis’, memorandum from Deputy Director of Health Services, 17 July 1939; 
GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 10–11; And see also CO/859/108 
(1945); 1945 MDAR, 1, 4–6.
210 GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 11.
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had taken place under Native Authorities during the 1930s, and the general neglect of 
northern facilities and infrastructure during the war, particularly the region’s road 
network, created problems for the slow restoration of health services which took place 
after 1945. 
However, after the war there was also a sudden increase in the funding and 
attention given to the north by Accra, principally for agricultural schemes aimed at 
boosting nutrition and export production, such as the large scale Gonja Development 
Project, discussed by Jeff Grischow.211 These developments represented a step-change 
in the north’s colonial-era fortunes, but they were more concretely a part of the 
independence transition itself. Post-war spending on northern healthcare was made with
an eye on rising nationalism across the Gold Coast, in the years following the Accra 
riots of 1948. For this reason the period after the Second World War is discussed in 
Chapter 3, which examines key developments across the independence transition, from 
1945 to the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966.
Conclusion
Several persistent themes characterised the development of northern 
healthcare from 1902 to 1945, over most years of British rule in the Northern 
Territories. First, there was the continued divergence of the north and south in terms of 
the net provision of health services to African peoples, whether at fixed facilities or 
through campaigns of treatment and health education.  Across this first 43-year period, 
two wars and two depressions slowed the expansion of health services in both regions. 
But the north experienced more extensive relative cuts to its fixed facilities and 
staffing, and services remained depressed for longer periods. When economic problems
211 Grischow, ‘Late Colonial Development’.
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threatened the Gold Coast, in other words, their health impacts were often pushed north
to the periphery, onto a population with less economic power and hence less political 
leverage in the colonial system – a replication of the way these global problems were 
displaced from Britain to its colonial margins. The north was integrated into the Gold 
Coast economy as a supplier of migrant labour, which further undermined the region’s 
agricultural economy, and perhaps also reduced the constituency of young, resident 
men who might have pressed the government for improved local health services. 
Because the north generated no revenues from export production, the government at 
Accra had little economic motive to seek to improve conditions there, as long as 
sufficient northern labour was available in the south. The Northern Territories was seen 
as a region ‘which imposes a burden upon the Gold Coast for which it makes no 
adequate return’.212 Fears about the spread of northern disease rose as the Territories 
became increasingly important to the southern economy, and the central government 
spent money to improve the south’s epidemiological defences against contamination 
from the region, with networks of disinfesting camps and inspection points on the main 
linking roads. Northerners in the south became associated with disease, which they 
often contracted under conditions of poverty in the south itself. 
Against this grim, economically deterministic picture, however, the north also
saw rising advocacy for the improvement of healthcare on moral or humanitarian 
grounds, on the part of local British officials who were aware of the poor state of health
in northern communities. The voices of these communities and their leaders are sadly 
almost entirely absent from the available sources for this period. In the 1930s, when 
central government funding for healthcare remained low after the Great Depression, 
local British officials and the newly created Native Authorities, using money raised 
212 1918 NTAR, 2–3.
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locally, found a way to rapidly expand the north’s rural health provision. The NA health
system demonstrated the essential role of local initiative and innovation in the face of 
southern neglect, and its success led to calls for the system to be emulated across the 
colony. This pattern would be repeated several times over the next 65 years: a 
successful locally-generated northern initiative, born of necessity, would become a 
blueprint for health services across Ghana. In 1938, a political officer posted in the 
north observed that innovation of this kind was essential for the region, because of ‘an 
isolation which is inevitable, so long as the Protectorate is separated from the seat of 
Government by so valuable a crop as cocoa’.213   
213 1937-1938 NTAR, 38.
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CHAPTER 2
Health in the hinterland: sleeping sickness and tsetse control
– 
From the broader discussion of colonial-era health institutions in northern 
Ghana, this chapter turns to closer examination of a single prominent disease of the 
colonial period, sleeping sickness, and its related control campaigns. Beyond its 
immediate conclusions about the nature of colonial sleeping sickness control in the 
north, the chapter is also linked with Chapter 4, on onchocerciasis. The two diseases are
linked by the nature of the campaigns against them: the colonial campaign against 
sleeping sickness inadvertently exposed people to onchocerciasis, contributing to an 
emergent public health crisis at the moment of independence. Across the century, the 
control programmes against sleeping sickness and onchocerciasis illuminate the 
changing relationship of the peripheral north to the centres of medical authority in 
Ghana and beyond: the colonial and postcolonial health administrations in Accra, 
transnational organisations like the WHO, and charitable organisations which at times 
had an influence on northern Ghana's healthcare system.  
The sleeping sickness and anti-tsetse fly campaign was the most extensive 
and sustained disease-control initiative in the north during the colonial period, 
operating between 1933 and 1957, while successive onchocerciasis control campaigns 
operated from the early 1950s until the end of the period under study – including the 
transnational Onchocerciasis Control Programme (a joint collaboration between 
independent Ghana, the WHO and the World Bank), which ran from 1974 to 2002. The 
recognition of sleeping sickness as a public health emergency in the north, and the 
resultant anti-tsetse campaign, were both shaped by the north's peripheral position in 
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the Gold Coast and broader imperial economy. The region remained on the political 
margins after independence, but the onchocerciasis campaign situated the north very 
centrally in another system of transnational medicine and donor fund-raising – 
sometimes construed as a neocolonial perpetuation of colonial power relationships, but 
which differed significantly from colonial-era interventions in the region’s health.1 
Together the two diseases and campaigns indicate the shift in healthcare priorities that 
took place across the transition to independence, while revealing continuities in the way
that northern Ghana and its peoples were perceived both nationally and internationally. 
The two campaigns also show the profound effects that disease control work could 
have on the physical and social environments of the region, particularly on riverine 
ecology and patterns of settlement. 
The social history of medical work in northern Ghana is another focus of the 
overall thesis. For the colonial period, work on sleeping sickness and onchocerciasis 
shows how gaps in medical knowledge gave rise to serious public health problems in 
the north – these lacunae were sustained by the conflicting imperatives of colonial 
administration, by the economic marginality of the north, and by research and treatment
priorities that were sometimes determined by metropolitan rather than local concerns. A
focus on the colonial period (with its relatively accessible archive) has meant that 
historians of Ghana have not regularly explored the connections between disease events
before and after independence.  These two linked chapters chart connections between 
the colonial trypanosomiasis campaign and the high incidence of onchocerciasis at 
independence, a public health catastrophe that only became the focus of systematic 
control efforts in 1974. 
1 See, for example, Thomas Akwasi Aidoo, ‘Rural Health under Colonialism and Neocolonialism: A 
Survey of the Ghanaian Experience’, International Journal of Health Services 12, no. 4 (1 October 
1982): 637–57; Mario Alejandro Valdez, ‘Neo-Colonial Epidemiology: Public Health Practice and 
the Right to Health in Guatemala’ (Thesis, University of Washington, 2013), ch.1.
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There were two approaches to sleeping sickness control in the north. A drug 
treatment campaign, based around a network of isolation camps, was accompanied by a
more enduring and expansive anti-tsetse campaign against the disease’s insect vector, 
involving the systematic clearance of riverine forests. Control work began in the mid-
1930s, following the belated official recognition of a sleeping sickness epidemic in the 
region. Northern peripherality contributed to a failure to recognise the significance of 
sleeping sickness in the north at an earlier stage, after local medical officers first raised 
concerns in the 1920s, and shaped the subsequent development of each control 
initiative. The Accra government allocated increasing resources to local control work as
epidemic sleeping sickness reduced the southwards labour supply, and directed the bulk
of its funding towards a plan that promised to increase agricultural production and 
boost revenues from the region, by resettling northern communities into valleys that 
had apparently been ‘freed’ from disease.
Sleeping sickness
Although it may seem illogical, in this thesis I have chosen to use the 
common name for one disease, sleeping sickness, while keeping the scientific name for 
the other, onchocerciasis. This is because onchocerciasis is known widely by northern 
Ghanaians as 'oncho', a result of the 1974-2002 WHO campaign.2 Its common name, 
'river blindness' was coined by a charitable organisation working in the north in the 
1950s, to facilitate fundraising and advocacy work in Britain. The term 'sleeping 
sickness' presents its own problems: in community interviews held long after the 
disease had ceased to pose a significant problem in the north, people sometimes 
2 See Chapter 5
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thought we were asking about general laziness. But the term is still used in northern 
Ghana, although each local language has its own name for disease.
African sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) is an infectious parasitic illness 
which attacks both humans and animals, causing either human sleeping sickness or the 
disease called 'nagana' in both wild and domesticated animals. In both cases the 
causative agents are microscopic protozoan organisms called trypanosomes, spread by 
the bite of blood-sucking flies in the genus Glossina, often known as 'tsetse' flies. There
are several species of tsetse fly, and several species of trypanosome. The two species 
that cause disease in humans are Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense, found in east and 
southern Africa, which causes an acute form of the disease that kills within weeks, and 
Trypanosoma brucei gambiense, which causes the chronic form that affects people in 
West Africa, taking an average of three years between infection and death without 
treatment.3 The trypanosomes and the fly are distributed in an east-west band across 
sub-Saharan Africa, from the 14th parallel (southern Niger), to the 20th parallel (northern
Namibia).4
The common English term for the animal disease, Nagana, is taken from the 
Zulu, Ngana, meaning 'weak' or 'useless', indicating the symptoms it produced in 
livestock. Infected animals become progressively anaemic and lethargic, followed by 
death in some species, and cannot be used for ploughing or transport.5 In humans, the 
trypanosome enters the circulatory system after infection from a tsetse bite, and the 
haemolymphatic stage of the disease begins, causing fever, headache, severe itching 
and visible swelling of the lymph glands.  At the second, neurological stage of the 
disease, the organism crosses the blood-brain barrier and begins to destroy the nervous 
3 Reto Brun et al., ‘Human African Trypanosomiasis’, Lancet 375, no. 9709 (9 January 2010): 148.
4 Dietmar Steverding, ‘The History of African Trypanosomiasis’, Parasites & Vectors 1 (12 February 
2008): 3.
5 Pierre Fenelle, ‘African Animal Trypanosomiasis’, World Animal Review 7. (1973): 1-6, hosted at  
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ah809e/AH809E02.htm, accessed 12 July 2016.
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system. The progression of symptoms varies, but often includes tremors, limb paralysis,
speech disorders, excessive salivation, psychotic reactions, and periods of aggression or
intense apathy and inactivity. A principal symptom of the disease is its disruption of the
circadian sleep/wake rhythm, meaning that sufferers fall asleep uncontrollably at 
irregular intervals. Untreated trypanosomiasis invariably progresses to coma and death.6
Northern sleeping sickness in the early colonial period, 1900-1925
Patterson and Scott have argued that sleeping sickness did not assume 
epidemic proportions or present a major public health problem in the Gold Coast before
the 1930s, but there are indications that the disease was more widespread in the north 
than has previously been recognised.7 British medics working in the Gold Coast were 
by this time aware of sleeping sickness as a serious health risk: there had been 
epidemics in other parts of colonial Africa, and research in the early 1900s had linked 
the disease with the parasitic trypanosome and the tsetse fly.8 But the Gold Coast 
Medical Department remained oriented towards diseases at the coast, while the duties 
of northern medical officers, which included managing the district prisons, meant they 
had little time or inclination to travel and record diseases among northern peoples. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the coast-focused nature of medical surveillance was 
demonstrated in 1908, when a small outbreak of plague in Accra (336 cases and 228 
deaths) drew in the majority of the Gold Coast's medical labour and special-measures 
6 Brun et al., ‘Human African Trypanosomiasis’, 149.
7 Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana, 44-45; Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, 138-145.
8 Maryinez Lyons, ‘Sleeping Sickness Epidemics and Public Health in the Belgian Congo’, in 
Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. David Arnold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), ch.5; Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of 
Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2011), ch.4; Steverding, 
‘African Trypanosomiasis’, 3-5.
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budget, in the same year as an epidemic of cerebrospinal meningitis (approximately 
20,000 deaths) devastated northern communities to comparatively little interest.9
Although the main focus of this chapter is the northern sleeping sickness 
epidemic that took place after the First World War, there are many indications that the 
disease was on the rise before this time. In 1906, after a case was confirmed at 
Gambaga in the north-east, a Medical Officer reported that sleeping sickness was 
prevalent in the northern savanna, observing that ‘the cases of sleeping sickness coming
under notice are an infinitesimal proportion to the actual cases which occur’.10 In 1908 
it was recognised that sleeping sickness was widespread in parts of German Togoland, 
and surveillance was increased across the colony.11 Cases were discovered in both 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories, with indications that infection in the north was 
more prevalent than the number of recorded cases suggested.12  A British medical 
officer contracted the disease, one of 12 MOs stationed in the north at the time, perhaps
giving a crude indication of infection rates among less-protected African 
communities.13 But control measures and expenditures in this period were directed 
entirely at Ashanti and the Colony, and not at the north. Two fly-proof hospitals were 
built, in the east at Anum and along Ashanti's border with the Northern Territories at 
Kintampo, and in 1910 the colony voted a total of £3,572 for sleeping sickness control 
measures, relative to a total annual medical budget of £44,981.14 These control budgets 
were allocated entirely to Ashanti and the Colony: a further indication of the early 
marginality of the north, even at a time when colonial administrators considered it to be
9 See Chapter 1
10 1906 MDAR, 9.
11 1908 MDAR, 5.
12 Particularly since reports from the north were limited to dying individuals who were brought for 
treatment at formal facilities, unlike the more extensive village surveys then underway in Ashanti. 
13 1909 MDAR, 5 and Appendix III – Medical Report on the Northern Territories for 1909.
14 1910 MDAR, 15; 1911 MDAR, 6; This adjusts to approximately £3 million in 2016 pounds. See 
http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue.php, accessed 4 March 2016.
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an area of revenue-generating potential. Early public health decisions of this kind may 
have entrenched the marginalisation of the region, as public health facilities were built 
to defend against the southwards ingress of northern disease.15
In 1910, the annual medical report concluded that ‘the seriousness and the 
possibilities of Sleeping Sickness, as far as the Gold Coast is concerned, are now well 
recognized, and every effort is being made to cope with a situation that at first sight 
strikes one as being well-nigh superhuman’.16 In 1911 the United Kingdom concluded a
formal agreement with Germany, ‘with a view to the more effectual combating of the 
disease known as sleeping sickness in the Gold Coast Colony, the Ashanti Protectorate, 
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, and in Togoland’.17 The agreement provided 
for intensified investigations of the disease and improved programmes of treatment, 
closure of borders and trade, and restrictions on the movement of African subjects. It 
suggests that sleeping sickness in the early twentieth-century Gold Coast had a greater 
impact – or was at least perceived to be a greater threat – than has been recognised by 
prior scholarship.
Over the following decade, however, official interest in sleeping sickness 
lapsed almost completely. The Gold Coast government commissioned an extensive 
survey of the Ashanti region by Allan Kinghorn, later acclaimed for his research on the 
link between the tsetse fly and the acute East African form of trypanosomiasis. The 
survey concluded that the disease did not pose a threat to public health, although what 
it more concretely demonstrated was that sleeping sickness did not imperil the 
economic heartlands of Ashanti and the Colony: it made no observations about the 
disease in the Northern Territories. There were no investigations in the north before the 
15 1911 MDAR, 6.
16 1910 MDAR, 34.
17 ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany with Regard to Sleeping Sickness’, The 
American Journal of International Law Vol. 6, No. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (January 
1912).
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outbreak of the First World War, but annual reports suggested the disease's persistent 
presence in the region. In 1913 the Accra medical laboratory observed that most of the 
cases of sleeping sickness it had confirmed were among soldiers recently brought down
from the north, which became the principal recruiting ground for Gold Coast troops 
during the war.18  In 1914, disease control across the colony was largely suspended due 
to 'lack of funds and the withdrawal of troops', and when the war finished in 1918 the 
annual medical report argued that ‘trypanosomiasis does not call for any special 
mention. There is no evidence that it is on the increase’.19  The administration persisted 
with research into the control of trypanosomiasis among cattle, but human sleeping 
sickness received little attention or funding until the 1930s.
Sleeping sickness 1925-1950
By the late 1920s, however, sleeping sickness appears to have reached 
epidemic proportions in the Northern Territories and neighbouring French Upper Volta. 
This was known to both the regional administration and the Gold Coast Medical 
Department, even though the outbreak went officially unrecognised until 1935. In 1924,
a medical officer toured the Lawra district in the north-west on the request of a district 
commissioner concerned about high numbers of infected people who were brought to 
the district station in an attempt to find medical assistance, at a time when very few 
people made the journey to colonial healthcare facilities. His survey covered 27 
villages, and 3,654 people were examined by the relatively crude method of checking 
for 'Winterbottom's Sign' - the visible enlargement of the cervical glands at the back of 
the neck, a symptom of the early-stage disease.20 The medical officer found that almost 
18 1913 MDAR, 91; and see Chapter One.
19 1914 MDAR, 33; 1918 MDAR, 25.
20 This was named for T.M. Winterbottom, physician of the mercantile British Sierra Leone Company 
in the 1790s. In an indication of how the disease was present and known in West Africa a century in 
advance of its medical description, he observed that slave traders refused captives with swollen neck 
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8 percent of the population appeared to be infected with sleeping sickness, with the 
most intense prevalence of symptoms in 16 villages located within three miles of the 
Black Volta and Kamba rivers. Here the infection rate was approximately 14 percent, 
with more than one in eight people potentially affected.21 The findings were important 
not only because they indicated the increasingly epidemic scale of the disease, when 
this was largely unrecognised in Accra, but also because this was the first report which 
identified the Kamba valley and its surroundings as a zone of high human sleeping 
sickness prevalence. It would subsequently become a focal point for the anti-tsetse fly 
campaign, and then for epidemic onchocerciasis.
This was not the only report sent to Accra about the serious prevalence of 
sleeping sickness in the north. In 1925, on the orders of the Imperial Bureau of 
Entomology, the Gold Coast had added a new and apparently enthusiastic entomologist 
to its staff.22 A.W. J. Pomeroy was initially tasked with investigating termite infestations
in the bungalows of colonial officials in Accra, but was later assigned to work on tsetse 
fly distribution and cattle trypanosomiasis along the main routes for the cattle trade to 
the south; disruption to the southern economy was again a central motivation for work 
on a northern health problem.23 He was not required to assess the human aspect of the 
disease via direct examination of people, but in the course of his work he uncovered 
further evidence of a growing epidemic. In the sources he emerges as a relatively 
isolated official voice calling attention to sleeping sickness in the 1920s, and may have 
been removed from his position as a result. His first project was an assessment of 
animal trypanosomiasis on the eastern cattle-trade route passing through Yeji, on the 
glands, who would fall victim to ‘sleepiness’. See Thomas Masterman Winterbottom, An Account of 
the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone: To Which Is Added, an Account of the 
Present State of Medicine among Them ... (London: C.Whittingham, 1803), 29.
21 1925-26 MDAR, 61-71, Appendix E: ’Report on the incidence of Sleeping Sickness in the Lawra 
District, October 1924’.
22 Ibid., 38, Appendix A:  ’Annual Report Of the Medical Research Institute, Accra’.
23 1926-27 MDAR, 47.
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Volta River frontier between the Northern Territories and Ashanti. While based there he
oversaw a survey of human sleeping sickness in the village of Makongo, a major 
resting point for northern migrant labour making the journey south. Although this was a
small sample (128 people), blood testing found that 6.5 percent of those surveyed were 
infected with trypanosomes. As Pomeroy and assistant entomologist G.F. Saunders 
reported, the difficulty in assembling a clear record of death rates in the Northern 
Territories meant that mortality was likely to be higher than the administration 
recognised.24 
In July 1928, Pomeroy was re-assigned for a journey into French West Africa 
to discuss tsetse fly distribution and cattle infection with his French counterparts, where
he became involved in a larger diplomatic exchange about the severity of the human 
sleeping sickness epidemic. In a confidential report he observed that every local official
he met had reported a high prevalence of the disease, and one French officer pointed 
out that villages were being abandoned – Pomeroy himself noted that 'some villages 
which are marked on the map had ceased to exist'.25 Pomeroy was met by the head of 
the Health Service of Upper Volta, Dr Dabadie, who told him that over 600 cases had 
been officially confirmed so far that year, and that the French administration was 
concerned about a 'probable decrease in population'.26  He also held a meeting with 
Fournier, the governor of Upper Volta, who asked him to carry a message to the Gold 
Coast government on behalf of the Governor-General of French West Africa, saying 
that they were interested in urgent co-operation on the subject of sleeping sickness and 
that any suggestion they made would be given attention in Paris. His concluding 
24 1928 MDAR, 67-77, Appendix B: ‘The Tsetse Problem And Trypanosomiasis On The Eastern Cattle 
Route Of The Gold Coast’.
25 ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enc. 3:  ’A Report on a tour of the Haute Volta and the Western Sudan 
with regard to Trypanosomiasis and Tsetse, with special reference to the relation of the problem in 
the Gold Coast’, Paragraph 29.
26 Ibid., Paragraph 23.
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request (unusual for a field entomologist) in his report to the Gold Coast government 
perhaps implies this urgency: ‘May I suggest that there are some points which I feel it 
might be necessary to explain to His Excellency the Governor personally, which are 
extremely difficult to write with the exact shade of meaning, and which express the 
attitude of the French administration’.27
If a historian were to rely only the main text of the Annual Medical Reports 
for this period –  without appendices and without reference to the internal files of the 
Medical Department and northern administration – then this apparent outbreak would 
largely be hidden from view, and it would appear that sleeping sickness only became a 
serious problem in the Gold Coast from the mid-1930s. In 1926, for example, the year 
after a survey had indicated a possible infection rate of almost 14 percent of village 
inhabitants in parts of the north west, the Annual Medical Report concluded that ‘unlike
East Africa, this disease is commonly not met with in man. Deaths from the disease in 
dogs, cattle, and horses on the other hand are of frequent occurrence’.28  In 1927-1928, 
the same year as Pomeroy's work showed an infection rate of 6.5 percent among people
in the labour-transit village of Makongo, the Annual Medical Report recorded that ‘The
disease on the Gold Coast is fortunately not the scourge it is in other parts of equatorial 
Africa and does not call for very special methods to deal with it. It not infrequently 
happens that it is accidentally discovered in a patient who is being examined for some 
other ailment’.29 There was an evident contradiction here, as later medical officials 
observed: the frequent discovery of sleeping sickness by accident, among the small 
number of people who presented for treatment at limited medical facilities, indicated 
the high prevalence of the disease in the broader population. 
27 Ibid., Paragraph 43.
28 1926-27 MDAR, 21.
29 1928 MDAR, 11.
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In 1928-1929, the year that Pomeroy submitted his report on the scale of the 
outbreak in French Upper Volta, the Annual Medical Report argued more defensively 
that ‘Human trypanosomiasis has attracted more attention than in previous years, and a 
greater number of cases are recorded, but it would be entirely premature to conclude 
that it is on the increase. In all probability the correct explanation is that greater 
facilities have occurred for observing the disease’.30  In that year, 94 cases were 
officially confirmed by the Gold Coast Medical Department, when the French 
administration had confirmed 600 cases in Upper Volta, many of them in villages just 
across the border from the Northern Territories.31 Pomeroy's private report on his 
journey to French territory, approximately half of which had been devoted to 
observations about the serious prevalence of human sleeping sickness, was condensed 
into a memorandum that made no reference to the human form of the disease. This 
incorrectly stated that Pomeroy's findings concerned animal trypanosomiasis and tsetse 
fly control only, and appeared to discard the recommendations he had made for 
preventing further spread of sleeping sickness by placing controls on labour migration 
from north to south, and from French Upper Volta into the Gold Coast via the north. It 
argued ‘now that the information is to hand, the executive measures can be left to 
others’.32 The investigative project which Pomeroy had led was closed, and Pomeroy 
himself was redeployed to mosquito research at Takoradi, on the coast, then dismissed 
a year later. The annual report concluded that ‘it was the opinion of the Medical 
Department that as human sleeping sickness appeared to be of minor medical 
30 1929 MDAR, vii.
31 1928 MDAR, 11; for French districts affected see ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enclosure 3,  ’A 
Report on a tour of the Haute Volta and the Western Sudan with regard to Trypanosomiasis and 
Tsetse, with special reference to the relation of the problem in the Gold Coast’, Paragraph 43.
32 ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enclosure 4, Memorandum on findings of Pomeroy’s work, undated; 
and Enc.5 p.19: Letter from Principal Veterinary Officer to Colonial Secretary and Head of Gold 
Coast Medical Research Department, 27 August 1929.
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importance, the investigation should end’.33 With the ending of his involvement the 
Medical Department published a lengthy report on four years of trypanosomiasis and 
tsetse fly research, led by a group of entomologists under Pomeroy. Despite his 
principle role, the report was not written by Pomeroy but by K.R.S. Morris, an assistant
entomologist who had only recently arrived in the Gold Coast.34  Ten years later, having
also been dismissed and then re-hired, Morris oversaw the vast campaign of anti-tsetse 
forest clearance that fed into the onchocerciasis revelations of the independence era. 
Several factors may have contributed to the administration's failure to 
recognise – or its official disregard of – the extent of sleeping sickness in the late 
1920s, when the Northern Territories and French Upper Volta were already 
significantly affected by the disease. In part this disregard stemmed from medical 
preconceptions about sleeping sickness, based on the experience of administrations in 
British East Africa. Here a different subspecies of the underlying parasite, 
Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense, gives rise to a rapidly progressing disease that leads 
to death within weeks or months of the initial infection, and had caused severe 
epidemics in the early twentieth century. In West Africa, however, the trypanosome 
subspecies (T. brucei gambiense, which accounts for almost all infections in the region)
gives rise to a form of sleeping sickness that progresses over one to five years, also 
leading inevitably to death if untreated.35 This much lengthier course from infection to 
death appears to have contributed to a misconception of the illness in Accra. Although 
the disease was known to be present, with a high prevalence of infection discovered in 
the north during successive surveys, the fact that some people who were infected did 
not rapidly die led health authorities to speculate that the disease posed a less serious 
33 1929 MDAR, 123, Appendix G: ‘A General Summary of the Tsetse Problem on the Gold Coast’.
34 1928 MDAR, 55 – ‘Scientific Research: Report on the Medical Research Institute’; 1929 MDAR, 
111-159, Appendices F, G & H – Reports on tsetse and trypanosomiasis.
35 Francesco Checchi et al., ‘The Natural Progression of Gambiense Sleeping Sickness: What Is the 
Evidence?’, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 2, no. 12 (2008): 303.
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threat, or that people in the Northern Territories possessed an unspecified form of 
resistance – as had been incorrectly conjectured for yellow fever in the same period. 
Successive reports argued that 'unlike in East Africa' or 'other parts of Equatorial 
Africa', widespread trypanosome infection did not constitute a major public health 
emergency.36 This mistaken belief, partly shaped by the sleeping sickness surveys of 
Ashanti conducted in 1909-1911, in a different disease ecosystem to that of the north, 
appears to have led the Medical Department at Accra to discount the testimony of 
medics in the field, who raised alarms about growing death rates, depopulation, and 
abandoned villages.
There were other factors which may also have generated resistance to the 
recognition of a sleeping sickness epidemic by the Gold Coast administration, 
concerned with preserving revenues and maintaining the migrant labour supply to the 
south. The official recognition of any epidemic disease could entail a substantial loss of
income, as it mandated the imposition of quarantine and control measures under both 
local and international law. In international terms, official notification of a specific set 
of diseases – those included in the International Sanitary Conventions of 1911 and 1926
– meant that a country, port or city declared as 'infected' could be subject to the 
suspension of incoming trade and inspection of outbound cargoes.37 Apart from these 
formal measures, international notification of epidemics also acted as a more general 
deterrent to commerce, and neighbouring countries might be compelled to prevent their
subjects from entering an infected region. 
A similar set of laws existed within the Gold Coast itself, as in other British 
colonies, having initially been passed to protect Europeans at the coast from outbreaks 
36 1926-27 MDAR, 21; 1937-1938 NTAR, 73.
37 See Sealey, ‘International Sanitary Convention’; Cummings, ‘The International Sanitary 
Conference’.
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of disease in the broader African population.38 These allowed medical officers to 
declare an area or trade route as 'infected', meaning that markets, general commerce, 
and – most importantly in regard to the north – travel by migrant labourers would be 
restricted. This tension between health concerns and economic imperatives gave 
motives for the understatement or concealment of disease conditions, and there were 
several occasions in colonial Africa where concealment took place. A notorious 
instance occurred on the Kimberley diamond fields in South Africa in the 1880s, where 
physicians in the employ of the mining business of Cecil John Rhodes – among them 
the future governor of the Cape Colony and part-instigator of the South African War, Dr
L.S. Jameson – fought a politicised battle with local medics to prevent the official 
reporting of a smallpox epidemic in the region. They ensured that the disease was 
instead reported as an invented and supposedly minor affliction called 'Kaffir Pox', 
ensuring a continued influx of migrant workers into the infected area to maintain 
diamond production.39 A comparable set of events took place on the Gold Coast from 
1900-1910, in relation to epidemic yellow fever. As Scott, a former medical officer in 
the colony recorded, ‘a mining boom developed, and officials became concerned that 
the news that the disease was prevalent in the area should interfere with this, and for a 
time it was the practice ... to suppress the information when the infection was 
discovered’.40 
In regard to sleeping sickness, administrators and private interests in Accra 
were opposed to the idea that labour migration from the north should be restricted by 
measures to control the epidemic. These would have involved declaring it publicly, 
followed by the mandatory imposition of quarantine laws.  This opposition was evident
38 1908 NTAR, 3–6; 1919 NTAR, 6.
39 See Doonan, ‘Temperate Medicine and Settler Capitalism’, ch.6; and Shula Marks and Neil 
Anderson, ‘Typhus and Social Control: South Africa, 1917-1950’, in Disease, Medicine, and Empire,
ed. Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis (London: Routledge, 1988), ch.13.
40 Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, 29.
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even in 1935, when the scale of infection had been recognised and medical officers in 
the north were insisting on action against the disease. These officers proposed a control 
programme similar to that suggested by Pomeroy in the 1920s, involving a network of 
medical camps along the main labour migration routes, where people travelling south 
would be checked for infection and treated if necessary. In light of increased concerns 
about the disease, the government in Accra had belatedly convened a committee on 
human trypanosomiasis. But it refused the proposed control measures, saying:
The Committee, while agreeing that a large number of the labourers entering
Ashanti  from the Northern Territories  are  undoubtedly infected,  is  unable to
envisage any system of regulation which might be expected to succeed … any
such scheme of control might interfere with the free flow of labour towards the
mines, which are likely to make increasingly heavy demands upon the NTs as a
source of supply. The scheme is  also rendered impracticable because of  the
enormous expenditure which would be involved - labourers rejected as unfit
would presumably have to be subsisted by government until such times as they
could be safely returned to their homes.41
This indicated another set of factors, in addition to the Accra government’s 
insistence on maintaining the southwards labour supply, that worked against official 
recognition of the sleeping sickness epidemic in the north from 1925. There was a 
sharp decline in the price paid for Gold Coast cocoa, and global economic instability 
culminated in the Great Depression. These developments meant that Britain tightened 
the imperial purse-strings when it came to expenditures in the Gold Coast, and the local
government passed these cuts onto the northern administration and its health services. 
When it was given official or public recognition, epidemic disease could make a moral 
claim on the allocation of colonial funds, and could mobilise metropolitan opinion in 
pressing for greater resources towards prevention measures. Therefore, under 
conditions of economic decline, the disease’s cost implications may have contributed to
official disregard for rising sleeping sickness mortality in the north. In 1932, again 
41 1935-1936 MDAR, 81, Appendix IV: ‘Report of the Committee on Human Trypanosomiasis’.
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apparently discounting reports from the region, the medical department at Accra argued
that ‘with the evidence at our disposal, trypanosomiasis is a problem which at present 
does not demand a very large diversion of sorely needed and often inadequate funds, 
from more pressing items affecting the public health elsewhere’.42 The epidemic had 
been growing since the mid-1920s, and by 1930 many more northern people were 
infected than were yet showing the terminal 'sleeping' symptoms of the disease, as 
blood testing and neck-gland surveys had revealed. But the entomologists reporting on 
sleeping sickness were nevertheless dismissed soon after the Wall Street Crash, and 
anti-tsetse work was shelved for some years.43
As with other diseases, the peripheral importance of both northern 
communities and the northern administration – the designation of these communities as
the low-cost migrant labourers of the colony, and the administration's lack of political 
influence in Accra  – meant that public health interventions commonly undertaken 
elsewhere in the Gold Coast were impeded north of Ashanti. Even when a disease was 
revealed to be present, and where measures were available for its control (including 
relatively effective drug treatments in the case of sleeping sickness), the Accra 
government was motivated to stall quarantine programmes in order to minimise 
spending on a region that was already considered a drain on the budget, and to maintain
labour supply. The difference between labour-sending and labour-receiving areas is 
indicated by a comparison with British Northern Nigeria, a region affected by similar 
diseases, but which received incoming migrant labour for tin mines around the Jos 
Plateau. Here a network of clinics and quarantine camps was developed from 1904 
onwards, soon after the colonial incorporation of the region, where labour migrants 
42 1932-1933 MDAR, 48.
43 1930-31 MDAR, 70.
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could be employed – or isolated as unhealthy – once they had already completed the 
journey.44   
Successive Gold Coast reports took pains to emphasise that 'tryps does not 
give any cause for anxiety', or argued that rising infection rates were a mirage arising 
from increased interest in the disease by individual medics.45 But by the mid-1930s the 
scale of the epidemic had become undeniable, giving rise to recriminations from 
northern officials. In 1937, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories 
observed that:
In 1928 it was reported that 'both human and animal trypanosomiasis is 
relatively unimportant'; while so recently as 1933 an Assistant-Director of 
Medical Service, although recording an increase in the number of cases treated, 
found it impossible to convince himself that 'human trypanosomiasis is such a 
serious cause of morbidity and mortality as to justify the diversion of large sums
of money to eradicate it at the expense of other medical services needed by the 
inhabitants of the Colony'. But officers with long local experience of the 
Protectorate did not share the optimism implied in the extracts quoted above, 
and pointed to the areas where to their certain knowledge the high mortality 
caused by trypanosomiasis had led to the gradual depopulation and eventual 
abandonment of many villages.46
In 1937, more than 1,200 people were diagnosed with sleeping sickness at a 
single district hospital in the north-west of the Northern Territories, while 2,400 people 
received treatment for the disease in the small north-eastern Mamprusi district, 
journeying in large numbers to the district's limited facilities. These groups alone were 
more than six times the total number of sleeping sickness infections recorded in British 
Tanganyika that year, a 'high risk' colony that had consistently been used by the Accra 
government to emphasize the lack of any threat in the Gold Coast.47 The years after 
1935 were a time of revelation as far as official recognition of the disease was 
44 Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1904, 143; B. W. Hodder, ‘Tin Mining on the Jos Plateau of 
Nigeria’, Economic Geography 35, no. 2 (1959): 109–22.
45 1930-31 MDAR, 11.
46 1937-1938 NTAR, 72.
47 See ibid., 73.
118
concerned. In 1936 the Gold Coast’s annual report acknowledged nearly 5,000 cases in 
the Northern Territories, and a survey of the far north-west revealed that 35 to 40 
percent of people were suffering from the disease.48 Perhaps more importantly for 
prompting a reaction in Accra, a number of European officials had also been infected.49 
The reported cases in this period were probably a small fraction of the total number of 
people affected by the disease. In the community interviews I conducted with elderly 
people who had lived in villages away from the major trade routes, most participants 
said that they had little contact with medical officials working on any disease control 
campaigns, and no access to colonial medical facilities, until the very end of the 
colonial era.50 Many similar settlements would also have gone unsurveyed for 
infections or deaths. 
Given how sleeping sickness progresses slowly, with cases taking from one 
to five years to develop into the terminal disease, the sudden reporting of thousands of 
cases in the mid-1930s again suggests the extent of neglect, or deliberate blindness, 
over the preceding years on the part of the Gold Coast government. Once the disease 
was officially recognised, however, significant resources were immediately allocated 
for two campaigns: a medical campaign, based on short-term epidemic control though a
network of quarantine camps and treatment with a range of drugs, and a longer-term 
prevention campaign based on the clearance of riverine forest throughout the north, 
aimed at eradicating the tsetse fly. Both had lasting implications for public health and 
disease prevalence in the region, unrelated to sleeping sickness itself. The remainder of 
48 1936-1937 NTAR, 7.
49 1937-1938 NTAR, 6.
50 Including Group.01: Bongo Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 27 July 2015; Group.02: Dua 
Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 27 July 2015; Group.08: Dulugu Village (Guruni), 
Interview, Upper East, 29 July 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview, 
Upper West, 7 August 2015; Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 
2015; Group.04: Tindonmoligo Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 28 July 2015; Group.12: 
Busa Wala Community 1, Wa Area (Wala), Interview, Upper West, 8 August 2015; Group.13: Busa 
Wala Community 2, Wa Area (Wala), Interview, Upper West, 8 August 2015.
119
this chapter deals primarily with the anti-tsetse clearance programme, while I discuss 
some broader effects of the medical campaign in Chapters 1 and 3. Among other things,
this campaign established a central role for indirect rule chieftaincies in the control of 
epidemic disease, blurring the line between political and medical authority, and it 
created one of the north's most successful public health institutions, the Medical Field 
Units.
The anti-tsetse bush clearing campaign and the path to onchocerciasis
In the late 1930s, as the treatment campaign against sleeping sickness 
continued to expand, a more expansive and enduring campaign was launched against 
the disease's vector, the tsetse fly. The work of this campaign – which proceeded with 
relatively little supervision from the north's political administration or its medical 
department – seems to have inadvertently contributed to an epidemic of onchocerciasis,
that rose to local and international prominence during the independence transition.
Apart from immediate treatment and quarantine measures, it was recognised 
that in the longer term epidemic trypanosomiasis in both humans and livestock would 
only be brought under control by breaking the cycle of transmission. In the mid-1920s, 
the Imperial Bureau of Entomology had already made enquiries about the potential 
application of the 'Swynnerton Method' for tsetse control in the Northern Territories,  
an approach which had been successfully used in British Tanganyika.51 This involved 
the destruction of habitat vegetation where the fly lived and reproduced, through large-
scale cutting and burning, with the aim of reducing fly populations and limiting the 
spread of trypanosomes to existing settlements. In the north, some limited measures of 
51 ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enc. 30: Memorandum from Chief Commissioner NTs to Colonial 
Secretary, 24 November 1925; And Enc.33: Notes on Request from Imperial Bureau of Entomology, 
Chief Veterinary Officer NTs, 4 July 1925; see also Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory, ch.4.
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this type were used in the late 1920s, on the recommendations of Pomeroy and others. 
Clearing took place along the principal labour and cattle routes running from Upper 
Volta through the north, and around the principal transit towns on the borders with 
Ashanti and the Colony: part of an ongoing epidemiological and economic detachment 
of north from south, with northern health problems contained in the region while labour
and livestock continued to move.52 
This limited bush-clearance work was suspended with the onset of the 
depression in 1929, but it was resumed on a much larger scale after the extent of 
epidemic sleeping sickness was recognised in the mid-1930s.53 K.R.S. Morris, an 
entomologist who had been dismissed in 1930, was re-employed to devise and oversee 
the anti-tsetse scheme, which operated between 1937 and 1955.  Morris' work is one of 
the few aspects of the history of medicine in northern Ghana to have attracted previous 
research attention. Jeff Grischow's research approaches Morris as an agent of progress, 
emblematic of the 'developmental' phase of colonial rule, who achieved success in 
reducing sleeping sickness despite his idiosyncratic theories of disease transmission.54 
Although limited anti-tsetse bush clearing was carried out along labour and 
cattle routes in the preceding decades, this had been accompanied by local 
administrative resistance to any major clearance campaign away from main roads.55 
When the Imperial Bureau of Entomology asked the Gold Coast administration to 
examine how the Swynnerton Method might be applied in the north, after its success in 
British East Africa, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories replied in 1925 
that tsetse eradication schemes of this kind were unsuitable to the region: he argued that
there were was insufficient local labour available, and that any major scheme of bush 
52 See CSO/11/19/06 (1932) Human Trypanosomiasis on the Gold Coast, PRAAD Accra.
53 1933-1934 NTAR, 62; and also CSO/11/19/06 (1932).
54 Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’.
55 See, for example, ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enc. 33-35: Notes on Request from Imperial Bureau 
of Entomology, Chief Commissioner and Chief Veterinary Officer NTs, June-July 1925, and passim.
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clearance would disrupt economic activity (perhaps meaning the recruitment of migrant
workers). The administration's counter-proposal recommended that bush clearing 
should be left to native farmers and mining companies, who were ‘already doing good 
work for civilisation by encroaching into it yearly’, and that the tsetse fly problem 
should instead be addressed through a major resettlement campaign. This proposed that
immigrants from French territory, and communities from the northern border areas, 
should be induced to resettle and farm in areas of high tsetse prevalence to the 
immediate south, by offering them farming tools and livestock and by exempting them 
from forced labour for 25 years. The administration argued that this would lead 
naturally to clearance of the bush.56  
This scheme, proposed in 1925, embodied a long-standing aim of the colonial
administration: to move communities away from the densely-populated northern 
frontier and closer to the southern labour markets. As a related aim, the administration 
considered that there was underpopulated land in the Northern Territories – particularly 
the southern Gonja districts – which could be turned to productive agriculture. In 1937, 
these goals were clearly articulated in Morris' new proposals for an anti-tsetse bush 
clearing scheme which, unlike the Swynnerton Method, was explicitly directed towards
the large-scale resettlement of the cleared areas. The ‘discovery’ of the 1930s sleeping 
sickness epidemic certainly gave rise to its own immediate pressures for a tsetse 
eradication programme. Faced with mass infection, the colonial office requested in 
1935 that urgent action should be taken to avert a potential disruption to the mine 
labour supply.57 Grischow argues that the Gold Coast government may also have 
conceived of the anti-tsetse campaign 'as a hedge against political resistance', although 
56 Ibid., Enc. 33: Memorandum from Chief Commissioner and Principal Veterinary Officer to Colonial 
Secretary, 4 July 1925.
57 Deputy Director of the Medical Service to DMS, 15 March 1935, cited in Grischow, ‘Morris and 
Tsetse Eradication’, 389.
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this is doubtful – there was no nationalist resistance in the north in the 1930s, when the 
campaign was conceived.58  
Once these proximate pressures are taken into account, however, Morris' 
proposals appear to have won support because they also chimed with the longer term 
preferences of the Gold Coast government: for the resettlement of northern 
communities and the development of productive agriculture. As the Northern 
Territories annual report observed, in the martial idiom of disease control:
[The situation] presents an excellent opportunity for a large-scale experiment of 
an aggressive attack upon trypanosomiasis. Briefly stated, the plan comprises 
simultaneous fly eradication and treatment of the disease, to be followed by 
repopulation and intensive development of the area. ... His plan of campaign 
differs basically from the policy adopted in Tanganyika. The latter involves the 
abandonment of territory to the enemy and may be described as a defensive 
retreat whereas the former, if successful in operation, will result in the recapture
of valuable territory.59
The resettlement aspect of Morris' plan was attractive to an administration 
which had already been looking for a way to achieve this goal. But it was also this 
element that would bring northern peoples into increased contact with onchocerciasis, a
disease which was not contemplated when designing the scheme. In his explanation of 
unexpected population distributions in the north, Morris only paid attention to one 
disease. During entomological surveys he had observed the ruins of long-abandoned 
villages along river valleys in the north, and had read reports on sleeping sickness from 
preceding decades: in conversation with local peoples, some northern officers had 
recorded that sleeping sickness and general poor health were occasionally associated 
with the slave raiding of Babatu Zatu in the 1880s, more than 50 years previously.60 
Morris combined these amateur archaeological and historical observations with his 
58 See Jeff Grischow, ‘Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis in the Gold Coast, 1924-1954’, Working Papers on 
Ghana No.5/2004 (University of Helsinki, 2005).
59 1937-1938 NTAR, 75.
60 See, for example, 1925-26 MDAR, 60–62; 1934-1935 MDAR, 86.
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knowledge of tsetse ecology, in an elaborate theory which he believed accounted for 
the depopulation of river valleys and the impacts of sleeping sickness in the north. 
Grischow gives a summary of this theory:
Ecological collapse was triggered by slave raiding in the nineteenth century, 
which reduced population densities to a point where the people could not fend 
off wild game or cultivate their bush farms. Tsetse flies invaded the farms, 
infested the wild game and moved into the villages to attack the people 
themselves. Production declines caused further food shortages and depopulation
until entire villages disappeared. By the 1930s the cycle of decline had set the 
conditions for a trypanosomiasis epidemic to wipe out many of the settlements 
along the Black Volta and its tributaries … Faced with this situation, Morris and
his team took on the challenge of reversing the process of ecological imbalance 
in the Northern Territories.61 
Here Morris had extrapolated from one or two brief observations from past 
district officers, regarding a nineteenth century association between Babatu Zatu and 
sleeping sickness among northern communities, to construct a long-term 
epidemiological history of the disease in the north, accounting for the depopulation of 
fertile river valleys. Grischow suggests that this theory had taken shape by the 1940s.62 
But it was already present in a report Morris submitted as a subordinate entomologist in
1929, before he was dismissed in the staff cuts which followed the onset of the Great 
Depression. Then a junior officer,  Morris conceded that his ideas ‘may be over 
dogmatic, and the observations carried out in a comparatively short space of time’.63 
When he was re-employed in the late 1930s, to implement a major campaign of anti-
tsetse bush clearance, he showed no such doubts. Morris promoted his theory 
constantly, through a number of metropolitan journals, and his ideas were perhaps more
widely disseminated in London than in the Gold Coast.64 
61 Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’, 387.
62 Grischow, ‘Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis’, 6.
63 Morris, ‘Report on Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis at Makongo’, in 1929 MDAR, Appendix H, 130.
64 See, for example, K.R. Morris, ‘Planning the Control of Sleeping Sickness.’, Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 43, no. 2 (1949): 165–98; K. R. Morris, ‘The 
Ecology of Epidemic Sleeping Sickness. I.—The Significance of Location’, Bulletin of 
Entomological Research 42, no. 2 (1951): 427; K.R. Morris, ‘The Science of Tsetse Control’, Nature
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Morris insisted that his theory of sleeping sickness accounted for the 
historical depopulation of river valleys, and that his clearance and resettlement methods
would therefore open the way to an agricultural boom. But his campaign was based 
upon a critical misunderstanding of the northern disease environment, indicated here 
for example in 1946 (italics added):
The removal of tsetse throughout the river system … has the following 
additional advantages: It makes possible a sound agricultural development … It
enables the population to live with impunity in the vicinity of permanent water 
and to avoid concentrations on dry, hilly country away from rivers; thus the 
possibilities of over-farming and erosion are avoided and the watersheds and 
headwaters can be reserved for afforestation. By these means, instead of ground 
being abandoned to the tsetse, the fly is replaced by a healthy agricultural 
population.65
Onchocerciasis was almost (but not entirely) unknown in the colony at this 
time,  and Morris's theory convinced the Gold Coast government, which already had 
the aim of resettling northern populations. The bush clearing campaign operated with 
significant funding allocations from 1937 to 1952.66 It began on the valleys of the 
Kamba River, a tributary of the Black Volta in the north-west, and by the 1950s major 
clearances had been carried out on many of the Volta system rivers of the north. These 
clearance operations employed thousands of northern people, although it appears that at
least some of this was unpaid or coerced labour, obtained through the Native Authority 
system.67  A report published in advance of the campaign argued that it would be 
necessary to provide ‘some amount of medical treatment’ to communities in the 
campaign areas, ‘in return for the work they do on clearing projects’.68 After the Second
164, no. 4183 (1949); K.R. Morris, ‘The Control of Trypanosomiasis by Entomological Means.’, 
Bulletin of Entomological Research 37, no. 2 (1946): 201–50; K. R. Morris, ‘The Bionomics and 
Importance of Glossina Longipalpis in the Gold Coast’, Bulletin of Entomological Research 25, no. 
03 (1934): 309.
65 Morris, ‘The Control of Trypanosomiasis by Entomological Means.’, 249.
66 For example 1938-1939 MDAR, 104.
67 NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955) Tsetse Control, PRAAD Tamale, See full file, and for example Enc.8: 
Letter from K.R.S Morris, Department for Tsetse Control, to Mr Panton, 23 January 1950.
68 1935-1936 MDAR, 81.
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World War these labourers were paid, on relatively austere terms – in some cases 
workers were required to pay the government for their cutting tools.69  Both this chapter
and Chapter 4, on onchocerciasis, draw on interviews with individuals who were 
employed on the anti-tsetse campaign from the late 1940s, usually as youths.70  
Figure 13. Selective clearing of riverine forest, northern Ghana (undated).
Source: Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, p.139
The campaign's central method was 'selective clearing': the removal of rough-
boled tree species which were considered to harbour the tsetse fly, leaving other 
riverine vegetation intact. In practice, as indicated by Fig.13, this meant the removal of 
most vegetation along the banks of each watercourse.71 With resettlement and farming 
69 NRG/8/13/4 (1945-55) Sanitation N.T.s Policy, PRAAD Tamale, Enc. 20: Memorandum from 
Acting Chief Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 21 December 1948.
70 Group.12: Busa Wala Community 1, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.13: Busa 
Wala Community 2, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa 
Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.11: Naachenyiri Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), 
Interview, Upper West, 7 August 2015; Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), 
Interview, Upper West, 8 August 2015.
71 Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, 178.
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as an aim, the clearing was intended to be permanent: some of those who worked on the
anti-tsetse gangs recalled that their pay was docked if there was any regrowth of new 
shoots, with inspections carried out months after clearance.72 
There is no way to gauge the full extent of the clearance work carried out 
between 1937 and the mid-1950s.  It appears that regular activity reports were not 
required by other branches of the administration: the data relating to some river valleys 
or communities does not appear to have been retained in any archives, while other 
rivers and settlements listed by the campaign have since been renamed. In part this was 
because the north’s Tsetse Control Department functioned as an independent 
organisation under Morris and his deputies, reporting to the Department of Agriculture 
and operating largely without supervision from the Medical Department and the 
Northern Territories administration.73 However, an indication of the scale of the 
campaign comes from the Tsetse Control Department's retrospective summary of its 
work in early 1950s, when the colony's governance was being re-oriented towards 
independence and the value and cost of the campaign were increasingly called into 
question. The department reported that in the small north-west region alone, it had 
cleared over 2,000 square miles of riverine forest – more than three times the area of 
Greater London – including 600 square miles along the Kamba valley.74 
Around 500 people had been 'placed' here in an initial post-clearance 
resettlement scheme in the early 1940s, and by 1949 Morris noted that a further 1,500 
people had voluntarily resettled in the valley, establishing over 4,000 acres of new 
72 Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.11: Naachenyiri
Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.13: Busa Wala Community 2, Wa 
Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015.
73 See NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), for details on the chain of command for the Tsetse Control 
Department.
74 NRG/8/7/27 (1955-1964) Tsetse Control Department, Development Plan 1956-61, PRAAD Tamale, 
Enc.3: Tsetse Control Department Memorandum, 22 July 1955, and for area comparison see 
http://data.london.gov.uk/, accessed March 10, 2017.
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farmland. Multiple dams were built on the river and its tributaries, and roads were 
constructed to allow access for communities and livestock – Morris reported that 
90,000 people now had tsetse-free access to river valleys in the Lawra area.75 The 
Kamba clearances were often cited as the model by which the overall campaign 
proceeded, and similar developments took place across the north. In the Damongo area 
of the Gonja district, for example, on the Sorie tributary of the Black Volta, 1,000 
square miles of bush was cleared and 1,200 people resettled between 1944 and 1952, 
with a further sixty families resettled at a location referred to as 'Piri Lake'.76 
This was the most expansive public health measure undertaken in the north 
during the colonial period, mobilising many communities and spanning more than 
twenty years. Patterson and Grischow have approached the campaign as a scientific or 
a developmental success, and the sources suggest that, in tandem with the Medical 
Department's quarantine and mass treatment campaign, it was indeed successful at 
reducing the incidence of sleeping sickness.77 The campaign was shaped by Morris's 
theory about the historical abandonment of river valleys in response to 
trypanosomiasis, and driven by the desire of the colonial administration to increase 
revenues from the north. Grischow argues that it represented a successful colonial 
engineering of socio-economic behaviour, which ‘set out to reverse a process of 
maldevelopment by redistributing the African population in the Kamba and Kulpawn 
river valleys’. Seen through this developmental lens, the campaign was not simply a 
contingent intervention against the immediate epidemic, but instead ‘the long-term goal
75 NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Encs. 6-11: Correspondence between Morris and DC Gonja, Damongo 
Region, January to April 1952; see also Morris, ‘Planning the Control of Sleeping Sickness.’
76 NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Enc. 6: ‘Tsetse Control at Damongo’, Report from Morris, Tsetse 
Control Department, to Chief Commissioner NTs, 19 February 1952; The location may refer to Lake
Kpiri to the north-west of Damongo, which is no longer a settlement.
77 NRG/8/7/27 (1955-1964), PRAAD Tamale; NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955); and see Patterson, Health in 
Colonial Ghana, ch.4; Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’.
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of tsetse eradication was to even out population densities across the Northern 
Territories, as a basis for sustained community development’.78
Conclusion
The Tsetse Control Department’s work secured Morris a reputation as an 
international expert, and its campaign has been hailed as a success in subsequent 
research. However, the anti-tsetse programme's public health benefits in reducing the 
spread of sleeping sickness, or its economic benefits in bringing agriculture to 
unpopulated valleys, must be considered in tandem with its unintended consequences. 
The campaign began to founder in the 1950s. The sleeping sickness epidemic had 
waned over the preceding decade, and the benefits of the programme, relative to its 
high costs, were less apparent to an African-led administration that increasingly 
prioritised popular health work against commonplace problems, like malaria or infant 
health, over less common diseases like sleeping sickness or yellow fever. In some 
districts the campaign had also failed on its own terms. Although valleys had been 
cleared, dams built, and access roads opened, northern peoples often proved reluctant to
move into these areas in large numbers. The administration had expected that once 
large communities were resettled in the valleys, they would be able to maintain bush 
clearances themselves, and that resettled populations would continue expanding. But 
records from the end of the anti-tsetse programme show that some of its earliest valley 
clearances could no longer be maintained. Cleared vegetation had begun to regrow, and
although some settlements were established, there had been no grateful flood of 
northerners into the valleys 'freed' from sleeping sickness.79 Shortly before 
independence in 1957, the campaign was greatly reduced, and the Tsetse Control 
78 Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’, 397–98.
79 See NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Enc.37: Tsetse Control Department, Progress Report 28 March 1955.
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Department given what was largely an advisory role. It protested strongly, providing 
details on how many people it had resettled, how many dams had been built, and how 
many thousands of square miles of bush had been cleared. ‘This is an executive 
department,’ argued the new Head of Tsetse Control, F.A. Squires in 1955 – Morris had
left the Gold Coast three years earlier, following the election of the first Nkrumah 
government. ‘If all this is merely advisory, then words have no meaning’.80
By the mid 1950s, as the tsetse control programme was being wound up, 
another disease began to attract the attention of the colony's medical authorities. 
Surveys revealed that onchocerciasis, and the blindness it caused, occurred at higher 
levels in the Northern Territories than anywhere else in Africa. This now appeared to be
the principal reason that communities had abandoned and avoided river valleys in the 
north: local knowledge which had been recorded by various colonial officers in the 
preceding decades, but which was not considered in the formulation of the colonial 
anti-tsetse campaign. Instead the campaign had brought people into much closer 
contact with the disease. 
The late colonial ‘discovery’ of onchocerciasis is the subject of Chapter 4, 
and this linked chapter serves as necessary context for the disease’s association with 
tsetse control. The chapter has also examined some aspects of colonial-era sleeping 
sickness and its related control work that have not received significant attention in prior
research. The sources suggest that sleeping sickness was widespread in the north at an 
earlier stage than has previously been recognized, well before 1930, and that the 
relatively low attention given to the disease stemmed from the north’s marginal 
situation in the Gold Coast’s economic and political order. From 1909 onwards, 
indications that the disease might be present in the south had resulted in village-by-
80 NRG/8/7/27 (1955-1964), Enc.3: Tsetse Control Department Memorandum, 22 July 1955.
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village surveys and rapid containment measures, even when the prevalence of the 
disease had not yet been determined: these surveys showed that sleeping sickness posed
little threat in the south itself.  Over the same period, a number of reports from 
individual medical officers indicated that the disease posed a serious problem for many 
northern communities. But resources were instead directed at maintaining a sanitary 
boundary between north and south, leading to recriminations and accusations of neglect
when the extent of northern sleeping sickness was officially recognized in the mid-
1930s. The subsequent tsetse control programme was also shaped by the economic and 
developmental preferences of the colonial administration, which for decades had sought
to increase regional revenues through agricultural resettlement. In the conduct of the 
bush-clearing campaign a great deal of executive power devolved to Morris, focused on
a single pathogen and operating with little oversight from the northern administration 
or the central Medical Department. The ecological effects of the campaign are hard to 
calculate, although the clearance of several thousand square miles of riverine forest is 
likely to have resulted in some reconfiguration of the northern environment. As I 
discuss in Chapter 4, the campaign was immediately followed by the extensive 
treatment of northern rivers with DDT and other larvicides as a control measure against
onchocerciasis, carried out by local officials with little or no prior experience of 
chemical vector control, and operating at a similar remove from regular oversight. After
years of control work focused on a single disease, the sudden attention given to 
widespread onchocerciasis – among the same communities and in the same river 
valleys that the Tsetse Control Department had worked for decades – was in part a 
result of the department’s misguided clearance programme, and an indication of the 
administration’s previous inattention to other persistent health problems in the region. 
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CHAPTER 3
Northern health services and the transition to independence, 1945-1966
– 
This chapter continues the institutional history begun in Chapter 1 by 
examining key themes, linkages and discontinuities in the state’s provision of northern 
healthcare. Here I assess a critical transition: how a short-lived period of 
‘developmental’ colonialism in the late 1940s gave way to the rapid reforms and 
political shifts of the independence transition itself, and the extent to which the 
institutions of colonial healthcare were maintained or effaced after independence. In 
this period, unexpected divisions emerged within the outgoing colonial administration. 
Rising nationalism in the south, and public health reforms under the first government of
Kwame Nkrumah from 1951 (when the Convention People’s Party won the Gold 
Coast’s first election for internal African self-government)  undermined the north’s 
Native Authority healthcare system, and gave rise to a confrontation over the future 
arrangement of the region’s health services – between British and African central 
governments in Accra, on the one hand, and traditional northern elites supported by a 
dwindling group of local British administrators on the other. 
Although the period from 1945 to 1957 is by definition part of the colonial 
era, and the years from 1957-1966 are evidently part of the post-colonial era, I hope to 
demonstrate that for health in northern Ghana, events from the late 1940s to the early 
1960s should be seen as part of a single over-arching event sequence. Many of the 
healthcare reforms enacted by Gold Coast governments after the war were made in 
anticipation of independence, and all healthcare activity took place in the context of 
rising nationalism and political factionalisation. In the same way, many key shifts in 
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northern healthcare under the CPP government had been set in motion during the early 
1950s, before Ghana formally gained independence. There were of course many 
developments and themes specific to each period. The transition to independence was 
the most significant shift in Ghana’s overall political arrangements across the century, 
and perhaps the most significant change in its economic structures, although structural 
adjustment in the 1980s had more significant consequences for societies and health 
systems in the north. The independence transition altered the state’s evaluation of 
regional needs and its conception of particular health problems, creating gulfs and 
disjunctures in the resultant provision of health services. 
In the first part of this chapter I assess northern healthcare in the late colonial 
period, when British policies developed in the aftermath of the Second World War were
abandoned or reformulated in light of nationalist politics in the south. I continue by 
discussing changes that followed the establishment of an African government in Accra 
from 1951, over the second and third national elections in 1954 and 1956, and on to 
independence in 1957. The departure of the north’s medical and administrative staff 
and cuts in British funding for the region were overlaid with political tensions between 
African elites in the north and south. Although successive investigations and policy 
proposals emphasised the need to expand northern health services, in the early 1950s 
there was a relative decline in the net provision of state healthcare. Funds allocated for 
the expansion of northern hospitals were withheld, the Native Authority rural health 
system was undermined by the centralisation of health training in the south, and the 
government transferred a number of government health facilities to the control of 
Christian missions. But this period also saw the creation of one of the north’s most 
enduring and successful health institutions, the Medical Field Units. In the second part 
of the chapter, I evaluate developments in the north after independence: how domestic 
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politics related to the cocoa economy, Ghana’s shifting international orientations, and 
the north’s persistent peripherality contributed to a crisis in health provision after 1961. 
In both this chapter and Chapter 5, I introduce new sources which illuminate the 
evolution of public health policy in Ghana as a whole, regarding the divergence of 
regional health systems and the pressures which came to bear on health practitioners 
across the country.
Part 1. Health and politics in the last years of the Gold Coast 
Late colonial health policy and north-south relations 
Before the Second World War had ended, Britain had begun formulating 
plans for the post-war development of its colonies, with an increasing emphasis on the 
principle of ‘Native Paramountcy’ that had been ineffectively articulated in the early 
Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 
1940, passed at the outset of the war as thousands of African subjects were recruited for
military service. Memoranda on post-war planning were sent to the government of the 
Northern Territories, emphasising a policy of expanding health services and ensuring 
that ‘the benefits of economic development accrue to the people’.1 As nationalist 
political activity increased after the war, and particularly after the Accra riots of 1948, 
efforts were made to minimise or obscure the ‘colonial’ aspects of colonial governance.
The Gold Coast Medical Department steadily changed its terminology, editing out 
words like ‘natives’ and ‘colonial’ in its various reports. Britain’s Colonial Medical 
Committee became its Advisory Medical Committee, and the Tamale African Hospital 
1 NRG/8/5/19 (1942) General Welfare Committee, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.1: ‘Confidential 
Memorandum on Machinery for Post-War Planning’, undated; and see also Enc.3: ‘Social 
Conditions of Persons in the Employ of the GC Government’, Letter from Colonial Secretary, Accra,
to NTs Administration, 30 October 1943.
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became the Central Tamale Hospital.2 Political considerations played an evident role in 
the formulation and execution of health policy and other work based on the ostensibly 
‘neutral’ sciences. In the south, some of the most significant political unrest of the post-
war period emerged from a conflict between colonial-era science and African 
smallholders, during the swollen shoot disease campaign of the 1940s. This was a plant 
disease which affected the cocoa harvest, and government scientists launched a control 
campaign based around the compulsory ‘cutting out’ of both healthy and infected trees 
on the farms of southern smallholders. A number of studies have examined how anger 
on the part of African farmers at the forced felling of their trees, with resultant 
economic losses, played a key part in the development of nationalist activism, and 
contributed directly to the riots of 1948.3 The Swollen Shoot campaign brought 
scientific and medical work to the foreground in African debates about the nature of 
colonial injustices – as the Gold Coast’s Watson Commission (established to investigate
the riots) observed in 1948, ‘We recognize that present feelings make it unlikely that 
further British scientific advice will be accepted as impartial’.4  
As the political climate changed, disease control methods that had previously 
been widely used were suddenly discarded, notably with the use of coercive quarantine 
and the closing of markets during meningitis epidemics in the north. In 1945, medical 
officers in the north had made extensive use of the army and local police to enforce a 
strict quarantine programme, with markets and roads closed, and people interned in 
treatment camps. In the north-west, police acting on the orders of British MOs had 
forced thousands of people to sleep outside in farmland surrounding their homes, 
2 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954) Hospital General, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.1: Letter from Assistant Medical 
Director, Kumasi, to Medical Dept and CC NTs, Tamale, 8 August 1947; and see, for example, the 
marginalia on appropriate terminology in CO/859/108 (1945); CO/96/798 (1949).
3 See Francis K. Danquah, ‘Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana, 1945-1951’, Agricultural 
History 68, no. 1 (1994): 1–19; Roger Gocking, The History of Ghana (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 2005), 81–82.
4 Watson Commission, quoted in Danquah, ‘Rural Discontent’, 12.
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during the cold and dusty months of the harmattan, guided by the belief that this would
interrupt meningitis transmission in crowded dwellings.5 By 1949, however, the year 
after the Accra riots, the Gold Coast Medical Department announced that ‘restrictive 
measures imposed by order are of little value and the DMS does not propose to ask for 
them in future’.6 The same northern medical officers who had argued strenuously for 
forced quarantine, and who had subsequently given lectures to medical audiences in 
London on the value of their new control method (forcing people to sleep in the open 
air), now reported that restrictive measures were an unconscionable interference ‘with 
the normal and lawful dry season activities of the people’.7 
In the Gold Coast as a whole, medical science and medical idioms do not 
appear to have played a significant role in shaping the African nationalist movements 
that emerged in the decade before independence, unlike the Asian nationalist 
movements studied by Warwick Anderson and Hans Pols, where a high proportion of 
scientifically trained independence-era leaders contributed to ‘an anticipatory 
nationalism derived from scientific enthusiasm and sensibility’.8 This may have been 
the result of a Gold Coast policy which limited the options for medical or other 
scientific training available to Africans, and which consistently restricted the 
employment options available to those who were trained.9 But the converse was 
certainly true. In the Gold Coast from 1945 to the end of colonial rule, medical activity 
5 CO/859/108 (1945), Enc. 17: B.B. Waddy, Medical Department Wa,  ’Report on the late stages of an 
epidemic of Cerebrospinal-Meningitis in the Western NTs’, June 27 1945; GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), 
Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 7–11.
6 1948 MDAR, 7; See the changed approach to disease control between CO/859/108 (1945); and 
CO/96/798 (1949).
7 GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 13.
8 Warwick Anderson and Hans Pols, ‘Scientific Patriotism: Medical Science and National Self-
Fashioning in Southeast Asia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 54, no. 1 (2012): 93–113.
9 Adell Patton, Physicians, Colonial Racism, and Diaspora in West Africa (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1996), 163–175 and passim.
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and the application (or even admissibility) of particular scientific viewpoints were 
strongly conditioned by the rise of African nationalism.
The overall healthcare policy of the Gold Coast was in flux from the end of 
the war until the end of colonial rule. Three successive proposals for reform of health 
services were put forward, and each was abandoned in favour of new plans chosen 
because of their implications for political stability in the colony, for their lower costs to 
Britain, which looked to cut its spending commitments as it became clear that colonial 
rule would end, or because of the relative balance of European and African input which
had gone into the formulation of health reforms. The first shift came in the late 1940s, 
with the formulation of the Medical Department’s ‘10 Year Development Plan’, which 
argued that ‘the future shape of medical services in the Gold Coast depends on a choice
that must be made at this stage, between the rival claims of preventive and curative 
work. To aim at providing services satisfactory in both respects, for the entire country, 
is out of the question’.10
The proposed 10-Year Plan noted the ‘overwhelming demand’ of the African 
public for curative services based around drug treatments, arguing that this demand had
been boosted by successful campaigns in the 1930s and during the war.11 The Medical 
Department argued that it was necessary to resist political pressure from the Gold Coast
government and African subjects, in order to pursue a policy of preventive medicine 
that would have a longer-term impact in reducing the prevalence of disease: ‘The 
temporary success of [curative campaigns] would be impressive, and their popularity 
would be great. But it is not that way that genuine, permanent improvement lies’.12 A 
policy shift towards preventive medicine had been a sustained focus of advocacy by 
10 NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.1:  Draft Ten Year Plan & Comments 1948, 2.
11 Ibid., 2-4.
12 Ibid., 1-2.
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northern officials from the 1920s, who had seen the falls in disease prevalence that 
resulted from improvements to water supplies in the south. But the Medical 
Department’s 10-Year Plan also proposed reforms that would have made the expansion 
and uptake of heath services in the north more difficult. It argued that payment should 
be required for all treatments, saying that ‘it is only when people pay directly for 
services that they demand, that they will realise the reason for limitations’.13 As I 
discuss in Chapter 5, attempts to make northern communities pay for health services on
the same basis as southerners, using income metrics derived from aggregates for the 
whole country, had the effect of rapidly driving down the use of government health 
facilities. 
The first 10-Year Plan anticipated that rural healthcare across the Gold Coast 
would be provided through a new network of basic ‘Health Centres’, comparable to the 
village dispensary system first developed in the north, and that Native Authorities 
would fund and operate almost all of the proposed new facilities (the government 
planned to build a further 170 health centres, in addition to the NA dispensaries already
in operation).14 The north’s successful expansion of rural health services was to be 
emulated across the Gold Coast, and the earlier decades of neglect – which had 
prompted northern communities to expand healthcare through the NA system – meant 
that the region already had a relatively well-developed Native Authority healthcare 
infrastructure in relation to the rest of the colony, even if there were few government 
hospitals or other centrally-funded medical facilities.  However, the first 10-Year Plan 
was revised substantially from 1949, after the Gold Coast appointed R.S. Cheverton as 
the Director of Medical Services. Cheverton’s amendments to health policy anticipated 
the end of colonial rule, if not how soon it would come: he proposed to implement 
13 Ibid., 1-2.
14 Ibid., 6-7.
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measures that would ensure the capacity of health services ‘when eventually the 
country is handed over to the Gold Coast people’.15 Unlike many previous directors, 
Cheverton toured the entire colony, including the north, attempting to gain an 
understanding of regional health needs. After discussions with local medical officers, 
he approved the fusion of the north’s mobile curative campaigns against yaws and 
sleeping sickness (in operation since the 1930s) into a new unified service intended to 
provide broad-based healthcare to communities away from the road network.16 
This service, the Medical Field Units (discussed below), would become one 
of the north’s most enduring health institutions. It continued to operate into the early 
1980s, and its staff acted as a crucial ark of local information and practical medical 
knowledge across the independence transition. But although he helped to create an 
enduring northern medical institution in the Field Units, Cheverton also began a 
process which lead to the end of the Native Authority healthcare system. He 
recommended the centralisation of medical training away from the north, and advised 
against entrusting Native Authority dispensers with the responsibility for rural medical 
treatments, despite their successes over the preceding 18 years.17 Cheverton also 
recommended that church groups and other ‘voluntary organisations’ should assume a 
substantial degree of responsibility for the colony’s medical services, with funding to 
be provided by the central government.18 These proposals, also discussed below, 
contributed to a process of professionalisation and part-privatisation in late Gold Coast 
healthcare. 
15 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57) Medical Department Policy, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.7: Report from R.S. 
CCheverton-‘Observations on the Medical Department following a tour in the Gold Coast and 
Neighbouring French Territories Between November 1949 and April 1950’, 53.
16 Ibid., 49.
17 Ibid., 4, 40–55.
18 Ibid., Enc.5: Memorandum from Cheverton, ‘Assistance to Voluntary Agencies’, 24 April 1950,  1-
10.
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It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the publication of these 10-year 
plans from 1948 – and other announcements regarding proposed improvements in the 
health or social well-being of Gold Coast subjects – were made with the intention of 
carrying them through to completion, and to what extent they were made as a short-
term strategy to demonstrate British benevolence and stave off nationalist unrest.  The 
most substantial changes to health policy came in 1953, with the third set of substantial 
reforms to be made in less than five years. These final reforms were a clear product of 
the independence transition. Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP won the Gold Coast’s first 
election for internal African self-governance in 1951, in the same year that the Northern
Territories and its African representatives were given representation in the overall 
government of the colony.19 After the 1951 election a Ministry of Health and Labour 
was created, and in 1953 this fused with the Gold Coast Medical Department to become
the Ministry of Health under an African minister, Imoru Egala.20 With the accession of 
an African government, a new panel of external experts was appointed by the British-
led Executive Council (to which the African government remained subordinate), to 
investigate and devise a national health policy. This was the Commission of Enquiry 
into the Health Needs of Ghana, known as the Maude Commission for its leader,  Sir 
John Maude, former Permanent Secretary to the UK Ministry of Health. The other 
leading members of the commission were Dr G.A. Clark, Britain’s Principal Medical 
Officer, and A.E. Lerenson, then working as a public health expert for the International 
Bank for Reconstruction & Development (later the World Bank), marking the first 
involvement of a Bretton Woods institution in Ghana’s health policy.21 
19 Gocking, History of Ghana, 95–102.
20 See 1953 MDAR; Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 314–15.
21 NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964) Health Needs Of Ghana, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.2: Circular from Minister 
of Labour & Health, 1951.
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The commission’s mandate was to review existing colonial health policies 
(the 10-year plans) and propose new measures for expanding the national health 
system.22 Its recommendations were shaped by the turn towards socialised medicine in 
Britain itself, where the post-war Labour government had created the National Health 
Service in 1948. Daniel Arhinful argues that by looking to the NHS as its ideal, the 
Maude Commission failed to account for local demographic and economic factors that 
limited Ghana’s ability to finance a health system that was free at the point of use – the 
commission overturned the recent 10-Year Plan and recommended that medical fees 
should be abolished, which took place in 1952.23 The same criticism (of failing to 
account for regional specificities) could be made of some of its other recommendations.
With the NHS as a model, Maude’s panel proposed an end to decentralised Native 
Authority healthcare in favour of a network of centrally controlled and funded district 
Health Centres, which in turn would operate smaller rural facilities.24 This meant most 
of the northern healthcare system, developed to circumvent colonial-era neglect, was 
again dependent on spending decisions made in Accra. Nkrumah accepted the 
Commission’s recommendations, and the ensuing reforms immediately led to strong 
criticism and resistance in the north, from the local administration and from northern 
communities who had become an increasingly public voice in the planning of their 
healthcare. 
22 Ibid., Enc.2.
23 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 44–46.
24 NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964), Encs. 16-21: Letters from Ministry of Health & Labour to Northern 
Territories Administration, 1951-1952.
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Figure 14. A vision of independence-era modernity: Kumasi Central Hospital, 1954
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection CO 1069-43-67
Northern health services at the independence transition: the north-south debates
This was the evolving national context for changes in the provision of 
northern healthcare in the years leading up to independence. Reforms proposed in the 
context of late-1940s ‘developmental’ colonialism were quickly superseded by reforms 
enacted under the transitional governments of the early 1950s. In the north, these 
changes gave rise to tensions that were evident in a series of debates about key areas of 
community health provision: about the fate of the Native Authority health system; the 
construction of new hospitals; the location of the Maude Commission’s proposed rural 
Health Centres; plans for staffing the health services; and about the role of Christian 
missions. As independence approached, the centres of political power multiplied. There
were British and African governing bodies in Accra, and newly appointed African  
councils in the north. The region’s British-led administration, a small and relatively 
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isolated group of political and medical officers who for years had been in tension with 
the central colonial government, now found itself in confrontations with the ‘diarchic’ 
African- and British-led government in the south, in an attempt to protect the region’s 
existing healthcare provision whilst negotiating the period’s shifting political terrain. In
these confrontations the north’s British officials were given a significant degree of 
support by local communities and their leaders. 
Before turning to the various healthcare debates, it is important to note the 
antagonistic political climate which developed between African political elites in the 
north and south as independence approached – a rift which had already become evident
during decades of northern subordinacy as a migrant labour supplier, and which to 
some extent was encouraged by the British government after the war.25 Independence-
era tensions began to build after 1946, when instead of granting northern 
representatives (comprised almost entirely of Native Authority chiefs) a place on the 
newly-created African Assembly of the Gold Coast, the British government instead 
created the Northern Territories Council, a body with limited local power and little 
influence on policy decisions made in Accra. The experience of the African members of
the Northern Territories Council, shut out of central decision-making, prompted a group
of northern chiefs to create the Northern People’s Party (NPP) to contest the second 
national elections in 1954. At this election the NPP unexpectedly received more votes 
than any southern party apart from the CPP, enough to become the official opposition. 
As Brukum has argued, the NPP’s sudden rise to official opposition ‘again formalised 
the difference between north and south’.26 Even before the creation of the NPP, the 
north’s political elites (again, principally meaning the Native Authority chiefs) had 
25 Saaka, ‘North-South Relations’, 144–45.
26 Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 371; and see also Saaka, ‘North-South Relations’,
ch.7.
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staked out a position in opposition to southern nationalist politics, to the extent that 
they were initially unwilling to countenance a transition to independent rule. Northern 
chiefs argued that independence should not be granted until the region had been 
developed to a comparable level as the south, because its inequality would otherwise 
become further entrenched. ‘We do not want, when we get self-government, to look 
upon the people of the south in the same way as we look upon the imperialists and the 
white man,’ said Mumuni Bawumia in 1954, one of the north’s first legislative 
representatives.27 
Figure 15. Charles Arden-Clarke, the final British governor of the Gold Coast, meets with northern
traditional leaders in Tamale, 1954
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection CO 1069-43-9
Northern political figures were keenly aware of the position the region had 
occupied in the colonial economy, saying that if reforms were not enacted before 
independence, the north would ‘remain nothing more than a labour camp’.28 They 
observed that little had changed in the early 1950s, when Nkrumah’s first government 
27 Bawumia, quoted in Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 374.
28 J.A. Braimah, 1952, quoted in ibid., 375.
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was given responsibility for internal affairs. The north continued to received 
disproportionately low expenditure votes from Accra, including for its health services, 
and it had little influence on policy or staffing decisions. The Tolon-Na, an influential 
Dagomba chief, argued that ‘the south has monopolised all the top posts in all 
departments. Northerners regard themselves as servants, not partners in development’.29
With independence imminent, the Northern Territories Council sent a delegation 
directly to London in 1956, in a final attempt to obtain developmental and political 
guarantees for the north. But the retreating British government had already informed 
northern chiefs that the treaties which Britain had signed with northern leaders in the 
late 1890s, permitting the incorporation of the Northern Territories into the Gold Coast,
were no longer regarded as ‘significant’, and the delegation’s petitions were refused.30
These concerns indicate the extent to which prior neglect had shaped 
northerners’ perception of their region’s place in the colony as a whole. In the period 
from 1949 to independence, therefore, there were several political groupings with 
potential influence on the development of northern health services. From Accra, the 
governor and other British officials continued to exert control over policy and 
expenditure allocations, although they increasingly deferred or acted in an advisory 
capacity to the African government led by Nkrumah and the CPP. In the north there was
the NPP as the dominant political party, and the Northern Territories Council as a 
governing assembly representing the chiefs of the Native Authorities. There was also 
the north’s British administration, under a Regional Commissioner. This gradually 
declined in size and its capacity for oversight, as independence approached and staff 
left the Gold Coast, but some officials who remained became increasingly combative 
29 Tolon Na, quoted in ibid., 373–74.
30 Ibid., 351–60; Saaka, ‘North-South Relations’, ch.7.
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about perceived neglect of the region. This advocacy was not confined to the health 
sector. As Ines Sutton observed in her study of Northern Territories agricultural policy: 
There was a distinction between the attitudes of Gold Coast government and 
officials in the south, and those of local officials in the north ... There was 
continual conflict over the allocation of resources between officials in the north 
and Colony officials, who saw the Gold Coast as a whole, with the north 
forming only a minor part in economic terms, except for the supply of labour.31 
This tension between the central and peripheral branches of the government 
was particularly acute in regards to healthcare – as Michael Worboys has noted, public 
health brought the contradictions of Britain’s colonial policy into relief for officials in 
many African regions.32 When the central government published the first 10-Year Plan 
for medical services, it argued that the north had historically been given lower health 
budget allocations simply as the result of its low population densities. The north’s Chief
Commissioner immediately responded, saying:
The reference to population density is misleading - it would be more accurate to
say neglect was due to the scarcity of paying patients. But I suppose we cannot. 
The picture of population density conveyed in your Memorandum is a false one.
In point of fact the southern 1/3 of the Territory is sparsely inhabited but the 
North, especially the North-East and the North-West are as densely populated as
any non-urban part of the Gold Coast – in fact probably more so.33 
Direct official remonstrations of this kind became more frequent from the late
1940s. It appears that under the conditions of impending independence, with the former
Gold Coast government’s control at Accra weakening and the exploitative aspects of 
colonial rule becoming an increasingly accepted element of public discourse in both 
Britain and the Gold Coast, northern officials felt able to more directly express opinions
that had previously been couched in euphemism or understatement, or only ever 
31 Sutton, ‘Colonial Agricultural Policy’, 642.
32 Worboys, ‘The Colonial World as Mission and Mandate’, 213.
33 As successive annual reports indicated, these high population densities were well known to the 
central government. NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.25: NTs Chief Commissioner to DMS, Accra, 1 
March 1949.
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pencilled into the margins of official reports.34 In another example, the northern 
administration pushed back against the decision to start charging medical fees across 
the colony, saying ‘We wish to make it quite clear that the great majority of NT people 
should continue to be treated free’.35 Officials in the north collectively developed a way
to bypass the fees directive through a discretionary power granted to individual medical
officers, enabling them to define almost all northern people as exempt from medical 
fees.36 The Northern Territories administration also began to criticise long-standing 
health initiatives that had been supervised from Accra – particularly the government’s 
anti-tsetse bush clearance campaign, overseen by the Department of Agriculture.37  
In the first of several sustained debates about the future of northern 
healthcare, the northern administration came into conflict with the Accra government 
over its attempts to reduce the region’s Native Authority health system. NA healthcare 
had previously been hailed as a success, including by the central Medical Department, 
and NA dispensaries remained the principal means by which northern people accessed 
state medical services – when the first 10-Year Plan was published in 1948, it had 
recommended a significant expansion in Native Authority responsibility for health. 
Many new NA dispensaries were built from 1948 to 1949, and the 10-Year Plan 
envisaged that Native Authorities would assume control of the district Health Centres 
that were central to the future expansion of basic healthcare. It proposed that 170 of 
these centres would be built by NAs (which were increasingly called ‘Local 
Authorities’ after 1948) across the Gold Coast, with the government to pay a 50 percent
34 For a discussion of rising anti-imperialism in Britain in this period, see Nicolas Owen, ‘Critics of 
Empire in Britain’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV. The Twentieth Century, 
ed. Judith M. Brown et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 188-211.
35 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.63: DMS, NTs, to Asst. Director of Medical Services, Cape Coast, 5 
August 1950.
36 Ibid., Enc.70: Circular from Asst. DMS, Tamale to NTs Medical Officers, 7 September 1950.
37 See Chapter 4 and NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Encs.25-40: Correspondence between Chief Regional 
Officer, NTs, Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Tsetse Control Dept., 1954-1955.
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rebate of the construction costs.38 Nurses trained by the Native Authorities were 
expected to take over from government’s nurses in northern health centres, and new 
schemes were developed to accelerate the training of NA dressers, who worked in 
outlying villages – these dressers would receive ‘instruction in the systematic treatment
of yaws and trypanosomiasis, field sterilization, and home nursing’.39 All local health 
services were to be passed to the Native or Local Authorities, and the central 
government’s role would be to ‘maintain professional standards, provide training 
facilities, to deal with major epidemic disease involving several authorities, to deal with
the international aspects of disease transmission, and to provide grants-in-aid to local 
authorities for approved schemes’.40
This appeared to be a recognition of the success of NA health work over the 
preceding 15 years. But proposals for this wholesale transferral of health services to the
north’s Native Authorities were cancelled in the 1950s, as independence approached. 
The government had already placed constraints on the expansion of the north’s NA 
dispensaries by refusing to re-open the Tamale Sanitary School, leading to 
recriminations from the Northern Territories administration, which argued that ‘in all 
rural areas of the NTs, and also in urban areas the local authorities have for long been 
responsible for health services under the general supervision of the medical officers. 
Hence the department's inability to re-open the Tamale NA sanitary school is to be 
deplored’.41  The school, which had been built collectively by Native Authorities using 
funds raised from northern communities, was eventually re-opened as a government 
38 NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.2: ’Ten Year Plan for Hospital, Health and Nutrition Services’, 6-7; 
1949 MDAR, 7–8.
39 1947 MDAR, 10; 1949 MDAR, 7.
40 NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.2: Ten Year Plan for Hospital, Health and Nutrition Services. 
Subsection on Preventive Medicine, 9.
41 Ibid., Enc.21: Handwritten report from Assistant DMS and Chief Commissioner, NTs, 21 February 
1949.
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Health Education Centre in 1951.42 By this time, however, a policy had been developed 
for centralising most medical training in southern institutions, following the argument 
that Native Authority health schools in the north were unable to provide training at a 
sufficiently advanced level.43 The northern administration protested the relocation of 
training and educated personnel from the region itself, arguing that sending NA 
healthworkers to train in the south would undermine local health provision, as many 
might not return: ‘Is it not right that a man should serve his own country, in his own 
place ... particularly in view of the fact that his local authority provided the funds for 
his education’.44 This concern was not unfounded. Across the century, there was a 
tendency for northern medical personnel to remain in the south on completion of their 
training, where they earned more and had increased opportunities for private practice. 
Despite protests by the northern administration, there was a growing view in 
Accra that the north’s NA health staff lacked professional training, and that 
professionalism was more important than maintaining a consistent basic service in the 
region. The north’s political and medical officers consistently pointed out that the local 
training which NA staff received had been approved by previous heads of the Medical 
Department, but they were arguing against a policy decision that had been taken by the 
Governor, with the support of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London: 
‘training must be standardised and given at the larger hospitals, where full training 
facilities are available’.45 In an attempt to prevent what the northern administration saw 
as a serious blow to rural health services, and a breach of trust with communities who 
42 Ibid., Handwritten correspondence between Assistant DMS and Chief Commissioner, NTs, 25 
October 1951.
43 See NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.7: Cheverton, ‘Observations on the Medical Department following
a tour between November 1949 and April 1950’, 40-50.
44 Ibid., Enc.65: ‘Microscopists’, Chief Commissioner, Northern Territories to Assistant DMS, 22 
August 1950.
45 NRG/8/13/9 (1947-57) Rural Medical Services, PRAAD Tamale, Enc. 1: ‘Rural Medical Services’, 
letter from CC NTs to DMS Accra, 16 Sep 1947; ibid., Enc.2: Letter from DMS Accra to CC NTs, 26
September 1948.
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had been induced to build facilities and fund training, officials unsuccessfully 
petitioned the Governor directly:
The Director of Medical Services speaks of ‘dressers who have not been 
sufficiently trained’. But our dressers receive 18 months training in accordance 
with what was agreed … We are at present working on the assumption that the 
policy laid down is to be implemented. The Native Authorities have drawn up 
schemes for the construction of dispensaries accordingly, and standard VII boys 
are being encouraged to take up medical training. I think we require an 
assurance that there is no suggestion that this policy is to be modified. I feel that
[the DMS] does not realize the number of NA Dispensaries that are already in 
existence, and the plans that have been made for increasing them.46
The decision to centralise and standardise medical training may have been 
taken in an effort to improve healthcare across the Gold Coast, but in the north – where 
previous experience had shown that the broad provision of basic healthcare could be 
preferable to a more limited provision of expert care – it had the effect of undermining 
the region’s most effective health system, the NA dispensaries. Although the 
dispensaries continued providing community health services into the 1950s, they were 
increasingly under-staffed. By 1952 there were 52 NA dispensaries in the north, but 
only 33 of them were still operational.47 
A second debate, which revealed the shifts in political and economic 
priorities that characterised health provision over the independence transition, 
concerned the building of new government hospitals in the north. In 1950, in alliance 
with communities in the north-east, the Northern Territories government had resisted an
attempt by the Accra government to close the Navrongo War Memorial hospital, built 
by the Native Authorities after the Great Depression with funds raised from 
surrounding communities. ‘[It is the policy] that the Navrongo War Memorial Hospital, 
built by the people of that area themselves in 1931, should be closed,’ wrote the NTs 
46 NRG/8/13/9 (1947-57), Enc. 4: Letter and supporting documentation from CC NTs to Colonial 
Secretary, 1 September 1947.
47 NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964), Enc.18: NTs Dispensaries List, May 1952; 1952 MDAR, 22.
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Chief Commissioner. ‘Needless to say this Administration and the 140,000 people 
concerned have always vehemently opposed the idea ... I do not propose to close this 
institution when the Bolgatanga Hospital opens’.48 Advocacy by the northern 
administration was successful, and the Navrongo War Memorial Hospital remained 
open. But as independence approached and the new African government at Accra 
sought to centralise control of public works, the development of additional hospitals or 
the refurbishment of existing facilities became a strongly contested subject.
Following the war, the northern administration and northern communities, 
through leaders including the Na of Mamprusi and the Navro-Pio of Navrongo, had 
consistently requested improvements to the region’s hospitals, which for decades had 
been recognised as inferior to those in the south.49 The 1951 Maude Commission had 
recommended multiple expansions and refurbishments to northern health facilities, and 
the Gold Coast’s final Director of Medical Services, R.S. Cheverton, became a vocal 
advocate on this issue in Accra. In correspondence with other departments of the 
colonial administration, and with ministers of the first Nkrumah government, 
Cheverton argued that it was necessary to develop northern hospitals to a comparable 
level of quality with those elsewhere in the Gold Coast. He repeated and endorsed the 
concerns of northern officials, who suggested that a delay in expanding and 
refurbishing the hospital network would result in political unrest.50 In 1951, following 
the publication of the Maude Commission’s recommendations, and advocacy from the 
Gold Coast Medical Department, the African government at Accra at first appeared to 
recognise the importance of improving the north’s hospitals. The Minister without 
48 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc.5: ‘Retention of Navrongo Hospital’, Letter from CC NTs to Colonial
Secretary, Accra, 25 May 1950.
49 See, for example, NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964),  ‘A Memorandum by A. Adda, the Navropio and 
President of the Kassena-Nankani Native Authority, to Members of the Health Commission on 
behalf of the People of Navrongo’, 19 April 1952.
50 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc.2: DMS Accra to GC Director of Public Works, Accra, 2nd July 1951;
ibid., Enc.5: DMS Cheverton, to Minister for Health & Labour, 31 December 1951.
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Portfolio J.A. Braimah, one of the only northerners in Nkrumah’s first government, 
wrote to reassure the regional administration, proposing public works projects for nine 
hospitals in the north, and arguing that ‘it is Government's avowed aim to apportion 
available medical facilities as equitably as possible to the needs of the various 
communities of the Gold Coast’.51
In the years leading up to independence, however, the Accra government’s 
expenditure priorities shifted rapidly. As in the preceding decades, spending on 
northern healthcare was reduced in preference to cutting funds earmarked for similar 
work further south. In January 1952, following meetings in Tamale, the Ministry of 
Health and Labour had reaffirmed a commitment to develop multiple northern 
hospitals. But in July 1952 the ministry announced that it would only fund construction 
of a single new hospital in the region, saying ‘little expectation can be placed on the 
diversion of funds from the Colony and Ashanti for building hospitals in the Northern 
Territories’.52 Despite the Accra government’s insistence on centralisation in other areas
of health provision, which was then undermining the north’s Native Authority 
healthcare system, the Minister for Health and Labour suggested that responsibility for 
finding a way around the shortfall in hospital funding lay with the northern 
administration, saying that he would consider ‘any suggestions for provision of health 
facilities in the Northern Territories which would be both far simpler and far cheaper’.53
The central government’s indifferent attitude to the expansion of the region’s hospitals 
– in the context of independence-era politics and antagonism between northern elites 
and Nkrumah’s CPP – was further emphasised at a meeting held in Accra that year. At 
51 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.88: K.A. Gbedemah, Secretary NTs, to J.A. Braimah, Minister without 
Portfolio, 12 May 1951.
52 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc.7: Minutes of the Meeting Held by the Minister for Health and 
Labour at Tamale, 24 January 1952; and Enc.9: Minister for Health & Labour to CRO, NTs, 28 July 
1952.
53 Ibid., Enc.9: Minister for Health & Labour to CRO, NTs, 28 July 1952.
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this meeting, representatives of the ministries of Communication and Works and of 
Health and Labour made clear that their aim was to identify savings that did not involve
‘undue political repercussions’, including funds intended for the expansion of northern 
hospitals. The government proposed that any expansion of physical healthcare facilities
in the region should make use of cheaper, ‘semi-permanent’ materials. Some planned 
hospital developments in the north would still be funded, but only temporarily and for 
the benefit of international observers: ‘The Minister responsible for Health and Labour 
pointed out that in view of the impending visit of the United Nations Mission, it was 
important to do some work … even though the intended full reconstruction of the 
hospital would have to be postponed’.54 
These decisions drew a sharp response from the north’s British 
administration, under Chief Regional Officer Thomas Mead, which now found itself in 
conflict with both British and African governments in Accra. In a striking example of 
the open criticism that had entered official correspondence between the north and Accra
in the late colonial period, Mead warned that if plans to improve northern hospitals 
were shelved, the Gold Coast government ‘must expect a very violent and justified 
reaction from the people of the Northern Territories’.55 He added: ‘I must protest 
against the implication that inferior standards are good enough for the people of the 
Northern Territories ... if the funds at our disposal are limited then I propose to use 
them to help a lot of people a little rather than a few people a lot,’56  and argued that the
government’s plans to continue construction work on a single hospital, in advance of 
the United Nations visit, would do little except ‘provide a handsome living for a 
contractor and a showy installation for the edification of tourists’. Mead concluded by 
54 Ibid., Enc.11: Minutes of a Meeting held at the office of the Minister of Communications and Works,
9 July 1952.
55 Ibid., Enc.12: ‘Hospitals in the Northern Territories’, Mead to Minister for Health and Labour, 5 
August 1952.
56 Ibid., Enc.12.
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observing that communities in the north now regarded delays in the expansion of 
government healthcare ‘with a certain cynicism and disgust’.57
In tandem with this criticism, officials in the north developed a detailed 
counter-proposal for the construction of new hospitals, using the same limited funding 
offered by the central government. The northern administration offered to build five 
new hospitals (at Bawku, Jirapa, Yendi, Navrongo and Wa) for a total cost of £285,000,
using its own planners and labour force, and guaranteed that construction would begin 
by the end of 1952.58 But these plans were again rebuffed in Accra, in favour of 
construction tenders awarded to private contractors based in the south. This was 
another development that characterised the transition to independence. As Britain 
looked to cut costs ahead of withdrawal, and as British control over the institutions of 
government receded, there was a concomitant increase in the involvement of private 
contractors in construction of healthcare facilities, offering new opportunities for 
patronage to political figures in the south. Mead’s proposal for the northern 
administration to build hospitals had been developed after consultation with local 
engineers and medical officers, and approved by the north’s Director of Public Works.59
But the CPP government refused, insisting that any construction of northern healthcare 
facilities should instead be offered as contracts to private companies, with tendering to 
be handled by the Central Tender Board in Accra, and not by the Northern Territories 
Tender Board.60 It argued that the Northern Territories administration lacked the 
capacity to manage a large public works budget. In response, Mead threatened to halt 
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., Enc.12: ‘Hospitals in the Northern Territories’, Mead to Minister for Health and Labour, 5 
August 1952, 38; and Enc.16: ‘New Hospitals in the Northern Territories’, Mead, CRO NTs to 
Minister of Health & Labour, 22 September 1952.
59 Ibid., Enc.16.
60 Ibid., Encs.18 & 19: Telegram & Written notes from Ministry of Health & Labour to CRO, NTs, 7 
November 1952; and Enc.20: Letter from A.J. Kerr, British Permanent Secretary at Ministry of 
Health & Labour, to CRO NTs, 16 November 1952.
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all public works already managed by the administration, including road building and 
other major construction projects: ‘in our official view we might, in view of the 
[Ministry of Communications and Works’] attitude, insist on divesting this regional 
organisation of all its public works responsibilities, which amount to vastly more per 
annum than these five hospital projects’.61
The debate over northern hospitals continued for more than a year, mobilising
many of the north’s remaining British medical and public works officials, with Thomas 
Mead as a central advocate.62 The CPP government ultimately prevailed, and the 
northern administration was compelled to accept a policy of hospital construction 
through tenders offered in the south. Ministers in Accra suggested that unless private 
contractors could be used, it was possible that budgetary allocations for hospital 
development in the north would be ‘indefinitely postponed’, because funds were 
needed for the Volta River Project.63 As in previous decades, healthcare in the north was
subordinated to southern political and economic concerns. The Northern Territories 
government had presented a detailed and costed proposal for the development of new 
hospitals, supported by northern communities and traditional elites, and successive 
national health policies had emphasised the need for accelerated development of 
northern health facilities. As with the debate over Native Authority healthcare, 
however, this was not enough to overcome the centralising tendencies of British and 
African governments at Accra on the approach to independence, with CPP attitudes to 
the north perhaps also shaped by the resistance of northern elites to southern 
nationalism. The scope for independent action by the northern administration was 
61 Ibid., Enc.21: Memorandum by Mead, 11 November 1952.
62 See also ibid., Enc.23: Mead to Ministry of Health & Labour, 29 November 1952; Enc.24, 
‘Construction of Northern Territories Hospitals’, CRO NTs to Ministry of Public Works, 3 December
1952; Enc.2 p.6: Ministry of Communications & Works to Acting CRO NTs, 15 December 1952, and
full file.
63 Ibid., Enc.22: Notes of a Meeting Held in the office of the Minister of Health, 5 November 1952.
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increasingly limited by the requirement for private contracting, leading to ‘interminable
delays’ in the growth of local health infrastructure.64 The turn to private contractors 
accelerated across the Gold Coast from the late 1940s, benefiting European and African
companies located in the south, close to the centres of political power, at the expense of
healthcare projects that had previously been managed (relatively rapidly and 
affordably) by the regional administration. In 1948 the Gold Coast government 
awarded 49 contracts for major public works across the colony, worth £306,820. By 
1951, the annual value of these contracts had more than trebled, to 102 private sector 
contracts worth £1,188,740, most of which were granted to European firms.65
Staff departures and decline in the 1950s
These debates over hospitals and the Native Authority dispensary system 
indicate the changing situation of the north and its healthcare in the context of 
decolonisation, and the complex position of the British officials who made up the 
Northern Territories administration.66 These officials had already developed an 
adversarial relationship with the central British government of the Gold Coast over the 
preceding decades, and they now also found themselves in tension with the first African
governments under Nkrumah and the CPP. Despite the CPP government’s evident 
opposition to British colonialism, in this period it occupied broadly the same position in
relation to northern healthcare as its predecessors: the region’s administration continued
to act as an advocate for the expansion of services, and greater allocations of state 
funding, against the perceived indifference of central government.  But by the mid-
64 Ibid., Enc.7: Minutes of the Meeting Held by the Minister for Health and Labour at Tamale, 24 
January 1952.
65 NRG/8/13/21 (1952-1955) Hospitals General, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.8: Statement by Minister of 
Communications & Works in response to Legislative Assembly Question 0/151, 17 April 1952.
66 From 1945 to 1957, there were several further healthcare-related confrontations between the north’s 
officials and traditional elites, and the central government. See NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964); 
NRG/8/13/9 (1947-57).
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1950s, rapid changes in personnel meant that the administration’s capacity for 
advocacy had diminished, and oversight of northern healthcare passed almost entirely 
to Accra and the Ministry of Health. As it became clear that the Gold Coast would be 
transferred to African rule, British officials began to retire from the colonial service, 
and as positions opened in the south these were often filled by the transfer of medical 
officers and trained African personnel from the north. By 1951 it was observed that ‘the
great wastage in trained staff’ meant that some northern health programmes were no 
longer operable, and by 1953 even the most intensively-funded public health 
organisation in the region – the Tsetse Control Department, which answered directly to 
the Ministry of Agriculture in Accra – reported that it no longer had enough staff to 
operate effectively.67  
In order to to try and attract personnel, it was proposed to shorten a tour of 
government medical service in the region to two years, instead of the four years 
required elsewhere in the colony.68 But problems in the north received increasingly little
attention, as they were superseded by a funding and staffing crisis for the colony as a 
whole. The total size of the Gold Coast health service was cut by 10 percent in 1953, 
and health expenditure as a percentage of total government spending fell from 10.5 
percent in 1946 to 2.5 percent in 1954.69 In 1955, most of the senior British medical 
personnel of the Gold Coast, and many junior staff, ‘proceeded on leave prior to 
retirement’.70 The sudden fall in staff and a concurrent reduction in British funding to 
the colony brought the shutdown of many pivotal public health programmes, including 
the Gold Coast’s Malaria Control Unit. The Ministry of Health observed that it was 
67 1952 MDAR, 14; NRG/8/13/9 (1947-57), p.33 Enc.16: Assistant DMS Waddy, Tamale, to CC NTs, 
Tamale, 15 December 1951; NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Enc.23: Tsetse Control Department, Wa, to 
CRO NTs, 23 December 1953.
68 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc.7: Minutes of the Meeting held by the Minister for Health and Labour
at Tamale, 24 January 1952.
69 1953 MDAR, 27, 87; 1954 MDAR, 40.
70 1955 MDAR, 15; Gocking, History of Ghana, 81–82.
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‘severely restricted in the matter of maintaining routine activities, and unable to deal 
adequately with the problems imposed by the activities of other ministries,’ and 
reported that the cessation of routine sanitation work in the north had increased the 
spread of some diseases: ‘Medical Officers of Health have all without exception noted 
the acute difficulty they are experiencing in maintaining any form of sanitary standards 
… let alone providing for improvements in general and environmental sanitation’.71  
By the early 1950s there were acute drug shortages in the north, compared 
with other regions, a problem which would persist after independence; the Gold Coast’s
outgoing Director of Medical Services observed that this was ‘not due to any lack of 
supplies available in Accra’.72 Faced with the possible closure of hospitals in the south, 
ahead of the final pre-independence national election in 1956, the Ministry of Health 
temporarily suspended most of its proposed public health projects until after 
independence and began attempts to recruit medical personnel from other 
Commonwealth countries. The budget for health work was reduced from £11,000,000 
to £1,000,000, with allocations to be reviewed ‘in two to three years’, in light of post-
independence revenues from cocoa exports. No new hospitals or hospital extensions 
were to be built – by 1954, the expansion of district health centres in the north had 
already been made dependent on the generation of surplus revenues from the Cocoa 
Marketing Board, in preference to the diversion of funds earmarked for southern 
facilities: ‘money is only available if Cocoa Marketing Board funds are made available 
to free health centre money from elsewhere’.73 The Ministry of Health argued that the 
government should resist calls to cut spending on preventive campaigns, including 
against onchocerciasis in the north, but it accepted that preventive medicine of this kind
71 1954 MDAR, 40–41.
72 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc.8: Governor’s Office to Navropio, Kassena-Nankani Native 
Authority, 3rd March 1953.
73 Ibid., Enc.15: Minutes, Northern Territories Hospitals Co-ordination Committee, 31 May 1954.
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‘might not be popular with the electorate’. As a result, an increasing proportion of 
funds were directed towards projects which might bring political rewards, including the
reconstruction of Accra’s central Korle Bu Hospital.74 
The Medical Field Units
Beyond the cuts in funding for northern health services, and the rapid 
departure of medical staff – which created a gulf in institutional knowledge of northern 
disease and the arrangement of local health services – there were two additional 
developments that shaped northern healthcare over the independence transition and 
beyond: the entrenchment of church control over the provision of health services, and 
the creation of the Medical Field Units.  The field units, still remembered by many 
northern communities as the ‘MFUs’, were a mobile rural medical service, and one of 
the north's most successful and enduring healthcare institutions. Like other innovations 
in the region, the service was developed contingently under conditions of economic and
political marginality, with government funds unavailable for an expansion of fixed 
health services along the same lines as the south. In this case, the MFUs were created 
by diverting funding and personnel from the expansive campaign against epidemic 
sleeping sickness in the north, which dwarfed all other centrally-funded healthcare 
activities in the region during the 1930s, towards the provision of medical treatment 
and surveillance for a greatly expanded range of diseases. 
In the late 1930s it became impossible to maintain sleeping sickness control 
through the quarantine camps alone, particularly after concurrent outbreaks of epidemic
meningitis from 1939. Meningitis spread more extensively than sleeping sickness and 
incurred fatalities more rapidly, and by the late 1930s meningitis posed a greater threat 
74 NRG/8/13/21 (1952-1955), Enc.16: Minutes, Conference of Principal Medical Officers, 15th June 
1955.
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to southwards labour migration. As a result personnel were transferred from the 
sleeping sickness treatment campaign to meningitis work, and many of the north’s 
sleeping sickness camps were re-purposed for meningitis control.75 In light of the 
difficulty in containing sleeping sickness infection through the camps, and in reaching 
rural populations for treatment, a mobile treatment campaign was launched in 1938, 
under the direction of B.B. Waddy, a medical officer with the northern administration. 
This comprised teams of African personnel – initially hospital nurses and urban 
sanitation workers trained in the south, but soon composed almost entirely of 
northerners, ‘accustomed to working in primitive surroundings and familiar with local 
languages’.76 Operating away from European supervision, these teams were able to 
access remote communities to monitor infection and supply sleeping sickness 
treatment, and were considered to have been highly effective, despite the difficult and 
sometimes dangerous nature of the work undertaken by the units' formally untrained 
personnel.77 In 1938, for example, a single mobile team in the south Mamprusi district 
– made up of 'local NT boys of 3rd standard education, or illiterates', was able to 
examine almost 25,000 people for sleeping sickness, and treated more than 600 cases of
the disease. In the same year, the Northern Territories' central sleeping sickness 
isolation camp at Nakpanduri treated 630 people, at far greater cost.78 Part-financed by 
the region’s Native Authorities, the new units were immediately endorsed by the 
75 See CO/96/762 (1939); and CO/859/108 (1945).
76 GB/0809/v54.6 (1957), Waddy ‘Cerebro-spinal Meningitis’, 11; B. B. Waddy, ‘Organization and 
Work of the Gold Coast Medical Field Units’, Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical 
Medicine and Hygiene 50, no. 4 (July 1956): 313–36.
77 Rural sleeping sickness control staff were at risk of accidental infection, and physical harm from 
patients in the terminal stages of the disease. See, for example, CSO/11/1/511 (1942) Accident to 
Bindya, Tryps worker, Med Dept, PRAAD Accra; CSO/11/1/512 (1942) Allan Wangara, Tryps 
campaign, PRAAD Accra.
78 1938-1939 NTAR, 50–52; 1938-1939 MDAR, 6.
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northern administration as a way of effectively using its low budget allocations, and of 
circumventing delays in the expansion of fixed medical facilities.79 
By 1950, the Medical Department considered that human sleeping sickness 
was 'virtually under control', but the administration elected to retain and extend the 
northern mobile units that had been created under the campaign.80 In 1947 these had 
been merged with a smaller set of mobile units also operating in the region, which had 
previously been focused on treating yaws.81 In 1950 the combined outfit was 
redesignated as the 'Medical Field Units', and its remit was greatly expanded. The 
number of field units was more than doubled, and they were tasked with monitoring 
and treating practically all of the north's principal diseases, including meningitis, 
onchocerciasis, guinea worm, tuberculosis, yaws, leprosy, malaria, smallpox, bilharzia, 
hookworm, and malnutrition. By 1957, the Gold Coast’s Director of Medical Services 
argued that the north’s MFUs were 'of greater service to the community than any 
hospital, however large.'82  Like the ‘Village Volunteers’ and Guinea Worm Eradication 
Programme of the 1990s (see Chapter 6), the Medical Field Units give an example of 
how long-lived medical institutions in the north were sometimes developed through 
contingent responses to occasional epidemics, which brought temporarily increased 
allocations of funding, rather than through any systemic programme to improve the 
region’s healthcare institutions. The MFUs were created in response to a sleeping 
sickness epidemic that overwhelmed the meagre formal medical infrastructure of the 
north, and were maintained because they were effective in reaching northern peoples 
that had previously been unattended by the colonial medical system. As much as the 
units were a success, they also demonstrated the ongoing marginality of the region, and 
79 1938-1939 NTAR, 50.
80 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.7: Cheverton, ‘Observations on the Medical Department between 
November 1949 and April 1950’, 49-51.
81 1947 MDAR, 5.
82 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.7: Cheverton, ‘Observations on the Medical Department’, 48-49.
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the failure of the British administration, over five decades, to develop comparable 
healthcare institutions to those which it had created in the more remunerative districts 
of the south. 
At the end of colonial rule, the MFUs were the only accessible source of 
state-sponsored medicine for many northerners, and this remained the case well into the
independence era. They remained a central element of the northern healthcare system 
into the early 1980s, when the units were disbanded following the turn to structural 
adjustment and a large-scale reorganisation of health services implemented by the 
Rawlings government.83 In addition to their effect as providers of front-line treatment to
rural communities, the MFU staff functioned as a crucial ark of information and 
medical skills across the independence divide, when knowledge of the north's health 
problems was often lost as British medical staff left the Gold Coast, and when formally 
trained southern medics refused to take up posts north of Kumasi. Dr Sam Bugri, who 
became the Regional Director of Health Services at Tamale in 1984, recalled that in the 
decades after independence, new doctors had relied on the staff of the MFUs to learn 
lumbar puncture techniques, to test for epidemic meningitis in the field:
We had a team they called the Medical Field Units – they started way back in 
the colonial times ... They were focused on the North, and they were well 
trained. I learned how to do lumbar puncture from them, not from medical 
school. I was so much interested in their kind of work – how they went from 
village to village. They could screen a village within a short period for any 
diseases that you want. When we were having these meningitis epidemics, we 
had a feeling that there were very few doctors who are comfortable with doing 
lumbar puncture. So we insisted to make sure that all the doctors in the field 
would see this. And these Medical Field Unit people, they were not highly 
educated. But they taught them how to do it safely, and very very accurately – 
and they did it with ease.84 
83 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
84 Ibid.
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Across five decades, spanning political upheavals and shifting state priorities,
the widely-remembered work of the MFUs stands as something of a testament to the 
role played by a group of 'uneducated' northerners, operating away from regular 
supervision by the formal healthcare system, in shaping the region's public health.
Independence-era expediency: missions and northern medical services
The long-term relationship between missions and government health 
institutions has arguably been under-researched by historians of Africa, although other 
aspects of missionary medicine have received a great deal of attention. For northern 
Ghana, most prior historical scholarship, particularly on the colonial period, has 
focused on the role of particular missions in northern education, and less attention has 
been given to the development of church-led healthcare.85 In part this is because the 
entry of missionary groups into northern healthcare was delayed in comparison to other
parts of colonial Africa. Bruce Fetter suggests that Christian missions ‘provided the 
bulk of western medical care for rural Africans’ under colonial rule, but this was not the
case in the Gold Coast.86 Here, even in the southern colony there were few large 
mission health facilities until 1930, when the Agogo Hospital was built by the Basel 
Mission in Ashanti.87 The absence of mission groups was particularly pronounced in the
Northern Territories, where for several decades after the region’s incorporation into the 
Gold Coast, the colonial government maintained a policy of preventing missions from 
establishing outposts and providing services like healthcare or education.88 From 1902 
85 For research on mission education in the north, see Benedict Der, ‘Christian Missions and the 
Expansion of Western Education in Northern Ghana, 1906-1975’, in Saaka, Regionalism and Public 
Policy, ch.6; Thomas, ‘Education in Northern Ghana’.
86 Fetter, ‘Health Care in Twentieth Century Africa’, 13.
87 See Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 47–48.
88 For a discussion see R. Bagulo Bening, ‘Internal Colonial Boundary Problems of the Gold Coast, 
1907-1951’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 17, no. 1 (1984): 81–99; Thomas, 
‘Education in Northern Ghana’.
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to 1931, the only group to establish and maintain a presence in the region was the 
French Society of Missionaries of Africa, or ‘White Fathers’, which was given 
permission to build a base at Navrongo in 1906, after accepting government restrictions
on its educational work.89 Other churches entered the north from the 1930s, when 
restrictions on education and proselytisation were relaxed, including the Basel Mission,
the Assemblies of God, and the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade Mission.90 But the 
White Fathers (and Catholicism as a denomination) remained the dominant mission 
group throughout the colonial period and into the independence era. Although the 
White Fathers had by 1929 established several church outposts among Dagaare 
communities in the north-west, and in the Navrongo district in the north-east, their 
involvement in northern healthcare had remained relatively minor, apart from the 
provision of limited clinical services at the missions themselves. This stood in stark 
contrast to the group’s health work elsewhere in colonial Africa. In 1911, for example, 
the White Fathers reported that they operated 289 hospitals and dispensaries across 
French and British East Africa, treating over 1.2 million people that year.91 
The first significant involvement of missions in the provision of northern 
healthcare came in 1930, when the White Fathers established a leper hospital at 
Navrongo, supported by the regional administration.92 As government health services 
contracted following the Great Depression, missions were given increased scope for the
provision of basic medical services, and a number of small clinics and treatment centres
were established in mission districts. The involvement of missions in northern 
healthcare still remained relatively limited until after the war. But as independence 
89 Der, ‘Christian Missions’, 108; Thomas, ‘Education in Northern Ghana’, 460.
90 Der, ‘Christian Missions’, 107–10; Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 237–55.
91 Charles M. Good, ‘Pioneer medical missions in colonial Africa’, Social Science and Medicine 32 
(1991): 5.
92 1930-31 MDAR, Appendix D,  ’Report on Leprosy Survey & Investigation’; 1932-1933 MDAR, 21;
1930-1931 NTAR, 2–4.
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became increasingly likely, and the colonial government looked for ways to maintain 
northern health services without additional spending commitments, the north’s missions
became central to government policy. In the late 1940s, the Gold Coast government 
proposed a far-reaching transfer of medical authority to church groups, including the 
hand-over of some existing northern government hospitals to mission control. These 
included the Navrongo War Memorial hospital, built and maintained with funds raised 
from local communities. Operational control was given to the White Fathers, and the 
hospital was rebuilt closer to the mission itself.93 In addition to the handover of 
hospitals and other facilities, the Medical Department proposed that broad areas of 
what was then called ‘social medicine’, including infant and maternal welfare and 
general preventative medicine, would in future be the responsibility of the British Red 
Cross and the missions. The proposals were subsequently approved by the Maude 
Commission, and broadly accepted by the first Nkrumah government in 1952.94 
The number of mission-managed hospitals increased rapidly, from three in 
1951 to 27 in 1960, with most located in the north, Ashanti, and the eastern Volta 
region.95 Of the first nine mission groups identified as candidates to take over 
government health services in 1950, six were located in the north.96 The handover of 
government facilities to mission control appears to have been seen as a way of reducing
government spending commitments, including funds intended for the renovation and 
expansion of northern hospitals, while simultaneously attempting to maintain staffing 
93 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.31: ‘Financial Assistance to the Roman Catholic Mission in the 
Northern Territories’, report from DMS Accra to CC NTs, 11 December 1950.; and Enc.32: 
Memorandum from Gerald Bertrand, Bishop of Tamale, to DMS Accra, 22 June 1950.
94 See Barbra Mann Wall, Into Africa: A Transnational History of Catholic Medical Missions and 
Social Change, (New York: Rutgers University Press, 2015), ch.2.
95 NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.2: Ten Year Plan for Hospital, Health and Nutrition Services. 
Subsection on Social Medicine, 13; Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 27–35.
96 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.11: ‘Assistance to Voluntary Agencies’, report from DMS Cheverton, 
24 April 1950.
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levels as British personnel departed.97 Agreements were made for the handover of 
government hospitals at Navrongo, Bawku, Nandom and Jirapa. These became ‘Joint 
Hospitals’, managed, staffed and part-funded by international mission groups, with 
government supplying a grant-in-aid to cover expenditures on medicine and materials. 
Although government ostensibly retained ultimate control over the facilities, with the 
ability to reassert control over a hospital if standards were not maintained, in practice 
the policy appears to have vested a great deal of authority with the missions, allowing 
them to resist government takeover. Joint hospitals were overseen by a management 
committee designed to have either a ‘Catholic majority’, or an equal number of mission
and government representatives, with an additional representative from the hospital’s 
local Native Authority. In the case of Jirapa Hospital, for example, the first 
management committee comprised the Bishop of Tamale, the Mother and Father 
Superiors of Jirapa, a representative of the Jirapa Native Authority, and three British 
medical officers.98 In some cases the handover policies appear to have been formulated 
by northern mission groups themselves, and adopted with little modification by the 
government at Accra.99 The pre-independence Nkrumah government assured the White 
Fathers that it was extremely unlikely that it would seek to reclaim former government 
facilities, and that in any event this could only be done by agreement of the hospital 
management committees.100 
Mission control of northern health services expanded as independence 
approached and new church groups entered the region. In 1954, for example, the 
97 See ibid., and Enc.31: ‘Financial Assistance to the Roman Catholic Mission in the Northern 
Territories’, report from R.S. Cheverton to Chief Commissioner NTs, 11 December 1950.
98 NRG/8/13/8 (1947-1954), Enc. 9: ‘Notes of the Main Points which arose in the meeting at Tamale’, 
Ministry of Health & Labour to CC NTs, 9 July 1951.
99 See, for example, ibid., Enc.9 and Enc.10: ‘Statement of the Principles regulating financial 
assistance to be given by Government to Voluntary agencies undertaking medical work’, from 
Ministry of Health and Labour to CC NTs, July 1951.
100 Ibid., Enc.7: Minutes of the Meeting held by the Minister for Health and Labour at Tamale, 24 
January 1952.
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American Baptists applied to open a new health centre at Nalerigu, the Ewe 
Presbyterians applied to take over Yendi hospital, and the Basel Mission applied to take
over Bawku hospital. The Ministry of Health proposed that mission doctors should 
assume control of government dispensaries in the north-west, and Native or Local 
Authority rural dressing stations across the north.101 By this stage, mission healthcare 
had supplanted or become integrated with Native Authority health services in many 
districts. As the Native Authority system declined in the early 1950s, through staff 
shortages and the centralisation of training in Accra, mission groups – able to 
independently recruit trained staff – filled the gap as a matter of government policy. 
Native Authorities, which had formerly operated the north’s most extensive rural 
healthcare network, now paid grants to missions out of the taxes they raised from local 
communities. Some districts were only served by mission health services. In Nandom, 
for example, by 1954 there was no longer any direct government or Native Authority 
involvement in healthcare. Medical facilities were operated by the White Sisters 
Mission, which reported that it was treating approximately 10,000 outpatients a month, 
part-funded both by government and by the Local Authority. The mission employed 
African, French and Canadian medical personnel; it was able to directly approach the 
Ministry of Health in Accra to request increases in government funding and the 
expansion of its activities, without consulting the northern administration.102 
This was an indication of the ongoing centralisation of healthcare by this 
point, and also of a new dynamic which would become increasingly apparent in the 
decades after independence: the increasing scope for missions, NGOs and other 
101 NRG/8/13/21 (1952-1955), Enc.15: Minutes of the Northern Territories Hospitals Co-ordination 
Committee, 31 May 1954.
102 NRG/8/13/26 (1953-1960) Local Authority Health Services General, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.9: ‘White
Sisters Dispensary And Clinic Nandom’, Government Agent to CRO, Tamale, 31 May 54; and 
Enc.10: Mother Superior M. Isaac Jogues to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health Accra, 10 May 
1954.
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international organisations, with access to central government, to shape northern 
healthcare without direct reference to local medical or political officials, or community 
preferences. The expansion of mission healthcare was nevertheless clearly welcomed 
by some northern communities, particularly as government health services declined in 
the years immediately before independence. In 1956, the Nandom Na wrote an 
excoriating letter to the Minister of Health and Northern Territories Council, 
emphasising the decline in government medical services and loss of the community’s 
Native Authority facilities, and revealing the extent to which mission healthcare had 
won local support. Instead of being seen as a planned extension of government 
healthcare by other means, the mission clinics were viewed as an alternative and 
superior provider:
The demand for a Health Centre for this area is not new; and local endeavours 
to procure these amenities confirm the statement. Namely, a dispensary was 
built by the sweat of the people. This worked wonderfully well for a short time 
but collapsed. Why? Not that all the sick people were cured, not that all the 
diseases were repelled from the area: but that there was no staff to manage the 
Dispensary and so self-help became ineffectual. My people and I have seen and 
have repeatedly pointed out the urgent needs of our community ... We built a 
small Maternity Clinic also by our sweat, with the firm hope that Government 
will be considerate this time. Indeed this too became but one of the biggest 
dreams imaginable. Again help was not forthcoming, yet the need was 
becoming one of a stressed urgency. We had to find a way out. It was at this 
juncture that the Nandom Local Council took decision and handed over to the 
White Sisters through the kind permission of His Lordship The Bishop of 
Tamale, the duties and management of the Dispensary and the Maternity Clinic, 
with an annual grant of Two Hundred Pounds from the Local Council.  It is 
sometimes good to flatter. But in a situation like ours flattery would be out of 
the question. We must face facts now. Let us examine the statistics for this year, 
and see for ourselves whether the White Sisters are not bravely facing the needs 
of the Government's People ... Is it not shameful to say that what the 
Government cannot do, an independent body like the Mission can?103 
For the north, policies promoted by colonial and African governments in the 
early 1950s vested a significant degree of public health authority with Christian 
103 NRG/8/13/9 (1947-57), Enc.35: Letter from Nandom Na to Ministry of Health and Chairman, NTs 
Council, 26th September 1956.
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churches and international mission groups. This shifted a financial and operational 
burden from government whilst simultaneously increasing the temporal power of 
northern churches – boosting their political, economic, and social influence in 
communities where they became state-supported gatekeepers to life-saving drugs and 
treatments.  Although the handover of government or NA facilities took place across 
the Gold Coast, it was particularly extensive in the north, where the government 
healthcare system was relatively underdeveloped and missions could make a 
compelling argument for the takeover of facilities. For better or worse, decisions taken 
at this point in the independence transition have had an enduring influence on the 
arrangement of healthcare in the north, and in Ghana as a whole.  Over the following 
decades, many major public health projects in the north were overseen by churches, 
who became allied in pan-denominational health organisations like the Christian Health
Association of Ghana (CHAG), founded in 1967.104 
At times northern churches and their medical facilities functioned as a 
collaborative extension of government healthcare – for example in the integrated 
government/church Bawku District Medical Programme, a community health network 
run by the White Fathers and the Ghana government’s Christian Health Commission in 
the 1970s.105 More generally, however, church-run medicine supplanted or was given 
control over local institutions that had previously been part of the state healthcare 
system. When the Medical Field Units were finally shelved as a northern healthcare 
institution during the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s, for example, they 
were partially replaced by Mission Mobile Clinics intended to fulfil the same purpose, 
104 See Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 48.
105 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975) Study on community involvement in solving local health 
problems, Ghana, WHO Geneva, Correspondence between Ghana Christian Health Commission and 
WHO, May 1974, 90-93.
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but no longer as directly accountable to government or the electorate.106 Churches were 
given permission to directly import pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies, 
through bodies like the Catholic Drug Centre, although their choices of drugs at times 
conflicted with the advice of health officials regarding the control of particular 
diseases, or the avoidance of antibiotic resistance.107 By the year 2000, mission groups 
represented by the Christian Health Association of Ghana were the largest providers of 
health services after the government, operating 128 major health facilities including 49 
hospitals across Ghana, with 80 percent of the salaries of church medical workers paid 
by the state.108
Church groups played an ambiguous role in northern healthcare over the 
century. They were evidently embraced by some communities, and at times they 
provided health services in areas that lay beyond the reach or inclination of the Accra 
government.109 As Giovanni Carbone has described, churches were also instrumental in 
establishing Ghana’s first mutual health insurance schemes in the 1990s, which were 
adopted as a model for the state financing of public health in 2003.110 But the mutually 
constitutive expansion of medical services and Christianity, in Ghana as a whole, is a 
subject which deserves further study.111 The state’s conferral of medical power on 
churches steadily increased their broader influence, and this influence made it 
increasingly difficult to rescind decisions first taken in the 1950s. At times, prevalent 
Christianity even had a direct religious influence on government health services. In the 
106 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85) ‘Socioeconomic Development In The Areas Freed From 
Onchocerciasis In Ghana’: Report From the Onchocerciasis Control Programme in the Volta Basin 
Area, 1984, WHO Geneva, 5–9.
107 See, for example, PD/152/v2 (1996) Importation of drugs, PRAAD Accra, Encs.1-3: 
Correspondence between National Catholic Secretariat & Catholic Drug Centre, and Ministry of 
Health Accra, August 1995.
108 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 48; and see PD/152/v2 (1996).
109 For observations about community support for mission healthcare in northern Ghana in the 1990s, 
see Bierlich, The Problem of Money, 101–3.
110 Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 397.
111 The provision of grants-in-aid to mission groups has also been part of health policy in a number of 
other independent African states. See Good, ‘Pioneer medical missions in colonial Africa’, 1–3.
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1970s, for example, mid-level Ghanaian health officials of all religions were sent 
Ministry of Health memoranda listing quotations from scripture, entreating them not to 
act like the Kings of the Gentiles, or to follow the teachings of Luke and Matthew.112 As
Carola Lentz and Benedict Der have argued with regard to Catholic mission education 
in the north, the government’s ceding of services to missions allowed them to 
accumulate a far-reaching political influence.113 A former regional director of northern 
health services observed that when he attempted to expand direct government health 
provision in one district in the 1990s, he was unable to build state facilities in areas 
where missions had assumed control of health services.114 
This was the broad situation for northern healthcare at independence in 1957. 
An exodus of staff and cuts in funding from Britain meant that proposed health 
spending under the Nkrumah government’s Second Development Plan was shelved 
until after the transition. The years immediately before independence saw significant 
cut-backs in central government funding for northern hospitals and other physical 
health facilities, and for some preventive campaigns. There was a concurrent transferral
of authority for northern healthcare to church groups, primarily the White Fathers and 
other Catholic bodies, which would have far-reaching effects in the decades after 
independence. The period also saw the decline of the Native Authority health system, 
and the creation of the Medical Field Units, which for the next thirty years became the 
state’s central means of providing health services to many rural northern communities. 
Despite sustained and vociferous advocacy from officials in the Northern Territories 
administration, over more than twenty years from the early 1930s, northern healthcare 
112 PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-1981) Health Centres, PRAAD Accra, Enc.6: ‘Basic Health 
Services’, Memorandum from Ministry of Health, 13 April 1973.
113 Lentz, Ethnicity, 174; Der, ‘Christian Missions’, 127.
114 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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at independence remained a function of the region’s peripheral situation in the Gold 
Coast economy, and in the new state of Ghana. 
Figure 16. Kungungu Polling Station in the Northern Territories, election day July 1956 
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection CO 1069-53-74
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Part 2. Northern health and the Nkrumah government: new policies,  new 
priorities, new results?
Health policy and Ghana’s economy
With a decisive majority in parliament, Kwame Nkrumah made improved 
healthcare a central aim of Ghana’s first government, following full independence in 
March 1957. At his Christmas broadcast that year, Nkrumah said:
My first objective is to abolish from Ghana poverty, ignorance and disease. We 
shall measure our progress by the improvement in the health of our people; by 
the number of children in school and the quality of their education; by the 
availability of water and electricity in our towns and villages … The welfare of 
our people is our chief pride and it is by this that my Government will ask to be 
judged.115
Nkrumah’s welfare policies have been well-studied at the national level. The 
CPP government set out to create a socialised health service on the British model, 
funded by general taxation instead of direct charges at medical facilities.116 Fees for 
drugs and outpatient health services were abolished, private practice was prohibited in 
government hospitals, and from 1961 all medical staff employed by government were 
forbidden to charge for services provided away from state facilities.117 District health 
centres were built across the country, with 46 in operation by 1965, and several new 
hospitals were built in the south. A national medical school was established at the 
University of Ghana in 1962, contributing to a rapid expansion in the number of private
medical practitioners across Ghana, and Nkrumah began efforts to integrate traditional 
healers into the national health system.118 From 1964, the CPP government also 
oversaw a policy shift towards the new paradigm of ‘community health’, promoted 
115 Nkrumah, quoted in Gilford Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at 
the University of Ghana, Legon, 17 January 1991 (Accra: University of Ghana Press, 1994), 30.
116 See Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 387–94.
117 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 49–50.
118 See WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965) UNSF Establishment of a Community Health Project, WHO 
Geneva, Enc.1: ‘WHO Consultant Report on Ghana under EPTA program’, 10-20; Agyei-Mensah 
and de-Graft Aikins, ‘Epidemiological Transition’, 886; Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 48–49.
173
internationally by the World Health Organisation, emphasising basic rural health care 
and preventive medicine.119 These changes were part of Ghana’s health- and welfare-
focused ‘Second Development Plan’, devised by the CPP and British Gold Coast 
governments before independence, but postponed due to low funds and the exodus of 
administrative staff in the early 1950s. After independence the state initially directed 
much of Ghana’s total tax revenues towards fulfilment of the plan, on the premise that 
spending on health and welfare would boost economic growth.120 
From 1961, however, there was a turn away from perceived British influence 
on Ghana’s state policy, and the healthcare programmes of the Second Development 
Plan were largely abandoned. As Roger Gocking has discussed, the Nkrumah 
government developed increasingly strong links with the centrally-planned states of the
Eastern Bloc, and enlisted the aid of eastern European economists in the development 
of a new national ‘Programme for Work and Happiness’, intended to bring about the 
‘socialist transformation of the economy and the complete eradication of its colonial 
structures’.121 Peter Sederburg has calculated that during the last five years of the 
Nkrumah presidency, Ghana’s ratio of capital to current expenditure was at least double
that of any year during the colonial period.122 As the state spent intensively in an effort 
to meet its public welfare commitments, it faced increasing shortfalls in revenue, which
were passed on in cuts to the provision of some health services, particularly the 
purchasing of imported drugs and the construction of rural health posts – in 1965 there 
were only eight functional health posts, out of 250 that had been planned.123 Budgetary 
shortfalls increased starkly after 1964, when the international cocoa price collapsed 
119 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.1: ‘WHO Consultant Report on Ghana under EPTA program’, 
10-20; WHO/AFR/EXT/16 (1967) Report on a Visit to Ghana by Dr J. Vysohild, Regional WHO 
Adviser, 31 March 1967, WHO Geneva, 30–50; Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 387–89.
120 See NRG/8/7/27 (1955-1964) Ghana Development Plan 1959-64, PRAAD Tamale.
121 Gocking, History of Ghana, 134–40.
122 Sederberg, ‘The Gold Coast under Colonial Rule’, 195.
123 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.1: WHO Consultant Report 1965, 18.
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following a bumper harvest across West Africa, at a time when cocoa made up more 
than 50 percent of Ghana’s total export earnings. 
Björn Beckman has argued that problems in the cocoa economy also 
stemmed from the initial success of the government’s welfare programmes, which had 
begun to reduce some of the disparity between north and south. The good salaries paid 
to government employees drove wages up across the Ghana economy, reducing the 
revenues earned by the government from cocoa production, while improvements in 
education, health provision and agricultural development in the rural north initially 
reduced the flow of low-paid northern migrants to the southern cocoa fields.124 But 
although the total size of Ghana’s health service increased over the early Nkrumah 
years from 1957 to 1961, particularly in the aggregate number of physical facilities, 
there was still a strong southern bias. Most healthcare initiatives were focused on urban
populations and the southern cocoa-growing areas – WHO personnel in Ghana reported
that the distribution of national health monitoring systems gave the government an idea 
of health needs ‘in the better-off parts of the country’, but little awareness of what was 
happening on its periphery.125 As I discuss below, this meant that northern health 
officials were sometimes required to spend time on centrally-mandated public health 
initiatives that had little relevance to rural communities or regional health problems. 
When international bodies offered funding and personnel to promote rural health 
development, as the WHO did in 1965, for example, they were often encouraged to 
focus their attention on the cocoa-growing areas.126 
124 Björn Beckman, Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana. 
(Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), ch.7; and see Dwayne Woods, ‘Predatory
Elites, Rents and Cocoa: A Comparative Analysis of Ghana and Ivory Coast’, Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics 42, no. 2 (2004): 233.
125 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.1: WHO Consultant Report 1965, 5-20; Carbone, ‘Democratic 
Demands’, 387–90.
126 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.1: WHO Consultant Report 1965, 19.
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Staffing Ghana’s public health system in the independence era
From the early 1960s, falling state revenues affected the employment 
conditions of government doctors. With extremely heavy workloads in state facilities, 
and prohibited from engaging in lucrative private practice, the doctors became 
increasingly disaffected with the CPP government.127 In 1965, shortly before the coup 
which deposed Nkrumah, the World Health Organisation estimated that it would take 
more than fifty years before Ghana was able to train enough doctors and specialists to 
adequately meet its own rising health needs. A WHO consultant employed to assess 
community health reported that ‘an ordinary doctor may see between 100 and 150 
patients in a working day, in addition to any emergency work that he is called upon to 
perform day and night. A doctor in such condition is unable to give any of his best to 
the sick, and is certainly in no position to undertake any preventive or health promotion
activity in the community’.128  The staffing crisis which had developed before 
independence persisted into the Nkrumah era, despite the expansion in Ghana’s local 
capacity for medical training. In 1960 there were fewer than 450 doctors working in the
country, serving a population of seven million people. By 1966 there were 597 doctors, 
almost half of whom were employed in private practice, and only 228 of whom were 
Ghanaian.129 In part this was because of an extremely high emigration rate among 
Ghanaians who travelled overseas to receive medical training. From 1960 to 1966, only
38 percent of Ghanaians who went abroad on medical scholarships returned to Ghana at
the end of their courses. The proportion who remained overseas increased as Ghana’s 
economy faltered, and in 1965 and 1966, of 131 medical graduates who were expected 
to return to government service after qualifying, only 34 came back.130 
127 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 50–51.
128 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.1, WHO Consultant Report 1965, 14.
129 Calculated from ibid., 14-21; WHO/AFR/EXT/16 (1967), 30–40.
130 WHO/AFR/EXT/16 (1967), 34.
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While funds were still available, Ghana recruited large numbers of foreign 
doctors to make up for shortfalls in local staff, in an attempt to match the continued 
expansion of physical health facilities under the Second Development Plan: where staff 
could not be found, buildings were left empty. From 1957 to 1962, the Nkrumah 
government recruited from Britain and its former colonies, employing a permanent 
representative in London to make the case for health work in Ghana. An exchange of 
letters in the British Medical Journal reveals the debates that took place about the 
employment of British doctors. From 1959 to 1962, C. Belfield Clarke, the Ghana 
Ministry of Health’s representative in London, called for applicants through the BMJ. 
His requests, couched in the idiom of the colonial era, attempted to allay prejudices 
about the changed political landscape, about expatriate employees from other states 
(including an increasing number of doctors from Eastern Europe), and about the 
solvency of the Ghanaian state:
No longer can the country be called  ‘the white man's grave’, neither is it any 
longer ‘the white man's burden’. I can confidently recommend doctors in the 
United Kingdom to take up posts in the rapidly expanding Medical Service in 
Ghana … They will be able to assist Ghana in its efforts to become the leading 
democratic country in ‘Africa’. The country is compact, with a population of 
only five million and a considerable sterling balance, and every prospect of 
becoming a stable, prosperous country. We are not seeking ‘misfits’.131
Belfield Clarke assured applicants that they would find all British 
conveniences: ‘Dinner in one of the University of Ghana halls combines the dignity of 
an Oxford or Cambridge college with the gaiety and colour of modern tropical 
buildings’.132  During a sustained correspondence with the BMJ, he was at pains to 
demonstrate continued British influence on Ghana’s health system: downplaying the 
extent of nationalism, and to some extent Ghana’s independence itself:
131 C. Belfield Clarke, ‘Correspondence - Ghana Medical Service II’, British Medical Journal 2, no. 
5158 (14 November 1959): 1024.
132 Ibid.
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The expanding medical service in Ghana which we are building is founded on 
the British system of medicine introduced by the Colonial Office while Ghana 
was still the Gold Coast. All the tradition of medicine is therefore British. 
Ghana is devoted to the idea of the Commonwealth, and this devotion extends 
to the masses of the people, as was demonstrated most clearly by the 
enthusiasm with which the masses all over Ghana greeted the Queen and the 
Duke of Edinburgh on the recent Royal Tour ...Ghana is anxious that the British 
tradition should be maintained and that the medical school shall be Ghanaian 
and not an importation from a foreign country. The Ghana Medical Association 
is affiliated to the parent body, the British Medical Association, and mutual 
benefits will flow from this affiliation. I hope that medicine in the United 
Kingdom will respond to this appeal.133
Several former Gold Coast medical practitioners replied to these requests to 
warn new doctors away – their responses perhaps reflected the sentiment of some 
colonial-era medics at the transition to African rule. For example:
I feel strongly that it can only be recommended with considerable reservations. 
For instance, one must be prepared to arrive back from leave to that democratic 
country and find one's house occupied by someone else and notice to be in 
another centre in two days' time. These two days, of course, are fully occupied 
trying to recover one's possessions. Many more inconveniences and frustrations 
could be cited ...  this letter is not one of 'sour grapes'.134
Some British correspondents enthused about work in Ghana on the grounds 
that it would improve their employability after gaining experience on African patients, 
referred to using the euphemistic medical term ‘clinical material’. For example: ‘The 
clinical material was impressive in both variety and nature and, of course, provided 
much in the way of tropical diseases. But it was not only the tropical picture that 
focused one's interest: a traffic problem on inadequate roads is responsible for many 
accidents’.135 Others argued that it was a duty for British doctors to aid Ghana as an ex-
133 Report, ‘Medicine and Surgery in the Commonwealth’, British Medical Journal 1, no. 5276 (24 
February 1962): 551.
134 D.G. Young, ‘Correspondence - Ghana Medical Service III’, British Medical Journal 2, no. 5161 (5 
December 1959): 1254–55.
135 H. Jackson, ‘Correspondence - Ghana Medical Service II’, British Medical Journal 1, no. 5165 (2 
January 1960): 60; D.H. Barham, ‘Correspondence - Health in Ghana IV’, British Medical Journal 
2, no. 5312 (27 October 1962): 1125.
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colony, as it sought ‘to build a health service comparable to the one in the United 
Kingdom’.136
One of the British doctors who wrote to the BMJ to sound a note of caution 
was already working in Ghana, in the north. P.R. Richards, a young doctor who had 
been one of the last intake of conscripts under Britain’s post-war National Service laws,
and who had volunteered to work in Tamale, argued against doctors travelling to Ghana
only for the sake of gaining experience. He indicated the state of northern medical 
services at the region’s most developed hospital:
The frustrations of not having modern drugs and ancillary aids readily available 
are just as bad as any in the NHS. Our drugs are always running out without 
immediate hope of replacement, and I regret to say that deaths occur because 
oxygen or tetracyclines are just not available ... it is alarming when there is 
nobody to consult but one's textbooks and two years' experience. Surely it is 
more satisfying to realize that one's patients are receiving the most modern 
drugs, with all modern ancillary aids, than gaining experience but at the 
patient's expense.137
In both the late colonial and early independence era, the low popularity of the
north as a posting meant that some of those who applied to work there seemed 
particularly committed to the region, and critical of perceived inequities in the 
provision of northern and southern health services. These included the British doctors 
B.B. Waddy and David Scott. Waddy, discussed in Chapter 4, was the region’s Principal
Medical Officer in the 1950s, when he oversaw the creation of the Medical Field Units.
He was dismissed at independence, but he continued to act as an advocate for northern 
health needs from London, and he was instrumental in organising a survey of regional 
onchocerciasis by the British Empire Society for the Blind, leading to the recognition 
that northern Ghana had the highest incidence of the disease worldwide. Scott joined 
136 P. Rabindran, ‘Correspondence - Health in Ghana III’, British Medical Journal 2, no. 5306 (15 
September 1962): 732.
137 P.R. Richards, ‘Correspondence - Practice Overseas III’, British Medical Journal 1, no. 5285 (21 
April 1962): 1143.
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the Medical Field Units in 1954, and remained in the north until 1961 when he became 
the Ministry of Health’s lead epidemiologist. He retired to Accra and died there. In 
interviews with individuals who trained and worked with him, and who went on to lead
the Ghana Health Service in the 1980s and 1990s, he was often recalled as an advocate 
for improved northern health services.138 
The number of foreign staff employed in the north declined after 1961, as the 
Nkrumah government became increasingly critical of the colonial legacy and ongoing 
British influence in Ghana. By 1962, at the senior level (including doctors and regional 
officials) the region’s medical service appears to have been largely staffed by personnel
from the south, who also made up a significant proportion of trained nursing staff. 
Perhaps the only parts of the northern health service predominantly made up of 
northerners were the sanitary and dispensary staff who had previously worked for the 
Native Administrations, and employees of the Medical Field Units.139 In interviews 
with a former Deputy Director General of the Ghana Health Service, and a former 
Regional Director for health services in the north, it was emphasized that for southern 
health workers, a posting to the north was sometimes seen as a form of punishment, and
appointments to northern facilities were often resisted.140 The ongoing centralisation of 
medical training in Ghana, begun in the early 1950s, also contributed to northern 
staffing problems after independence. In 1958, the government announced that all 
district sanitation officials would be required to hold a three-year certificate from the 
Accra School of Hygiene. The Northern Region administration pointed out that this 
would ‘rule out most of the serving officers’ in the region’s districts, and that because 
of low educational opportunities in the region throughout the colonial period (entrants 
138 Dr Moses Adibo, Interview, Accra, 17 June 2016; Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016; Dr 
Samuel Oko Sackey, Interview, Accra, 22 June 2015.
139 See staff, NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65) Health Education, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.12: Minutes of the  
Regional Committee of Health Education of the Public, October 3, 1961.
140 Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016; Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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to the Accra School of Hygiene were required to hold a secondary school leaving 
certificate), it was unlikely that the requirement could be met in the near future.141 The 
dearth of colonial-era educational opportunities created similar problems in the 
recruitment of northern women for nursing and nutritional services after independence, 
as women had previously been almost entirely excluded from government schooling in 
the region.142
Northern health initiatives under the CPP Government: nutrition and disease 
surveillance
After independence, the Nkrumah government first centralised and then 
partly re-regionalised the responsibility for local healthcare. In 1957, the Ministry of 
Health asserted control over all health provision, preventing Local Authorities 
(formerly Native Authorities) from ‘initiating or developing’ any medical work or 
building any new facilities.143  In the colonial era, Native Authorities had funded health 
services from their own treasuries, and had broadly been free to shape rural medical 
provision according to their own determination of community needs. This marked a 
final end to the north’s NA health system, which had been undermined over the 
preceding decade by centralisation and low staff allocations. The system had also been 
undermined by the antagonistic relationship that had developed between the CPP, 
guided by anti-tribalist nationalism and with a predominantly southern constituency, 
and the NPP as a representative of traditional elites in the north. In 1958, the Ministry 
returned control over healthcare decisions to northern regions, but on Accra’s terms. 
Local Councils were instituted to replace the former colonial District Councils, which 
141 NRG/8/13/7 (1947-1959) Health Training School, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.25: ‘Qualifications’, 
Ministry of Health Circular, 14 November 1958.
142 See, for example, NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964), Enc.26: ‘Vacancies for Nutrition Assistants’, Ministry 
of Health Nutrition Unit to Regional Office, Tamale, 5 December 1960.
143 NRG/8/13/26 (1953-1960), Enc.14: ‘Local Authority Health Services’, circular from MoH Accra, 31
December 1957.
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had been composed of Native Authority representatives: the change increased the 
influence of the CPP in the north.144 
With health services now based around the new councils, the Ministry of 
Health created Local Council Health Committees in each of the north’s administrative 
districts. The committees were able to apply for grants from government central funds, 
allowing them to take over the sanitation work and deployment of rural medical 
personnel that had previously been funded by Native Authorities.145 At the same time as
this re-regionalisation of basic rural health services, there was an expansion in the 
number of large health facilities directly controlled and financed by the Ministry of 
Health. By 1960 there were 12 District Health Centres in the north, staffed with nurses 
and usually doctors, providing outpatient treatments and dispensary treatments as well 
as maternal and child healthcare.146 Isolation wards were added to all northern hospitals,
as part of a nationwide tuberculosis control programme, and wards reserved for women
and children were built at most of region’s facilities.147 In support of health education 
and disease control work, the state was able to use a greatly increased number of 
northern media outlets including local radio, printing services, and newspapers, 
generally produced in Tamale, to publicise its initiatives.148 
The CPP government made efforts to improve the provision of health services
to northern women, and to increase the number of women employed as healthworkers. 
Mobile clinics for women and children were introduced in health centre districts, 
representatives of ‘women’s groups’ were given a permanent place on Local Council 
144 Saaka, ‘North-South Relations’, ch.7; Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 371–80.
145 NRG/8/5/188 (1958) Eastern Dagomba Local Council Health Committee, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.1: 
Minutes of the First Meeting of the Health Committee, 29 July 1958.
146 NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.4: ‘Northern Region Health’, undated memorandum (1960).
147 NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65) Infectious Diseases, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.92: PMO Tamale to RC, 
Northern Region, 1 February 1960.
148 See, for example, NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.3: Minutes of the Committee for Planning National 
Health Week, 2 February 1960.
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Health Committee meetings, and under the government’s northern nutritional 
programme (discussed below), preference was given to the employment of women as 
government nutritional officers.149 In 1960, northern health officials also formulated an 
extensive, locally tailored plan for school health services, including in-school health 
inspections and vaccinations. They observed that  ‘the number of medical officers has 
fortunately increased considerably, enough now to make this possible’.150 Before the 
collapse of the southern cocoa economy in 1964, and particularly before the 
abandonment of Ghana’s Second Development Plan in 1961, there were some tangible 
advances in the provision of health services to northern communities, reversing some of
the decline that had drawn criticism at the end of colonial rule. 
However, the region’s healthcare system still depended partly on Christian 
groups that had been given control of government medical facilities in the late colonial 
period. Catholic or Anglican Bishops (or their spokespeople) were given permanent 
representation on northern health committees, mission societies continued to control 
many northern hospitals, supported with government grants, and churches worked in 
tandem with the regional health services in campaigns against ‘undesirable social 
practices’, including prostitution.151 Increasing competition between mission-based and 
government health services drew complaints from the Ministry of Justice in Accra, 
which argued that ‘there is a great deal of overlapping and duplication of the health 
programs, and this tends to confuse the community in which these agencies operate’.152 
Despite the significant proportion of Muslims in northern Ghana, from 1957-1966 the 
149 Ibid., Enc.3: Minutes of the Committee for Planning National Health Week, February 2 1960’ and 
Enc.4, ‘Northern Region Health’, undated memorandum (1960).
150 Ibid., Enc.5: ‘School Health Service’, Circular from PMO, Tamale, 22 March 1960.
151 See ibid., Enc.2: Regional Committee on Health of the Public, Meeting 22 March 1960; and Enc.3: 
Minutes of the Committee for Planning, February 2 1960; NRG/8/5/308 (1965) Regional Committee
for Social Education Progress Campaign against Undesirable Social Practices, PRAAD Tamale, 
Enc.1: Memorandum from Ministry of Health & Social Welfare, 12 June 1965.
152 NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.19: ‘Co-Ordination Of Health Activities’, Letter from Ministry of 
Justice, Accra, to Regional Commissioner, Northern Region, 19 March 1963.
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government does not appear to have made similar efforts to involve Muslim groups or 
leaders in the development of northern health, at least not to the extent that these were 
represented on regional health committees. The persistently close relationship between 
Christianity and the state in northern healthcare, across the century, appears to have 
been a reflection of this relationship in Ghana as a whole, with Christian churches able 
to exert a greater influence on national health policy in Accra. Muslims made up only 
17 percent of Ghana’s total population in 2010, for example, but they comprised 48 
percent of the northern population of 4.2 million people.153 
Apart from the expansion of physical healthcare facilities and an increase in 
staff numbers – both of which had begun a reversal by 1966, as I discuss below – the 
CPP government pursued three principal health initiatives in the north: the 
improvement of infectious disease surveillance and control work, another initiative 
focused on nutrition, and another on health education. The three programmes reveal the
inconsistent attention given to specific health problems in the north over the Nkrumah 
years, and the way that local health work was sometimes neglected as healthcare 
officials pursued the CPP’s preferred national projects. Of the three initiatives, the 
nutrition programme was most successful, certainly in terms of the number of 
communities reached by government health-workers. Northern nutrition became an 
urgent national health priority soon after independence, when a joint investigation by 
the WHO and United Nations Food & Agriculture Association (FAO) in 1958 found 
serious shortfalls in the availability of affordable food, creating a cycle of under-
production and increased malnutrition. The investigation estimated that working age 
men in the north needed 2,680 daily calories of food to sustain moderate agricultural 
labour, but only able reliably to obtain 1,600 daily calories, falling to 1,100 in the dry 
153 Government of Ghana, ‘2010 Population & Housing Census Of Ghana’, 40, Table 16.
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season.154 Following the investigation, the north was given ‘first line’ status at the 
passing of the National Food & Nutrition Act of 1959, which made improve nutrition 
on of Ghana’s central welfare policies.155  The National Medical Nutritional Survey, 
which followed the act, again identified the northern regions as requiring the most 
urgent attention. 
Nutrition Officers, almost all of them women, were appointed to travel the 
region and advise communities on diet, domestic food production and meal 
preparation.156 For a period and region where relatively few sources give a granular 
level of detail on the day-to-day work of health personnel, the daily and monthly 
activity logs of the north’s Nutrition Officers offer a wealth of day-by-day information, 
and a striking example of publicly accountable health activity (in the sense that their 
work was open to community comment and local political scrutiny), during the 
Nkrumah years.157 They also reveal the political terrain that health workers might be 
required to negotiate in order to maintain their positions and continue work, and the 
extent to which the CPP maintained an influence over the apparently neutral organs of 
state welfare. In 1961, for example, Ghana’s Ministry of Agriculture, A.S. Abban, wrote
personally to the northern administration to ensure that his preferred appointee for a 
northern Nutrition Officer would be introduced to specific ‘VIPs’, including the senior 
constituency members of the CPP and traditional chiefs.158 
The CPP government’s second initiative, to improve the surveillance and 
reporting of infectious disease in the north, was also relatively successful – in part 
154 See Destombes, ‘Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal Hunger’, 22.
155 NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964), Enc.24: Letter from National Food & Nutrition Board to Regional 
Commissioner, Northern Region, 23 June 1960.
156 Ibid., Encs.25-30: Northern Regional Office, correspondence regarding Nutrition Officers, 1960-
1961; NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.4: ‘Northern Region Health’, undated memorandum (1960).
157 NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964), Encs.31-59: Local Nutrition Boards, Northern Region, Monthly & Daily 
Activity Logs, 1961-1964.
158 Ibid., Enc.29: A.S.A Abban, Minister of Agriculture to Northern Regional Commissioner, 
Appointment of Miss Florence Adadevoh as Nutrition Officer, 24 February 1961.
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because of the rural public health system that had been created locally before 
independence, in response to low allocations of funding from Accra. As the Ministry of 
Health tried to increase its capacity for recording cases and identifying outbreaks of 
infectious disease, it drew on the existing knowledge and information networks of the 
north’s traditional leaders, which had become a central part of northern disease control 
from the 1930s.159 It was also able to use the Medical Field Units, created in the late 
1940s to serve remote northern settlements that lay beyond the reach of existing 
medical services. The success of the north’s Medical Field Units in the Nkrumah-era 
disease surveillance programme led to their adoption as a national institution after 
1966. This meant that the MFU headquarters was relocated to the Ministry of Health in 
Accra, where its leading personnel were deployed to create an Epidemiology Division 
for the Ghana Health Service.160 
As with the Native Authority rural dispensaries, a northern innovation 
prompted by southern neglect had become a cost-effective national success. 
Immediately after independence, for example, Ghana faced the 1957-58 ‘Asian Flu’  
influenza pandemic, and the north’s existing disease surveillance network was found to 
be highly effective in recording the incidence of the disease when it reached West 
Africa. The precision of observations in the north meant that it was possible to estimate 
a regional mortality rate of 0.7 deaths per 1,000 people, suggesting that the pandemic 
had more serious effects in northern Ghana than in many other world regions (the 
particular strain of influenza was considered relatively mild, and the global mortality 
rate has been calculated at 1.4 deaths per 10,000 people).161  During the 1957 pandemic,
159 See, for example, NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65), Enc.80:  ’Smallpox Outbreak at Pong-Tamale’, Letters 
from Government Agent, Tamale to Yo-Na, Savelugu; Tolon-Na; Kumbung-Na, Kumbungu; Nanton-
Na, Nanton, 18 March 1958.
160 Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana, 11–12.
161 NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65), Enc.68-78, Influenza reports and statistics, 1957; and see Cécile Viboud et 
al., ‘Global Mortality Impact of the 1957–1959 Influenza Pandemic’, Journal of Infectious Diseases 
213, no. 5 (2016): 738–45.
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the CPP government also revived colonial-era quarantine laws that had been shelved 
during the late 1940s, when coercive quarantine was restricted on political grounds. 
The laws, which used the same drafting as the colonial Acts, allowed the state to restrict
community movements, to detain infected individuals, and to prohibit ‘public meetings,
funeral ceremonies, and other native customs’.162 These Quarantine and Vaccination 
Ordinances would be used extensively during the World Health Organisation’s 
eradication campaign against smallpox, which began officially in 1966, although 
preparations for a mass control programme began in northern Ghana from the early 
1960s.163 
In this period (1957-1966), the state’s disease control priorities were shaped 
by the priorities of the CPP government and by the increasing influence of the WHO, 
after Ghana became the first independent African state to assume membership in 
1957.164 As the result of the disease’s prioritisation by the WHO, smallpox became a 
central focus of the CPP government’s health programme in the north. Monitoring posts
were established along Ghana’s border with French Upper Volta, quarantine restrictions
were deployed with increasing frequency, and by 1960 teachers at northern schools 
were being trained to become ‘Teacher-Vaccinators’, in anticipation of ‘the country-
wide vaccination campaign to be launched soon by the World Health Organisation’.165 
These developments came at a time when many local officials considered measles to be
the most serious illness affecting northern communities, a vaccine-preventable disease 
162 NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65), Enc.67: Regional circular on regulations permitting quarantine restriction, 
PMO Northern Region, 2 September 1957; and Enc.68: MoH,  ’Infectious Diseases Ordinance-
Influenza Order 1957’.
163 Ibid., Encs.80-86: Internal correspondence and quarantine regulations for smallpox control, 1959-
1960.
164 WHO/L2/308/2/GHA (1957) Ghana Membership, WHO Geneva, Enc.19: Kwame Nkrumah to 
WHO Secretariat, 30 March 1957.
165 NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.5: Circular from Principal Medical Officer, Tamale, 22 March 1960; 
Enc.6: Minutes of the Regional Committee, Held on 1st April 1960; NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65), 
Encs.80-86: Internal correspondence and quarantine regulations for smallpox control, 1959-1960.
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that ‘cost more in terms of morbidity and mortality than all the major epidemics 
together’.166 As I discuss in the following section of this chapter, the resources 
committed by the central government in support of transnational eradication campaigns
may have reduced attention to diseases that more concretely threatened the life and 
health of northern people. Apart from smallpox, the evolution of the state’s disease 
monitoring system in the north was also shaped by the WHO’s prioritisation of other 
specific diseases. Central government spending on the expansion of northern 
surveillance for bilharzia and tuberculosis, for example, followed the precedent 
establishment of WHO programmes against these diseases in Ghana.167 In other words, 
at the same time as Ghana’s government asserted its newfound political independence, 
the Ministry of Health appears to have ceded some authority for decisions about public 
health priorities to the WHO, a trend which accelerated during the rapid political 
transitions that followed the deposal of Nkrumah. 
166 See Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, vii.
167 See WHO/Project files/Ghana-2101 (1959-1973) Bilharziasis Control, WHO Geneva; NRG/8/13/32 
(1954-65), Encs.98-101: Correspondence relating to Bilharzia: Principal Medical Officer, Northern 
Region and Ministry of Health, 1962; and WHO/Project files/Ghana-1202 (1960-1973) Tuberculosis 
Control, WHO Geneva; NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.24:  ’Minutes of the The Northern Regional 
Committee, TB Screening’, 10 July 1964.
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 Figure 17. WHO smallpox vaccination publicity materials distributed in northern Ghana, 1965
Source: NRG/8/13/44 (PRAAD Tamale)
Figure 18. Ghana Health Education Service, vaccination publicity pamphlet distributed in northern
Ghana, 1964-1965
Source: NRG/8/13/44 (PRAAD Tamale)
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The CPP health education initiative in the north: national health on the nation’s 
margins
Along with nutrition, improved basic health education was another 
central policy of the CPP government. As I discuss in Chapter 6, on guinea worm, 
urban communities in the south had benefited from health education initiatives since 
the early 1900s, when techniques for filtering drinking water and avoiding common 
diseases were first taught in schools. In the predominantly rural north, where relatively 
few government schools were built during the colonial period, there had been no 
systematic attempt to provide basic health education of this kind, and the Nkrumah 
government oversaw the region’s first health education programme. However, the 
history of this CPP programme in the north also indicates the secondary importance 
given to regional contexts for healthcare, in relation to national concerns. 
The national health education initiative began in southern Ghana from 1958, 
but its extension to the north was delayed for some years, as the cocoa districts and 
constituency centres of the CPP were given priority. In 1959, the Minister of Health 
told northern officials: ‘It had been understood in your region that the Ministry would 
find the funds for the future operation of health education in Northern Ghana. I regret, 
however, to inform you that the grant from the Cocoa Marketing Board for non-cocoa 
growing areas, made to me this year, has now been fully allocated, and I unable to 
consider your request’.168 In 1960 the north eventually received a small allocation of 
central government funds, which were used to establish trial health education projects 
in the Tumu, Bolgatanga and Tamale districts. Medical Officers formulated a syllabus 
intended to provide essential, locally relevant information on nutrition:  ‘preparation 
and use of local foods, and the feeding of children, expectant and nursing mothers so as
to prevent malnutrition’; on the popularisation of government medical facilities: ‘to 
168 NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.1: Letter from Ministry of Health & Social Welfare to Regional 
Commissioner, Northern Region, 4 December 1959.
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encourage regular attendance at clinics, at Health Centres and Hospitals, and to make 
the people accept as a fact that these institutions have been built for them’; on 
community sanitation: ‘to spread knowledge of the transmission of alimentary 
infections and encourage communal efforts to control them by digging latrines and 
using them’; and on the recognition and prevention of local diseases: ‘to impart to the 
people knowledge of the commonest communicable diseases prevalent in the Northern 
Region - smallpox, cerebro-spinal meningitis, ankylostomiasis, bilharzia and others’.169 
Despite the importance given to the national health education initiative in 
Accra, and presentation of detailed plans and budgetary requests by northern health 
officials – including proposals for the creation of 66 village health education 
committees across the region – health education in the north continued to depend on 
temporary, discretionary allocations of funds from a shifting set of ministries in Accra. 
In 1960, for example, funds were provided by the Ministry of Education’s Department 
of Social Welfare and Community Development, for example, not by the Ministry of 
Health, and they were exhausted by the end of the year.170 Although some level of 
central funding was provided until 1965, the expansion of basic health education in the 
north was limited by another factor: the earmarking of significant funds for a single 
annual event, Nkrumah’s ‘National Health Week’, sometimes in preference to the 
extension of health education to outlying rural communities. The CPP Government 
seems to have set great store by the annual health weeks, intended to publicise a 
particular health education theme each year. Nkrumah announced each year’s theme 
himself at an annual Christmas speech: in 1961 the theme was ‘The Importance Of 
169 Ibid., Enc.4: ‘Memorandum, Northern Region Health’, undated (1960).
170 Ibid.; and Enc.6: Minutes of The Regional Committee for Health Education, 1st April 1960.
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Food Production To Good Health’,  and ‘Health Homes for Healthy Families’ in 
1962.171 
The central planning committee sent numerous memoranda to the northern 
administration, requiring it to publicise and celebrate the annual Health Week theme 
with ‘pomp, grandeur and success’, and giving a detailed programme for regional 
committees to follow each year. This included public rallies, large-scale exhibitions 
including the construction of temporary model buildings, and a number of competitions
between, for example, local trade groups including butchers, chop-bar keepers and 
bread sellers, in the maintenance of hygienic standards.172 The costs of organising and 
hosting the National Health Week were taken from the north’s total annual vote for 
health education, and from 1959-1964 it appears that the health weeks absorbed much 
of the funding and time available to the regional Committee for Health Education.173 
Proposals to expand basic health education in rural areas, or to teach techniques for 
domestic vegetable production were shelved, and instead the committee’s principal 
focus became the organisation of a single week-long festival and exhibition in Tamale, 
beyond the reach of most northerners.174 In mid-1960, after months of regular meetings 
and detailed discussions to plan the event, the committee’s funds were exhausted and it 
did not meet again until 1961, when it reconvened with a new budget to plan the next 
health week.175 In 1962, there was a minor scandal when journalists at Accra’s Daily 
Graphic discovered that the northern administration proposed to spend a significant 
171 Ibid., Enc.7: Minutes Of The Regional Committee On Health Education, Northern Region, June 16 
1960; Enc.8: National Planning Committee to Regional Commissioner, Northern and Upper 
Regions, 18 July 1960; Enc.13: ‘National Health Week’, Memorandum from Central Committee for 
Health Education to Regional Commissioner and PMO, Northern Region, 7 November 1961.
172 Ibid., Enc.13: Memorandum from Central Committee, 7 November 1961; Enc.6: Minutes of the 
Regional Committee On Health Education, 20 May 1960; Enc.7: Minutes Of The Regional 
Committee On Health Education, 16 June 1960.
173 See NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65).
174 Ibid., Enc.6: Minutes of the Regional Committee, May 20 1960; Enc.15: Minutes, Health Education 
Committee for the Northern Region, 18 January 1962.
175 Ibid., Enc.12: Minutes Of The Regional Committee Of Health Education Of The Public, 3 October 
1961.
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proportion of its total health budget improving the municipal drains in Tamale ahead of 
the Health Week event, and not on planned rural health measures.176 Some northern 
Health Education Committee members, notably the Anglican Canon J.H. Brewer, 
complained about the pressure each national Health Week theme placed on the region’s 
annual funding, insisting that the ‘horror’ of epidemic measles deserved greater local 
attention.177
 Here was an example of a national health programme which displaced local 
initiatives, as local officials attempted to meet the requirements of a priority project for 
the ruling party. As the economy began to falter in the mid-1960s, however, the CPP 
government stopped emphasising the importance of National Health Week. The 
Ministry of Health no longer provided a detailed plan to the regions, noting their ‘very 
limited available resources of manpower and material’, and instead left it to regional 
committees to organise a celebration according to their means.178  But the north’s 
Health Education Committee was still required to allocate part of its its budget towards 
another similar event, the WHO’s World Health day, which supplanted the National 
Health Week as an annual focus for health education by the mid-1960s, as the CPP 
government became preoccupied with activities and regions that generated revenues for
the state.179 
In the health-related archive of the Nkrumah-era northern administration in 
Tamale, the largest single file (more than double the length of any other) is titled 
‘World Health Organisation’. Covering the years from 1961-1967, when economic and 
political shifts undermined the capacity of the central government, it includes plans for 
176 Ibid., Enc.17: Medical Public Relations Division, MoH Accra, to PMO, Tamale, and Daily Graphic, 
5 March 1962.
177 Ibid., Enc.6: Minutes of the Regional Committee, May 20 1960.
178 Ibid., Enc.20: ‘National Health Week’, MoH Accra to Regional Health Education Officer, Northern 
Region, 11 July 1963.
179 See Beckman, Organising the Farmers, ch.7.
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celebrating the WHO’s World Health Day as required by the Ministry of Health. The 
file also reveals a degree of direct WHO influence on the arrangement of northern 
healthcare, including press releases sent from the WHO to northern medical officers, 
covering aspects of health activity and disease control in the north.180 The increased 
influence of international organisations is a central theme of Chapter 5. Here it is worth 
noting how the WHO’s World Health Day came to take the place of Nkrumah’s 
National Health Week – perhaps emblematic of the broader shift of public health 
authority towards the WHO in many African states, as the independence-era ideals of 
national self-sufficiency were tempered by exposure to economic difficulties. It is also 
worth noting how the event consumed local funding for rural health education in a 
similar way. In 1963 the World Health Day’s theme was ‘Blindness’, in 1964 it was ‘No
Truce for Tuberculosis’, and in 1965 it was ‘Smallpox: Constant Alert!’. The north’s 
Health Education Committee was again required to plan and fund an exhibition from 
the region’s overall health budget, with additional mobile cinema vans for rural 
communities (showing films relevant to the annual WHO theme) to be organised 
centrally in Accra.181 
As with the National Health Week, officials organised a single exhibition in 
Tamale, out of the reach of most northern communities.  Even in years when the 
WHO’s annual educational theme was particularly relevant to the north (the 1962 
theme of ‘Blindness’, for example, was directly linked to the recognition of African 
onchocerciasis as a global health emergency), the central government appears to have 
placed most importance on the event itself, as a public spectacle. It rarely sent the 
180 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967) World Health Organisation, PRAAD Tamale.
181 NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65), Enc.25: Minutes of the Northern Regional Committee, 26 January 1965; 
Enc.22: Minutes of the Northern Regional Committee, 16 March 1964; Enc.24: Minutes of the 
Northern Regional Committee, 10 July 1964; NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Encs.64-70: Planning 
materials for World Health Day, 1962; Enc.98: Government Information Service, Accra, to Regional 
Information Officer, Tamale, ‘Briefing Notes on World Health Day’, 30 March 1962.
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Ministry of Health’s public cinema vans to the north, sending apologies each year when
all available films were in use in southern districts. The Accra government nevertheless 
continued to insist on detailed reports about the popular reception of the World Health 
Day exhibition, an emphasis which evidently shaped the response of northern officials, 
who gave glowing accounts even as their budgets diminished. ‘The success of the day 
was a remarkable achievement, and its prominence will ever remain fresh in the minds 
of the people,’ reported the Northern Region’s Information Officer, in a year when the 
only significant event during the north’s Health Day celebrations had been a single 
film-viewing, held in the administration’s headquarters.182 
Conclusion: Public health in the north at the end of the Nkrumah years
By the time that the cocoa price collapsed, the northern administrations (in 
what were then called the Northern and Upper Regions) had already seen a steady 
reduction in the region’s spending allocations from central government. There had been
some beneficial developments immediately after independence, with an increase in the 
number of district Health Centres, the expansion of surveillance capabilities for some 
diseases, and the implementation of a nutritional programme that reached many rural 
communities. But by 1964, northern officials observed that in terms of government 
funding there was ‘very little to handle from year to year’. The Accra government 
began to emphasize ‘self-help’ as a way of meeting development objectives in the 
north, transferring the responsibility for rural health projects (in terms of labour, 
oversight and part of the costs) back to district officials and local authorities.183 In 1965,
the grant funds available for northern self-help projects were also cut substantially, to 
182 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Enc.103: ‘Report on WHO Day 1962’, Director of Information Services 
to Regional Informations Officers, Tamale and Bolgatanga, 18 April 1962.
183 NRG/8/7/57 (1964-1965) Regional Development Policy, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.2: Internal Notes, 13 
May 1964.
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less than 6 percent of the total national allocation. As Chief Commissioners of the 
colonial period had done before, Regional Commissioner Ebeneezer Adam lodged a 
protest with the CPP government, noting that the state’s ‘infinitesimal’ allocation of 
funding was inadequate to meet projected needs: ‘I consider, therefore, that some 
injustice has been done to our region’.184 Here again, advocacy from northern officials 
was largely ineffective as problems deepened for the state as a whole.185 Recession in 
the national economy accelerated a longer-term process of decline in the provision of 
rural health services in the north, which had begun in the late 1940s with the 
centralisation of authority that undermined NA healthcare. In 1962, the Northern 
Region’s Principal Medical Officer, Dr C.S. Hoffman, submitted a critical report to the 
Ministry of Health. He argued that the accelerated spread of diseases was a direct result
of this centralisation, and noted the precarious state of the north’s rural health services: 
I draw your attention to the recent outbreaks of small-pox and cerebro-spinal 
meningitis in the Northern Region, epidemics of measles, and the present 
epidemic of typhoid. The spread and belated discovery of such epidemics are 
connected with a) the almost complete collapse of local Sanitary Services and 
Dressing Stations, depriving the Ministry of early notification and information, 
and b) the collapse of basic Sanitary Services in rustic areas, which is directly 
and indirectly responsible for the current epidemics ... I cannot stress enough 
that immediate restitution of the formerly existent sanitary personnel – as 
employed by the local authorities – is the most vital issue for the north.186 
In their study of agricultural development and the environment in northern 
Ghana, Grischow and Weiss argue that although the Nkrumah government promised a 
great deal to the region in terms of development, the net effect of CPP agricultural 
policy (which principally involved the creation of large-scale mechanised farms 
producing rice and tomatoes) was to ‘to force peasants into cash crop production for 
184 Ibid., Encs.4-10: Correspondence between Department of Social Welfare and Community 
Development and Regional Commissioner, Tamale, July 1965.
185 Ibid., Enc.6: Handwritten file note, 17 July 1965.
186 NRG/8/13/32 (1954-65), Enc.40: C.S. Hoffman, PMO Accra, to MoH Accra, 5 December 1962.
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markets abroad and in southern Ghana, rather than increasing foodstuff production for 
the North’.187 This echoed a similar policy pursued by colonial governments in the 
north before the 1930s, when northerners were ‘encouraged almost to the verge of 
coercion to cultivate crops, cotton and shea butter among others, which were intended 
for export out of the country’.188 The Nkrumah government also cancelled the planned 
northern extension of Ghana’s railway network. A railway had been extended from the 
coast into Ashanti by 1903, but plans to extend the line to the northern border were 
shelved in the 1920s, and it was only in the ‘developmental’ late colonial period that 
proposals for the extension were renewed. But these were cancelled again soon after 
independence, on the grounds that funds were needed for the Volta River hydroelectric 
project.189 
The uneven provision of health services in the north during the Nkrumah era 
reflected this broader failure to realise the promises and potential that had accompanied
the transition to independent rule for northern Ghana. The CPP had proposed to address
the region’s health needs as a matter of urgency. But as it oversaw the construction of 
new District Health Centres, it presided over a continued decline in rural health staffing
and facilities that began in the late 1940s, and finally reached a point of collapse in the 
late 1960s. In this sense, healthcare in the north under the first independent government
was to some extent a perpetuation of late colonial policy, and of the same colonial-era 
relationship between Accra and the north, indicating the enduring effect of the north’s 
geographic, economic and political marginality in shaping its developmental fortunes. 
In 1966, while away on a diplomatic visit to China, Nkrumah was deposed in 
‘Operation Cold Chop’, a coup led by a group of military and police officers who 
187 Jeff Grischow and Holger Weiss, ‘Colonial Famine Relief and Development Policies: Towards an 
Environmental History of Northern Ghana’, Global Environment 4, no. 7 (2011): 95–96.
188 1934-1935 NTAR, 108–12.
189 Brukum, ‘Northern Territories under British Rule’, 240–43.
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installed themselves in government as the National Liberation Council.190 This marked 
the beginning of a twenty-year period of rapid political transitions, prolonged stasis in 
the expansion of physical health facilities in the north, and an accretion of control by 
international organisations, over the maintenance and development of the region’s rural 
healthcare system.
190 Gocking, History of Ghana, 137–39; and see Peter Barker, Operation Cold Chop: The Coup That 
Toppled Nkrumah (Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1979).
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CHAPTER 4
From sleeping sickness to onchocerciasis: disease control before and after
independence
– 
In Chapter 2, I examined the anti-tsetse campaign, the most extensive public 
health intervention in the north during the colonial era. Shaped by the long-term 
economic preferences of the colonial government, the campaign had ambitions beyond 
the immediate reduction of trypanosome transmission. It emerged from the belated 
recognition of the threat posed by sleeping sickness in the north, and developed into a 
large-scale attempt at social and environmental engineering, in a region which had little
political influence in Accra. The anti-tsetse work proceeded without regularly 
consulting either northern communities or northern officials, including medical 
officers, which may have meant that the unintended consequences of the Tsetse Control
Department’s bush clearing and resettlement programme went unnoticed. This chapter 
examines the links between colonial-era tsetse control and onchocerciasis, before 
turning to the WHO Onchocerciasis Control Programme in the years after 1957 – a 
transnational campaign that re-situated Ghana’s peripheral north as a central focus of 
international disease control work and fund-raising. The chapter discusses connections 
between public health activity in different periods, and charts the gaps in institutional 
memory that were created by the independence transition. 
First, some background to onchocerciasis in the Gold Coast, and in its 
historiography.  Patterson has described the slow accumulation of medical knowledge 
around onchocerciasis from 1900 to 1950, noting how evidence of the disease was 
repeatedly overlooked by Gold Coast medical officers before the 1940s. Like 
Grischow, focused specifically on trypanosomiasis, Patterson did not examine the 
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linkages between the two diseases, although both observed that sleeping sickness and 
onchocerciasis were prevalent in the same areas.1 Here I seek to build upon Patterson’s 
study of northern onchocerciasis before 1950, using sources which were unavailable at 
the time of his research, and then to extend the analysis through the 1950s and into the 
decades after independence.2 
As with some other diseases, including yellow fever and sleeping sickness, 
the history of onchocerciasis in the Gold Coast shows how local medical research was 
often conducted with a view to building reputations in Europe, as opposed to 
identifying or addressing local public health concerns. Several foundational discoveries
relating to onchocerciasis were made in the Gold Coast. In 1874, a British surgeon at 
Ada published the first description of the microfilaria form of the parasite, isolated 
from the skin of a patient suffering from 'craw-craw' - an itching skin condition caused 
by the disease. In 1893, the adult worm was identified by the zoologist Rudolf 
Leuckart, in skin nodules collected from African patients by a German medical 
missionary on the Gold Coast. Fulleborn and Simon, another pair of German medics 
based in the colony, established a link between the microfilariae and the adult worm in 
African patients in 1914. The insect vector was identified in 1923 in another West 
African colony, Sierra Leone, while the link between parasite infection and blindness 
was confirmed in 1915, by Rodolfo Robles in Guatemala – the disease was transported 
from Africa to the Americas during the slave trade.3 
1 K. David Patterson, ‘River Blindness in Northern Ghana, 1900-50’, in Disease in African History: 
An Introductory Survey and Case Studies, ed. M.J. Azevedo, G.W Hartwig, and K.D. Patterson 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), ch.4.
2 Including from the CSO and NRG file series of the Ghana archive, largely uncatalogued at the time 
of Patterson's study, and from the WHO Archives in Geneva.
3 Isao Tada, ‘Onchocerciasis’, Tropical Medicine and Health 43 (November 2015): 57–60; G. Kluxen, 
‘History of Onchocerciasis’, 2005, Hosted at http://jean-hissette.de/Oncho_JH_GB.html, accessed 20
July 2015.
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These turn-of-the-century research advances, many of them based on the 
bodies of Gold Coast people, had revealed a great deal about a previously unknown 
disease. Despite this knowledge, it was only after 1932, following research in the 
Belgian Congo, that the connection between onchocerca parasites and blindness in 
Africa became widely accepted.4 In the case of the Gold Coast, onchocerciasis was only
officially recognised as a serious public health problem in the final years of the colonial
period. This doesn't mean that it was unknown to medical officers or African subjects. 
From the outset of colonial rule in the north, the annual disease returns recorded that 
unspecified eye disease made up an extremely high proportion of the total number of 
African people who presented for treatment at the region's medical facilities. In 1912, a 
medical officer conducted an investigation of widespread blindness affecting villages in
the Tumu district, and in 1921 a district officer recorded that at a northern settlement 
called Kangjunmangchang, ‘the majority of the people are blind owing to some 
contagious eye disease’. Both of these reports were transcribed from old district logs in 
1949, by B.B. Waddy, a medical officer who served in the north and who conducted the
region's first systematic survey of the disease. Waddy observed that in each case the 
reports had received no attention from the higher levels of the medical department, and 
Kangjunmangchang had ceased to exist by the 1940s.5 
In 1929, the colony's annual medical report noted that in the Northern 
Territories, ‘cases of severe conjunctivitis leading to opacities and often to blindness 
are very common’.6 And in 1934, as the administration began its medical and bush 
clearing campaigns against sleeping sickness, local medical officers established 
4 Following research by Jean Hissette, who confirmed the link to ‘River Blindness’ in the Belgian 
Congo in 1932. D. L. Augustine, ‘The Pathogenicity of Onchocerca Volvulus’, Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 16, no. 3 (1957): 665–69; Kluxen, ‘History of Onchocerciasis’.
5 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) ‘Onchocerciasis in the Northern Territories’, by B.B. 
Waddy, LSHTM Archive, London.
6 1928 MDAR, 14.
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conclusively (through tissue samples) that onchocerciasis was the cause of blindness in 
at least some cases.7 To those British officials who were interested, onchocerciasis 
presented a potential risk to public health in the region. In 1941, as valley clearing and 
resettlement proceeded during the anti-tsetse programme, a report compiled by a local 
official, and repeated in the central medical department’s annual report, identified both 
sleeping sickness and onchocerciasis as causes contributing to famine in parts of the 
north.8 
Despite persistent indications that the disease was present and posed a threat 
to northern communities, and despite a well-established body of knowledge regarding 
the disease and its transmission, the central government showed little interest in further 
investigation. Between 1912 and 1941, reports by northern medical officers which 
noted unusually widespread blindness, or directly confirmed onchocerciasis as a health 
risk, went almost entirely unpublished, until they were retrospectively discovered 
during the onchocerciasis ‘emergency’ of the early 1950s. The disease was briefly 
mentioned in the 1941 annual medical report, which noted that onchocerciasis had been
identified as a public health problem during a survey of poor nutrition in the north, but 
only to say that the survey was ‘not in a form suitable for general publication’.9 This 
was the nutritional investigation by Dr F.M. Purcell, discussed in Chapter 1, which was 
suppressed by the government in Accra. As with sleeping sickness in the north during 
the 1920s, there was a long gap between the confirmation of widespread onchocerciasis
infection by individual medics, and official recognition of the disease and its impacts. 
Even in 1950, when two systematic investigations (in 1945 and 1949) by concerned 
local medical officers had revealed serious onchocerciasis prevalence along Northern 
7 1934-1935 MDAR, 86.
8 1941 MDAR, 2.
9 Ibid.
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Territories river systems, the central Medical Department only reported trachoma and 
acute conjunctivitis as noteworthy causes of blindness in the region – after the Director 
of Medical Services had toured the north and met with Waddy, the officer who had 
conducted one of these surveys.10 
As with sleeping sickness, it is interesting to consider what led to this 
disregard for reports of onchocerciasis as an important disease affecting northern 
peoples, especially since its significance was recognised in many other parts of colonial
Africa by this time. There were investigations across the continent after 1932, when 
Hissette had confirmed that onchocerciasis caused blindness in the Belgian Congo. In 
British East Africa, regional medical departments held a symposium on the disease in 
1943, and an expansive control programme using DDT spraying was launched in 
Kenya in 1947.11 Onchocerciasis was known in West Africa too. In Upper Volta, across 
the border with the Northern Territories, wide areas of infection and related blindness 
had been identified in 1932 and confirmed by French medical officers between 1936 
and 1938, and experimental larvicide control had already begun.12 Through mass 
examination of African communities between 1939 and 1942, the French identified 
additional zones of serious infection in Upper Volta, in north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire - 
again bordering the Northern Territories - and in Togoland, Niger, and French Soudan 
(Mali).13 The French had already concluded that widespread onchocerciasis infection 
must extend into the Gold Coast, as their own infected zones closely followed the 
colony's northern borders, but it would be ten years before this was acknowledged in 
10 See NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.7: Cheverton, ‘Observations on the Medical Department following
a tour’, May 1950, 46.
11 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 4–7.
12 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/5 (1954) Onchocerciasis in French African Territories south of the 
Sahara (Submissions for Conference on African Onchocerciasis, Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), 
WHO Geneva, 2; WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/7 (1954) Onchocerciasis in French West Africa: 
Work by Medical Officers of the Service General d’Hygiene Mobile et de Prophylaxie (Submissions 
for Conference on African Onchocerciasis, Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), WHO Geneva, 2–10.
13 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/5 (1954), 2–4.
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the Gold Coast itself.14 It is worth noting that this French knowledge of onchocerciasis 
infection was gained through a campaign against the same sleeping sickness epidemic 
that affected the Northern Territories. The General Autonomous Sleeping Sickness 
Service of French West Africa, led by Gaston Muraz,  recognised the serious prevalence
of onchocerciasis in the course of its sleeping sickness control programme.15 This stood
in contrast to the Northern Territories, where the sleeping sickness treatment campaign 
apparently obscured the extent of onchocerciasis infection by focusing personnel and 
regional resources on one disease, and the anti-tsetse valley clearances materially 
increased it.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the staffing demands and sustained costs of
the northern campaign against sleeping sickness may have drawn attention away from 
other diseases affecting the region, while the Second World War, which fell in the 
middle of the campaign, further reduced the capacity of the health service to monitor 
and respond to any disease. In any case, the north and its particular diseases were often 
of little interest to the central government, or even to the Gold Coast Medical 
Department, until they impinged upon economic or political goals in Accra. This meant
that multiple researchers were able to conduct name-making studies on onchocerciasis 
in the Gold Coast, over decades, and yet the disease was not locally recognised as a 
public health problem requiring attention. Submissions to a WHO conference in 1954, 
when onchocerciasis started to receive global attention, indicate that at least eight 
articles in international journals from 1875 to 1951 had depended on research in the 
Gold Coast.16  British medics held conferences on the disease in East Africa, and 
colonies of white settlement like Kenya launched control campaigns, while French 
14 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/7 (1954), 7.
15 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/5 (1954), 2–12.
16 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/3 (1954) Onchocerciasis in the Gold Coast (Submissions for 
Conference on African Onchocerciasis, Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), WHO Geneva, 9.
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medical departments recorded that onchocerciasis infection was widespread just 
beyond the northern border. But these earlier reports of infection and advances in 
medical knowledge did not lead to an investigation in the Northern Territories. 
Again, as with sleeping sickness in the 1920s, onchocerciasis first received 
significant attention when its impacts were felt in the south. The first investigation of 
northern onchocerciasis took place in 1945, driven by the discovery of the disease in 
military recruits from the north, who were examined at Accra before embarkation for 
the war. It was argued that ‘African troops, many of whom are infected, may well carry 
the disease to South East Asia and the East Indies’.17 The investigation was conducted 
by Major Harold Ridley, an ambitious physician who had joined the Royal Army 
Medical Corps and had been reluctantly posted to Accra. Ridley used time in the Gold 
Coast as a research opportunity: ‘a blessing in disguise, for it was the period when he 
performed his original work in the field of tropical eye disease’, and he was later hailed
as a pioneer in the development of ocular implants.18 
Ridley's study was primarily focused on the clinical manifestations of 
onchocerciasis-related blindness, and the article he published used Northern Territories 
people as a resource for illustrating the pathology of the disease. He tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade sufferers to allow him to aspirate microfilariae samples 
directly from their eyeballs, using large-bore needles, and considered that his 
expedition had partially failed when no blind person would allow him to remove their 
whole eyeball for study – Ridley had offered a pair of his spectacles in exchange.19 This
was an example of a colonial researcher using novel diseases in Africa to secure a 
reputation in London. Nevertheless, Ridley was evidently affected by the severity of 
17 Harold Ridley, Ocular Onchocerciasis, Including an Investigation in the Gold Coast (London: 
Pulman, 1945), 8.
18 See D.J. Apple and J. Sims, ‘Harold Ridley and the Invention of the Intraocular Lens.’, Survey of 
Ophthalmology 40, no. 4 (1996): 279–92.
19 Ridley, Ocular Onchocerciasis, 40–41.
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onchocerciasis that he encountered. In a paragraph on his host community, the town of 
Funsi in the north-west, he called for government intervention:
Were it not for the eye disease the district might be relatively healthy … Though
food is nearly always scarce no one starves, for they help each other. Were it not
for this there would be little hope for the blind, who are an economic loss to the 
community. Surely such people deserve assistance to rid them of blindness, 
their chief scourge.20 
Ridley had visited a single Sisaala town, Funsi, where he examined 300 
people over the course of two weeks and found that approximately one-sixth were 
either blind or irreversibly going blind due to onchocerciasis.21 The investigation was 
not mentioned in the Gold Coast's annual medical reports, or the northern government's
annual administrative reports, and his findings did not give rise to any public health 
work by the colonial administration. Ridley himself thought that there would be little 
action against the disease unless an outside party took an interest, writing ‘it is to be 
hoped that at some future date the subject of onchocerciasis in Africa will attract the 
attention of a research organisation’.22 But his study did have some effect: it caught the 
attention of a handful of concerned medical officers in the north, who cited it as the 
inspiration for later investigations.23
20 Ibid., 37.
21 Ibid., 44.
22 Ibid., 35.
23 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 4.
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Figure 19. Images from Ridley’s 1945 investigation of onchocerciasis in the north
Source: Ridley, ‘Ocular onchocerciasis’
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The relationship between tsetse control and onchocerciasis
By 1950, anti-tsetse bush clearance had been under way along northern water
courses for more than 15 years. The project had begun with smaller scale clearings at 
river crossings and around settled areas, but under Morris it had expanded into a 
sweeping campaign for the clearance of Volta-system river valleys and their tributary 
streams, accompanied by a resettlement programme which encouraged people to move 
into the cleared areas, providing dams and access roads to make these areas attractive. 
The campaign promoted the idea that in these areas it was now possible for northern 
communities, in Morris' words, ‘to live with impunity in the vicinity of permanent 
water’.24 In the Kamba valley, the Tsetse Control Department had even tried to develop 
fishing as a principal economic activity.25  
All of this had been done in ignorance of the risk from onchocerciasis, a 
disease with an infection rate which, unlike sleeping sickness, is strictly determined by 
proximity to running water. The tsetse flies which transmit human sleeping sickness 
require shade and woodland, often close to water, but can live and reproduce in any 
area where these and a mammalian food supply come together, in some cases far from 
river valleys.26 But the Simulium blackflies that transmit the Onchocerca parasite 
require running water to breed, and infection rates from onchocerciasis decline with the
distance of a community from a river or stream.27 Morris's anti-tsetse campaign had 
resettled people directly into zones of increased onchocerciasis transmission, and by 
building dams it had also improved the breeding conditions for the insect vector: it has 
been demonstrated that dam spillways provide an optimal, well-oxygenated breeding 
24 Morris, ‘The Control of Trypanosomiasis by Entomological Means.’, 4.
25 Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’, 394.
26 J.A. Rozendaal, Vector Control: Methods for Use by Individuals and Communities (Geneva: WHO, 
1997), 178–80.
27 Ibid., 18–20, 41–44.
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environment for Simulium damnosum blackflies.28 Even when settlements were not 
established in cleared areas, the campaign increased exposure to the disease by opening
access roads to valley floors which had been cleared of dense vegetation, turning them 
into convenient low-lying routes for travel or for grazing livestock. As well as directly 
exposing surrounding communities to the disease, the changes brought by the mobile 
clearing campaign may have worsened the overall epidemiological picture for 
onchocerciasis and related blindness in the north, when increased transmission of the 
parasite in campaign areas contributed to a greater total number of people and 
blackflies hosting the parasite, amplifying the disease as both carried it to new districts 
away from the cleared valleys.
Morris' Tsetse Control Department was apparently uninformed about 
onchocerciasis, although the disease had for years been the subject of research interest 
and active control work, both within Britain's colonial health system and the broader 
transnational medical community. In Kenya, for example, the colony's medical 
department had also begun a campaign to clear the Kodera River valley of biting flies, 
so that people could be resettled there. But the flies it targeted were not tsetse: instead 
the campaign was against the Simulium blackfly vector of onchocerciasis, because in 
Kenya it was recognised that resettlement of such valleys was ‘an impossibility’ until 
the blackfly had been eradicated.29 As noted above, authorities in neighbouring Upper 
Volta had reported widespread onchocerciasis infection and attempted control measures
by the early 1940s. Despite various imperial conferences and memoranda from the 
health section of the Colonial Office, personnel working in one part of Africa were 
28 See WHO/CPD67.4 (Archived 24 April 1968) Report On The Health Aspects Of The Land And 
Water Survey In The Upper And Northern Regions Of Ghana, FAO/UNDP Project 1962-1966, WHO
Geneva, 7; WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF.1/17 (1954) Attempted methods of reducing the incidence
of Onchocerciasis in Northern Gold Coast (Submissions for Conference on African Onchocerciasis, 
Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), WHO Geneva, 3.
29 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 4–7.
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often uninformed about what was happening in relation to the same disease or control 
method elsewhere. In a region like the Northern Territories, where interventions took 
place with little coordination from the central government, let alone from London, 
colonial-era public health work was very much the product of individual officials, their 
theories, and the knowledge they did or did not possess. This was true even in the 
1950s, and at times in northern Ghana after independence. Efforts at monitoring and 
controlling guinea worm in the north during the 1970s and early 1980s, for example, 
were sustained by the interest of one or two local physicians, as I discuss in Chapter 6.
The Tsetse Control Department not only worked in ignorance of an 
accumulating body of colonial knowledge about onchocerciasis. It also paid little 
attention to local knowledge of the disease among African communities, evident in 
colonial reports over decades, and encouraged people to act in contradiction of this 
knowledge. The campaign took place at a time when northerners were increasingly 
turning to state-sponsored healthcare, which had demonstrated its curative power 
against some of the region's most prevalent diseases, including drug treatments for 
malaria and yaws, and effective vaccination against smallpox. From the mid-1930s, the 
new sulphonamide antibiotics and then penicillin offered a new way to cure many 
serious diseases affecting northern subjects – during the meningitis epidemics from 
1939, for example, the mortality rate fell from 80 percent to 10 percent of those 
infected.30 Drug treatments for sleeping sickness were also considered to have won 
popular support for the government’s broader health work, although this is more 
debatable.31 The arsenic compounds used against the disease offered a relatively 
effective cure for an otherwise fatal illness, but they often caused permanent blindness 
as a side effect, and required careful preparation to deliver a safe dose. There were at 
30 See Chapter 1
31 See 1935-1936 MDAR, 79.
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least three catastrophic episodes during the north’s sleeping sickness campaign when 
multiple people died after the injection of poorly prepared drugs.32
By the late 1930s, many observers reported that curative successes had 
increased the confidence of northern communities in the colonial healthcare system. 
These successes may have led people to trust the message promulgated by the bush 
clearing campaign: that it was now safe to spend time in river valleys, with further 
inducements in the form of agricultural equipment for those who settled there. But in 
promoting this message, as with planning the overall clearance and resettlement 
campaign, Morris and the Tsetse Control Department were apparently unaware of a 
substantial body of local onchocerciasis knowledge, which might have indicated to 
them why the valleys were previously avoided. At least northern communities were 
aware of the link between nodules caused by the Onchocerca parasite and eventual 
blindness, and they had effective ways of treating the condition. In 1928, a medical 
officer had recorded that villagers in the north-west had the same practical 
understanding of the disease as villagers in Guatemala, whose information had led 
Robles to first propose a link between the parasite and blindness:
Both in Lawra and Tumu it is believed that the nodules of Onchocerca volvulus 
cause eye disease when situated on the scalp. For this reason a considerable 
number of people come to have them removed ... Native surgeons remove them 
by burning the skin and then extracting the tumours with a knife; this is often 
neatly done. The extraordinary fact of finding the same belief in Guatemala and 
in Lawra-Tumu calls for some remarks.33
This was a testament to the aetiological reasoning of people whose medical 
practices were often depicted as distinct from or less effective than those of 
32 See CSO/11/16/79 (1942-43) Anti-Trypanosomiasis injections, deaths following, PRAAD Accra; 
CSO/11/19/11 (1937) Innoculation of people at Bawku for sleeping sickness, fatal respect of, 
PRAAD Accra; CSO/11/19/12 (1936-1938) Anti-trypanosomiasis injection, deaths at Navrongo 
following, PRAAD Accra.
33 1928 MDAR, 147, Appendix: Dr G.F.T. Saunders,  ’Some interesting eye conditions, extracted from 
the Annual Report of the first travelling dispensary’.
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biomedicine. In 1945, Ridley recorded the same understanding of onchocerciasis 
among Sisaala communities to the east, indicating that knowledge of the disease was 
not limited to one or two communities. He was also told that the nodules caused 
blindness, particularly when located on the head, and he saw cases where nodules had 
been removed by a local surgeon.34 It has since been established that nodule location 
does influence the progression to blindness, which comes more rapidly when the adult 
parasite is resident in the head or neck, and that surgical interventions of this kind may 
be effective in slowing the disease.35 
Northerners were also aware of the association between river valleys, biting 
flies and blindness, and this was why they settled and farmed at a distance from 
running water. In his landmark survey of the north, which first demonstrated the scale 
of the region's onchocerciasis problem, medical officer B.B. Waddy observed that ‘the 
probability of going blind is consistently given by natives as their reason for not 
farming close to rivers where onchocerciasis is endemic. It is notable that practically no
natives of the Northern Territories fish: such fishing as is done is by immigrants from 
the coast’.36 The same long-standing knowledge was recorded among rural 
communities across the north after independence, who were visited by the 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme in the early 1970s:
The interesting thing about the onchocerciasis – it was something that 
everybody, virtually everybody around knew. They knew that this is what was 
making the people blind, because they associated it with people staying by the 
river area. So when the programme came it was absolutely no problem in 
engaging the people.37
34 Ridley, Ocular Onchocerciasis, 45–57.
35 H. Fuglsang and J. Anderson, ‘Further Observations on the Relationship between Ocular 
Onchocerciasis and the Head Nodule, and on the Possible Benefit of Nodulectomy.’, British Journal 
of Ophthalmology 62, no. 7 (1978): 445–49.
36 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 10.
37 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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In Northern Nigeria, local onchocerciasis knowledge was taken into account 
by colonial authorities, at least in some cases. Here some communities also associated 
blindness with drinking river water: when the administration tried to convince people to
move into abandoned valleys in the late 1940s, it found that ‘the natives attribute the 
original depopulation of these areas to onchocerciasis, and resettlement will not be 
accepted until onchocerciasis is controlled’.38 This stood in contrast to the Gold Coast 
Tsetse Control department.  Its work was shaped by Morris' belief that sleeping 
sickness had led to the abandonment of watercourses, and its resettlement policy 
operated on the basis that river valleys had been made safe for habitation. The 
implications of this misunderstanding are revealed in the onchocerciasis infection data 
that was compiled in two successive surveys conducted in 1949 and 1952-55: the first 
by Waddy, a concerned local medical officer, the second funded by the British Empire 
Society for the Blind. This latter survey, which covered colonies across Africa, showed 
that the Northern Territories had the highest levels of onchocerciasis infection 
worldwide.39 
Here Northern Nigeria makes another useful counter-example.  Apart from 
the upper Sahelian edge of Northern Nigeria, the two regions span the same latitudes 
and are comparable in terms of climate, ecology and the presence of many diseases. In 
Nigeria the colonial administration had also undertaken a tsetse clearing and 
resettlement project, but on a more limited scale, using methods which reduced 
exposure to onchocerciasis infection. This was the Anchau Scheme in Zaria Province, 
implemented by the entomologist T.A. Nash from 1938 to the late 1940s.40 The project 
38 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/4 (1954) F.H. Budden, The Distribution Of Onchocerciasis In 
Northern Nigeria And Its Importance As A Cause Of Blindness (Submissions for Conference on 
African Onchocerciasis, Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), WHO Geneva, 6.
39 See F. C Rodger, Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind: Blindness in West Africa (London : 
Lewis, 1959).
40 See T. A. Nash, The Anchau Rural Development and Settlement Scheme. (London: Pub. for the 
Colonial Office by H.M.S.O., 1948); G. Jones, ‘Review: The Anchau Rural Development and 
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cleared and resettled a tsetse-free corridor covering 712 square miles, less than the 
1,500 square miles that were reported to have been cleared on the Northern Territories' 
Kamba valley alone. Crucially, the Anchau resettlement villages were constructed at 
some distance from water, around concrete wells intended to reduce the need for 
communities to risk infection by entering valleys.41 In the Northern Territories, 
however, the Tsetse Control Department instead built dams in the valleys to provide 
water, with spillways which provided an optimum breeding habitat for the blackfly, and
which compelled people to constantly visit these breeding sites.  When the British 
Empire Society for the Blind surveyed Northern Nigeria and the Northern Territories 
for total blindness, the differences were evident. In Northern Nigeria, 0.8 percent of the 
population were found to be blind. In northern Ghana the number of the blind was more
than three times higher, at 3 percent, with approximately sixty percent of this blindness 
estimated to have been caused by onchocerciasis.42 This immediately became a 
headline figure in global activity against the disease, quoted by charities, transnational 
organisations and governments, making northern Ghana the regional ‘poster child’ for a
newly recognised public health emergency.43 
By the early 1950s, serious levels of endemic onchocerciasis were being 
discovered across West Africa, and it is likely the disease would have been widespread 
in the north, even in the absence of anti-tsetse clearance and resettlement. But in survey
data from the late colonial period, it is striking how closely zones of the most severe 
Settlement Scheme’, Africa 19, no. 2 (1949): 161–63; and for details of later schemes in Nigeria, 
which operated alongside onchocerciasis control, see David Bourn, ‘Tsetse Control, Agricultural 
Expansion and Environmental Change in Nigeria’ (Thesis, University of Oxford, 1983).
41 See Jones, ‘Review: Anchau Scheme’, 161–63; and Reuben Udo, ‘Sleeping Sickness and the Anchau
Settlement Scheme’, in Geographical Regions of Nigeria, ed. Reuben Udo, (London: Heinemann, 
1981), 157–59.
42 ‘Review: Blindness in West Africa by F.C. Rodger’, British Journal of Ophthalmology, no. 44 
(1960): 128; Rodger, Blindness in West Africa, 81.
43 See, for example, NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Encs.64-100: Information packs and plans for World 
Health Day 1962, Theme ‘Blindness’; UK House of Commons Debate: Onchocerciasis and 
Trypanosomiasis, Hansard vol.651 cc.1317-28, 19 December 1961.
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onchocerciasis infection can be mapped onto the activities of the Tsetse Control 
Department. The 1952 survey indicated that the single worst-affected location in West 
Africa was the valley of the Kamba river, where Morris had begun his clearance work 
and where resettlement and dam building had been sustained for the longest time. More
than one in ten people living here were blind from the disease: 12.6 percent of all adults
and children. The Kamba was described in international reportage and fund-raising 
publications as West Africa's 'Valley of the Blind', and northern Ghana as the 'Country 
of the Blind'.44 The Simulium blackfly was found to be breeding in large numbers below
the laterite dams that had been constructed on the river and its tributaries during the 
resettlement campaign – the Kamba subsequently became the initial focus of efforts to 
eradicate the disease in the north, and continued to be a principal focus of 
onchocerciasis control work into the 1960s.45
Similarly high rates of onchocerciasis infection and blindness were found in 
the Damongo area, another centre of Tsetse Department clearance and resettlement, 
where its work had proceeded alongside a large-scale colonial project to boost 
groundnut production.46 bush clearing, dam building and resettlement had been 
underway for more than six years by 1953, when the British Empire Society for the 
Blind's onchocerciasis survey arrived.47 The survey found that people who lived and 
farmed in the areas cleared by the anti-tsetse campaign had significantly greater 
onchocerciasis infection rates (over 20 percent of population) than those who lived in 
44 For example John Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 
108, no. 5042 (1960): 122–23; ‘Valley of the Blind Found in Africa’, The Southeast Missourian, 30 
January 1954.
45 WHO/CPD67/AFR/ONCH.CONF.1/17 (1954), 3; G.K. Noamesi, ‘A Progress Report on the Control 
of Simulium Damnosum in Northern Ghana’, Ghana Journal of Science 4, no. 2 (1962): 165–68; 
WHO/05/181/14 (1969) Grant in respect of onchocerciasis studies, WHO Geneva, p.145, Report of 
Dr Noamesi to WHO, July 1969.
46 For details of this scheme see Grischow, ‘Late Colonial Development’.
47 See NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Enc.10:  ’Tsetse Control, Gonja Development Area’, Tsetse Control 
Department Report, 29 January 1952; and Enc.15: Report on an Investigation carried out at 
Damongo, 17-31 March 1952.
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the old town of Damongo itself, 4km distant from the cleared Sorie River system (at 5 
percent of the population), indicating that the resettlement programme had brought 
people into closer contact with the disease.48 It is possible that the parasites may have 
been carried to some new areas by the anti-tsetse campaign itself, as clearance teams 
were moved between relatively isolated valleys and villages.  Bush clearance and 
resettlement proceeded in the Damongo area (Western Gonja District) until 
independence in 1957, and the prevalence of the disease worsened. In the early 1960s, a
WHO study recorded that the district was among the most severely affected by 
onchocerciasis in northern Ghana, with up to 25 percent blindness in some villages: 
here dam-building had also increased the breeding habitat for Simulium blackflies.49 
Beyond these two examples there were many further strong overlaps between
anti-tsetse work and high onchocerciasis infection at various sites. These included the 
Kulpawn valley and its tributaries, notably the Sissili River, the White Volta system 
which runs north of the Gambaga escarpment, and almost all river valleys of the far 
north-west. Here, by 1953 the Tsetse Control Department reported that it was clearing 
'the last important river', with re-clearance and additional dam building under way on 
several rivers that had previously been cleared.50  From the available sources it is 
impossible to definitively conclude that the tsetse control programme was responsible 
for high rates of infection and blindness in the north, relative to other areas in the Gold 
Coast or neighbouring colonies. Onchocerciasis was being recognised as a serious 
disease across West Africa at this point, and infection would likely have been 
widespread in any case. But in the areas where it operated, and across the Northern 
Territories as a whole – by transporting potentially-infected staff from district to 
48 The Sorie River now appears on maps as the Laboni River. WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/3 (1954),
4–13.
49 WHO/CPD67.4 (1968), 4–9.
50 NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Enc.34: ‘Half Yearly Progress Report’, Tsetse Control Department, Wa, 
29 October 1953.
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district; opening valleys for grazing and passage; building dams and access roads; 
resettling people directly into the valleys; and spreading the message that rivers were 
now safe – it seems possible that Morris's Tsetse Control Department unwittingly and 
significantly increased the prevalence of onchocerciasis. 
It is worth asking how onchocerciasis was neglected in northern Ghana for so
long, although it was increasingly well known elsewhere in colonial Africa, and how 
the anti-tsetse campaign was able to proceed for years with a project that evidently 
exposed people to the disease. As I have argued previously, the roots of these problems 
lie in the peripheral situation of the north, regarded as a region of low economic 
importance (unlike the areas cleared in Kenya or Uganda), with African populations 
that had little or no political influence on the colonial administration (unlike Northern 
Nigeria). Stemming from this general marginality, there were several proximate factors 
which meant that anti-tsetse policy was never called into question. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Tsetse Control Department functioned as an independent unit of the 
Gold Coast government, with its own staff and budget. It reported principally to the 
Department of Agriculture, with limited oversight from either the Gold Coast Medical 
Department or the Northern Territories administration. Correspondence from the early 
1950s shows the extent to which the campaign had operated in isolation from local 
officials. For several years, the north's Chief Regional Officer (previously Chief 
Commissioner) tried to obtain a full report from the Tsetse Control Department on its 
activities in the region. But details of these activities were only issued in 1954, when 
the Ministry for Agriculture (created on the eve of independence, and under the 
leadership of a Ghanaian), intervened directly to request the information.51 The extent 
of anti-tsetse work came as a surprise to the north's government. Among other things, it
51 Ibid., Ministry of Agriculture to Director of Tsetse Control, 26 March 1954.
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discovered that the Tsetse Control Department had started to enact a plan for the mass 
shooting and driving out of wild game in the north-west. The Chief Regional Officer's 
reply indicates the extent to which the Morris' department had operated without local 
oversight:
The long delay in informing me of the measures which the Department is taking
towards tsetse control in central Gonja is unnecessary. The lack of such 
information handicaps me in giving consideration to problems of general 
development. I am in a similar difficulty over other aspects of the Department's 
work ... I am not aware that the Minister has approved any policy for the 
wholesale driving of game from vast areas of the country and I shall be grateful 
to know what is the Minister's policy in this matter. I understand that the 
method to be employed is the wholesale extermination of those larger antelopes 
which object to going quietly to their new home, and I am not clear how this is 
to be reconciled with the Wild Animals Preservation Ordinance.52
There appears to have been similarly little oversight of the tsetse control 
campaign from the Medical Department at Accra, and apart from Morris, himself a 
medical entomologist, there was no local medical oversight of its work in the north. 
Staffing levels meant that some of the rural areas where the campaign operated were 
rarely visited by other Medical Department staff during the late colonial period, with 
‘only one medical officer (two before the war) being available for the entire Northern 
Territories west of the White Volta-Sissili line’.53 This was precisely the region where 
anti-tsetse work had been most active. The location of work within the Department for 
Agriculture suggests another reason why the clearance and resettlement scheme was 
not called into question: because Morris's ideas tallied with the economic goals of the 
administration, unrelated to human disease or public health. To use Grischow's term, 
the government had for decades been seeking a way to correct what it saw as the 
‘maldevelopment’ that had led communities to avoid the most productive valley land.54 
52 Ibid., Enc.25: ‘Tsetse Control Policy’, CRO NTs to Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 5
March 1954.
53 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 27.
54 Grischow, ‘Morris and Tsetse Eradication’, 394.
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The long-run history of public health in northern Ghana shows some repetition in this 
regard. Well-meant solutions to economic problems, championed by bodies outside of 
the public health system, posed similar risks to the health of northern people after 
independence. In the mid-1960s, for example, the WHO became aware that another 
United Nations agency, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, was collaborating with 
Ghana's Ministry of Agriculture to survey the north in advance of a vast dam building 
and irrigation scheme, involving large-scale resettlement and with the similar aim of 
improving agricultural production. The WHO intervened to modify the project, noting 
that Ghana's Ministry of Health had never been consulted in the FAO's proposal, and 
that the north's water-related diseases had again not been taken into account.55
In the absence of official knowledge about onchocerciasis, Morris's proposal 
had seemed to offer a solution to a long-standing problem. His well-funded campaign 
ran for years with little oversight, the product of ecological and developmental theories 
which disregarded relevant local knowledge of disease, and vested a great deal of 
intellectual and practical power in a single well-intentioned but misinformed individual.
It was perhaps unsurprisingly that relevant African knowledge was discounted: this 
appears to have been a principle established in the early days of tsetse control.  In 
instructions issued to the Gold Coast government in 1914, for example, the Imperial 
Bureau of Entomology had emphasised that entomologists ‘should in no case rely on 
native evidence’ when investigating the distribution of tsetse and other biting flies.56  
But failure to identify the risk from onchocerciasis, during the 15-year anti-tsetse 
campaign, also indicated the gaps in institutional knowledge which separated the 
various departments of the colonial government. These were particularly pronounced in
55 See WHO/CPD67.4 (1968).
56 ADM/56/1/46 (1904-1927), Enc.50: ‘Investigation Into The Habits And Distribution Of The Cattle 
Tsetse Flies’, Instructions from Imperial Bureau of Entomology, 1914.
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a remote region like the north, where low funds and staffing meant there was little 
possibility for even incidental supervision of independent projects. 
It is nevertheless surprising that nobody commented on the confluence of the 
anti-tsetse bush clearing campaign, extensive blindness and local knowledge regarding 
the abandonment of river valleys. The colonial sources record no recognition that the 
Tsetse Control Department's clearance and resettlement campaign may have exposed 
people to the disease, although some individuals raised implicit criticisms of the 
project. Once onchocerciasis in the Northern Territories started to receive international 
attention in the mid-1950s, the idea that valleys had once been abandoned due to 
sleeping sickness was quite suddenly considered 'very far-fetched': it was now 'known' 
that onchocerciasis had driven people away.57 In 1952, a few months after the survey 
team from the British Empire Society for the Blind had begun working in the region, 
showing the Kamba valley to have the highest known levels of infection in Africa, 
Morris retired from the Gold Coast and the colonial service.58  Despite the correlation, 
there is no indication that his departure had any connection to the survey's revelations 
about the disease, and many British personnel were leaving the colony at this time. The 
low importance and staffing accorded to the north meant that the relationship between 
tsetse control and onchocerciasis may simply have gone unnoticed. As with sleeping 
sickness in the late 1920s, there might also have been an official reluctance to recognise
potentially costly health problems in the region. Shortly before he died in 1981, retired 
northern medical officer B.B. Waddy recalled that when he presented the results of his 
1949 onchocerciasis survey to the Gold Coast's Director of Medical Services, he was 
57 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/3 (1954), 4–13.
58 NRG/8/13/16 (1949-1955), Encs. 10-24: Correspondence between Tsetse Control Department and 
NTs administration, January-November 1952.
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‘accused of being a madman’, and that the 'very existence' of onchocerciasis in the 
north was denied for many years.59
Gaps in institutional knowledge became more pronounced as independence 
approached and various colonial employees left the Gold Coast, taking with them 
specific knowledge about patterns of regional disease and the organisation of local 
health services. For the Ghanaian health officials who succeeded the colonial 
administration, the independence transition constituted a significant informational gulf. 
The same has been true for historians of Africa. Many sources do not cross the division,
and so researchers working on one or the other period are in some sense blinded to 
connections between them. For the Northern Territories, as with most of the country, 
few colonial medical officers remained after independence.60 The results of this 
disjuncture were evident immediately after independence. In 1959, for example, a 
researcher on onchocerciasis in northern Ghana complained that no nutritional survey 
had been done of the region, which might help him gauge the effects of Vitamin A 
deficiency on blindness. In fact there had been a survey of this specific deficiency in 
1936, a general nutritional survey of the north in 1941, and a number of smaller studies 
on the same subject, but they do not appear to have been published outside of the 
colonial bureaucracy. With the departure of medical staff, the information had been lost
to view.61 
The gulf between colonial and post-colonial sources, or between colonial-era 
sources buried in the administrative archive and those which gained wider circulation 
through publication in scientific journals, also appears to have affected one of the 
59 Waddy made these comments in 1977, at a symposium for former colonial health workers. See E.E. 
Sabben-Clare et al., eds., Health in Tropical Africa during the Colonial Period: Based on the 
Proceedings of a Symposium Held at New College, Oxford 21-23 March 1977 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 165.
60 See Chapter 3
61 C.M. McLean, ‘Ocular Onchocerciasis in Northern Ghana: A Treatment Survey’, British Journal of 
Ophthalmology 43, no. 8 (1959): 477–85.
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foundational studies of onchocerciasis after independence. The geographer John 
Hunter's 1966 study, 'River Blindness in Nangodi, Northern Ghana', has been seen as a 
landmark in its field.62 His research was influential in international work against the 
disease, to the extent that it was influential in the formulation of onchocerciasis control 
policy in the Americas.63 Drawing on oral interviews, an analysis of lineages, and 
contemporary settlement patterns, Hunter proposed that northern Ghanaian 
communities had cyclically moved into valleys where onchocerciasis was present, and 
then retreated to uplands away from infection as their productive capacity fell through 
increasing blindness, before returning to valleys as upland soil erosion led in turn to 
underproduction and hunger. Using interviews and evidence of abandoned settlements, 
he presented a precise calculation of the rate of advance and retreat, suggesting that 
people had begun entering northern river valleys in the 1890s, remained until around 
1918 when blindness began to take its toll, and had then retreated by around a mile 
each year until the time of his research. 
There are two possible problems with Hunter's study, beyond its 
disconcertingly precise calculations of the dates and rate at which communities were 
retreating from onchocerciasis infection each year (which seem difficult to sustain 
without additional data), and his assumptions about the organisation of northern society
in the nineteenth century (which make guesses about population behaviour from one or 
two oral histories, as Morris had done for sleeping sickness). His broader thesis about 
advance and retreat is persuasive, but additional credit should have been given to 
earlier research. Hunter's study makes a passing reference to Waddy as a local medical 
officer who had conducted a colonial onchocerciasis survey, leaving a 'cyclostyled 
62 John Hunter, ‘River Blindness in Nangodi, Northern Ghana: A Hypothesis of Cyclical Advance and 
Retreat’, Geographical Review 56, no. 3 (1966): 398–416.
63 WHO/05/87/8 (1974-1975) Onchocerciasis: Pan-American Health Organisation Conference, 1974, 
WHO Geneva, Enc.3: WHO Division of Malaria and Other Parasitic Diseases to Dr M. Martins da 
Silva, Chief of Department of Research Development and Coordination, PAHO, 2 May 1975.
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report' which received a brief footnote.64 But Waddy had made Hunter's core argument 
in 1949, in an extensive discussion which accompanied his survey data. Using past 
census returns, Waddy presented a detailed statistical analysis of ‘the rise and fall of 
population and blindness in 77 towns and villages in the Tumu District’, arguing that:
The result is not only that the population is retreating from its water, but that 
farms are cleared further and further back from the rivers and up into 
watersheds, giving rise to rapid increase of soil erosion ... the effect on the 
community's manpower is devastating and liable to result in disaster if two or 
more difficult farming seasons follow one another.65
The intention here is to point out that an acknowledgement was missed, or 
that Waddy's arguments were overlooked. The second problem with Hunter's study is 
more indicative of the gulf affecting colonial and postcolonial knowledge of the region.
For his theory to work, there had to be no long-standing African knowledge about the 
link between river valleys and onchocerciasis, and he argued this was the case: that in 
1966, ‘it seems probable that until about 10 years ago there was no awareness of a 
causal relationship between riverside farming and a higher incidence of morbidity’.66 
This assertion, which seems to link northern communities’ first causal knowledge of 
onchocerciasis to the start of control work in the mid-1950s, was evidently made 
without recognition of colonial-era sources which indicated that the disease was known
to northern communities. This had been made plain in Waddy's survey, which observed 
that ‘the probability of going blind is consistently given by natives as their reason for 
not farming close to rivers where onchocerciasis is endemic’.67
64 Hunter, ‘River Blindness’, 405.
65 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 29; 
WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/3 (1954), 5.
66 Hunter, ‘River Blindness’, 413.
67 GB/0809/Ross Institute/03/23/Vol.27 (1949) Waddy, ‘Onchocerciasis’, 10.
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The recognition and internationalisation of northern onchocerciasis
As colonial anti-tsetse work ground to a halt, it was replaced almost directly 
by a major campaign against onchocerciasis, in identical areas and with many of the 
same organisational forms and practical techniques. The disease’s serious impacts had 
first been suggested by Ridley's survey in 1945, carried out because infection among 
northern military recruits had raised concerns at Accra. Although Ridley's findings 
generated no further investigation or action from the Gold Coast administration, they 
were noted by Waddy, who had arrived in the Gold Coast in 1937, and was 
subsequently promoted from district medical officer to deputy director of medical 
services for the Northern Territories. When no action took place, Waddy organised his 
own onchocerciasis survey in 1949, on a much wider scale. He used a range of 
evidence to make his case that the disease posed a serious public health risk, including 
direct physical examinations in multiple northern communities, and through a 
comparison of the total rate of blindness recorded in the 1931 and 1948 census returns 
for more than 70 settlements in the Tumu district.68
On Waddy's tour of the north, carried out over two months in 1949, he 
examined over 4,000 people via skin-snip tests at larger villages and their satellite 
communities. His investigation revealed an average onchocerciasis infection rate of 
almost 60 percent in these communities, with particularly high rates recorded on the 
Kulpawn river system, where more than 70 percent of all people were infected.69 
Waddy's conclusions about this ‘appalling state of affairs’, where the onset of blindness
began at around thirty years of age, were expressed repeatedly throughout his report:
The economic and social plight of the inhabitants could hardly be worse. They 
are gradually fading out in disease and semi-starvation ... The vicious spiral 
down which they are sliding is all too plain; less energy – less land farmed – 
68 Ibid., 9.
69 Calculated from Waddy’s data. Ibid., 12–25.
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less food – even less energy. As an example of their present condition it is 
sufficient to mention that while I was there a herd of Roan antelopes milled 
around all one night in the crops right in front of a Headman's compound, 
ruining them, while no attempt whatsoever was made to drive them away or to 
kill some for meat.70
Waddy had conducted the survey on his own initiative, and when it was 
completed he tried to raise a call for government action, couching this in terms of cost 
savings and potential economic benefits:
I consider that the elimination of onchocerciasis as soon as possible is vital to 
the future of the NT's, and I wish to stress that the problem is urgent. It is 
notoriously difficult to take a balanced view of a subject in which one is 
intensely interested, and I submit the facts that I have endeavoured to establish 
for the judgement of others …  the victims are mostly men in the prime of life, 
who are completely disabled but may live on for more than 20 years. Its 
elimination, therefore, would add not to the population to be supported, but to 
the working efficiency of the population.71
No action was taken: under an administration where the 'very existence' of the disease 
was denied, Waddy was ‘accused of being a madman’.72 But, like Ridley, his work 
caught the attention of others, this time of an organisation which worked beyond the 
institutional biases and operational control of the Gold Coast administration. This was 
the British Empire Society for the Blind, created in 1950 as a collaboration between the
Colonial Office and an older Victorian charity, the Royal National Institute for the 
Blind.73 Like earlier charitable organisations focused on the colonies (for example the 
British Empire Leprosy Relief Association, founded in 1924), the British Empire 
Society for the Blind evolved into an independent advocate for health in Africa and 
Asia. It was able to mobilise popular and political opinion, and independent funding, in 
Britain itself, and so could bypass the Gold Coast's administrative inertia. The society's 
70 Ibid., 11, 19.
71 Ibid., 30.
72 Sabben-Clare et al., Health in Tropical Africa, 165.
73 Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, 125.
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founder John Wilson, himself blind, read Waddy's paper on the Northern Territories and
travelled to the region in the early 1950s. Struck by the severe impacts of the disease, 
on his return to London he popularised the term 'river blindness' as a more accessible 
name for onchocerciasis, and raised funds for a multi-year survey of the disease.74 The 
society's researchers spent almost three years in West Africa, revealing the full extent of
the disease across the region, with northern Ghana the worst affected area of all. 
Infection rates had continued to rise since Waddy's investigation, and the survey found 
that ‘in many, the majority, of the villages surveyed, every person over 20 was 
infected’.75  With these conditions, northern Ghana became a constant referent for the 
Society. Its work in turn became a template for fundraising to support charitable 
activity in Africa, and perhaps also for an abiding way of depicting African 
communities and African disease. As Wilson remarked in 1960, the entire cost of the 
survey was funded by voluntary donations, ‘from thousands of individuals who were 
moved by the story of West Africa’s “Country of the Blind”’.76 
These surveys had revealed the serious extent of an 'unknown' disease on the 
very eve of Ghana's independence. They were indicative of a shift in the focus of public
health, towards locally important diseases, and they also heralded a sea-change in the 
system by which public health in the north was managed and funded. As the colonial 
healthcare system ended, and most of its medical personnel returned to the UK, work 
against onchocerciasis marked the arrival of a new source of medical authority, the 
WHO, which would remain a constant presence and often a direct intervenor in the 
arrangement of the region's public health. Onchocerciasis also brought increased 
involvement by the non-government aid sector which, apart from a small number of 
74 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF.1/19 (1954) ‘Epidemiological factors in endemic onchocerciasis 
areas in the northern Gold Coast’, by F.C. Rodger  (Submissions for Conference on African 
Onchocerciasis, Leopoldville, 1-6 October 1954), WHO Geneva, 5–6.
75 Ibid., 6–7.
76 Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, 124.
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churches, had been largely absent from the region during the colonial period. The 
disease attracted some of the first of what would become many hundreds of charities 
and aid organisations operating persistently in the region. In 1957, perhaps driven by 
the political transition in Ghana, the state most central to its work and fundraising, the 
British Empire Society for the Blind became the Royal Commonwealth Society for the 
Blind.77 In 1986, it became 'Sightsavers', the transnational NGO, which has now been 
present in northern Ghana for more than 60 years.78  
In the years after this survey, onchocerciasis rapidly became a subject of 
international discussion among health agencies and charities, politicians, and broader 
publics. In these discussions the disease, and those infected in the north, were 
represented in a number of ways: as a public health emergency requiring specific 
medical action; as a horrifying example of disease in Africa which raised charitable 
funds or sold newspapers; or as an example of the failings of colonialism and/or 
independent African states. In 1961, a debate in the British House of Commons drew 
on many of these representations, revealing changes and continuities as Africa was 
decolonised. Having returned from a visit to West Africa, where he had visited projects 
run by the Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind, the MP Lesley Hale raised 
criticisms of British inaction regarding onchocerciasis.  He argued that Britain was 
abdicating its responsibility to newly independent people faced with infection 
contracted under British administration:
I decided to put down Questions to find out in detail what Her Majesty's 
Government were doing in this matter … the answer, in verbose detail, was 
‘Nothing’. ‘I am not my brother's keeper’ says the Secretary for Technical 
Cooperation. ‘These people have self government; they should do it 
themselves.’79
77 Ibid., 25.
78 Kate Bennell, ‘Seven Decades of Sightsavers’ Work’, 16 January 2017, Accessed 24 June 2017, 
https://www.sightsavers.org/.
79 HC Deb (19 December 1961) v.651, c.1320.
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In his parliamentary questions, Hale made the observation that in West 
Africa, bush clearance against tsetse had ‘shown that the destruction there does not 
greatly affect the Simulium fly’, another implicit recognition of the link between the 
anti-tsetse campaign and the rise of onchocerciasis.80 With some irony, the 
government's response, delivered by Secretary for Technical Cooperation Dennis 
Vosper, turned in detail to the anti-tsetse campaigns and ongoing research on 
trypanosomiasis, as an example of Britain's continued good works in Africa, and as an 
explanation for inaction against onchocerciasis:
I wish to refer particularly to one of the two diseases named in the subject of 
tonight's debate, trypanosomiasis, because I think that it is against the 
background of the progress made in respect of that disease and because it is, 
perhaps, the better known of the two, that one can see the progress which still 
must be made in respect of [onchocerciasis].81
Vosper also pointed to colonial-era British work against onchocerciasis in 
East Africa, which had begun in the 1940s when the disease was still unacknowledged 
in northern Ghana, as an example of British action against the disease. He suggested 
that it was the governments of Ghana and other independent West African states that 
were impeding work against onchocerciasis in the region, saying that Britain would be 
‘only too willing’ to help if they applied for assistance.82
The debate indicated the rifts that had formed in the administration of public 
health in northern Ghana over the independence transition. New governments in West 
Africa found themselves with limited staff and reduced institutional expertise regarding
their own disease problems. In the independence-era political climate they may also 
have been reluctant to apply for assistance from their former rulers, at a time when they
80 Ibid., cc1320-1323.
81 Ibid., cc1324-1328.
82 Ibid.
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were being courted by many other world powers, notably the Soviet Union.83 In Britain,
priorities for technical assistance in health appear to have been shaped by returning 
medical staff who had left before they became familiar with the emerging 
onchocerciasis problem, and by an older and enduring focus of colonial health policy: 
sleeping sickness and tsetse control. Sleeping sickness was no longer a public health 
emergency in West Africa, but it remained an inherited focus of British medical 
knowledge regarding the region.
As Britain disengaged from independent Ghana, the centre of advocacy and 
action shifted strongly towards charitable organisations, in particular the Royal 
Commonwealth Society for the Blind (RCSB), which shaped action against 
onchocerciasis in northern Ghana between independence and the late 1960s, when it 
was supplanted by the WHO in tandem with the Ghana government. The RCSB was 
itself emblematic of the disengagements and continuities between the colonial and post-
colonial eras. Vosper, Britain's Secretary for Technical Cooperation, was in fact its vice-
president, alongside its founder, John Wilson. In Wilson's public engagements in 
Britain, he described the organisation as a bridge between Britain (as a former colonial 
power) and independent Africa, and a symbol of the new Commonwealth idea:
Our relationship with Governments is such that it is difficult to say where 
voluntary action ends and official action begins … it reaches forward to an 
association which goes well beyond the formal links of Government or the 
requirements of strategy and trade. Such a wish can find its most natural 
expression in an organization such as ours, which has nothing to do with 
politics but has much to do with basic uncontroversial human needs.84
Wilson considered that non-governmental organisations like the RCSB, 
although it had been founded by the Colonial Office and had a British Secretary of 
State as vice-president, were well placed to guide onchocerciasis control and other 
83 See Gocking, History of Ghana, 129.
84 Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, 130–31.
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public health work across the political cleavages of the independence transition. In a 
question and answer session at the Royal Society he said:
You say ‘now the Empire is disintegrating’; I would rather say, ‘as the 
Commonwealth evolves’ … I do not think it made the slightest difference when 
Ghana became independent. I really do not think that at our unofficial level 
these political difficulties which one encounters in so many other respects have 
much meaning.85
In the early 1950s, the RCSB was pivotal in drawing attention to the 
onchocerciasis crisis in northern Ghana, when the Gold Coast administration had 
neglected the disease –  the phenomenon of NGOs working to fill gaps in healthcare, 
apart from or even in opposition to local government, was not a new feature of 
independent Africa states. Despite its roots in Britain's 'disintegrating Empire', the 
Society carved out a place as an independent metropolitan advocate for Africa health 
issues that were largely unknown to the British public. This proved politically 
acceptable to the CPP government, permitting a continuation of close RCSB 
involvement across the transition, and for a time it became directly involved in northern
onchocerciasis control. The Society oversaw and funded early control initiatives, and 
trained individuals who later became important to the Ghanaian government's own 
control work. Even by the late 1960s, as the WHO became more closely involved with 
onchocerciasis control in the country, eclipsing all other institutions working locally on 
the disease, it continued to rely on maps and disease distribution data from the RCSB.86
Here was a good example of how imperial institutions morphed into NGOs 
which remained persistently involved in healthcare in independent Africa. The RCSB's 
early work situated onchocerciasis as a foundational 'neglected' disease affecting 
85 Ibid., 131.
86 WHO/05/180/2 (1964-1973) Onchocerciasis: Geographical Distribution, WHO Geneva, Enc.14: Dr 
Gockel, WHO Communicable Diseases Division, to Mr Wilson, Royal Commonwealth Society for 
the Blind, 12 March 1968.
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African people, with northern Ghana as its foundational endemic area. As Cross et. al. 
have argued, onchocerciasis in Africa subsequently became a template for the broader 
paradigm of 'Neglected Tropical Diseases', a mobilising theme for many health-focused
NGOs.87  But in its efforts against onchocerciasis, the RCSB also established a much 
imitated template for advocacy and fund-raising work. It formulated and consistently 
deployed a particular representation of African disease and African people, one which 
became widely used, perhaps with enduring implications for Western perceptions of the
continent.
From the outset, the RCSB and John Wilson worked to shape public 
perceptions of the disease in Britain. For a start, this involved coining a new name for 
onchocerciasis, the formerly 'unpronounceable scourge'. 'River blindness' was less of a 
mouthful. Although many infected people did not become blind, and instead 
experienced other serious symptoms, parasite-induced blindness was emphasised as a 
disturbing outcome in publicity material by the RCSB and later by the WHO.88 In this 
material, a consistent and typical description of affected African communities and 
individuals also began to emerge, as indicated by the following quotes from various 
sources:
In the northern Gold Coast [there are] one million people, the bulk of whom 
during the time when the flies are breeding almost everywhere, work close by 
from dawn to dusk, naked and intent on their job, easy victims. It is not difficult
to see why onchocerciasis flourishes in this sad part of the world … I have seen 
blind working in the fields during the rains, and there is no doubt that in some 
places they are led out for that purpose, each holding the stick of the man in 
front.89
Northern Ghana is an area which without much exaggeration has been called 
“the country of the blind” ... In some of the stricken villages, where a tenth of 
87 Catherine Cross et al., ‘From River Blindness to Neglected Tropical Diseases—Lessons Learned in 
Africa’, PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases 9, no. 5 (2015): e0003506.
88 See, for example, Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’.
89 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF.1/19 (1954), Enc.19: RCSB Presentation, 3,7.
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the people are blind, a hemp rope guides the women to the well and the men 
plant in straight lines along a length of bamboo. The community has for so long 
lived under the menace of the disease that they have come to regard blindness 
as normal, and are frankly surprised that the authorities nowadays make so 
much fuss about it … I have described these communities not from any wish to 
horrify but because, in a talk which attempts to see this problem on a 
Commonwealth scale, it is so easy to lose sight of the people behind the 
statistics.90
The term “the Dark Continent” is indeed based upon a terrible truth. If we 
examine the figures for villages, or tribes, we find that their tragedy may easily 
be lost sight of in the striking averages, which often hide more than they seek to
reveal. In some villages of Northern Ghana the blindness rate is not the Western 
European figure of one in 500, but one in 10.91
Most [villagers in north-east Ghana] seem to be stoically resigned to a fate of 
poverty, malnutrition, blindness, and disease, with the forces of an inhospitable 
environment gradually gaining the upper hand. For a population seasonally 
hungry and never far from starvation, blindness, striking a man in his prime, is a
calamity.92
In publicity materials, some of which found their way to northern Ghana 
itself, contrasts were drawn with the ‘technically and socially advanced countries of 
Western Europe, Australia and North America’, where individuals like Helen Keller, 
'the world's most famous blind citizen', refused to resign themselves to their fate.93 With
the boom in mass media consumption after the world wars – in newspaper readerships, 
and particularly with the growth of television ownership in the 1950s – these 
descriptions of African disease were disseminated more widely than had been possible 
for earlier twentieth-century charitable organisations. They may also have found a more
receptive audience in American and European publics attuned to developments in 
Africa during the independence years. Publicity films, like the World Bank's 'A Plague 
90 Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, 122–23.
91 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Encs.64-100: WHO Information packs and plans for World Health Day 
1962, Theme ‘Blindness’.
92 Hunter, ‘River Blindness’, 405.
93 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Encs.64-100: WHO Information packs and plans for World Health Day 
1962, Theme ‘Blindness’.
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Upon the Land', were made to accompany the campaigns against the disease.94 A search
of the limited range of scanned articles available online, from the late 1940s until the 
beginning of the expansive WHO Onchocerciasis Control Programme in the mid-
1970s, shows that onchocerciasis in Africa was reported widely in print media over this
time. The disease generated headlines even in small provincial newspapers: from 'Blind
in Paradise' (The Milwaukee Sentinel) and 'Jungle Expedition Planned to Fight African 
Blindness' (The Toledo Blade) to 'Valley of Blind found in Africa' (South East 
Missourian), 'Villages of the Blind' (The Virgin Islands Daily Register),  'Fly kills off 
whole African villages' (Boca Raton News) and 'Scourge of the Flies' (Sarasota 
Journal).95 
Onchocerciasis in Africa was temporarily a source of media sensation, 
making use of a shared idiom for disease in Africa that had partly been developed by 
the RCSB, with northern Ghana as its central exemplar. Publicity materials from the 
RCSB and WHO were re-written in the media, and reportage followed their 
descriptions closely: the blind being led into the fields with sticks, and stricken villages 
of dusty people unable to effect change themselves, resigned to the tragedy of disease. 
Europeans who visited infected areas in northern Ghana were clearly affected by what 
they saw there, and justifiably motivated by a sense that urgent action needed to be 
taken. But it is interesting to consider how through this advocacy and fundraising work,
and the language it employed in attempting to show ‘the people behind the statistics’, 
onchocerciasis in northern Ghana contributed to a changing conception of the 
continent. As nineteenth and early twentieth century representations of Africa as savage
94 The World Bank, A Plague Upon the Land (United Nations Division of Public Affairs, 1983).
95 Among many other similar articles of the period. ‘Blind in Paradise’, The Milwaukee Sentinel, 29 
October 1956; ‘Jungle Expedition Planned to Fight African Blindness’, Toledo Blade, 22 May 1952; 
‘Village of the Blind’, The Virgin Islands Daily Register, 8 February 1958; ‘Fly Kills off Whole 
African Villages’, Boca Raton News, 15 October 1972; ‘Scourge of the Flies’, Sarasota Journal, 9 
March 1977.
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and dangerous receded, these depictions now presented its people as supine and 
pitiable. 
Figure 20. ‘Fly kills off whole African villages’,  Boca Raton News, 15 October 1972
Source:  Boca Raton News, hosted at http://www.bocahistory.org/newspapers/ 
Figure 21. 'A victim of river blindness being led to his village'. Publicity image for the WHO
Onchocerciasis Control Programme, January 1974
Source:  United Nations Photo/Ray Witlin
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The Onchocerciasis Control Programme and international involvement in northern 
health
In the years immediately before and after independence, the RCSB had a 
leading role within northern Ghana itself, beyond its international advocacy. The 
outgoing British administration did not attempt any sustained programme of 
onchocerciasis control, along the lines that it had attempted in Kenya in the 1940s. 
Although the 1951 Maude Commission on the Health Needs of Ghana received 
petitions from northern chiefs calling for investigations of widespread blindness, it 
made no specific observations regarding onchocerciasis. Waddy's survey, which had 
shown the disease to be a serious health problem in 1949, also appears to have been 
discounted. Maude's report provided the basis for independent Ghana's health system, 
recommending systemic reforms and listing diseases of high priority, and the omission 
of onchocerciasis as a priority may have stalled action against the disease.  The 
commission’s recommendations were accepted by the new government of Ghana, a 
year before the British Empire Society for the Blind publicised the first findings of its 
West African blindness survey.96 
Although onchocerciasis was not the subject of any systematic prevention 
policy under Ghana's transitional health system, research and preliminary control work 
did take place before the WHO campaign of the 1970s. A programme of DDT larvicide 
treatments on the Kamba river was overseen by entomologists working for the British 
Empire Society for the Blind, who in 1953 were able to enlist the staff of the anti-tsetse 
campaign to carry out the work.97 But control efforts remained local and experimental 
until after independence, carried out by individual officers on a limited scale. Large-
scale control projects elsewhere in colonial Africa, in the 1940s and 1950s, had 
96 See NRG/8/13/18 (1951-1964).
97 WHO/CPD67/AFR/ONCH.CONF.1/17 (1954), 1–8.
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established a method which aimed to kill off fly larvae populations and limit the 
disease's spread. One of the most expansive efforts took place along the Congo River at
Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) in 1948, where a section of the vast river and its banks 
was treated intensively with DDT from an aircraft over three months. This temporarily 
eradicated the fly and eliminated infection, although re-spraying had to be carried out 
annually. Further significant DDT control programmes were launched in Kenya (1948),
Uganda (1952), Nigeria (1955), Chad (1955), and Sierra Leone (1957).98 
Figure 22. Simulium fly research shortly on the Black Volta before independence, northern Ghana,
January 1957
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection CO 1069-53-72
98 See WHO/05/89/1 (1956-1960) Onchocerciasis Control Measures, WHO Geneva; A.W. Brown, ‘A 
Survey of Simulium Control in Africa.’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 27 (1962): 511–
27.
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Independent Ghana's own Simulium Control Unit was established in 1957, 
under the entomologist G.K Noamesi. It began with a three-year programme of 
research in the north-west, which by that time was consistently reported as the worst-
affected onchocerciasis area in Africa. In 1960 the unit began a larvae control initiative 
on the Kamba and Bekpong Rivers, and on sections of the Black Volta itself.99 This 
operated until 1962, at the same time as work started on the Akosombo Dam. As with 
other major hydrological projects in Africa at this time, the creation of Lake Volta 
intensified concerns about the spread of water-related diseases, although it ultimately 
reduced the incidence of onchocerciasis over a large area towards the south-east.100
Noamesi's report on Simulium fly control in Ghana, published in an early 
issue of the Ghana Journal of Science (first published in October 1961), showed the 
evolution of Ghana's internal capacity for research and public health action, a reflection
of government policies towards self-sufficiency and 'Africanisation' of key posts.101 But
even as this local capacity developed, the national economy faltered in the early 1960s, 
and transnational organisations came to play an increasingly central role in public 
health and economic projects. By 1965 there were several large WHO health projects 
operating in Ghana, including TB and bilharzia control programmes and the 
unsuccessful Malaria Pre-Eradication Project, and a further 29 projects under the 
United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA). Most of these 
were focused on the south, but they included preparatory work on a massive water 
supply and resettlement scheme for northern Ghana.102  In the 1960s, the north was also 
part of the extensive West Africa Rinderpest Eradication Campaign, organised by the 
99 Noamesi, ‘A Progress Report on the Control of Simulium Damnosum in Northern Ghana’, 157–68.
100 WHO/D67/AFR/ONCH.CONF/3 (1954), 13; WHO/CPD67.4 (1968), 7–10.
101 Gocking, History of Ghana, 95–103.
102 See WHO/CPD67.4 (1968).
237
Organisation of African Unity and funded by the United States, an early attempt to 
eliminate the cattle disease across the region.103  
The relatively short duration of Ghana's initial onchocerciasis control 
programme, limited to the north-west, may have been the result of the new nation’s 
economic problems, which intensified after 1961. Local initiative also appears to have 
receded with the expansion of WHO activity against the disease. In 1962 the WHO 
annual working budget was almost doubled, to US$30 million. The raised budget 
brought a concomitant expansion in the organisation's mandate, which now included an
'accelerated programme of assistance' to African states, including direct operational 
assistance, the training of national staff, and the planning of public health policy.104 This
was a watershed moment for the increased involvement of the WHO in Africa, a new 
source of medical authority which expanded into independent Ghana as its economic 
problems intensified in the 1960s. It is interesting to note that Ghana at this time held a 
seat on the executive board of the WHO, allowing it to introduce subjects for 
discussion at the World Health Assembly. In 1962 the submission of Ghana's 
representative, C.O. Easmon, was informed by the ideologies of nationalism and 
modernisation underpinning independence-era politics. He warned that the WHO 
should not seek to transplant its methods 'indiscriminately from one part of the world to
another', and argued that Ghana's people had an obligation to give up 'long-cherished 
prejudices' as they embraced medical science.105
As its budget was expanded, the WHO began in-country research on 
onchocerciasis in Ghana and across West Africa, in the first steps towards its Volta 
103 G.R. Scott and A. Provost, Global Eradication of Rinderpest (Edinburgh: Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, 1992), ch.1.
104 (US$843 million in adjusted 2016 pounds. NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Enc.115: Report on 15th 
World Health Assembly, 8-25 May 1962; also see WHO Programme Budget, accessed April 6, 2016,
at http://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/budget/; and for pound adjustments: 
https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/relativevalue.php.
105 Ibid., Enc.115: Report on 15th World Health Assembly, 8-25 May 1962.
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Basin control programme of the 1970s.106 After independence there appears to have 
been relatively little overt concern about northern onchocerciasis among Accra-based 
health officials, however, and this became increasingly apparent as the WHO's 
involvement in Ghana increased. From the early 1960s a permanent WHO team was 
based in the country to conduct fly and infection surveys, although it did not carry out 
larviciding or other control work. Instead the organisation was focused on preliminary 
research for a long term control programme covering the entire Volta basin, including 
neighbouring countries, with the aim of preventing recolonisation by flies from 
untreated areas.107 After 1965 the WHO set out to co-ordinate all onchocerciasis 
research across West Africa, and as part of this it provided funding to Ghana's 
Simulium Control Unit, established in 1957 under G.K. Noamesi, and renamed the 
Onchocerciasis Research Unit after 1962: an indication of how state-led disease control
work was reduced after 1963.108 With WHO support, the Onchocerciasis Research Unit 
was tasked with researching the movement patterns of the blackfly, and with devising a 
new dry-season larvicide campaign to limit the spread of infection among northern 
communities. But the unit was disbanded in 1968, on the orders of the National 
Liberation Council, which governed after the 1966 coup against Nkrumah. Noamesi 
was dismissed, although he had been the government's only trained entomologist.109
As I discuss further in Chapter 5, the history of the Onchocerciasis Research 
Unit shows how public health work in northern Ghana could be shaped by political 
instability, southern bias and the pull of outside funding. In the period between 1962 
and 1966, Noamesi and his unit put together a detailed and costed plan for control of 
onchocerciasis in the north, covering all dry-season breeding sites, but they were not 
106 Ibid., Enc.138: Report on 16th World Health Assembly, 7 May 1963.
107 WHO/CPD67.4 (1968), 5–7.
108 See Chapter 5
109 See Chapter 5, and WHO/05/181/14 (1969).
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given permission to proceed with the work. The unit complained that it never received 
an allocation of trained staff. In his correspondence with the WHO during the late 
Nkrumah period, Noamesi argued that the Ghanaian government was uninterested in 
the disease, and suggested that the WHO might pressure it to ‘see the importance of a 
total attack on Simulium as soon as possible’.110 After the coup in 1966, he took a more 
openly combative approach, in which he evidently relied on his links with the WHO as 
backing in a confrontation with the military-run NLC. He wrote a memorandum to the 
regime titled ‘The Extent of Onchocerciasis in Ghana Should Concern Us All’, arguing 
that the country had become ‘a bitter experience and a disappointment to the world’ for 
not following through with his unit's proposed control campaign. Noamesi requested 
that the government give him permission, as a member of the WHO Expert Committee 
on Onchocerciasis, to ‘approach on behalf of Ghana all world bodies interested in the 
control of onchocerciasis, for the balance of funds and other resources necessary’. In 
making his case, he tried to show that the disease presented a threat outside of the 
region, arguing that ‘the belief that onchocerciasis and the blindness due to it belong to 
the north of Ghana has been disproved’, and listing southern areas at risk.111
His arguments, emphasising the risk to the south, were similar to those of 
concerned colonial-era medical officers trying to convince Accra to act against northern
disease. Noamesi's dismissal by the NLC was perhaps inevitable, given this combative 
approach, although the disbanding of the Onchocerciasis Research Unit indicated a 
broader lack of interest regarding the disease. But despite his calls to action, Noamesi 
also to some extent personified the south-centred nature of Ghana's health system. 
From 1965 to 1969 his research against onchocerciasis was supported by the WHO, 
110 Ibid., Enc.23:  ’Progress report on research in Ghana for improving knowledge of the bionomics of 
Simulium Damnosum, 1964-1966’, Report from Dr G.K. Noamesi to WHO, November 1966.
111 Ibid., Enc.37: ‘The Extent of Onchocerciasis in Ghana should concern us all’, memorandum from Dr
G.K. Noamesi to the Health Committee of the National Liberation Council, 9 April 1966.
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which provided funds and equipment, including vehicles and boats, on the basis that 
Noamesi's work (as the focus of Ghanaian state efforts) would be coordinated with 
WHO personnel working in the region.112 This funding was cut off in 1969, when it 
became clear that Noamesi had been dismissed by the Ghana government a year 
previously. He had attempted to use his WHO connection to carve out a position of 
power within the Ghana health system, apparently believing that the independent 
funding and prestige of this linkage would insure him against local politics.113 More 
damningly, certainly from the perspective of northern communities affected by 
onchocerciasis, it turned that Noamesi did relatively little work in the north itself. Local
WHO personnel reported that he conducted his research by 'remote control' from his 
offices in Accra, using auxiliary northern personnel, and that his descriptions of 
ambitious dry-season fly control measures could not be substantiated.114 When a 
Canadian WHO consultant asked Noamesi to support a study on the disease in 1966, it 
turned out that under the conditions of Ghana's economic downturn, the government's 
operation in the north was defunct and its vehicles inoperational, and no funding had 
been provided to match the WHO contribution. The Ministry of Health proposed that 
the WHO could instead conduct research close to Accra, hundreds of miles from the 
infected areas.115 
Under conditions of economic privation and poor government funding in the 
late 1960s, the funding offered by the WHO for northern onchocerciasis work was 
understandably attractive to public health officials in Accra. The recession also 
112 Ibid., Enc.71: Dr Gockel, Division of Communicable Diseases, WHO, to Dr Noamesi, 8 November 
1967.
113 Ibid., Enc.168: Letter from J.D. Marr, WHO Entomologist, Ghana, to N. Ansari, Division of 
Communicable Diseases, WHO, 12 March 1969.
114 Ibid., Encs.94-99: Correspondence between P.D. Scheffel, WHO AFRO-131 team leader, Ghana, and
G.W. Gockel, Division of Communicable Diseases, WHO, March 1968.
115 Ibid., Enc.36: MoH Accra, to C.W. Gockel, Division of Communicable Diseases, WHO, 29 June 
1966.
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undermined local government initiatives like the north-west DDT control programme, 
which was shelved in 1962.  In these years the low economic importance of the north 
may again have reduced the government’s motivations for funding an annual campaign 
aimed at limiting the further spread of infection in northern communities. In East 
Africa, on the Victoria Nile in Uganda, and on the Congo River alongside Leopoldville,
DDT larviciding was carried out repeatedly to protect revenue-generating areas, even 
when the flies were liable to recolonise an area the next season. In northern Ghana, 
recognised since 1953 as one of Africa's worst affected areas, little systematic control 
work took place between 1962 and the early 1970s – a decade of relative inaction and 
continued infection, as successive governments waited for the WHO's sweeping Volta 
Basin programme to commence.
WHO involvement in northern onchocerciasis control continued after the 
dismissal of Noamesi and across the overthrow of Nkrumah. With a policy of 
remaining studiously apolitical, the WHO maintained its presence as governments 
changed abruptly, specialist units were shuttered and local experts were dismissed. In 
addition to its financial and technical resources, this persistence and relative immunity 
to local politics was another mechanism by which the WHO came to be a major – 
perhaps the major – source of institutional knowledge on northern onchocerciasis and 
other northern diseases, beyond any Ghanaian unit or individual government employee.
The organisations approach to funding, with domestic initiatives only supported if they 
were carried out in coordination with the WHO's own activities, may have also 
constrained the development of Ghana’s own efforts regarding the disease. In this 
period, however, the principal factor affecting the development of onchocerciasis 
control in the north remained the political situation at Accra. Although the WHO 
operated at a remove from local politics in Ghana, this did not mean its work was 
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unaffected by political developments. In August 1969, for example, the organisation 
wrote to the government to demand that the vehicles and funds it had donated to 
Noamesi's unit should remain allocated to onchocerciasis work, as they appeared to 
have disappeared into Ghana's broader health system.116 This was a time of intense 
political activity at Accra, as groups aligned sometimes by ethnicity, or by their 
relationship to the previous Nkrumah government, sought to gain support in advance of
a general election at the end of August. The election installed the civilian government 
of the Second Republic, under Kofi Busia, which ruled for two years through continued
economic decline, until it was overthrown by another coup d’etat in 1972.117
A new modus vivendi was established for northern onchocerciasis control 
under this military government, led by General Ignatius Acheampong, which operated 
as the National Redemption Council and then the Supreme Military Council from 
1972-1979, when it was overthrown in the first Rawlings coup. Despite its 
authoritarianism and complex layers of bureaucracy, in which each government 
ministry was overseen by a military Commissioner, the Acheampong government 
embarked on a number of initiatives to improve health provision in Ghana, and it was 
responsive to WHO requirements for the onchocerciasis programme.118 This was noted 
during community interviews in the north, where the Nkrumah, Acheampong and 
second Rawlings governments were consistently remembered as those which oversaw 
the greatest local improvements in health provision.119 The transnational Onchocerciasis
116 Ibid., Encs.169-179: Correspondence between WHO Epidemiological Advisory Team on 
Onchocerciasis and MoH, Accra, March-August 1969.
117 Gocking, History of Ghana, ch.9.
118 See WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975).
119 See, for example, Group.04: Tindonmoligo Village (Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.03: 
Sherigu Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 28 July 2015; Group.02: Dua Village (Guruni), 
Interview 27 July 2015; Group.08: Dulugu Village (Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; Group.16: 
Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.17: Dagomba Community 
2, Tamale Area, Interview, Northern Region, 10 August 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa 
Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), 
Interview 8 August 2015.
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Control Programme began in 1974, and was present in northern Ghana for more than a 
decade, operating through the first and second Rawlings coups (1979 and 1981), and 
the brief civilian Third Republic under Hilla Limann (1979-1981). Following a period 
of entry and negotiation between 1957 and 1972, the primacy of the WHO as an 
external force on Ghana's health system had been established, in a form which would 
continue until the late 1980s. Other bodies which had been influential in shaping 
independence-era disease control policy and initiating government action – like the 
RCSB in the late 1950s – became less important.
The Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) of the 1970s and 1980s was 
operated by the WHO in tandem with local governments in West Africa, and largely 
funded by the World Bank.120 Several researchers have depicted the campaign as 
emerging from a revelatory moment in 1972, when World Bank president Robert 
McNamara visited the Volta Basin and was struck by the poverty caused by the 
disease.121 But although the World Bank spearheaded the funding effort, it is clear that 
plans for the Volta Basin programme had been present for years, emerging from 
collaborations between the WHO and African health officials from the early 1960s: the 
narrative of Bretton Woods heroism obscures an effort of greater duration, which was 
stalled for a decade or more by the recessions and political upheavals that followed 
independence in Ghana and other African states. The campaign used helicopters and 
ground crews to treat river systems with larvicides, and in 1988 this was supplemented 
by the distribution of a new drug treatment for the disease, Ivermectin – originally 
120 For a general description and timeline of the campaign, see B. Boatin, ‘The Onchocerciasis Control 
Programme in West Africa’, Annals of Tropical Medicine & Parasitology 102, no. sup1 (2013): 13–
17; World Health Organization, Success in Africa: The Onchocerciasis Control Programme in West 
Africa, 1974-2002. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002).
121 World Bank, ‘The Extraordinary River Blindness Partnership Sets Its Sights on New Goals’, 
accessed 7 April 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/03/forty-years-later-the-
extraordinary-river-blindness-partnership-sets-its-sights-on-new-goals; A. Crump, C.M. Morel, and 
S. Omura, ‘The Onchocerciasis Chronicle: From the Beginning to the End?’, Trends in Parasitology 
28, no. 7 (2012): 280–88.
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developed for parasitic infections in dogs, but which was found to be exceptionally 
effective against onchocerciasis and other filarial diseases. The drug’s creator, Merck &
Co, agreed to provide treatment free to all affected countries.122 By 2002, 
onchocerciasis was considered to have been eliminated as a significant public health 
risk in ten of the 11 countries where the programme had operated, including Ghana.
Northern Ghana was one of the first regions to control onchocerciasis through
the OCP, with only 'mopping up' work remaining by the mid-1980s. Like other 
contingent responses to particular disease emergencies, before and after 1957, the 
campaign left a lasting legacy in the broader provision of public health. The Northern 
Region's only parasitology laboratory, still operating in Tamale at present, was built as 
a headquarters for the Onchocerciasis Control Programme, and subsequently became a 
base for the eradication programme against Guinea Worm sponsored by the Carter 
Foundation.123 The OCP also offered employment and research funding for northern 
Ghanaians, some of whom remained in the region as experts shaping the provision of 
public health. Others used the WHO connection as a springboard to leave the country, 
including two of the programme’s three Ghanaian entomologists employed in the 
north.124  
By 1984, the attention of international donors had turned to ‘socioeconomic 
development in the areas freed from onchocerciasis’ in northern Ghana, and the 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme supplanted by a proliferation of expansive state-
donor developmental projects, arriving after Ghana's turn towards IMF-World Bank 
structural adjustment in 1983. These included the Ghana-German Agricultural 
Development Project (GGADP); the US-sponsored Economic and Rural Development 
122 S. Omura and A. Crump, ‘The Life and Times of Ivermectin - a Success Story.’, Nature Reviews: 
Microbiology 2, no. 12 (2004): 984–89.
123 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
124 Ibid.; and WHO/08/181/l8 (1975) CTS Agreement with University of Ghana for electrophonetic 
Determination of Simulium Damnosum Complex, WHO Geneva.
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Management Programme (ERDM); the Farmer Associations and Agricultural Business 
Development (FAAD), co-funded by the US and the Catholic Church; the World Bank-
funded Upper Region Agricultural Development Project (URADEP); and the Northern 
Regional Rural Integrated Programme (NORRIP), ‘a long-term project of cooperation 
between the governments of Ghana and Canada, to effect socioeconomic structural 
changes of living of the rural poor’.125 Onchocerciasis was gone, the country was under 
leadership favoured by donor states, and aid workers had arrived in large numbers.
Figure 23. ‘Young girls carrying pots with water from the community well’. UN publicity image on
development in the areas freed from onchocerciasis in West Africa, 1 May 1983
Source: United Nations Photo / 32846
125 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), 25–29; and Jon Kraus, ‘The Struggle over Structural Adjustment 
in Ghana’, Africa Today 38, no. 4 (1991): 19–37.
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Through great effort, sustained over decades of financial, environmental and 
human costs, two diseases – sleeping sickness and river blindness – had ceased to pose 
a serious threat to people in northern Ghana. Fifty years after sleeping sickness had 
been brought under control, WHO reports argued it was  'obvious' that onchocerciasis 
had been the cause of valley depopulation and a source of the north's economic 
stagnation. Two serious diseases had been greatly reduced, but widespread poverty 
remained, and the north remained on the periphery of Ghana's economy and politics. In 
the language used in 1980s reports, celebrating how the north was 'freed' from 
onchocerciasis, it is possible to detect a repetition – almost a verbatim reproduction – of
the entomologist K.R.S. Morris in the 1940s, as he worked to free the north from 
sleeping sickness: 
Whereas earlier development projects had been centred on the upland areas 
because the valleys were disease ridden, the Onchocerciasis Control Programme
had as one of its major objectives freeing the valleys, in order to open these 
areas up for farming and general economic development. The success of the 
Programme will help to relieve population pressure on the upland areas through 
resettlement of the valley areas, and thus improve the quality of life in the 
whole region.126
Conclusion
This chapter, and Chapter 2, have explored the connections between public 
health interventions over long periods of time. A campaign against sleeping sickness in 
the colonial period unwittingly intensified the infection of northern communities with 
onchocerciasis, which led on to a post-independence campaign that encompassed many
of the same areas, actions, and developmental objectives. Northern Ghana's persistent 
marginality meant that colonial sleeping sickness went unrecognised until it impinged 
on the southern economy, and also that onchocerciasis infection only became a matter 
of concern when a metropolitan charity became involved on the brink of independence. 
126 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), 20.
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The north's peripheral situation allowed Morris's bush clearing to proceed with little 
oversight: his proposals were accepted not only because of the immediate sleeping 
sickness epidemic, but because they offered a way for the administration to achieve its 
longstanding goal of re-distributing the northern population. At independence, 
institutional knowledge of northern disease was lost as medical personnel departed, and
onchocerciasis control was held up in the turmoil of political transitions and economic 
recession from 1966 to 1972. The two chapters have also attempted to describe the 
shifting locations of medical authority over the century: the dissolution of colonial 
oversight of public health, the emergence of charities and advocacy groups which 
constituted a linkage between the colonial era and NGOs operating in independent 
Ghana, and the rise of the WHO as an important actor and determinant of national 
policy in the decades since independence. The chapter has also briefly examined how 
the mass-media methods used to raise awareness of onchocerciasis internationally, 
which often relied on northern Ghana as an example of the disease's worst effects, may 
have played an early part in constructing an idiom of African suffering that continues to
shape conceptions of Africa societies in the present.
Blindness was the most noticeable effect of widespread onchocerciasis, but 
its systemic impact on northern communities was probably much greater. Recent 
research, which tracked the health of 300,000 people in West Africa between 1971 and 
2001, suggests that populations burdened by a heavy microfilarial load – the presence 
of onchocerciasis parasites in the skin and tissues - experience an excess mortality rate 
of around 5.2 percent, independently of the incidence of blindness.127 The persistent 
high transmission of onchocerciasis over decades in the north, exacerbated by the anti-
tsetse campaign and by a lack of control efforts until 1974, may have contributed to 
127 M.P. Little et al., ‘Association between Microfilarial Load and Excess Mortality in Onchocerciasis: 
An Epidemiological Study.’, Lancet 363, no. 9420 (2004): 1514–21.
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further divergence in the health and productivity of the north relative to the south, even 
when other interventions (the provision of better education, for example) were seeking 
to narrow this gap.
What is missing from this account are the experiences of northern people 
who suffered from onchocerciasis or sleeping sickness, or who witnessed the sweeping 
control measures against each disease. However, it is interesting to note that in the 
memory of many interview subjects across the north, these two diseases have become 
elided, and both are being forgotten as the threat they pose recedes. In some 
communities, I met people who had worked on the anti-tsetse campaign as teenagers or 
children – they remembered seeing or hearing about 'Dr Morrow', and his stringent 
requirements for bush clearing. Very few communities remembered encountering 
anyone who suffered from sleeping sickness, however, and in general only older people
were familiar with the symptoms of the disease. For younger people, these often 
sounded like a joke.128 In the first decades of colonial rule, officials recorded that a 
number of northern communities treated sleeping sickness as a grave affliction – ‘the 
people considered the disease shameful and kept those suffering from it confined to a 
hut on the outskirts of the village. Those dying of it were denied the ordinary burial, 
and before burial the bones of their right hand were broken and the hand bent back’.129 
By the late 1930s, as the medical campaign had success in treating the 
disease, it was observed that ‘the former widespread practice of separate burial for 
victims of trypanosomiasis is now dying out’.130 During my interviews, most questions 
128 Group.12: Busa Wala Community 1, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.13: Busa 
Wala Community 2, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, 
Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.18: Dagomba Community 3, Pong-Tamale, 
Interview 11 August 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 
2015; Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015.
129 1937-1938 NTAR, 72; see also 1925-26 MDAR, 61–70 Appendix E: Report on sleeping sickness in 
the Lawra District.
130 1935-1936 MDAR, 79; see also 1933-1934 NTAR, 86.
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about disease control pertaining to rivers, or diseases spread by biting flies (as opposed 
to mosquitoes or other insects) were answered with 'oncho'. Some people insisted that 
Dr Morrow's colonial-era work, on the same river valleys, had also been part of the 
onchocerciasis programme. Many people recalled the decades of onchocerciasis control
work, particularly the helicopters marked 'ONCHO' which dusted rivers with larvicide, 
which were often remembered as a cause of fear when they appeared unexpectedly at 
low levels, dispersing white spray. By 1985, communities around northern Ghana had 
lived through 50 years of near-constant control and survey work along their river 
valleys. But in 2015, onchocerciasis as a disease was also being forgotten, and other 
causes of blindness and itching were more prominent sources of concern for old and 
young interview subjects.131 In a sense this shows the achievements of the colonial era 
fight against sleeping sickness, and the post-colonial campaign against onchocerciasis. 
Both reduced the disease which they set out to control. Despite various unintended 
consequences, forgetting is the result of this success.
131 See Group.12: Busa Wala Community 1, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.13: Busa 
Wala Community 2, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, 
Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.18: Dagomba Community 3, Pong-Tamale, 
Interview 11 August 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 
2015; Group.11: Naachenyiri Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.14: 
Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; Group.15: Chomvula and Gonja 
community, Bole Area, Interview, Northern Region, 9 August 2015; Group.03: Sherigu Village 
(Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.06: Tanzul Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 29 July
2015; Group.05: Yorogo Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 28 July 2015.
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CHAPTER 5
Visions of self-sufficiency to visions of adjustment: public health in northern
Ghana beyond the independence era
– 
This chapter completes the narrative and analytical arc begun in Chapter 1 
and continued in Chapter 3, by examining the changing contexts for public health in 
northern Ghana from 1966 to 2000. I begin by discussing northern healthcare in the 
decades that followed the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, when Ghana was ruled by 
seven different governments (four military and three civilian) over a fifteen year period.
The abrupt political reconfigurations that followed each coup or transition brought 
rapid shifts in policy and changes in personnel across all government departments. 
These changes disrupted the effective provision of health services, which had expanded
nationally during the first years of Nkrumah’s presidency, and also diminished the 
state’s record-keeping capacity. There are relatively few government sources available 
for these years: I was fortunate to gain access to files kept by the state pharmaceuticals 
regulator, which contain various internal memoranda on the state of regional health 
services. In tandem with files in the WHO archives, which represent the views of WHO
personnel stationed in Ghana, and by using interviews with retired health professionals,
it is possible to gain a relatively coherent picture of what happened to northern 
healthcare over the abrupt political transitions from 1966 to 1981, accounting for 
changes at the national level and in the region itself. Many of the Nkrumah-era reforms 
foundered, and health services across the country either collapsed or entered a period of
stasis. One physician, based at a hospital in the south in the 1970s, recalled that 
surgeons had to plead with a local hairdressing salon for latex gloves to perform sterile 
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operations, as the government was no longer able to maintain supplies of these and 
other basic items.1 
In step with a recession in government health services, this period saw the 
steady expansion of northern health programmes planned and overseen by international
organisations – most centrally the WHO, but also USAID (which began work in Ghana 
after Nkrumah’s socialist government was deposed), UNICEF, and the bilateral 
development agencies of states including Canada and Denmark. Authority for 
healthcare in the north became increasingly divided between the state and these 
organisations, a process which accelerated after the Rawlings government began to 
implement structural adjustment in 1983. Increased international intervention in the 
north’s health came as a corollary of the adjustment programme itself, and the region 
saw a proliferation of vertical disease control campaigns, bilateral health agencies, 
international NGOs and health research projects led by European universities. I 
examine this period (1981-2000) in the second half of this chapter. As Ghana’s own 
healthcare capacity increased in the 1990s, over a long period of relative political 
stability under a single autocratic government, the state was able to reassert its 
authority in some areas of health provision. At the end of the century, a number of 
internationally-funded health research centres had been established in the region, 
conducting ‘demographic surveillance’ and randomised clinical trials that involved tens
or even hundreds of thousands of northern people. One of these studies, the ‘Navrongo 
Experiment’, led to the creation of a new institution for rural health provision, the 
Community-Based Health and Planning Service, which in some respects was 
comparable to the Native Authority health system of the 1930s.
1 Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016.
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Part 1. After the first coup: health from 1966-1981
The implications of rapid political change
On the deposal of Nkrumah in 1966, the work of the Northern Region’s 
Health Education Committee was abandoned, bringing an end to a flagship CPP public 
health initiative and apparently marking the cessation of most health education work in 
the north for some years.2 The coup came at the same time as deepening recession in 
Ghana’s economy, and the provision of health services was concurrently shaped by 
falling state revenues and the rapid reconfiguration of political power. There was 
almost no per-capita GDP growth between 1966 and 1983, when the first government 
of Jerry Rawlings was compelled to accept IMF/World Bank loans and structural 
adjustment reforms.3 In 1966 there were immediate changes to the personnel 
responsible for regional government services, as officials associated with the CPP 
government were replaced by those loyal to the National Liberation Council (NLC); the
coup also led to the re-drawing of administrative districts to suit the new government. 
In the north-west, for example, the NLC dismissed all district commissioners and 
dissolved the district councils, replacing these with its own management committees:  
the councils had been responsible for rural health, even if their capacity to actually 
provide health services had been greatly diminished from the early 1960s.4 In the 
following years this removal of higher-ranking personnel and effacement of 
institutional knowledge (and record-keeping) would be repeated at each new change of 
government. After Nkrumah came the right-leaning military government of the 
2 From the available sources, no further local committees or files on health education were created 
from this year until the end of the period in which health-related documents were retained in the 
archive at Tamale (up to 1978). And see NRG/8/13/40 (1959-65).
3 Gareth Austin, ‘African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies’, International Development
Policy Series 2010/2011 (1 March 2010): 14.
4 See Lentz, Ethnicity, 227.
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National Liberation Council, under Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah. The NLC ruled 
for three years (1966-1969), when it returned power to a short-lived civilian 
government under Dr Kofi Busia, which also held power for three years (1969-1972). 
This ‘Second Republic’ was deposed in another military coup led by Colonel Ignatius 
Acheampong, which installed the left-leaning National Redemption Council from 1972 
to 1975, when it was displaced by another military body, the Supreme Military Council.
This ruled Ghana from 1975 to 1978 under one set of generals, who were replaced in a 
bloodless coup by a second group in 1978. In 1979, a movement of low-ranking air 
force and army officers led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings temporarily seized 
power and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). With the aid 
of university students and other supporters across the country, the AFRC carried out 
executions and floggings of former ruling elites over the four months that it held power,
before standing aside to allow a general election that had been planned by the previous 
military regime. This election installed the civilian government of the ‘Third Republic’ 
under the Nkrumah-ist People’s National Party led by Dr Hilla Limann, the first 
northerner to hold the presidency. However, perceptions that the government was under
excessive northern influence, and continued economic decline (with annual inflation 
reaching over 100 percent by 1981) led to another coup by Rawlings on 31 December 
1981, which established the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Rawlings 
ruled at the head of this authoritarian and avowedly ‘radical’ military government, 
which continued the execution of judges and former political figures deemed to be 
corrupt or complicit in the failings of earlier regimes. Rawlings governed the country 
for 20 years, until the end of the period covered by this thesis, first as head of the 
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PNDC and then as a civilian president of the ‘Fourth Republic’ after democratic 
elections in 1992.5
This summary account indicates the scale of political upheaval after the fall 
of Ghana’s first independent government. Returning to 1966, in the period immediately
following Nkrumah’s overthrow, there are some examples which demonstrate the way 
in which political transitions shaped the country’s health services. The coup 
undermined existing healthcare provision, as funds were withdrawn and officials were 
sacked. The number of newly-graduated doctors returning to Ghana from overseas 
training fell to even lower levels than in previous years, and some foreign doctors 
working in the country either left or were dismissed, at a time when there was an 
average of one doctor for every 35,000 people in the country.6 WHO consultants 
criticised the new government’s ‘sudden low priority’ for community health initiatives 
that had been started in the Nkrumah era, arguing that the organisation would only be 
willing to collaborate with future projects ‘on the assumption that the government 
attaches importance to support of the public health sector’.7 For the north, funds and 
personnel were withdrawn from the national Onchocerciasis Research Unit, established
to investigate the disease and collaborate with the WHO in planning an eradication 
campaign. The unit’s leader, G.K. Noamesi, tried to argue that although the disease was
most prevalent in the north, it did not ‘belong to the North’, and deserved to be treated 
as a national health emergency.8 But visits from WHO consultants were cancelled, the 
unit’s vehicles were withdrawn, and it was unable to carry out research in the region 
itself. Instead the Ministry of Health proposed that onchocerciasis research could be 
5 Gocking, History of Ghana, Chapters 9,10 and 11.
6 WHO/AFR/EXT/16 (1967), 30–40.
7 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), 30–40.
8 See WHO/05/181/14 (1969), Enc.37: ‘The Extent of Onchocerciasis in Ghana should concern us all’,
memorandum from Dr G.K. Noamesi to the Health Committee of the National Liberation Council, 9 
April 1966.
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carried out ‘in the hills north of Accra’, a region with no significant presence of the 
disease.9 
In general, over this period there appears to have been an increasing 
politicisation of public health work. Health officials and researchers needed to petition 
successive military councils for re-approval of their previous projects, which were also 
undermined by sudden policy shifts and large-scale reorganisations of the national 
health service.10 In 1973, for example, the National Redemption Council gave a group 
of military commissioners final authority over the activities of civilian ministries. WHO
consultants noted that in order for the organisation’s public health projects to continue, 
it was ‘of the greatest importance’ that the military’s Commissioner for Health, 
Lieutenant Colonel A.H. Selormey, should be ‘kept interested’, while Selormey 
suggested that he would speak ‘as a soldier’ when he made recommendations for public
health work.11 In internal memoranda, lower-ranking health officials noted that 
‘political influences’ or ‘the coup’ had undermined their ability to provide basic 
medical services, although there was an evident risk in attributing a decline in health 
standards to a particular government.12 Ghanaian health workers who had fallen out of 
favour under one government were sometimes re-appointed by its successor, then 
dismissed again when power shifted. Dr Eustace Akwei, for example, former 
epidemiologist with the Medical Field Units and then Ghana’s Chief Medical Officer, 
9 Ibid., Enc.3: G.K. Noamesi to C.W. Gockel, Division of Communicable Diseases, WHO, 29 June 
1966.
10 Ibid., Encs.94-99: Correspondence between P.D. Scheffel, WHO AFRO-131 team leader, Ghana, and
G.W. Gockel, Division of Communicable Diseases, WHO, March 1968; and Enc.37: Memorandum 
9 April 1966.
11 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.63: Duty Travel Report of visit to Ghana, 1-23 October 
1974.
12 See, for example, PD/192 (1973) Commission of Enquiry (drug shortages), PRAAD Accra, Enc.1: 
‘Memorandum to the Committee on Drugs’, undated (1973); PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-
1981), Enc.8: Comments on ’Development of Basic Health Services, Plan Of Operation, Ghana, 
Second Edition 1972’, 4 May 1972.
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was dismissed by the CPP, re-appointed by the NLC in 1966, then fired by Busia’s 
civilian government during a mass dismissal of Ewe public administrators in 1970.13 
Some healthworkers did speak out against a perceived neglect of northern 
health problems. In 1966, G.K. Noamesi submitted his memorandum to the NLC, 
arguing that Ghana had been ‘a bitter experience and a disappointment to the world’ 
after the regime restricted the unit’s work in the north, and criticising its ‘lack of 
appreciation of the urgency’ for control measures against the disease.14 From 
correspondence filed in the WHO Archives in Geneva, it appears that Noamesi felt his 
association with the WHO gave him a degree of political protection, and he was the 
only trained medical entomologist employed by the Ministry of Health. He was 
nevertheless dismissed in 1968, and the NLC disbanded the Onchocerciasis Control 
Unit he had led, the centre of Ghana’s national capacity for controlling the disease.15 As
I discuss below, politically-motivated shifts in the arrangement of health services 
undermined local capacity and opened the way for increased international control of 
Ghana’s public health, principally by the WHO. Although a few officials raised 
concerns, the unstable political situation from 1966-1981 appears to have generally 
stifled both initiative and criticism. Doctor Von Asigri recalled at interview that 
‘everybody was scared about authorising certain things’. When the Supreme Military 
Council took power in 1975,  Asigri himself was forced to abandon a PhD in Public 
Health that he had started in the United States. Unable to secure permission to remain 
overseas, he was compelled to return to Ghana and complete his studies locally, and 
13 Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana, 11–13.
14 WHO/05/181/14 (1969), Enc.37: ‘The Extent of Onchocerciasis in Ghana should concern us all’, 
memorandum from Dr G.K. Noamesi to the Health Committee of the National Liberation Council, 9 
April 1966.
15 Ibid., Encs. 91–110, Correspondence between Dr G.K. Noamesi and WHO Communicable Division 
on Communicable Diseases, Geneva, March–August 1968.
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went on to work as lead entomologist for the WHO Onchocerciasis Eradication 
Programme in the north.16 
Figure 24. 1967: Shortly after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the leader of the National Liberation Council,
General Ankrah, is vaccinated to publicise the WHO Smallpox Eradication Programme in Ghana.
Source: CDC Public Health Image Library/13239/J.D.Millar/1967
Figure 25. 1968.  NLC health officials and the US Surgeon-General William Stewart hold a ceremony in
Accra to vaccinate Rebecca Asamoah, 25 millionth person vaccinated under the WHO programme.
Source: CDC Public Health Image Library/5649/1968    
16 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
258
Northern health and new governments
Constant political transitions destabilised health services across Ghana. But 
as with the transition from colonial rule to the first independent government, improved 
public health – or at least the public assertion of a government’s ambition to improve 
health – continued to be seen as a principal means of gaining legitimacy by each new 
regime. Within months of the 1966 coup, the NLC announced the creation of a 
Committee on the Health Needs of Ghana, modelled on the 1952 Maude Commission. 
A similar public enquiry was established by the civilian Busia government soon after it 
came to power in 1969. Each proposed significant reforms, based in part on the 
conclusion that the north had been neglected in the overall provision of health services, 
although these reforms were not implemented in the short period before each 
government was deposed.17 As with the 1952 Maude Commission, the 1966 committee 
proposed to travel the country, hearing testimony from communities and medical 
practitioners about health problems that had been neglected under the Nkrumah regime.
The committee wrote directly to northern traditional leaders, whose influence over the 
provision of health services had been diminished under CPP rule, asking them to 
submit written representations and send delegates to meet the committee as it visited 
larger settlements across the region.18 Having publicly announced a tour of the north, 
however, the committee changed its plans and called only at Tamale, where it stayed for
two days. 
Over this short visit, the only representations to the committee came from 
communities in the surrounding area: these reflected criticisms of declining health 
provision in the early 1960s, and the enduring hope that a new government would pay 
17 NRG/8/13/50 (1964-1966) Health Needs of Ghana, PRAAD Tamale, Enc.2: ‘National Liberation 
Council Committee on the Health Needs of Ghana’, internal memorandum 13 September 1966; and 
see Botchway, ‘Are Development Planners Afraid’, 54.
18 NRG/8/13/50 (1964-1966), Enc.3:  ’The Health Committee: Itinerary to Northern, Upper, Ashanti 
and Brong-Ahafo Regions, October 1966’, undated internal document (1966).
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increased attention to the region. The Health Education Committee of the Gambaga 
district, one of the by-then defunct local committees that had been created in the early 
Nkrumah era, submitted a detailed account of the ‘inadequate’ state of local health 
services in 1966. Their principal complaints were about a lack of staff, the same 
criticism made by northern administrations in the 1940s and 1950s following the 
decline of the Native Authority rural network. Although the district had received a new 
Health Centre at Walewale in the late 1950s, and was therefore apparently equipped to 
national standards, the centre was ‘no longer serving the purpose it was meant to’, 
because of a complete absence of doctors, nurses or midwives. The medical officer 
assigned to rural health services for the Gambaga district was also ‘no longer at post’.19 
As in other periods, the low availability of trained northerners, and the reluctance of 
southerners to take up postings in the north, meant that the region remained chronically 
under-staffed even as the expansion of physical health facilities proceeded according to 
central policy. The senior public health nurse of the Tamale Community Nurses 
Training School, created from the colonial-era Tamale School of Hygiene in the early 
Nkrumah era, appeared before the committee to report that many of the school’s 
buildings and facilities had been out of service for years, and the drainage system had 
fallen into disrepair: ‘During the rainy season the compound is seriously flooded and 
movement is seriously restricted –  it is sometimes impossible for nurses to go from the
dormitory to the dining hall’.20
It is not clear whether the National Liberation Council acted on these local 
petitions. As Gocking argues,  the NLC became increasingly focused on maintaining its
19 Ibid., Enc.9: ‘Memorandum submitted to the Health Committee of the NLC by the Health Education 
Committee of Gambaga’, 3 October 1966; and see Enc.7: ‘Itinerary of the NLC Health Committee to
the Regional Capitals’, 17 September 1966; Enc.8: ‘Health Committee of NLC Schedule’, undated 
(1966).
20 Ibid., Enc.10: Memorandum submitted by Miss Comfort Oto, Senior Public Health Nurse, to the 
Health Committee of the National Liberation Council, 3 October 1966.
260
legitimacy among coastal political elites and among industrial workers on the mines 
and railways:  it therefore pursued a policy of austerity which passed the costs of 
Ghana’s prolonged recession onto rural communities away from the cocoa-growing 
areas.21 But although constant political transitions reduced the capacity of the state to 
maintain a long term programme for the expansion of northern health services, this 
does not mean that healthcare initiatives ceased completely. Some public health 
projects were sustained across multiple governments even when there was relatively 
constant change in terms of policy, motivated by each new government’s desire to 
distinguish itself from its predecessor. In 1966, the NLC government set out to ‘divest 
the state from the socialist programmes pursued under Nkrumah’.22 Guided by the 
recommendations of its Committee on the Health Needs of Ghana (and more 
substantially by the proposals of the WHO and UNICEF, as I discuss below), it 
proposed a new 5-Year Plan for the development of health services, along similar lines 
as the plan formulated before independence and discarded by the CPP government in 
1961.23 As with earlier plans, this envisaged the expansion of basic health services into 
rural areas that had been neglected by previous governments. The NLC established a 
pilot project for the 5-Year Plan in the north, but it made no budgetary allocations to 
expand basic health facilities in the region. Instead the government’s principal 
healthcare aim was introduce measures by which the state could recover its spending on
medical services – it proposed a small fee for accessing state healthcare, but it was 
forced to abandon this in the face of widespread public condemnation. The same was 
true for the civilian government of the Progress Party under Kofi Busia, which 
21 Gocking, History of Ghana, 150–51.
22 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 51.
23 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.59: Duty Travel Report, Ghana, 23 November to 19 
December 1973, 127-166.
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succeeded the NLC in 1969, and was also forced to shelve proposals to charges fees at 
rural health facilities.24 
The expansion of rural health services remained static during the Busia years,
under conditions of extreme austerity, and the north’s share of national healthcare 
expenditures remained extremely low: in 1972, the two northern regions received less 
than 8 percent of the total national healthcare budget, although they were home to 19 
percent of the population.25 However, the Busia government was successful in 
improving healthcare relations with neighbouring West African states. Unlike the NLC,
which was regionally unpopular after its deposal of Nkrumah, it was able to establish a 
joint health commission with Upper Volta, intended to monitor and reduce the spread of
disease across the northern border, and with Togo to the east. Again, these bilateral 
agreements was also substantially shaped by the requirements of the WHO, as it 
intensified the global Smallpox Eradication Programme and made preparations for the 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme in West Africa.26 
Of all governments from 1966 to 1981, the military National Redemption 
Council (NRC) under General Ignatius Acheampong appears to have devoted the 
greatest attention to rural health services, and to northern communities in particular. As 
noted in Chapter 4, this was born out consistently in interviews with community groups
in the north, who recalled that the Nkrumah, Acheampong and Rawlings regimes 
oversaw the most substantial improvements in their local health services.27 The NRC 
24 PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-1981), Enc.9:  ’Development of Basic Health Services, Plan Of 
Operation, Ghana, Second Edition 1972’; Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 48–50.
25 WHO/Project Files/Ghana-4301 (1970-1972) Medical Care Insurance, WHO Geneva, Enc.3: 
‘Medical Care Insurance in Ghana’, Report by Dr RF Bridgman, WHO Consultant, 15 February 
1972; Government of Ghana, ‘Population Data Analysis Reports, 2000 Census’ (Accra: Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2005), 117.
26 See PD/218 Box 31/02/02751 (1971-80) Health Committee of the Ghana-Upper Volta Joint 
Commission, PRAAD Accra, Encs.2-13: Correspondence and undated ‘Agreement on Cooperation 
in Health Matters between Ghana and Upper Volta’, 1971; PD/219 Box 31/02/02751 (1971-80) 
Health Committee of the Ghana-Togo Commission, PRAAD Accra.
27 Group.04: Tindonmoligo Village (Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.03: Sherigu Village 
(Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.08: Dulugu Village (Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; 
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defined its politics in opposition to the anti-Nkrumah NLC and the ‘neo-colonial’ 
Progress Party of Busia, and its central military council was composed of what 
Gocking calls the ‘outs’ of these two prior regimes.28 It was broadly ‘socialist’ and 
protection-oriented in its management of the economy, placing an emphasis on local 
food production, import substitution, and part nationalisation of foreign-owned 
companies. 
Aided by good harvests and improving prices for Ghana’s agricultural 
products on world markets, the NRC government was able to achieve a relatively 
substantial trade surplus by 1973.29 It began to increase budgetary allocations to 
healthcare, which had fallen significantly over the preceding two governments, and 
spending on health services rose to 8 percent of the country’s total expenditure by 
1974.30 NRC Health planners, working within the state’s new Health Planning Unit, 
explicitly conceived of the provision of health services in terms of a developed core 
and a neglected periphery, perhaps influenced by the Dependency and World Systems 
theories then gaining ground in the social sciences.  The Ministry of Health agreed that 
the earlier provision of health services between southern Ghana’s economic heartlands 
and outlying regions (the north and the Brong-Ahafo region, which had formed the 
northernmost part of Ashanti under colonial rule) had been ‘inequitable’, and it set out 
to expand government healthcare ‘into the hitherto untouched periphery’.31 The 
ministry requested the help of WHO consultants to develop its programme of Basic 
Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.17: Dagomba 
Community 2, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area 
(Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 
August 2015.
28 Gocking, History of Ghana, 166–67.
29 Ibid., ch.9.
30 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.210: Project Report: ‘Estimates for International Assistance 
to the Project’, 19 June 1974; Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 52–60.
31 PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-1981), Enc.9:  ’Development of Basic Health Services, Plan Of 
Operation, Ghana, Second Edition 1972’.
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Health Services: ‘A network of co-ordinated peripheral and intermediate health units 
capable of performing effectively a selected set of functions essential to the health of an
area, and assuring the availability of competent professional and auxiliary personnel’.32
The NRC’s policy reforms were intended to allow the state to address some 
of the most pressing health problems of rural communities, as articulated by northern 
community leaders and local officials over the preceding decades: the lack of local 
healthcare facilities, and inadequate staffing. But despite Ghana’s rising trade surplus, 
government spending power remained constrained, and so the Ministry of Health 
attempted to square the circle by achieving a substantial expansion in rural health 
services without a concomitant increase in state spending:
There is the recognition of the almost impossible task of getting any substantial 
increases in the allocation of the national budget for the health sector. The share 
of the health sector in the national budget is unlikely to increase substantially, 
because the present state of the economy cannot accommodate increases in 
allocation without serious repercussions in other sectors of the economy. Faced 
with this dilemma, the only logical step is the development of new systems of 
health care delivery that are capable of achieving the desired effect at minimum 
cost.33
Here, Ghana as a whole found itself facing the same difficulties that northern 
administrations had faced in the colonial period – how to extend health services to rural
communities on the basis that there would be no additional funds. The NRC elected to 
pursue a similar course to that chosen by officials in the 1930s, when northern 
healthcare was decentralised to the Native Authorities. As with its national food 
production campaign, ‘Operation Feed Yourself’, the NRC reformed health services to 
emphasize local initiative, and to compensate for a chronic shortage of trained 
personnel. It did this ‘by means of organized voluntary groups assuming 
32 Ibid., Enc.6: ‘Basic Health Services’, memorandum from MoH Accra, 13 April 1973.
33 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.191: Dr M.A. Baddoo, Director of Medical Services, Accra, 
to Division of Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, Geneva, 31 August 1973.
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responsibilities for aspects of health activities’. Community Development Committees 
were created in each district, with healthcare provision to be ‘decided upon and 
organised by the communities themselves, through their committee’.34 This was similar 
to the Native Authority reforms in that it conferred healthcare decision-making power 
on northern communities. It was also an evident retreat from welfare responsibilities 
previously assumed by the state, and a reversal of the centralisation that characterised 
the late colonial and early independence period. The new policy shifted responsibility 
for organising and maintaining health services back to communities on a ‘voluntary’ 
basis (without increased allocations of funds), and greatly increased the scope for 
international health organisations, charities and NGOs to assume control over particular
aspects of northern healthcare. WHO consultants who worked with the NRC 
government reported that although Ghana’s proposed new health system would be 
‘technically entirely a national enterprise’, the voluntary nature of rural community 
participation meant that as a matter of policy, international charities and other 
healthcare organisations would become increasingly involved in the provision of health
services. As the policy was being formulated, with trial projects planned for the north, 
the WHO began to contact international NGOs about their prospective involvement in 
the provision of Ghana’s community health services.35
The National Redemption Council government morphed into the Supreme 
Military Council government after 1975. A large number of officials were replaced, but 
Acheampong remained the head of state, and NRC healthcare policies were largely 
maintained across the transition. The next substantial political shift came in 1978, when
a group of army officers under General Fred Akuffo took control of the Supreme 
34 Ibid., Enc.251: Report of Duty Travel to Ghana by Dr J. Holm and Dr J. Stromberg, Division of 
Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, April to May 1974.
35 Ibid., Enc.270.
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Military Council. Ghana’s economic problems continued to deepen across this period 
and into the early 1980s. Extremely high inflation undermined local living standards, 
prompting tens of thousands of trained public-sector employees, principally teachers 
and health workers, to emigrate for work in Nigeria and Europe after 1975.36 Under 
these difficult conditions the government continued to insist that it was providing better
health services for less, proposing in 1978, for example, that ‘in the face of continued 
inflation and budgetary restrictions ... better management will make it possible to reach 
more people at the same cost’.37 But by 1978 and well into the Rawlings era, the most 
substantial changes to Ghana’s national health policy, and in the provision of rural 
northern health services and disease control measures, came as the result of direct 
recommendations or interventions by the WHO and other international bodies. 
I discuss the rise of international influence and the decline in Ghana’s control 
of its health services in the second part of the chapter. First, a closer examination of the 
actual state of health services in the north over this period, in comparison to stated aims
and policy reforms. As the NRC and then the SMC reformulated healthcare policy with 
the aim of improving health provision at the rural periphery, there was continued 
decline in the state of northern facilities relative to the south, where a degree of health 
provision was maintained through the government hospitals that had been built in most 
districts. In his discussion of national health service delivery, Kojo Senah calculates 
that by 1978, the greater Accra area alone had 34 percent of total hospital beds and 12 
percent per cent of all hospital facilities in Ghana, although it was home to only 9 
percent of the population.38 Even in 1973, at the height of the NRC’s increased 
36 It is estimated that 14,000 teachers left the Ghana education services and emigrated between 1975 
and 1981. See Gocking, History of Ghana, 173.
37 PD/232 Box 18/02/02726 (1978-1993) Organisation & Estimates for Health Service, PRAAD Accra,
Enc.9: Guidelines For 1978/79 Estimates, MoH Accra, 6 February 1978.
38 Kodjo Senah, ‘Problems of the Health Care Delivery System’, in The State, Development and 
Politics in Ghana, ed. Kwame Ninsin and Emmanuel Hansen (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1989), 256–59.
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budgetary allocations for the improvement of peripheral healthcare, health services 
outside hospitals still received less than 15 percent of the government’s total health 
budget.39 The WHO reported that ‘in actuality, healthcare is primarily limited to those 
patients who come (or are brought) to the health facilities ... getting to a health facility 
represents a significant investment for any person who lives outside of the very 
immediate area’.40 
In the north, the main government facilities were unevenly maintained over 
this period, and their ability to reach surrounding communities was constrained by a 
constant lack of working vehicles. State health inspectors made an unannounced visit to
northern facilities in 1975. The north at this point had seven hospitals (at Bolgatanga, 
Navrongo, Lawra, Wa, Yendi, Salaga and Tamale), an increase of one since the colonial
period, and six functioning district health centres (in Tumu, Lawra, Savelugu, Bimbilla,
Walewale and Daboya districts), suggesting that six of the 12 health centres built by the
early Nkrumah government were no long in use – earlier reports indicated that this was 
because of the continued absence of staff.41 The government inspector found that of the 
132 vehicles allocated to northern health services, 73 were broken down and off the 
road, while a number of working ambulances had been diverted for use as local taxis. 
Health centres at Walewale, Savelugu, Lawra and Tumu were found to be in good 
working condition – the Lawra Health Centre had been opened that year by 
Acheampong himself – as were the government hospitals at Lawra and Tamale. But 
significant problems were reported at all other facilities. At Bimbilla Health Centre, for 
39 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.201: Dr F.T. Sai, International Planned Parenthood 
Federation, Accra, to A. Zahra, Division of Family Health, WHO Geneva, 16 July 1973.
40 Ibid., Enc.251: Report of Duty Travel to Ghana by Dr J. Holm and Dr J. Stromberg, Division of 
Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, April to May 1974.
41 PD/68/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1974-1977) Report: Northern and Upper Region, PRAAD Accra, 
Enc.4: ’Inspectorate Report, Upper Region, 18-24 March 1975’, MoH Inspectorate Dept., Accra, 4 
April 1975; and Enc.5: ‘Inspectorate Report, Northern Region, 10-17 March 1975’, MoH 
Inspectorate Dept., Accra, 4 April 1975.
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example, the main facilities and medical stores were found disused and covered with 
‘dust and cobwebs’, while its ambulances were being used as commercial transports. 
Bolgatanga hospital was found to be illegally charging people for medical services 
through a system of compulsory ‘voluntary donations’, and the inspector discovered the
theft of medical products from stores across the region. The health centre at Daboya 
was found to be cut off from all government transport networks, with no means of 
bringing in medical supplies, and without a supply of water.42 
Many of these problems were not particular to northern Ghana. As Bruce 
Fetter argues, for the continent as a whole:
In the mid-1970s commodity prices received by African exporters began to fall 
relative to the cost of imported manufactured goods. U.S. aid began to drop as 
the nation felt the impact of the debt run-up during the Vietnam War. These 
reductions in both foreign and domestic revenues caused real cutbacks in 
African health care (often disguised by the action of inflation on local 
currencies). First, and worst hit, were the rural dispensaries whose supplies and 
personnel suffered draconian cuts. Underpaid staff began to supplement their 
salaries by stealing supplies and selling them in local markets. In some 
facilities, staff began demanding bribes for the provision of services which 
should have been free.43
These observations accurately reflect some of the problems affecting northern health 
services. A new policy emphasis on improving the peripheral north’s physical health 
facilities, formulated by the NRC and sustained by the SMC, had few tangible effects in
the face of the country’s broader economic problems, a product of Ghana’s own 
peripheral location in the global economy. A decline in northern healthcare provision - 
or perhaps more correctly a continued stasis, after health services had declined in the 
late Nkrumah era – came as the general poverty of northern communities deepened. In 
the north-eastern Bawku area, for example, it has been estimated that 80 to 90 percent 
42 Ibid., Encs. 4 and 5.
43 Fetter, ‘Health Care in Twentieth Century Africa’, 18–19.
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of the population were vulnerable or destitute from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.44 
In 1978, when the Ghana government began another reformulation of national health 
policy to accommodate the ‘Healthcare for All’ goals of the Alma Ata Declaration, 
promoted locally by the WHO, the Ministry of Health reported that for rural health 
services there had been ‘little improvement in the last 15 years’.45 For the north there 
had in fact been almost no improvement in the extension of physical health facilities 
(the health centres, clinics and rural health posts required by national policy) since the 
early 1960s, when the CPP cut northern spending as it focused on the cocoa-growing 
areas and southern towns. 
Before turning to the growing role of international organisations, however, it 
is worth briefly noting the persistent importance of the Medical Field Units in 
maintaining a degree of regional health provision over the period from 1957 to 1981.  
The MFUs had originally been created when local medical officers took funds allocated
for sleeping sickness control in the 1930s – a time when sleeping sickness received a 
far greater budgetary allocation than any other aspect of northern healthcare – and used 
these to sustain a general purpose mobile medical unit that provided a range of 
treatments to rural northern communities. This broader remit was formalised in 1947, 
and the MFUs continued working across the independence transition and the Nkrumah 
era. Their village-by-village approach to rural healthcare, using staff without formal 
medical qualifications, was recognised as an outstanding success under the conditions 
of extreme privation encountered in the north. After independence the MFUs were 
taken up as a national model, by Ghanaian governments seeking a solution to the 
problem of expanding rural health provision while avoiding the expenditures required 
44 DFID, ‘Economic Growth’, 42.
45 PD/232 Box 18/02/02726 (1978-93) Circulars, organisation & estimates for Health Service, PRAAD 
Accra, Enc.10:’Summary of the Primary Health Care Concept’, MoH Circular, 6 February 1978.
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for the maintenance of fixed healthcare facilities, of the kind that served populations at 
the coast.  
Gilford Ashitey, a former WHO epidemiologist and head of the Department 
of Community Health at the University of Ghana, recalled that the MFU programme 
became ‘the pride of the Ministry of Health’. Originally based at Gambaga, the MFU 
headquarters was relocated southwards to Kintampo and then to Accra in 1968, and 
mobile units began to serve rural communities across Ghana.46 From 1969, the Ministry
of Health decided to base its entire training regime for rural health services, including 
for staff at fixed facilities, on the course developed for northern MFU personnel, a 
policy which was maintained across the following transitions to military governments.47
WHO consultants posted in the north consistently remarked on the importance of the 
MFUs under the economic conditions of the 1970s, observing that they offered the best 
way of ‘providing as much coverage to the population as is possible within the 
limitations of available staff and resources’.48  
Between 1957 and 1981 the MFUs contributed their staff and local 
knowledge to WHO campaigns against yaws, tuberculosis, smallpox, bilharzia and 
onchocerciasis in the north. They also led post-independence campaigns against 
diseases which were not the focus of WHO attention, including filariasis and epidemic 
meningitis.49  The units were dissolved following Ghana’s turn to structural adjustment 
in 1983, when the Rawlings government expanded the number of rural health posts and
46 Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana, 11.
47 PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-1981), Enc.9:’Rural Health Training Centre, Kintampo’, internal 
report, 7 March 1969; and Enc.10:  ’Development of Basic Health Services, Plan Of Operation, 
Ghana, Second Edition 1972’.
48 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.251: Report of Duty Travel to Ghana by Dr J. Holm and Dr 
J. Stromberg, Division of Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, April to May 1974.
49 See Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 
2015; WHO/CPD67.4 (1968); WHO/Project files/Ghana-1202 (1960-1973); WHO/Project 
files/Ghana-2101 (1959-1973); and V. K. Agadzi et al., ‘Yaws in Ghana’, Clinical Infectious 
Diseases Clinical Infectious Diseases 7, no. Supplement 2 (1985): S233–36.
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increased the number of ‘technical officers’ based at these fixed facilities, with formal 
training in epidemiology and public health. But for almost 30 years after independence,
the MFUs, staffed by local people who were ‘were not highly educated, but very handy 
and knew the terrain’, were the front-line of state healthcare in the north.50 In 2015, 
during community interviews in villages across the three northern regions of Ghana, 
older people would often laugh at questions about how often they had used government
doctors or health facilities in the 1960s and 1970s. ‘Government – was there even 
government?’ was one (relatively typical) reply. ‘We only had the MFUs.’51 
Part 2. International Influence and the Rawlings Years
The increased presence of international organisations in African health 
services from the late 1970s, at a time of economic weakness and political turbulence 
for many African states, has become an increasingly active area of historical research. 
Several recent volumes include studies that examine internationally-led disease control 
campaigns after independence, or which draw comparisons between the healthcare 
interventions of colonial powers and those of post-colonial international organisations,  
as a new form of external imposition on African health systems.52 A relatively broad 
consensus has arguably emerged regarding some aspects of international involvement. 
First, there is the view that ‘from the immediate post–World War II period to the 
present, global health initiatives have been characterized by a commitment to disease-
50 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
51 Group.03: Sherigu Village (Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015.
52 See, for example, William Schneider, ‘The Long History of Smallpox Eradication: Lessons for 
Global Health in Africa’; and James Webb ‘The First Large-Scale Use of Synthetic Insecticide for 
Malaria Control: Lesson from Liberia, 1945-1962’, both in Global Health in Africa, ed. Tamara 
Giles-Vernick and James Webb; also Noemi Tousignant, ‘The Qualities of Citizenship: Private 
Pharmacists and the State in Senegal after Independence and Alternance’, in Making and Unmaking 
Public Health in Africa, ed. Ruth Prince and Rebecca Marsland.
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specific programs’; in other words to ‘vertical’ campaigns against specific pathogens or
forms of illness, an emphasis which stemmed from WHO influence.53 Second, there is a
view that for many African states, it was a turn to structural adjustment in the 1980s 
that led to ‘the decay of government-controlled health services and a corresponding 
proliferation of nongovernmental, transnational, private, and humanitarian 
organizations’.54 But in Ghana, as the first sub-Saharan African state to gain 
independence, and where a rapid economic decline related to its specific economic 
conditions (a dependence on cocoa exports) meant that the capacity of the state was 
arguably undermined at an earlier stage than for many African governments, the 
evolution of WHO and other international influences followed a slightly different 
trajectory. Here the WHO became intricately involved in national healthcare from the 
late 1960s, as Ghana’s economy collapsed and a period of chaotic political transitions 
began. As I discuss below, its influence was felt not only in the implementation of 
vertical disease control campaigns, but across a much broader range of health activities,
including the planning and delivery of basic community healthcare through the WHO’s 
Division for Strengthening of Health Services. Some early WHO interventions in 
Ghana were explicitly motivated by the belief that ‘vertical’ campaigns were ineffective
at addressing broader health needs.55  
As noted in the preceding chapters, there was relatively little international 
influence on northern health services for most of the colonial period. In much of the 
south, responsibility for maternal and infant welfare, and health education services, had
been handed to the Gold Coast branch of the British Red Cross Society in 1932, with 
53 See Giles-Vernick and Webb, Global Health in Africa, 7–11.
54 See Prince and Marsland, Making and Unmaking Public Health, 1–3.
55 See, for example, WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.251: Report of Duty Travel to Ghana by 
Dr J. Holm and Dr J. Stromberg, Division of Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, April to May 
1974; and passim.
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some official reports praising its work.56 But the Red Cross did not establish similar 
operations in the north over the colonial period. Before 1957, the only significant 
northern involvement of an international charity or health organisation came with the 
posting of a medical officer from the British Leprosy Relief Association to the region in
the 1920s, who was withdrawn after the onset of the Great Depression, and with the 
landmark survey of blindness and onchocerciasis carried out by the British Empire 
Society for the Blind (BESB) in 1952.57 
Southern health facilities benefited from an additional influx of donor 
funding in the 1920s and early 1930s, when the Rockefeller Foundation’s Yellow Fever 
Commission collaborated with the Gold Coast Medical Department in research on 
yellow fever vaccines – over this period there were more government medical staff 
assigned to the Medical Research Laboratory in Accra than to the whole of the 
Northern Territories.58 In the early 1960s the Rockefeller Foundation also part-funded 
training for nurses at the University of Ghana, in collaboration with McGill University 
in Canada, although it is unclear whether this was maintained after Nkrumah’s turn 
towards the Eastern Bloc.59 The Rockefeller Foundation had no direct involvement in 
northern health services, although had funded ethnographic research in the north-east 
during the colonial era, by the South African anthropologist Meyer Fortes.60 It is 
interesting to note that by 1908, Rockefeller-funded research had led to the 
development of a relatively effective serum treatment for meningitis, which was found 
to reduce mortality from the disease from 70 percent to 25 percent of those infected. 
56 See Chapter 1, and 1932-1933 MDAR, 34.
57 Chapters 1 and 4; also 1951 MDAR, 12; 1933-1934 MDAR, 100; 1953 MDAR, 2.
58 See Chapter 1
59 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Enc.150:  ’A Nursing Programme at the University of Ghana, Accra’, 
WHO Press Release, 11 September 1962; and see Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Elizabeth Fee, ‘The 
Rockefeller Foundation and the International Health Agenda’, The Lancet 381, no. 9878 (11 May 
2013): 1618–20.
60 Allman and Parker, Tongnaab, 195.
273
This was never trialled by the Gold Coast government for use against recurrent 
epidemics of the disease in the north, despite recommendations from an expert advisor 
brought in to study the outbreaks.61
Over the colonial period, the Gold Coast government generally resisted the 
influence or involvement of the principal transnational health organisations (the League
of Nations Health Section, and the WHO) in the arrangement of its health services.  
This was the case across British colonies more generally. Susan Pedersen has noted the 
difference in healthcare and labour policies between Britain and France’s colonies and 
their mandated territories, open to League of Nations and UN inspection, where the two
colonial powers often developed approaches that were ‘more restrained and more 
internationally-oriented than those in the rest of their empires in tropical Africa’.62 
Although Britain was a signatory to the International Sanitary Conventions, it insisted 
on exceptions which meant that health services and disease outbreaks in its African 
colonies were not subject to the same reporting requirements as the metropole.63 There 
was an evident antipathy in some interactions. During a serious meningitis epidemic in 
the north in 1945-1946, for example, Gold Coast- and London-based officials 
circulated internal notes emphasizing that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA, which evolved to become the WHO and UNICEF) should 
not be informed about the scale of the outbreaks, and that no notification should be 
given under the international sanitary conventions.64 There was nevertheless a gradual 
increase in international influence, particularly as independence approached. As Giles-
61 Horn, ‘Investigation of Cerebro-Spinal Fever’, 23–24.
62 Susan Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’, American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (2007): 
1105; and see also Patricia Clavin and Jen-Wilhelm Wessel, ‘Transnationalism and the League of 
Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial Organisation’, Contemporary 
European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 465–92.
63 Sealey, ‘International Sanitary Convention’, 449.
64 See CO/859/108 (1945), Enc.2: Handwritten internal note, 15 February 1945; and Enc.8: internal 
note, 9 August 1945.
274
Vernick and Webb have argued, despite the minor earlier involvement of international 
agencies in colonial health, it was only after the creation of the WHO in 1948 ‘that 
African health issues began to be considered from a broader international 
perspective’.65 By the early 1950s, the WHO was providing advice on purification 
methods for rural water supplies in the north, and UNICEF was supplying vehicles to 
support the Medical Field Units’ yaws control programme.66
British involvement in planning or funding Ghana’s health services fell away 
abruptly at independence, leading to recriminations in Britain itself. In the early 1960s, 
members of the UK parliament attacked Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government 
for withdrawing assistance to control programmes against onchocerciasis in Ghana, and
for a general renouncement of responsibility for health problems in West Africa. The 
government replied that these problems were ‘now the responsibility of the independent
Governments’, which would need to petition the UK for any assistance.67 A degree of 
British influence remained, through the continued presence of commonwealth 
organisations like the British Empire Society for the Blind, which had selected northern
Ghana – Africa’s ‘Country of the Blind’ – as its exemplar for international fundraising 
efforts.68 In the early Nkrumah period, a degree of British influence was also 
maintained through the CPP government’s focus on Britain as a principal recruiting 
ground for doctors and other medical staff. But from the early 1960s, the WHO rapidly 
replaced Britain as a principal external influence on the development of national health 
services. From 1957 to 1981 there were moments when Ghana raised criticisms of 
WHO activity, or withdrew support for WHO projects.  In 1966, for example, soon 
65 Giles-Vernick and Webb, Global Health in Africa, 7.
66 NRG/8/13/4 (1945-55), Enc.64: MoH, Accra to CRO, Tamale, 15 October 1955; and see Sylvester 
Gundona, ‘“Coping with This Scourge”: The State, Leprosy, and the Politics of Public Health in 
Colonial Ghana, 1900-Mid 1950s’ (Thesis, University of Austin, 2015), 129.
67 HC Deb (19 December 1961) v.651, c.1324.
68 Wilson, ‘Blindness in the Commonwealth’, 125.
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after the deposal of Nkrumah, the NLC government condemned the WHO publicly at 
the organisation’s nineteenth annual World Health Assembly, arguing that ‘intolerance 
and lack of realism, or of creativeness on the part of some WHO staff, have proved 
serious obstacles to fruitful cooperation’.69 Despite these temporary tensions, there was 
a steady accretion of WHO influence and involvement, which was broadly maintained 
across military coups and changes of government.70 Rapid political changes had the 
effect of increasing the WHO’s relative authority and institutional knowledge of 
Ghanaian health problems. Even at relatively low district levels, Ministry of Health 
employees were regularly dismissed following shifts in government, while the WHO’s 
in-country staff persisted in their roles. 
Over time, the WHO absorbed a significant number of Ghanaian public 
health officials who had been dismissed by past governments, or who simply saw WHO
employment as preferable to local options – for example Dr Eddie Beausoleil, Ghana’s 
Director of Medical Services before the Rawlings coup of 1979, or Frank Grant, the 
first Ghanaian head of the Medical Field Units in the late 1960s. Both took up positions
with the WHO’s African headquarters in Brazzaville, and Grant later returned to the 
north as a consultant for the WHO/Carter Centre Guinea Worm Eradication Program in 
the 1990s.71 In interviews with a number of the country’s current and recently-retired 
health officials, it was noted that employment with the WHO was a preferred career 
69 NRG/8/13/44 (1961-1967), Enc.170:  ’African Delegates Discuss Director-General’s Report’, WHO 
report on the nineteenth World Health Assembly, 26 May 1966; And see WHO/P9/445/8/GHA 
(1973-1975), Enc.251: Report of Duty Travel to Ghana by Dr J. Holm and Dr J. Stromberg, Division
of Strengthening of Health Services, WHO, April to May 1974; WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), 
Encs.30-39: Correspondence between WHO Africa Regional Directorate, Brazzaville and 
WHO/UNDP representatives, Ghana, July to October 1966.
70 For WHO files which show how projects persisted across abrupt political transitions in Ghana, see 
WHO/05/181/14 (1969); WHO/CPD67.4 (1968); WHO/Project files/Ghana-1202 (1960-1973); 
WHO/Project files/Ghana-2101 (1959-1973).
71 Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana, 9–12.
276
progression for many health workers, once they had obtained the requisite level of 
qualifications and experience.72 
The WHO’s institutional knowledge of Ghana’s public health system steadily
increased from the 1950s as it established a permanent presence in the country, and as 
Ghanaians left the national health service to take up employment with the organisation. 
In collaboration with other UN agencies, it became involved in a number of national 
projects. In terms of ‘vertical’ disease-oriented programmes, these included Ghana’s 
participation in transnational campaigns against yaws (WHO and UNICEF, 1955-
1959), diseases of malnutrition (WHO, 1957-1964), tuberculosis (WHO, 1960-1973), 
smallpox (WHO, 1966-1970), and onchocerciasis (1974-1984), and localised WHO 
projects against bilharzia (1959-1973) and leprosy (1956-1969).73 Beyond these vertical
campaigns, the WHO also oversaw projects related to the broader improvement of 
public health and the development of Ghana’s healthcare capacity. It conducted a 
survey of environmental sanitation needs across the country, and designed an improved 
water and sewerage system for the Accra-Tema metropolitan area (with installation co-
funded by the World Bank).74 The WHO developed and funded national training 
programmes for community health nurses (1961-1968) and public health engineers 
(1971-1972), and from 1967-1980 it ran a series of rural sanitation pilot projects across 
the country.75 
72 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Professor Fred Binka, Interview, Ho,  21 June 2016;
Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Dr Moses Adibo, Interview, Accra, 17 June 2016; 
Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016.
73 WHO/V3/375/7 (1955-58) UNICEF & WHO Yaws Campaign, WHO Geneva; WHO/Project 
files/Ghana-9 (1956-69) Leprosy, WHO Geneva; WHO/Project files/Ghana-14 (1957-64) Nutrition, 
WHO Geneva; WHO/Project files/Ghana-2101 (1959-1973); WHO/Project files/Ghana-1202 (1960-
1973); and see Frank Fenner, Smallpox and Its Eradication (Geneva: World Health Organization, 
1988), 901–3.
74 WHO/Project files/GHA-PIP-001 (1973-80) Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project, WHO 
Geneva; WHO/Project files/Ghana-10 (1961-67) Environmental Sanitation, WHO Geneva; 
WHO/Project files/GHA-40 (1973-80) Assistance to the Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation, 
WHO Geneva.
75 WHO/Project files/Ghana-25 (1961-1968) Training of Community Health Nurses, WHO Geneva; 
WHO/Project files/GHA-PIP-001 (1973-80); WHO/Project files/GHA-HMD-002 (1971-1972) 
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Many of these projects emerged from the organisation’s broader involvement 
in the development of Ghana’s national health policies, at the request of successive 
governments. The WHO was asked by the National Liberation Council to carry out ‘a 
review of the whole field of public health legislation including sanitary law, the law 
relating to health care services, social security, the control of food and drugs, the 
control of medical and allied professions, and health statistics’, with a view to 
redrafting national laws.76  Under the Busia government, WHO consultants surveyed 
the regional allocation of health services in the country, noting the inequitable 
distribution of health services between north and south, and developed detailed plans 
for a national health insurance scheme.77 Following changes in government, the 
proposals resulting from these requests were not fully enacted, but the requests 
themselves indicate the extent to which governments of various political backgrounds 
depended on the WHO for the formulation of policy. The extent of WHO influence was
particularly striking in the development of plans for basic rural health services, of the 
kind required and consistently requested by communities in the north. The 
reformulations of health policy under the NLC in 1967, and under the National 
Redemption Council in 1973 – which led to an emphasis on extending health services 
‘into the hitherto untouched periphery’ – were the direct result of WHO 
recommendations: ‘The idea for new approaches to health services delivery came from 
[WHO Africa headquarters in] Brazzaville and became embodied in the Development 
of Basic Health Services Plan of Operation for Ghana in 1967’.78 Giovanni Carbone 
Public Health Engineering Education, WHO Geneva.
76 WHO/Project files/Ghana-4101 (1967-70) Health Legislation, WHO Geneva, Enc.10: ‘Consultant to
review Health legislation in Ghana’, internal memorandum, 7 February 1969.
77 WHO/Project Files/Ghana-4301 (1970-1972), Enc.3: ‘Medical Care Insurance in Ghana’, report by 
Dr RF Bridgman, WHO Consultant, 15 February 1972.
78 Dr Yaw Agoabye-Atta, Planning Committee Chairman, quoted in WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975),
Enc.120: WHO Duty Travel Report, Ghana, 23 November to 19 December 1973, Annex 8, Report of
meeting held 30 November 1973.
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argues that international influence only came strongly to bear on Ghanaian health 
policy in the late 1970s, when the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration committed states to 
‘Health for All’ through the provision of basic, ‘primary’ health services.79 But the 
evidence suggests that in Ghana, and possibly in other African states, WHO influence 
had helped to entrench primary health care as a policy goal – if not in practice – a 
decade before Alma Ata.
Northern healthcare and the WHO, 1957-1981
Although it had a clear role in shaping national policy, and despite its 
involvement numerous broad-based ‘non-vertical’ initiatives in Ghana before the 
structural adjustment era, the WHO’s presence in northern healthcare over this period 
was almost entirely confined to campaigns against particular diseases. Perhaps because 
of the ‘gatekeeper’ role played by governments in Accra, and also because of the 
preferences of international consultants, many internationally-funded public health 
projects were conducted in the south and close to the capital. In 1965, for example, the 
government recommended the peri-urban Accra-Tema region and the southern town of 
Asamankese as sites for a WHO study in community health – it later recommended the 
village of Danfa, 19km from Accra, for a long running USAID-funded study in rural 
health.80  As a result, plans for rural health provision were to some extent based around 
conceptions of health needs in the south, where relatively substantial transport 
infrastructure and physical health facilities had been developed since the colonial era.81 
79 Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 401.
80 WHO/S10/372/2/GHA/6 (1965), Enc.10: ‘Establishment of a Community Health Project’, WHO 
Consultant Report on Ghana under EPTA program, July 1966; WHO/Project files/Ghana-44 (1967-
70) Danfa Rural Health Project, WHO Geneva.
81 See WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.201: Dr F.T. Sai, International Planned Parenthood 
Federation, Accra, to A. Zahra, Division of Family Health, WHO Geneva, 16 July 1973.
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Figure 26. July 2015. People show vaccination scars from the Smallpox Eradication Programme in
northern Ghana
Source: author 
280
Just as many African people in the colonial period had their principal 
encounters with state-sponsored medicine through one of the ‘great campaigns’ against 
specific diseases, so too for northerners during the decades from independence to the 
accession of Jerry Rawlings.82 For many people the only contact with health services 
during this period came through the MFUs, who were consistently engaged in work for 
the WHO, or with disease control teams employed directly by the WHO itself. In 
village interviews, two campaigns were most closely remembered by northern 
communities. The WHO Smallpox Eradication Programme (funded in Ghana by 
USAID) was recalled vividly by almost all people over the age of fifty in all of the 23 
community groups I interviewed, principally for its coercive elements. Search teams 
apparently came into each village to check people for the typical scarring which 
follows vaccination. Those found without vaccination scars were forcibly vaccinated, 
sometimes after being physically restrained or interned with others in a shed or other 
temporary facility; the parents of unvaccinated children were charged with a criminal 
offence and fined a substantial amount. In many communities the eradication campaign
is remembered with an onomatopoeic name, chiru-chiru, which mimics the sound of 
the needleless pressure-jet injector used to administer the vaccine. Some communities 
recalled that when word of an arriving vaccination team reached a village, people 
would run and hide in the surrounding bush, or they would conceal children and 
younger family members in the roofs of houses or among crops. In other cases ‘the 
people found out that well, okay, you have to find a way of putting a scar on this 
child’.83 The campaign also left its mark on the urban geography of the north. In 
82 Vaughan, Curing Their Ills, 37.
83 Group.04: Tindonmoligo Village (Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.06: Tanzul Village 
(Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; Group.07: Zuarungu Village (Guruni), Interview, Upper East, 29 
July 2015; Group.08: Dulugu Village (Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, 
Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.11: Naachenyiri Village, Jirapa Area 
(Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.12: Busa Wala Community 1, Wa Area (Wala), Interview
8 August 2015; Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; 
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Tamale, the region’s largest city, the small suburb surrounding the Ahmadiyyah mosque
is now formally designated as Sakasaka District. According to interviews with 
communities and health practitioners who were present in the north during the 
smallpox eradication campaign, this name comes from the Hausa equivalent term for 
‘chiru-chiru’ : saka-saka, from the word saka meaning ‘insert’, ‘knit’ or ‘put in’. Set on
the main road from the northwards settlements of Walewale, Bolgatanga, and 
Navrongo, the district became the central checkpoint for the smallpox campaign. 
According to Dr Sam Bugri, former director of health services for the Northern Region,
then working as a junior physician in the north: 
That used to be the entrance to Tamale, and there was a barrier there which they
stopped and examined everybody for smallpox scars. If you didn't have one 
then you were vaccinated on the spot. And because of the way in which 
smallpox vaccine was transmitted, this action is called saka in Hausa. So they 
just called the place Sakasaka. And the name has stuck. They even sometimes 
examined the people who were coming for any body lice and so on, when 
people were coming past the smallpox checkpoint – and if you had body lice, 
then they would lock you in a room and they would spray you.84
If WHO smallpox eradication is largely remembered for the fear engendered 
by forced vaccination, then the WHO-World Bank Onchocerciasis Control Program is 
remembered for its spraying – the large-scale treatment of northern river systems with 
DDT and other larvicides using helicopters marked ‘ONCHO’.85 For northern Ghana, 
the programme represented the height of what might be called the ‘DDT era’ of vector 
control. As debates on the environmental impacts of DDT and other dioxin insecticides 
took place in the United States and Europe, local disease control staff with relatively 
Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.17: Dagomba 
Community 2, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.18: Dagomba Community 3, Pong-
Tamale, Interview 11 August 2015; Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Unlike other 
archives of the WHO, files on the smallpox eradication campaign are restricted, and subject to a 
vetting process before they can be released to researchers; for this reason it was not possible to cross-
check these details with WHO documents. But see also Fenner, Smallpox and Its Eradication, 900–
906.
84 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
85 See Chapter 4
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little training in aquatic pesticide use continued to deploy DDT in northern river 
systems, sometimes noting that their efforts had resulted in die-offs of fish and 
invertebrate life.86 The Onchocerciasis campaign was also remembered for its 
employment of ‘vector-collectors’ or ‘fly boys’, often associated with colonial sleeping 
sickness campaigns, people who worked as living bait to survey river valleys for the 
parasitic Simulium blackfly that spreads the disease. WHO officials searched for a way 
to stop this practice in 1966, but Ghanaian medical officers insisted on its value, and it 
was still used in the 1980s.87 As this suggests, the idea that a tenable distinction can be 
made between ‘colonial medicine’ and postcolonial (or non-colonial) medicine is 
undermined by the persistent use of similar methods and idioms across the period. Both
colonial-era and postcolonial-era medicine were more substantially shaped by the 
concerns of a cosmospolitan medical community with its own internal prejudices, 
preferred methods, and competitions for status – at some points these concerns and 
prejudices were aligned with the broader political contexts for medical work, and at 
others they were not.
Although the principal vectors of direct WHO influence in the north from 
1957-1981 were the campaigns against smallpox and onchocerciasis, the organisation 
was also involved with health consulting for a vast northern resettlement project 
proposed by the FAO and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). During 
the last years of the CPP government, as spending on the region fell, the FAO 
conducted a survey of northern Ghana ‘with the broad purpose of raising the economic 
86 WHO/05/181/14 (1969), Enc.97: Report on Dry Season Operations and AFRO-131 Joint Project in 
Ghana, 24 August 1968; WHO/V2/86/19 (1971-1972) Onchocerciasis, Upper Volta, WHO Geneva, 
p.4; Noamesi, ‘A Progress Report on the Control of Simulium Damnosum in Northern Ghana’, 3–17.
87 WHO/05/181/14 (1969), Enc.76: Onchocerciasis Research Unit, Fourth Annual Report, October 
1966 to September 1967, 6-7; Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015;  for discussion of ‘fly
boys’ in sleeping sickness control, see Kirk Arden Hoppe, ‘Lords of the Fly: Colonial Visions and 
Revisions of African Sleeping-Sickness Environments on Ugandan Lake Victoria, 1906-61’, Africa 
67, no. 1 (1997): 86–105; Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial 
Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 220–25.
283
level of the northern population’.88 Its proposals, published after the coup in 1966, 
included the development of an expansive irrigation scheme, covering 2,000 square 
kilometres and involving the resettlement of up to 300,000 northern people. The WHO 
was brought in to assess the health aspects of the scheme, although as Ghana’s overall 
economy declined, the FAO’s proposals for extensive northern development were never
implemented. WHO staff discovered that the FAO had not consulted the Ghana 
Ministry of Health during the formulation of its plans, which had been developed only 
with the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works. Instead the proposal envisaged 
that the WHO would make recommendations on the health aspects of the project, 
effectively bypassing Ghana’s own health officials. The WHO insisted that the Ministry
of the Health should be involved, pointing out that the creation of a vast network of 
dams and irrigation canals was likely to increase infection with malaria, bilharzia and 
guinea worm.89 The affair gives an indication of the extent to which transnational 
organisations already held authority over some aspects of African health: both the FAO,
and apparently Ghana’s own Ministry of Agriculture, had considered that the WHO 
would oversee the proposed scheme. As the overall involvement of the WHO and other 
UN organisations in Ghana increased during the 1970s, their influence was also felt in 
the daily operation of northern health services. From the early 1970s, for example, all 
maternity kits in the country were supplied by UNICEF, as well as a sizeable 
proportion of all vehicles and basic clinical equipment used by rural health services, 
while from the late 1970s (as with other African states) the WHO held a significant 
degree of responsibility for the formulation and bulk-purchasing of Ghana’s national 
list of essential drugs.90 In the 1960s and 1970s in northern Ghana, the increased 
88 WHO/CPD67.4 (1968), 15.
89 Ibid., 1–18.
90 PD/232 Box 18/02/02726 (1978-93), Enc.7: ‘Preparation Of The 1979/80 Annual Estimates’, MoH, 
Accra, January 1979; PD/65/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1972-1981), Enc.9:  ’Development of Basic 
Health Services, Plan Of Operation, Ghana, Second Edition 1972’; and Enc.1: C.A.A Quenum, 
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presence of WHO personnel created what was to some extent an alternative centre of 
medical authority to the Ministry of Health in Accra. In 1974, for example, a WHO 
consultant at the Medical Field Units’ northern base observed that ‘the visitors book in 
the guest cottage reads like a Who's Who of regional and international public health’.91 
The onchocerciasis campaign, among the most extensive interventions in the region’s 
health over the century, was directed from the WHO’s International Centre for Vector 
Control across the northern border in Upper Volta, and overseen by the WHO African 
Regional Office on Onchocerciasis based in northern Ghana itself, in Bolgatanga.92  As 
I discuss below, the establishment of these WHO offices drove a growth in subsidiary 
research institutions, often funded by international universities, which were influential 
in the evolution of northern health services during the structural adjustment era.  
The Rawlings government, structural adjustment, and Ghana’s health system
Ghana’s turn to structural adjustment in 1983, under the military government 
of Jerry Rawlings, has been extensively studied in terms of its overall economic 
impacts, as Ghana was among the first African countries to accept IMF/World Bank 
mandated structural adjustment in exchange for development loans. In some analyses 
of late twentieth-century African economic history, Ghana’s adjustment programme is 
seen as an outstanding success. Austin, for example, argues that the country was ‘one of
the two most successful cases of structural adjustment in Africa, the other being 
Uganda’.93 Arguments of this kind are often based on aggregate growth figures without 
close regard to distributional effects, suggesting that structural adjustment succeeded 
Regional Director WHO, Brazzaville to Director of Medical Services, MoH Accra, 29 July 1981.
91 WHO/P9/445/8/GHA (1973-1975), Enc.93: Dr J. Stromberg, WHO Division for Strengthening of 
Health Services, to Dr J.A. de Vries, Johns Hopkins University, 26 April 1974.
92 WHO/V2/86/19 (1971-1972), Enc.4:  ’Proposal for biological control of disease-transmitting 
blackflies’, 10 July 1972, 18-26.
93 Austin, ‘African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies’, 3.
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because Ghana’s economic growth averaged over 5 percent annually from 1983 to the 
end of the century. 
However, there is an equally substantial body of research which argues that 
although the acceptance of structural adjustment brought an immediate influx of loan 
funding, while austerity measures freed up government funds for some infrastructure 
development projects, and devaluation of the currency boosted revenues from some 
export products, the programme was ultimately a failure on its own macroeconomic 
terms.94 After an initial rise in per capita GDP to over 5 percent per annum from 1983 
to 1989 (a period when many African states embarked on structural adjustment reforms 
on the basis of Ghana’s initial success), this fell back during the 1990s. The country’s 
total foreign debt more than doubled between 1983 and 1987, and continued to rise: as 
Gocking puts it, ‘to many people it seemed as if Ghana had lost control over its own 
economic policies to the IMF and World Bank, and hordes of foreign consultants took 
over the day to day operation of the economy’.95 The costs of structural adjustment 
austerity were consistently passed to peripheral regions and the rural poor, whom the 
IMF and World Bank has cast as one of the principal beneficiaries of their 
recommendations. In 1989, faced with growing public criticism, the Rawlings 
government announced a ‘Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of 
Adjustment’, which chiefly attempted to boost the rural economy by raising the price 
paid for cocoa to smallholder farmers. It had little effect in the north. There, rising 
poverty as a result of trade liberalisation and currency devaluation after 1983, and 
substantial cuts in local spending on health and education services, drove a greatly 
increased number of destitute northerners to migrate to squatter settlements around 
94 See, for example, Egor Kraev, ‘Towards Adequate Analysis and Modeling of Structural Adjustment 
Programs: An Analytical Framework with Application to Ghana’ (Thesis, University of Maryland, 
2004).
95 Gocking, History of Ghana, ch.10; Kraus, ‘The Struggle over Structural Adjustment in Ghana’, 20.
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southern cities.96 As Richard Jeffries noted during interview research in the 1990s, even
supporters of the Rawlings government and its economic reforms considered that ‘the 
government has saved the economy at the expense of the people’.97
This is not to say that there was no improvement in some aspects of 
healthcare for Ghana as a whole, or in particular areas of northern healthcare. Health 
spending and the overall Ghana health service had already reached a point of near-
collapse by the time Rawlings and the PNDC seized power from the civilian 
government of the northerner Hilla Limann, in 1981. Between 1976 and 1980, at a time
of falling export revenues after prolonged droughts, and during the fuel crisis which 
followed the 1973 oil embargo, health spending in Ghana had been cut by almost 80 
percent.98 Documents in the Public Records division of Ghana’s national archives 
reveal the extent to which economic decline had undermined health provision even in 
the southern cities by 1981, principally as the result of a sustained shortage of basic 
drugs. These documents also reveal the extent to which structural adjustment donors 
and their agents subsequently came to control the central administration of Ghana’s 
health system in Accra – and how association with a body like the World Bank or WHO
could confer significant political power on individuals who were unaccountable to the 
government. For example in 1992, as the PNDC sought to reassert a degree of 
Ghanaian control over state ministries (ahead of a planned democratic election at the 
end of the year), it discovered that over the preceding years a temporary Ghanaian 
contractor to the World Bank, Colonel P.K. Awuku – apparently acting without the 
knowledge or permission of higher state officials – had successfully assigned himself 
96 Agyei-Mensah and de-Graft Aikins, ‘Epidemiological Transition’, 887; Gocking, History of Ghana, 
199.
97 Richard Jeffries, ‘Urban Popular Attitudes towards the Economic Recovery Programme and the 
PNDC Government in Ghana’, African Affairs, 1992, 214.
98 Carolyn Baylies, ‘The Meaning of Health in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy 13, no. 36
(1986): 71.
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the role of Director of Supply at the Ministry of Health, where he had attempted to 
assume control of drugs purchasing for the country.99 
The World Bank’s influence on healthcare was evident even in minor 
spending decisions. Ghanaian health officials had to obtain permission from the World 
Bank Permanent Mission in Accra before they could increase or cancel small orders 
(worth less than $5,000 in some cases) for drugs or other medical equipment, slowing 
down the supply of these necessities to outlying regions.100 Dependent on the approval 
of external financial consultants, Ghana’s severe drug shortages persisted well into the 
structural adjustment era. In 1986, despite significant growth in headline figures for the 
economy since 1983, Ministry of Health officials reported that the country had almost 
run out of critical basic drugs including penicillin, ampicillin, and cloramphenicol 
antibiotics, and meningitis vaccine: 
Most of the items are not available in the system, or the physical stock levels at 
Central Medical Stores in Tema are very low. Again, no orders have been placed
for any of these items under the 1986 Import Programme, thus making the 
situation very critical ... the non-availability of some of the items is making 
delivery of health care services extremely difficult.101 
In 1992, after years of structural adjustment, supplies of anti-tuberculosis drugs ran 
completely dry. The Ministry of Health reported that ‘TB treatment has come to a halt, 
and this has not been an acute situation. The situation has crept up slowly, with one 
drug being exhausted before the other, until we have the situation as it is now’.102
99 PD/44 Box 15/02/2723 (1990-1992) Revolving Drugs Fund, PRAAD Accra, Enc.3: ‘Implementation
of Cash and Carry Drug Scheme’, Bombardier Matthias Cudjoe, PNDC Co-Ordinator, to PNDC 
Health Secretary, 18 March 1992.
100 See, for example, PD/207v1 Box 31/02/02751 (1985-92) Canada Line of Credit, PRAAD Accra, 
Encs.2-3: Correspondence between Nicholas Bennet, Health and Education Planner, World Bank 
Permanent Mission in Ghana, and J.A. Maafo, Project Management Unit, MoH Accra, April 1991.
101 PD/224 Box 1802/02726 (1986-89) World Bank Health Fund (Facility for Drugs), PRAAD Accra, 
Enc.1: Dr Moses Adibo, PNDC Secretary for Health, to UNICEF Procurement and Assembly Centre,
Denmark, 14 July 1986.
102 PD/85 Box 27/02/02735 (1994) Medical Stores, General Correspondence, PRAAD Accra, Enc.3: 
‘Current Drug Situation At The Department Of Chest Diseases, Korle Bu’, Letter from Staff Doctors
to PNDC Secretary for Health, MoH Accra, 27 March 1992.
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Ghana became increasing dependent on charitable donations or bilateral 
credit lines to maintain a supply of basic drugs, with some state donors requiring that 
loans should be used to buy medical products that they produced. Britain had done the 
same with the Colonial Welfare and Development Acts, when it used development 
loans as a way of supporting its domestic economy.103 As Western state donors 
publicised the aid programmes they had launched in tandem with Ghana’s acceptance 
of economic liberalisation – an ostensible turn away from socialist influence – Ghana 
was concluding emergency credit agreements for drugs purchasing with China, Cuba, 
Bulgaria and East Germany.104 As opposed to these lines of credit, which also generate 
revenues for the creditor county, John Fetter has observed that in this period, very little 
bilateral aid money found its way to government health services across Africa. In 1988,
only 3.7 percent of total aid spending was allocated to healthcare programmes, with 
only 1.5 percent allocated to primary health services.105 
Instead there was an emphasis on the recovery of healthcare costs by African 
governments, through the introduction of fees for medical services. Described by 
international lenders as a way of increasing the economic efficiency of states 
undergoing structural adjustment, and of discouraging the ‘frivolous’ use of medical 
services, the principle of costs recovery was strenuously promoted by the World Bank 
in Ghana. Policies for costs recovery were also developed by the WHO and UNICEF as
a way of expanding community health services that had collapsed during the late 
1970s. These policies were endorsed by African governments through the Harare 
Declaration and Bamako Initiative in 1987, although as Kojo Arhinful observes, Ghana 
103 See PD/207v1 Box 31/02/02751 (1985-92); PD/221 Box 18/02/02726 (1993) Gifts of 
Pharmaceuticals, PRAAD Accra; PD/230 Box 18/02/02726 (1983-89) Bulgaria Line of Credit, 
PRAAD Accra; SD/15/TJ Box 27/02/02735 (1984-86) UK-Ghana Grant, PRAAD Accra; SD/222v2 
Box/27/02/02735 (1980-1989) GDR-Ghana Line of Credit, PRAAD Accra.
104 PD/230 Box 18/02/02726 (1983-89), Enc.4:  ’Negotiation Of Bilateral Agreement Between Ghana 
And G.D.R., Cuba, Bulgaria And China’, 21 July 1986.
105 Fetter, ‘Health Care in Twentieth Century Africa’, 19–20.
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had ‘virtually abandoned’ the Bamako model (which saw the WHO and UNICEF 
supply cheap drugs for sale at rural health centres) by 1990.106 Instead, pressure from 
international lenders to increase costs recovery led to the introduction of an entirely 
decentralised system of user fees from 1992, implemented under the guidance of local 
World Bank advisors. Formally described as the ‘Revolving Fund’, but known to both 
government officials and the Ghanaian public as ‘Cash and Carry’, the new system 
required district health facilities to sell drugs at a substantial mark up, using the 
revenues to meet local costs and purchase new pharmaceuticals from central 
government stores.107 
This forced a rapid and sustained reduction in the public’s use of health 
services across Ghana. Although there were officially exemptions on grounds of 
poverty, these often went unrecognised at local facilities – ‘in practice, virtually every 
Ghanaian ended up paying for public health services at point of use’.108 Ernest Aryeetey
and Markus Goldstein observe that as a result of costs recovery initiatives and other 
regressive spending policies, the poorest fifth of Ghana’s population received 
approximately 11 percent of total government health spending in 1992, while 33 
percent of spending went to the wealthiest 20 percent.109 For northern communities with
relatively little spending power, served by health facilities that were unable to compete 
with the southern health system for allocations of available drugs, the turn to Cash and 
Carry had particularly pronounced effects on the ability of people to access basic 
106 Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 53; And see Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 388; Giles-Vernick 
and Webb, Global Health in Africa, 10.
107 PD/44 Box 15/02/2723 (1990-1992), Enc.1: ‘Cash and Carry – Design Workshop, memorandum 
from Dr Issaka-Tinorgah, Project Director for PNDC Secretary for Health, 5 October 1992; and 
Enc.2: ‘Implementation of Cash and Carry Drug Scheme’, Bombardier Matthias Cudjoe, PNDC Co-
Ordinator, to PNDC Health Secretary, 10 January 1992; See also Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 
388–401.
108 Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 388–89.
109 Ernest Aryeetey and Markus Goldstein, ‘Ghana: Social-Policy Reform in Africa’, in Reforming 
Social Policy: Changing Perspectives on Sustainable Human Development, ed. Jennifer L. Moher et 
al. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2008), 18.
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government health services.  In 2001 a former Director-General of the Ghana Health 
Service, Professor Badu Akosa, described the situation across Ghana after a decade of 
Cash and Carry:
A gradual diminution in use of health facilities because of affordability, 
resulting in 69% of the population unable to attend or use the health service. 
The majority have resorted to self-medication, herbal or traditional medicine, or
healing crusades or prayers, or resigned themselves to their fate not by choice, 
but purely because they cannot afford health care.110
Northern health in the adjustment era
In northern Ghana there were some tangible improvements in general 
infrastructure under the Rawlings government, with benefits for the provision of health 
services. Following the successful completion of the WHO Onchocerciasis Control 
Programme in northern Ghana, the PNDC government drew up a tailored development 
plan for the region, the Five-Year Regional and Rural Development Programme for the 
‘Oncho-freed Zone’. The plan anticipated a broad expansion of services in the north, 
premised on the idea that it was endemic onchocerciasis (and not systemic neglect) 
which had limited economic production and therefore hindered the earlier provision of 
basic services. The government’s proposals included ‘economic infrastructural 
development covering the rural health system, educational and communication 
facilities, the feeder road network, good drinking water, rural electrification, irrigation, 
and a rural human resource development programme’.111 As with others before it, this 
ambitious plan achieved relatively little in regard to the expansion of physical health 
facilities in the region. As I discuss below, perhaps because of a sudden proliferation in 
the number of health-focused international organisations and NGOs operating in the 
region, from 1981-1992 little money was spent on expanding the government’s own 
110 Badu Akosa, ‘Financing health care in Ghana: A case of open, honest and dispassionate debate’, 
article in Daily Graphic, 10 February 2001, quoted in Arhinful, ‘Health Care In Ghana’, 54.
111 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), 16.
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healthcare network. But other aspects of the PNDC northern development plan brought 
significant health benefits. At the beginning of the 1980s, the only northern settlement 
with regular electricity was Tamale, powered by an unreliable oil generator. Using 
World Bank loans, Rawlings launched a drive for rural electrification in the region – 
power supplies were extended into district capitals and smaller urban settlements, and 
eventually to some larger villages close to transport networks.112 With refrigerators 
installed in northern district health centres, this greatly increased the reliability of 
vaccines administered through Ghana’s participation in the WHO Expanded 
Programme on Vaccination, against measles, diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. 
Electrification and refrigeration also allowed northern health services to use reactive 
vaccination as a control measure during the region’s cyclical meningitis outbreaks, 
although large-scale preventive vaccination against meningitis only began in northern 
Ghana in 2010.113
For the north, the most noticeable change to public health services over the 
structural adjustment period came with the sudden proliferation of international 
organisations and NGOs at work in the region. Over the preceding two decades, the 
only international health organisations with a persistent presence had been the WHO 
and UNICEF, in addition to the international churches and mission groups that had 
operated some northern health facilities since the colonial period. A World Health 
Organisation report published in 1984, a year after adjustment measures began, reveals 
a greatly expanded number of organisations working in the region, running 
programmes aimed at boosting ‘socio-economic development in the areas freed from 
onchocerciasis’. Many of these projects, also discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, were 
aimed at general economic development, on the premise that the north’s ‘valleys of 
112 Ibid., 4–12.
113 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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river blindness’ had been opened for productive agriculture. This was the same idea that
had guided colonial-era resettlement initiatives, which assumed that northern valleys 
had been made safe by tsetse fly control.114 The sources for this period show the extent 
to which ‘International Development’ had gained purchase as an ideology and 
organising principle for the improvement of peripheral societies. Development planners
confidently proposed precise rates of return for northern projects with vague end goals: 
for the reshaping of northern communities’ dietary preferences towards increased 
consumption of fish, or a project which would ‘decrease prevailing negative attitudes 
towards the forest’.115 As Botchway argues, proposals for both health and general 
economic development in the north have consistently lacked a historical dimension to 
their assessment of poor health and poverty, instead seeing these problems arising 
‘primarily as a function of inadequate bio-physical characteristics and a poor 
application of economic principles’.116
Among the internationally-funded health projects underway by the mid-
1980s was the Pong-Tamale Veterinary Laboratory Project, a ‘multi-million West 
German Government-assisted project’ intended to revive a defunct colonial-era 
laboratory, built in 1933 for surveillance and control of livestock diseases, for 
international research directed at the same goal. A separate and expansive programme 
for both health and general economic development, funded and organised by the 
Canadian International Development Agency, proposed to extend primary health care 
‘to over 80 percent of the rural population by the year 2000’. In part, this was to be 
achieved through a ‘Mission Mobile Clinics and NGO Services Expansion Project’. 
Church groups, part-funded by the government of Ghana and by international donors, 
114 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), 4–8.
115 Ibid., 5, Subsections 4-5.
116 Botchway, ‘Are Development Planners Afraid’, 36.
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would assume responsibility for roaming rural health provision, taking on the role of 
the recently-dissolved Medical Field Units. Planners accepted that NGOs would in 
future take on an increasingly central role in northern health, ‘to get more immediate 
results in terms of increased availability of healthcare’.117 There were longer-term 
ambitions for Ministry of Health personnel to reassume full control of the region’s 
health system, but the devolution of health services to NGOs in the north was not 
significantly reversed before the end of the study period (2000), and continues at 
present. Several of the former health officials I interviewed suggested that the north 
now has more health-focused NGOs than any other region of Ghana, with the 
implication that the region was therefore not in need of increased government 
attention.118 
The increased role of international health agencies in the north from the 
1980s, apart from the WHO, was also apparent in the launch of the global Guinea 
Worm Eradication Project in northern Ghana. In Chapter 6, I discuss how local health 
officials were able to divert resources away from this programme, to sustain a network 
of ‘village volunteers’  that reported on general community health needs. Although the 
WHO was responsible for certifying guinea worm eradication, the eradication project 
itself was launched by the United States Centres for Disease Control and managed by 
the Carter Centre charitable foundation, with filtration materials donated by Dupont, 
and subsequent funding provided by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. As 
Vernick and Webb suggest, this period ‘heralded a new world order’, in which the 
influence of private philanthropic capital in global health surpassed that of the WHO or 
bilateral state donors. To some extent this was a return to the model of health funding 
117 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), p.9-12, Section 6: NORRIP Health Program and Section 2.14: 
Pong Tamale Veterinary Laboratory Project.
118 Dr Moses Adibo, Interview, Accra, 17 June 2016; Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016; Dr 
George Amofah, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2015.
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that prevailed in the early 1900s, when the Rockefeller Foundation oversaw a number 
of international public health campaigns. Anne-Emanuelle Birn argues that the 
Rockefeller Foundation was created during a period of ‘scientific philanthropy’ 
influenced by Andrew Carnegie’s ‘Gospel of Wealth’, which proposed that the world’s 
industrial magnates should channel their riches towards societal goods ‘so that the ties 
of brotherhood may still bind together the rich and poor’.119 In the 1990s, with private 
capital again resurgent in international public health, the approach of the Rockefeller 
Foundation had itself been shaped by subsequent reconceptions of the relationship 
between private wealth and philanthropy: it called for venture capitalists ‘to address 
social and/or environmental problems while also turning a profit’.120 The increased 
participation of private philanthropic organisations in northern healthcare mirrored the 
accelerated entry of private capital in search of revenues from Ghana’s people: from the
late 1980s to 2000, 665 multinational firms established new offices in Accra.121 
A final element in the shifting arrangement of northern healthcare 
institutions, from 1981 onwards, came with the expansion of international medical 
research in the region. In the colonial period there had been a single health-related 
laboratory in the region, the Pong-Tamale Veterinary Laboratory, established to 
immunise northern herds and to protect the livestock trade passing south from French 
West Africa.122 A further research facility was added by the Nkrumah government, with 
the creation of the Onchocerciasis Research Section in Bolgatanga: this was part of the 
CPP government’s National Institutes of Health and Medical Research, but the facility 
passed to WHO control after the National Institutes were disbanded by the NLC regime
119 Andrew Carnegie, ‘The Gospel of Wealth’, North American Review CCCXCI (1889); and see Birn 
and Fee, ‘The Rockefeller Foundation and the International Health Agenda’, 1618.
120 Rockefeller Foundation Impact Enterprise Project, quoted in Birn and Fee, ‘The Rockefeller 
Foundation and the International Health Agenda’, 1619.
121 Agyei-Mensah and de-Graft Aikins, ‘Epidemiological Transition’, 889.
122 See Chapter 1.
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in the late 1960s.123 The WHO subsequently re-based its onchocerciasis headquarters in 
Tamale, and after the regional onchocerciasis control programme concluded in the 
1980s, it returned the laboratory to the government of Ghana. This became the Tamale 
Parasitic Diseases Research Centre, operated by the Ghana Health Service and co-
funded by research groups managed by European states and universities, notably by the
Leiden University Medical Centre and the Dutch Foundation for the Advancement of 
Tropical Research, who have financed research on the little-known intestinal parasite 
Oesophagostomum in north-east Ghana from the 1980s.124 
The most substantial research facility in the north, and the most consequential
for the future arrangement of northern health services, was established in Navrongo in 
1988, with funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). 
Initially operated by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and 
subsequently by the Ghana Health Service, the Navrongo Health Research Centre has 
hosted multiple large-scale population studies and medical trials: for dietary 
supplementation with Vitamin A (1988-1992, funded by DFID); the clinical 
manifestations of lymphatic filariasis (1990-1994, funded by USAID); the use of 
insecticide-treated bed nets for malaria control (1992-1995: WHO and UNICEF); and 
the use of rectal artesunate for malaria treatment (1998-2006: WHO, TDR and NMDC).
These are a small sample. From 1988 to 2016 the Navrongo Centre has hosted 126 
multi-year studies and trials, funded by a broad range of public and private 
international health organisations.125 The trials have often involved tens of thousands of 
people in the north-east, making use of a demographic surveillance and trial-recruiting 
123 Hunter, ‘River Blindness’, 402–3; Ashitey, Disease Control in Ghana, 29.
124 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Juventus Benogle Ziem, ‘Controlling Human 
Oesophagostomiasis in Northern Ghana’ (Thesis, Leiden University Medical Center, 2006), ch.1.
125 Navrongo Health Research Centre, ‘NHRC-Approved Funded Research Projects, 1988-2016’, 
accessed 23 April 2017, http://www.navrongo-hrc.org/; Professor Fred Binka, Interview, Ho,  21 
June 2016.
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system that was developed with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1993.126 
The centre’s foundational placebo-controlled trial in dietary supplementation with 
Vitamin A, for example, recruited 22,721 children aged 9 months to 8 years old, while 
the randomised trial of treated bed-nets involved the monitoring of 6,053 family 
compounds.127  
Some of these studies have been hailed as medical landmarks, informing the 
improved provision of public health services in Africa and worldwide. Along with the 
Noguchi Memorial Centre for Medical Research in Accra, the Navrongo Health 
Research Centre is one of West Africa’s most active sites for internationally-funded 
medical research.  Its establishment in the 1980s constitutes an implicit recognition (on 
the part of international health researchers) of the high prevalence of particular diseases
and the general low provision of health services in the region, which give rise to a large
study population in which particular diseases or nutritional deficiencies can be reliably 
observed.  The location of the Navrongo Research Centres perhaps also indicates the 
relative ease of implementing large-scale medical trials at the economic periphery. At 
the time of its establishment, the north-east was Ghana’s poorest administrative 
division, while it was also among the country’s most densely populated areas. In his 
anthropological study of medical research in impoverished African communities, Paul 
Geissler has discussed the emergence of similar facilities elsewhere on the continent. 
He notes the incongruities of advanced medical research among communities whose 
health has been shaped by a political and economic history that cannot easily be 
126 Navrongo Health Research Centre, ‘NHRC-Approved Funded Research Projects, 1988-2016’.
127 See D.A. Ross et al., ‘Vitamin A Supplementation in Northern Ghana: Effects on Clinic Attendances,
Hospital Admissions, and Child Mortality’, The Lancet 342, no. 8862 (1993): 7–12; F. N Binka et al.,
‘Impact of Permethrin Impregnated Bednets on Child Mortality in Kassena-Nankana District, 
Ghana: A Randomized Controlled Trial’, Tropical Medicine & International Health 1, no. 2 (2007): 
147–54.
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accounted for in the research itself, even if individual researchers are well aware of this
history:
If African health science once dreamed of expanding modernity’s reach across 
national territory (as in imperial colonization or postcolonial nation-building –  
“Africa as a laboratory”), using large cadres of public health staff, networks of 
field stations down to divisional level, and closed-circuited interministerial 
action, the contemporary global configuration of African laboratories 
reconstitutes technical modernity as an archipelago of a few high-powered and 
well-resourced islands of global science ... This peculiar geography of medical 
science in Africa —sharp boundaries between research sites and their 
surroundings, and hopping relations to distant overseas centers — makes for 
marked confrontations with inequality for those working at these sites.128
A century later: health in contemporary northern Ghana 
In several of the developments discussed above there was an echo of older 
programmes, tried and then abandoned or dissolved at various points from the 1930s: 
the Mission Mobile Clinics that replaced the Medical Field Units, for example, or the 
reinvigorated work of colonial-era research facilities. This echo of older initiatives was 
particularly striking in regard to the rural healthcare system which eventually gained 
purchase in the north at the end of the century, and which finally offered a way of 
providing primary health services to communities previously considered beyond the 
reach of the state. This health system – Community-Based Health Planning and 
Services, usually called ‘CHPS’   – was another northern innovation that was 
subsequently adopted nationally, having been proven under conditions of poverty and 
long-term neglect. There is a sense in which the north was (and remains) Ghana’s 
‘living laboratory’, allowing the state to test new institutions under extreme conditions. 
If a mode of healthcare provision worked there, where people could afford little, and 
where little government infrastructure had been provided, then it was likely to flourish 
(and save the state some money) in the better-resourced districts of the south. The 
128 Paul Wenzel Geissler, ‘Public Secrets in Public Health: Knowing Not to Know While Making 
Scientific Knowledge’, American Ethnologist 40, no. 1 (2013): 14.
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CHPS health system, which currently constitutes the front-line of rural healthcare in 
Ghana, was developed from a community health study known as ‘the Navrongo 
Experiment’. Overseen by the Navrongo Health Research Centre and funded by 
USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation, the Navrongo Experiment drew in 
approximately 171,000 people in north-eastern Ghana. It was designed to test new 
community health interventions in comparison with existing (or practically non-
existent) government health provision:  
Treatment areas in Kassena-Nankana District will be comprised of four cells, of
which three will involve instituting a basic primary health-care and family 
planning system in an area with approximately 3,000 compounds per cell, with 
a combined population of about 103,000 for the treatment areas. A comparison 
population of about 34,000 from a contiguous area will be provided with the 
usual service system of the Ministry of Health district health program in 
Navrongo, but with upgraded clinical facilities and staff training. A pure control 
area in a neighbouring district, also comprising a population of about 34,000, 
will be provided with the usual services of the Ministry.129
The Navrongo Experiment’s success led to its national implementation as the 
CHPS system in the early 2000s, hailed as a landmark in the extension of primary 
health care in Ghana.130 What is remarkable, however, is the extent to which this ‘new’ 
experimental discovery mirrored a much earlier northern success. The Native Authority
healthcare system, created in the 1930s, placed a small number of trained health 
personnel directly into rural communities, where they worked closely with traditional 
leadership structures and their networks. The local nature of health provision was 
decided collaboratively, through consultation with Native Authority councils and the 
communities they represented, who provided both labour and time for activities like 
129 Fred Binka, Alex Nazzar, and James F. Phillips, ‘The Navrongo Community Health and Family 
Planning Project’, Studies in Family Planning 26, no. 3 (1995): 126; Professor Fred Binka, 
Interview, Ho,  21 June 2016.
130 Dr J. Koku Awoonor-Williams, Interview, Navrongo, 2 July 2016; Dr Moses Adibo, Interview, 
Accra, 17 June 2016; and John Koku Awoonor-Williams et al., ‘Bridging the Gap Between 
Evidence-Based Innovation and National Health-Sector Reform in Ghana’, Studies in Family 
Planning 35, no. 3 (1 September 2004): 161–77.
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disease surveillance, the maintenance of rural facilities, and assistance with treatment 
programmes. The Native Authority system was recognised as an outstanding success by
local officials, the Gold Coast Medical Department, and by the communities 
themselves, who bitterly resisted its neglect and eventual closure over the independence
transition (see Chapter 2), as the government at Accra reasserted control over a 
northern healthcare system associated with ‘conservative’ traditional elites and their 
resistance to nationalist politics. Apparently without knowledge of this colonial-era 
success, after decades when northern health provision had been subject to the 
vicissitudes of Accra politics and centralised budgetary allocations, the new health 
system proposed that successful northern health provision should again involve the 
placement of trained health personnel directly into rural communities, to ‘mobilize the 
previously untapped cultural resources of chieftaincy, social networks, and village 
gatherings in order to promote community accountability, volunteerism, and investment
in health services’.131 Community health committees were established by councils of 
‘chiefs and elders’, and regular regional gatherings of these committees (still called 
durbars by Ghanaian government officials, using a term imported by British officers 
from colonial India) were held to discuss the provision of local services. As with the 
NA healthcare system of the 1930s, the Navrongo Experiment and resulting CHPS 
system were immediately recognised as a success: in areas where the system operated, 
childhood mortality was halved.132
After the year 2000, when government passed from Rawling’s NDC to the 
opposition NPP party under John Kufuor, in the third democratic general elections 
since 1992, there was a strenuous effort to increase the state’s oversight and capacity 
131 Awoonor-Williams et al., ‘Bridging the Gap Between Evidence-Based Innovation and National 
Health-Sector Reform in Ghana’, 162.
132 Ibid., 163.
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for health service provision, reversing a decades-long cession of authority to 
international health agencies. As Carbone argues in his study of healthcare policy in the
post-Rawlings era, ‘the process of change is largely explained by the political 
competition set off by the new democratic regime ... the politicisation of health policy 
making that followed the country’s democratic transition greatly reduced the weight of 
international actors’.133 The introduction of a national health insurance scheme from 
2003, and particularly the extension of the CHPS system to all northern districts, 
greatly increased the opportunities for northern people to receive medical treatment, 
and created a new network of advocates calling attention to problems in northern 
health.
Conclusion
This narrative of progress obscures a great deal. In the period from 1981-
2000, as structural adjustment reshaped the Ghanaian economy, many of the worst 
effects were pushed northwards, to the detriment of northern health services. Shortages 
of drugs were significantly more pronounced than in the south – in 1984, for example, 
an investigation at the north’s main medical stores in Tamale revealed that the region 
had no supplies of anti-helminthic, anti-protozoal or anti-TB drugs. Of the 17 different 
antibiotics recommended by government, only one (co-trimoxazole) was available, and 
stock records showed that in the preceding year there had been prolonged shortages of 
all anti-malarial treatments.134 In 1992, during an outbreak of epidemic meningitis in 
the north, health officials found that no stores of meningitis vaccine had been 
maintained in Accra, and were forced to make an emergency appeal to UNICEF.135 
133 Carbone, ‘Democratic Demands’, 396.
134 PD/68/v2 Box 27/02/02735 (1974-1977), Enc.6: Stock Control Report, Regional Medical Services 
Tamale, Returns on Drugs 4th Quarter 1984.
135 PD/85 Box 27/02/02735 (1994), Enc.2: ‘Emergency Supply: Urgent Requirement Of Vaccines’, 
PNDC Secretary for Health, Commodore O.S. Obimpeh, to UNICEF Ghana, 20 May 1992.
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A decline in government health provision also drove the continued transfer of
medical authority to Christian groups, funded by the government and licensed to 
directly import their own drugs. By 1992, ‘Christian Health Associations’ received a 
quarter of the Ministry of Health’s total salaries budget, and one-sixth of the total 
healthcare budget.136 Many of these Christian health groups were remembered 
favourably by northern communities, particularly in areas where Christian clinics and 
schools offered the best or only options for education and medical care.137 However, as 
I have argued previously, the conferral of medical authority on religious organisations 
(particularly on Christian organisations in a region of mixed religions) is problematic in
that it greatly increases their influence in other spheres: their ability to win support for 
both their religious and temporal activities among local communities, and therefore the 
extent to which they could shape local politics to further their own interests and secure 
their tenure in regard to health provision. As shown in Chapter 2, the operation of 
medical facilities by Christian groups led to praise for the churches and disdain for the 
government, from northern communities who saw Church healthcare as a competing 
service and not as a planned extension of government healthcare through funding 
grants. 
Even when government health facilities were refurbished, or new facilities 
built in the 1980s and 1990s, there were still almost no personnel to staff them. In 1989,
of the seventy government pharmacists employed by the Ghana Ministry of Health, 
only five (7 percent) were posted in the north: home to 19 percent of Ghana’s 
population, and to a number of hospital and health centres without pharmaceutical staff 
136 PD/232 Box 18/02/02726 (1978-93), Enc.5: ‘1992 Recurrent Estimates: summary of expenditure by 
programmes and objects’, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 19 February 1992.
137 See Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.11: 
Naachenyiri Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; Group.17: Dagomba 
Community 2, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.18: Dagomba Community 3, Pong-
Tamale, Interview 11 August 2015.
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– at that time there were more government pharmacists posted in the southern town of 
Cape Coast.138 By the mid-1990s, responsibility for many aspects of northern health 
provision had been passed to international agencies. In the Upper West Region, for 
example, the Danish development agency DANIDA assumed control of drugs 
purchasing and distribution from 1996, an early stage of the Health Sector Support 
Programme that Danida continues to operate in the region at present.139 
These examples indicate the continued marginality of the north at the end of 
the century, one hundred years after its incorporation into the colonial Gold Coast, and 
how this marginality had persistently shaped the region’s health.  It is impossible to 
know precisely how the continued neglect of health services, and high presence of 
many treatable diseases, shaped the relative economic and social development of the 
region over time: the feedback loop between poverty and a subsequent lack of political 
power, leading to poor health services that in turn gave rise to economically-limiting 
problems of public health. As the revival of the forgotten ‘Native Authority’ approach 
to healthcare under the CHPS system suggests, low expenditures and inconsistent 
staffing, and abrupt political transitions in Ghana as a whole, meant that the 
institutional knowledge of northern health needs (and the best way to address these) 
was regularly effaced. As structural adjustment advanced, the economic gap between 
the northern periphery and the coast widened considerably. In Ghana, formally-defined 
poverty fell between 1980 and 1999, from over 52 percent of the population to less than
40 percent. But in the three northern regions, poverty increased, and in 2008, 80 
138 PD/93 Box 27/02/02735 (1989) Pharmacy Staff List, General, PRAAD Accra, Enc.1: ‘Pharmacy 
Staff’, Report from F. Yeliu, Deputy Director of Pharmaceutical Services to MoH Accra, 6 May 
1989.
139 PD/229 Box 18/02/02726)(1994-96) Drug Management (Ghana Denmark Upper West supply 
program), PRAAD Accra, Enc.2: ‘Ghana Denmark Health Sector Support Programme: Drug Supply 
Project, Upper West Region’, Implementation Proposal June 1996; and see ‘Danida Ghana: Health 
Sector’, accessed 26 August 2017, http://ghana.um.dk/en/danida-en/health-sector.
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percent of the northern population still lived in formal poverty.140 In 1999, the stunting 
of growth among children as the result of malnutrition was found to be highest in the 
north, at 40 percent of all children (compared with 11 percent in the Greater Accra 
region), while levels of vaccine coverage were significantly below the national average,
except in the districts where Catholic missions had assumed responsibility for public 
health.141 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the north’s migrant labourers would travel south 
during the dry season for work on the mines and cocoa plantations, before returning to 
work on family farms for the rest of the year. But from the 1980s many stopped 
returning, preferring instead to remain in informal settlements around southern towns 
where, despite their relative poverty, there was greater access to healthcare, education 
and employment. As Saul Agyei-Mensah and Ama de-Graft Aikins have shown, for 
health services in Accra this contributed to a ‘double burden’ of disease. For wealthier 
southern populations, the principle causes of death by this time were chronic diseases 
(high blood pressure or diabetes, for example), while for many of the northern 
immigrants who settled in the south, infectious diseases remained an important cause of
death.142 Dr Sam Bugri, a former regional director of health services who grew up in the
north, recalled how the failure of government services and general economic decline 
reshaped the region’s societies:
At first it was seasonal migration – during the dry season they had nothing to 
do, so they went there to work in cocoa farms and other things. And then in the 
rainy season they came back here to farm. But later on it became a kind of 
permanent thing. They went and didn't come back again, not unless someone 
was sick.  They came back probably for a funeral.143   
140 Krüger Rasmussen, ‘Pro-Poor Health Care’, 15.
141 Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang and Judith Shabaya, ‘What Has Corruption Got to Do with It?: 
Understanding the Persistence of Rural-Urban and Inter-Regional Inequalities in Ghana and 
Zimbabwe’, GeoJournal 62, no. 2 (2005): 36–40.
142 Agyei-Mensah and de-Graft Aikins, ‘Epidemiological Transition’, 890.
143 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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CHAPTER 6
The past in the present: guinea worm south and north
– 
This final chapter discusses the divergent histories of guinea worm disease in 
northern and southern Ghana over the twentieth century. In the early 1900s, in many 
southern districts and urban centres, specific control measures and general 
improvements to water quality reduced the incidence of guinea worm, an economically 
debilitating disease that only became the focus of sustained control measures in the 
north from the 1980s. The chapter uses the disease as a lens through which to examine 
the long-term entrenchment of regional differences. As I hope to show in this 
introduction, guinea worm is a particularly suitable disease for this approach. 
Guinea worm disease is caused by a parasitic nematode worm, Dracunculo 
medinensis, or the 'little dragon of Medina'. The parasite's common name, guinea 
worm, emerged from the era of the Atlantic slave trade in West Africa, when the disease
was frequently seen among slaves and coastal populations.  As both Latin and common 
names suggest, the worm was geographically widespread, and guinea worm disease is 
an ancient problem.1 It was one of the first afflictions to appear consistently in 
historical records and archaeological data. Calcified worms have been removed from 
Egyptian mummies, and the disease is referred to in literature from ancient India, 
Greece and the Middle East.2 It was a common theme in medical treatises across the 
last two millennia, appearing in work by Plutarch, Galen, and in the writing of Ibn Sina,
who described its association with the city of Medina.3 With the expansion of global 
1 In past documents and current scholarship, the disease caused by the parasite is sometimes referred 
to as dracunculiasis or dracontiasis. I use 'guinea worm disease' or simply 'guinea worm'. 
2 S. Cairncross, R. Muller, and N. Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis (Guinea Worm Disease) and the 
Eradication Initiative’, Clinical Microbiology 15 (2002): 223.
3 Susan Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities in Disease Eradication: Dracunculiasis Eradication in 
Africa’, Social Science & Medicine 46, no. 7 (1998): 800.
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trade systems from the fifteenth century, guinea worm became a disease which 
occasionally affected travelling Europeans. But as some historians have noted, it 
continued to be seen as an affliction of the global 'other'. Infection among Europeans 
remained a curiosity during the slave trade and colonial eras, although the disease's 
painful course was occasionally recounted to burnish the reputation for fortitude of a 
Victorian explorer or colonial memoir-writer.4  
Guinea worm disease is caused by the female Dracunculo worm, transmitted 
to humans by a miniscule freshwater crustacean (a copepod, or 'cyclops') which is the 
intermediate host for the worm's larvae.  Copepods proliferate in bodies of still water, 
and once an infested copepod is ingested by a person drinking, male and female guinea 
worm larvae move from the crustacean into the lining of the stomach and mate. Over 
the course of nine months to a year, the female grows rapidly, up to a metre in length, 
and migrates through the connecting tissues, usually to the lower limbs. Here, once it 
has gestated a large number of its own larvae, the worm forces its way to the surface of 
the person's skin and causes a large blister. In an example of a parasite manipulating its 
host's behaviour, the worm creates an intensely painful burning sensation, prompting 
those affected to immerse the blister in cooling water. Once submerged in water, the 
female worm's head emerges from the blister and disgorges thousands of new larvae, 
which infest copepods and begin the cycle again.5 
This is the basic biology and pathology, but there are also some particular 
features of guinea worm infection which make it a relevant focus for understanding the 
divergent health histories of northern and southern Ghana. First, the life-cycle and 
control of guinea worm were understood well before the extension of colonial rule 
across the Gold Coast and Northern Territories. Unlike onchocerciasis or epidemic 
4 See, for example, the account of the nineteenth century explorer James Bruce, in ibid., 801–2.
5 Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 224–27.
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meningitis, it was not a disease which lay beyond the reach of preventative medicine 
for part of the century. Guinea worm is one of the only diseases transmitted by drinking
water alone: the association between the parasite and its intermediate copepod host was
demonstrated in the nineteenth century by a Russian physician, at a time when germ 
theory was only beginning to gain purchase, and confirmed by Patrick Manson in 
1895.6 This understanding of the life-cycle of the parasite (and its dependence on the 
ingestion of copepods by drinking water) meant that from the beginning of the century 
it was seen as a candidate for regional control or local elimination, and eventually for 
global eradication.7
A further feature of guinea worm disease is that it has no effective drug 
treatment or clinical 'cure'. Until very recently there was no way to determine whether a
person was infected before the emergence of the worm, and surgical removal of the 
worm from the tissues carries prohibitive risks and costs. The basic method of 
treatment has remained the same since antiquity. When it emerges, the worm is 
extracted over the course of days or weeks, by slowly winding it out around a piece of 
bandage or a stick  – it has sometimes been argued that this ancient practice gave rise to
what is now a near-universal symbol for medical work, the serpent around a branch 
called the Rod of Asclepius.8 Unlike many aspects of colonial-era medical work, 
therefore, ‘biomedical’ treatment for guinea worm represented a relatively unusual 
convergence with long-standing African practices, rather than the displacement or 
newfound pluralism with which biomedicine has often been associated. Citing evidence
from Nigeria, Susan Watts has argued that the lack of a novel or rapidly effective 
6 Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities’, 801; Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 223.
7 For a discussion of the distinctions between control, elimination and eradication, see Eileen R. 
Choffnes et al., The Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic Diseases (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press, 2011), 46.
8 CDC-Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘CDC - Guinea Worm Disease - Eradication 
Program’, accessed 27 August 2017, http://www.cdc.gov/parasites/guineaworm/gwep.html; 
Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 227.
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treatment for guinea worm meant that affected people, 'recognising the limitations of 
the white men's medicine', were unlikely to seek treatment at colonial or postcolonial 
government facilities, which masked the extent of the problem from health authorities.9 
But there is also much evidence that the pain and distress associated with the disease 
drove people to seek help from any available practitioner, and often from official 
facilities, perhaps because analgesics were also available there. This was certainly the 
case in the colonial Gold Coast.
As there was no effective clinical cure, the control of guinea worm disease in 
the twentieth century very closely tracks the provision of access to clean water: through
the installation of urban treatment plants and piped supplies, the construction of 
boreholes or clean wells in villages, or through the provision of personal 'drinking 
straw' mesh filters, the preferred method of the international Guinea Worm Eradication 
Program that began in the 1980s.10  Like other pathologies in the group now designated 
as 'Neglected Tropical Diseases', this means that guinea worm disease acted as a proxy 
marker for broader regional development, and for the political importance accorded to 
particular places or people across the century.
Another relevant aspect of the disease is the well-established body of 
knowledge regarding its social and economic impacts. Guinea worm infection is rarely 
fatal, except as the result of secondary infections which can be contracted when the 
worm comes out through the skin, or if it breaks inside the body during extraction. 
However, over the period of its emergence and extraction, sufferers are partially or 
entirely disabled through pain and the effects of the parasite on the affected limb. 
Recent studies have demonstrated the severe impacts of this debilitation on agricultural 
9 Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities’, 803.
10 For a discussion, see Hotez, ‘NTDs and Poverty’, workshop proceedings in Choffnes et al., The 
Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic Diseases, 37.
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communities. Research in Nigeria, conducted in 1989, found that almost all guinea 
worm sufferers experienced a period of partial disability averaging three months in 
length. The study also found that 58 percent of those infected experienced a period of 
near-total disability, with sufferers unable to leave their compounds, lasting an average 
of a month. Most of those infected were in the 15-49 year age group, critical for 
agricultural production, and disability caused by emerging worms most commonly took
place during the yam and rice harvest (the larvae having been ingested nine months to a
year previously).11 Another study, drawing on village surveillance activities from the 
Guinea Worm Eradication Program in northern Ghana, found that a third of sufferers 
continued to experience difficulty in performing some daily tasks 12-18 months after 
the worm had emerged, and that one in every 200 experienced permanent serious 
disability through the destruction of joint tissues.12 Guinea worm infection confers no 
immunity, so it is possible for people exposed to contaminated water to become 
repeatedly infected each year.13
Sandy Cairncross, who conducted epidemiological research on the disease as 
part of the eradication programme, observes that the debilitating effects of guinea worm
are amplified, in social and economic terms, by a seasonal pattern of worm emergence 
which maps onto peaks of agricultural activity in West Africa:
This seasonality means that a whole community can be laid prostrate 
simultaneously, and household members can be prevented from substituting for 
one another in agricultural and other tasks. Indeed, it has been claimed that the 
effect of the disease on agricultural productivity can be detected in satellite 
photographs. The Dogon people of Mali refer to the infection as ‘the disease of 
the empty granary’ - the impact of guinea worm disease does not end when the 
worm is out and the sufferer returns to work.14
11 G. Smith et al., ‘Disability from Dracunculiasis: Effect on Mobility’, Annals of Tropical Medicine & 
Parasitology 83, no. 2 (2016): 151–58.
12 M. Hours and S. Cairncross, ‘Long-Term Disability due to Guinea Worm Disease’, Transactions of 
the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. 88, no. 5 (1994): 559.
13 Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 228.
14 Ibid., 223.
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Recent research has further indicated the effects that guinea worm 
specifically, and a burden of parasitic diseases more generally, may have on education 
and the development of cognitive ability. In the first case this is because long periods 
of school are missed, both by children affected by the disease, and when children are 
asked to work in place of infected adults – to the extent that schools in some endemic 
areas have been compelled to close for a month each year. It has also been suggested 
that a heavy general burden of parasitic diseases, including guinea worm, can 
measurably impair the development of memory formation and other cognitive 
functions in children and young adults.15  
In recent years, and increasing noticeably in the 1980s, with the turn to 
structural adjustment and rise of metric-led donor interventions into African health, this
recognition of the impacts of guinea worm has led economists to try and calculate the 
economic 'rate of return' to be had from guinea worm control.16 But its social and 
economic effects were already recognised by colonial authorities at the beginning of the
twentieth century, when guinea worm was seen as a disease 'of greatest economic 
importance', affecting African labour and military recruits.17 Along with the knowledge 
that the disease could be controlled by improving water, this led to an early attempt to 
eliminate guinea worm in the urban centres of the coastal south, as part of a broader 
move towards improved colonial sanitation and accompanying urban segregation.
This chapter, then, attempts to chart the differential evolution of guinea worm
control in the north and south over the century. While guinea worm had largely been 
brought under control at the coast by 1930, in the north it was only addressed seventy 
15 See Eppig, ‘Parasite prevalence and the worldwide distribution of cognitive ability’, workshop 
proceedings in Choffnes et al., The Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic 
Diseases, 229.
16 Kelly Callahan et al., ‘Contributions of the Guinea Worm Disease Eradication Campaign toward 
Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals’, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 7, no. 5 
(2013): 2160.
17 1907 MDAR, 10.
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years later, as part of the transnational Guinea Worm Eradication Program (GWEP) that
began in the 1980s, and was emblematic of Ghana and the north's new situations in the 
era of structural adjustment. Although the recent impacts of guinea worm disease have 
been studied by researchers and donor agencies, there has been little attempt to study it 
as a historical problem affecting northern communities, which contributed to the 
region's divergence from the south. Over the course of the century, the disease may 
have had a significant and unacknowledged effect on this divergence. 
The chapter's structure is as follows: after a brief discussion of existing 
scholarship on guinea worm, I discuss the disease as a public health problem in the 
early southern Gold Coast, and examine how it was brought under control in southern 
settlements over the first decades of the twentieth century. This includes a brief history 
of government programmes for the expansion of water supplies in the colony. I follow 
this with a comparative discussion of guinea worm in the north, and northern water 
supplies over the same period. In the second section of the chapter, I look at guinea 
worm in the north from the 1930s to independence in 1957, noting the advocacy of 
individual colonial officials towards improved health conditions in the north, and the 
way in which guinea worm infection was increased by the same misplaced 
developmental plans as onchocerciasis. In the final section, I assess the history of 
northern guinea worm control (and water provision) from independence to the 
transnational eradication programme which began in the 1980s, funded by various 
international bodies and led by the Carter Foundation. I also examine the role played by
one northern Ghanaian, Dr Sam Bugri, in the development of guinea worm control and 
northern public health.
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The historiography and ethnography of guinea worm control 
Although guinea worm is often mentioned in survey histories of disease and 
medicine in Ghana, the disease and its related control programmes have not yet been 
the subject of much focused attention by historians, either for the north or for the 
country as a whole.18 The same is broadly true for other countries in Africa and Asia. 
The global eradication campaign against the disease began relatively recently – work 
started in Pakistan and Ghana in 1987, and this is perhaps too recent for the kind of 
campaign-focused research which constitutes a large part of the historiography on 
twentieth-century medicine in Africa. Well-funded and with an extensive public-
relations apparatus, the Guinea Worm Eradication Program has to some extent been 
able to write its own history, in a manner comparable to the WHO's Smallpox 
Eradication Programme. The detailed official history of smallpox eradication, written 
by the programme's leader Frank Fenner, remains a central reference for what took 
place at the height of activity in the 1970s.19 But the WHO archives on country-level 
smallpox eradication are difficult to access, and go through redaction before they are 
made available to external researchers. Many historical assessments of the guinea 
worm eradication campaign have also been written by those who were involved, and it 
is only relatively recently that work has been written on the campaign by 'outsiders'.20   
For Ghana, this includes research by Amy Moran-Thomas, published in 2015.21 Moran-
Thomas makes an ethnographic study of the final stages of the Carter Centre's guinea 
18 See, for example, Patterson, Health in Colonial Ghana, ch.4; Scott, Epidemic Disease in Ghana, 
ch.1.
19 Fenner, Smallpox and Its Eradication.
20 For an example of work produced by those who worked on the campaign, see Cairncross, Muller, 
and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’.
21 Amy Moran-Thomas, ‘The Creation of Emergency and Afterlife of Intervention: Reflections on 
Guinea Worm Eradication in Ghana’, in Medical Humanitarianism: Ethnographies of Practice, ed. 
Sharon Alane Abramowitz, Catherine Panter-Brick, and Peter Piot (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), ch.11.
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worm eradication work in northern Ghana in 2008, at a time when the country, which 
was one of the last to achieve eradication, was recording only 500 cases each year.
Moran-Thomas writes critically about the persistence of the late campaign's 
'emergency imaginary' in Ghana – the flotsam of campaign information material and 
community engagement activities which persisted in the public realm, even as the 
campaign drew to a close and the impacts of guinea worm became less evident in 
relation to other urgent health problems in the region. She discusses the vocabulary of 
disease emergencies, noting the ubiquitous martial language used in 'wars' on disease, 
and concludes that the guinea worm eradication programme constituted an 'iconic' 
example of an externally imposed, vertical, 'magic bullet' campaign (relying on the 
technological fix of individual water filters). She also concludes that the programme 
focused resources on what she appears to see as a relatively unimportant disease (not a 
'killing disease', like diabetes), and that it may ultimately have undermined the broader 
provision of public health, leaving behind a network of unrewarded rural volunteers. 
This thesis shares many of her interests and concerns with the 'afterlife' of public health
interventions, for guinea worm as well as for smallpox, sleeping sickness, and 
onchocerciasis.
However, Moran-Thomas, working in the ethnographic present at the tail end
of a decades-long campaign, arguably fails to set recent guinea worm control work in 
northern Ghana in its longer historical context.  As discussed above, although guinea 
worm was rarely a killing disease, it was the cause of extensive suffering and disability,
which in turn gave rise to economic privation and increased mortality and morbidity – 
in part by amplifying diseases of nutritional deprivation like kwashiorkor, which she 
cites as more deserving of attention. A defining characteristic of the 'neglected tropical 
diseases' is that they usually cause little direct mortality, but instead bring high 
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morbidity and a great deal of indirect mortality, through their impact on the ability of 
communities to sustain themselves.22 There were numerous instances over the twentieth
century in Ghana – notably during the colonial period in regard to yellow fever 
research – when resources were diverted away from control of widespread diseases 
affecting African subjects, on the grounds that a disease like yellow fever was 
potentially a more fearsome 'killing disease', even though it affected far fewer people. 
And although the guinea worm eradication programme was ostensibly a vertical, single 
disease campaign – certainly from the perspective of donor funders – on the ground it 
morphed into something broader. As this chapter shows, the networks of guinea worm 
'village volunteers' and district workers, mobilised and funded through the Carter 
Centre programme, took on an expanded unofficial role in public health provision 
across much of the north. The volunteers monitored their rural communities for many 
other diseases, alerting health workers to problems, and helped with general health 
education and the improvement of water supplies. This additional activity was contrary 
to the wishes of 'vertical' external donors, and came at a time when the Accra 
government was making little provision for expansion of the northern health system. 
Nor was the campaign focused on a single technological 'magic bullet'.  
Unlike smallpox, where a single vaccination could prevent future transmission of the 
disease, or the use of Ivermectin as a mass therapeutic agent for onchocerciasis, guinea 
worm control relied on a matrix of different measures over time: on various forms of 
improved water provision, including individual filters, but most critically on education 
and community surveillance by volunteers. By 2008, near the end of Ghana's guinea 
worm eradication programme, the disease would certainly have appeared less important
than many other local health problems.  Drawing on personal observations about the 
22 Callahan et al., ‘Contributions’, 3.
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relics of a spent campaign – the mass of guinea worm posters and hoardings still on 
show in the north, for a disease which barely existed any more – Moran-Thomas makes
an argument about the misplaced attentions of public health work. But underneath the 
old posters about guinea worm control, hung in clinic waiting rooms or plastered on 
bus shelters in the north, you will sometimes also find an even more tattered poster 
about the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (1970s-1980s). The public awareness 
materials which accompanied the earlier smallpox (1960s-1970s) or yaws (1930s-
1970s) campaigns are long gone, but they were once hung in the same places. In my 
interviews people remembered all four diseases as serious afflictions of the past, and 
nobody considered that the campaigns which ended them had been a misuse of 
resources.
Figure 27. Taha, northern Ghana, March 2006. Faded sign from the Guinea Worm Control Program
Source: Carter Center Health Programs Photos / E.Staub
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This may be an undeserved degree of criticism for one of the few non-
medical studies of guinea worm in northern Ghana. Despite the strengths of Moran 
Thomas' study, I mention it here as an example of a pervasive problem in the 
scholarship on northern Ghana: a failure to historicise research on recent decades, with 
the significance of long-standing problems obscured by assumptions about the current 
state of affairs. Jeff Grischow and Holger Weiss have written about the same 
phenomenon in recent studies of seasonal famine in the north, and Karl Botchway has 
documented the lack of historical awareness which underpinned a great deal of recent 
donor-funded development in the region.23
In relation to Africa more broadly, research by Susan Watts seeks to situate 
guinea worm control in context of the longer-term development of public health and 
political change. Watts argues that in the non-settler colonies where guinea worm was 
principally found, the life-cycle of the parasite meant that it was rarely encountered by 
Europeans, and the diseases was therefore almost entirely neglected until it affected 
conscripted African troops. This happened in Sudan in 1911, giving rise to a flurry of 
new research.24 Through examination of the history of guinea worm in rural 
communities around Ilorin, in western Nigeria, Watts observes that misplaced 
development work in the late colonial period and early independence era, notably the 
dam building of the 1960s, gave rise to an unanticipated increase in infections. She 
discusses local knowledge of the disease, observing that its association with water was 
known to many communities (even if the exact mode of transmission remained 
unclear), and describes how guinea worm eradication evolved from the global 
campaign against smallpox.25 Many of her conclusions are borne out in the history of 
23 See Grischow and Weiss, ‘Colonial Famine Relief’; Botchway, ‘Are Development Planners Afraid’.
24 Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities’, 802–5.
25 Ibid., 808–10.
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guinea worm in northern Ghana. With little other research focused on these aspects of 
the disease, Watts' paper is to some extent a foundational study of guinea worm in the 
history of twentieth century West Africa, and her work on Nigeria is an important 
comparative study for this chapter.
Part 1. The early Gold Coast gets the worm: the elimination of guinea worm in the
urban south, 1900-1930
The disease in the south
It is clear that guinea worm was recognised as a serious problem, at least for 
some groups of people, from the formalisation of colonial rule in the southern Colony 
in the late nineteenth century. The colonial administration saw the disease as a drag on 
the coastal economy and the efficiency of military recruits, while the Gold Coast 
Medical Department noted that it made significant demands on the limited funding 
allocations made towards African healthcare. In 1899, Guinea worm was recorded as 
the principal disease for which African subjects at the coast applied for government 
treatment.26  Across the century in Ghana, malaria has generally been the most 
prevalent disease in official records of in-patient and out-patient cases. This was the 
case in the early 1900s, when cases of malaria were recorded in detail according to 
symptomatic classifications ('tertian fever', 'bilious remittent fever' or 'blackwater 
fever', among others). However, in these early decades of colonial rule there were many
successive years when the number of cases of guinea worm were exceeded only by 
malaria as the most commonly encountered disease.27 In 1900 the Medical Department 
treated more cases of guinea worm than malaria, and through the 1910s medical 
26 1899 MDAR, 316.
27 See, for example, 1907 MDAR, 3 and Annex I, Disease Returns; 1908 MDAR, Annex I, Disease 
Returns; 1912 MDAR, 4 and Annex I, Disease Returns; 1914 MDAR, 6 and Annex I, Disease 
Returns.
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officers at some coastal hospitals complained about the demands that guinea worm 
made on their resources.28 In 1905 in Winneba, for example, the colonial dispensary 
reported that a third of all African patients (approximately 600 that year) were seeking 
treatment for guinea worm, many because they had experienced an unsuccessful worm 
extraction at home. This runs counter to Watt's argument about similar extraction 
methods deterring attendance at government facilities.29 
There were many indications of the Gold Coast government's concern about 
the impacts of the disease, and Medical Officers directed their research efforts towards 
its control. Officials had raised an alarm in 1901, noting that native police and other 
employees were severely affected by the disease, and insisting on the provision of 
filtered water to these groups.30 Similarly, in 1906, medical officers in Accra carried out
their own version of John Snow’s famous Broad Street Pump investigation. They 
tracked down an urban pond called the Akim Tank, a contaminated source of drinking 
water that had given rise to guinea worm infections among the African population, and 
ensured that it was enclosed with concrete and the water filtered.31 These early water 
improvements prefigured the extensive works that took place in the following decade. 
Medical officers also spent time researching the life cycle of the guinea worm parasite: 
some of the earliest local work had been done in the preceding century by the Sierra 
Leonian doctor James Africanus Horton, who mistakenly believed that the parasite was 
contracted through the soles of the feet.32 The copepod mode of transmission was well 
established by the 1900s, and in 1905 a guinea worm specialist, Dr Leiper, was 
commissioned to undertake a study in the Gold Coast: his work was seen as proving 
28 1900 MDAR, 7.
29 1905 MDAR, 15.
30 1900 MDAR, 31.
31 Ibid., 34.
32 See Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 223.
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conclusively that the local disease was similarly caused by infested copepods ingested 
in drinking water.33 
Research interest in the disease, and concern about the impacts of guinea 
worm on colonial revenues, came together in 1907 in a report written by medical 
officer W. M. Graham. His research was based on investigations across the Gold Coast, 
although the bulk of his conclusions on guinea worm had been drawn from a posting at 
Gambaga, in the far north-east, where he had observed the effect of the disease on 
military recruits. Graham couched his conclusions directly in terms of expenses and 
lost revenues, writing that:
The disease caused a larger annual loss to Government than all other native 
diseases in the aggregate ... Guinea Worm disease is of great economic 
importance on the Gold Coast, as it causes the largest annual admission to the 
Sick Lists in the various native services maintained by the Colony.34
His report, which circulated in London and locally, recognised that attempts to control 
the spread of the disease by curative methods or behavioural restrictions would be 
impossible, ‘as it is impossible to control the action of thirsty men’. Graham instead 
recommended a programme of water improvements: the closure and filling in of 
existing drinking pools or tanks in a settlement, and their replacement with deep wells 
lined with a concrete parapet, ideally accompanied by a pump, and ultimately the 
installation of public stand-pipes to supply urban drinking water.35
33 1905 MDAR, 12.
34 1907 MDAR, 25–27, Appendix: Report on Guinea Worm.
35 Ibid.
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Figure 28. Reclamation and concreting of an urban water source, Accra, 1914.
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection, CO 1069-40-33
Figure 29. Water pipeline, Sekondi, c.1914
Source: TNA, Colonial Office photographic collection, CO 1069-45-29
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The development of southern water supplies
From 1910 onwards, the recommendations made by Graham were rolled out 
across the coastal centres of the Gold Coast. In some cases this was done with the direct
intention of reducing guinea worm transmission, but also as part of a broader shift 
towards the improvement of living conditions in southern communities, in part to 
attract new trading and mining firms. The annual medical report from 1912 argued that 
in the preceding decades, some traders and colonial officials had deliberately spread the
idea that the Gold Coast was an unhealthy destination, in order to deter the ingress of 
competitors:
This colony is overshadowed by a curse, the curse of a bad name ... to preserve 
the monopoly of an extraordinarily lucrative trade, merchants have damned the 
place by giving it a bad name, and thus crippled all attempts at developing the 
resources of the Colony.  We can at least serve one useful purpose – we can 
show that we enjoy no monopoly of any peculiarly fatal and malignant disease. 
There can be no doubt that in the past, officials as well as merchants have 
caballed to keep up the evil reputation of the Colony.36
Improved water supplies at the coast, and in inland mining communities, were to some 
extent a way of countering this reputation in Britain, at a time when the colonial 
administration was expanding and private firms were importing a large number of 
British mineworkers. Water supply improvements were also linked to new ideas about 
urban sanitation and racial segregation in colonial Africa. But as Graham's report, 
earlier recommendations after the 'Akim Tank' investigation, and the provision of 
filtered water to the Native Police demonstrated, concerns about guinea worm also 
played a part in the rapid expansion of potable water supplies from 1910.
By 1910, the Gold Coast administration had begun work on piped water 
supplies for Accra and Sekondi, although the first town in the colony to get piped water
was the gold mining settlement of Obuasi, where 12 public standpipes had been 
36 1912 MDAR, 4.
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installed by the mining company.37  Already, by 1900 the only stagnant or guinea 
worm-infested water sources in the coastal towns were considered to be in 'Native' 
areas, and these were in the process of being improved.38  A similar process of replacing
ponds with wells was under way in the larger inland towns, and from 1910 
developments accelerated rapidly. By this time health officials had developed an 
apparently detailed picture of the state of water provision in the south, although as later 
developments would show, almost no attention had been paid to water supply in the 
Northern Territories. The medical department reported that in 1910 there were 38 
public wells, 1,224 private wells, 130 public and 854 private water tanks, and 3,043 
water barrels across the Colony and Ashanti's various settlements, with 80 percent of 
these now 'protected' from insect larvae.39  
37 1910 MDAR, 54.
38 1900 MDAR, 14; 1902 MDAR, 28–29.
39 1910 MDAR, 54–55.
323
The installation of new water supplies often proceeded without the 
involvement of health officials, giving rise to complaints from the Medical Department:
this lack of medical oversight came to have serious implications for the spread of both 
onchocerciasis and guinea worm, before and after independence.40 In 1911 the drinking 
water supply in the 'Native' areas of some settlements was still considered ‘little better 
than liquid sewage’. But water works were in an advanced stage of construction in 
Accra and Sekondi, and plans were underway for piped water in the coastal towns of 
Cape Coast, Saltpond and Winneba.41 In 1912, more than thirty settlements in the 
Colony and Ashanti reported water supply improvements, including the construction of 
numerous wells, concrete water tanks and public wash houses, and the draining of 
swamps and other standing water.42 By 1913, a reporting protocol had been established 
to monitor water supply provision, giving detail on work in each administrative region, 
although the Northern Territories were not included in any similar assessment.43
The Accra waterworks began operation in 1914, and the site for a waterworks
at Kumasi was selected in the same year.44 Although many large-scale plans were held 
up during the First World War, the installation of wells and sealed tanks continued in 
smaller towns in the south, and there was an expansion of piped water to African 
communities in the gold mining areas.45 In 1917 the installation of piped water was 
completed at Sekondi, and by 1920 water works were planned for Koforidua and Axim,
in addition to the plants already under construction at Kumasi, Cape Coast, Winneba 
and Saltpond; it was also recommended that enclosed water carriage and sewage 
systems be installed in all the coastal towns.46 Surveys for the railway network linking 
40 See, for example, 1911 MDAR, 55.
41 Ibid., 66.
42 1912 MDAR, 104, ‘Water Supply’.
43 See, for example, 1913 MDAR, 48, ‘Water Supply’.
44 Ibid., 21.
45 1915 MDAR, 17; 1916 MDAR, 14.
46 1917 MDAR, 19; 1920 MDAR, 23.
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Kumasi to the coast had begun by 1923, along with proposals to extend piped water 
supplies out from urban centres to nearby villages. The administration had already 
completed a waterworks at Winneba, and had begun overhauling Accra's existing piped 
supply to allow further expansion.47 The mid-1920s saw a further sustained expansion 
of drinking water supplies in the south, including a scheme to improve private wells 
through construction of concrete casings, and the extension of piped water in mining 
areas inland.48 Piped water began flowing at Cape Coast in 1927, by which time a 
system of chlorinated wells had been installed at Kumasi, ahead of its piped supply.49 
The construction of waterworks began at Kumasi and Koforidua in 1928,  and civil 
engineering projects were commenced to remove expansive bodies of standing water (a
major source of guinea worm infection) in both the south and Ashanti.50 These projects 
included the partial draining and concrete walling of the Korle Lagoon at Accra, and 
the filling in of the Ejisu, New Asafu and Brobo Valley wetlands close to Kumasi.51 
The effects of water improvement on guinea worm disease
These details – by no means a comprehensive account – are recounted to 
show the pace and extent of water supply improvements in Ashanti and the Colony 
before 1930. Piped water was installed in the major coastal settlements, and then 
extended into surrounding villages. In large towns where piped water had not been 
installed by 1930, chlorination was often used as an alternative, and concrete lined 
wells were installed at large and small settlements across the southern Gold Coast. 
Engineering projects aimed at reducing disease transmission, and at reclaiming ground 
47 1921 MDAR, 10; 1922 MDAR, 10, 49; 1923-1924 MDAR, 15.
48 1924-1925 MDAR, 17.
49 1927-1928 MDAR, 28, 33.
50 1928 MDAR, 31.
51 1929 MDAR, 23.
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for roads, railways and construction, drained extensive wetlands that had previously 
been a focus of guinea worm disease.
Many of these improvements were not directed specifically at guinea worm, 
and on several occasions they were driven by outbreaks of diseases more feared by 
Europeans. In 1910, referring to an epidemic which affected a number of southern 
towns, the annual medical report noted that ‘the unfortunate outbreak of yellow fever 
was not without some good results – money was voted and drinking water sources 
protected on a scale that would not otherwise have been possible’.52 Similarly, in regard
to the provision of chlorinated water supplies in some native areas of Kumasi, a report 
in 1924 observed that the decision ‘received its initial impetus from the outbreak of 
plague’.53
Nevertheless, the expansion of drinking water supplies had a significant 
effect on the prevalence of guinea worm in the south. Even simple improvements 
intended to reduce mosquito breeding (for example the sealing of tanks), which did not 
render water free from dysentery or other microbial disease risks, appear to have been 
effective in excluding copepods and breaking the transmission of guinea worm. The 
results were very clear.  In 1914, the year that the first public water standpipes were 
made available in Accra, the medical report recorded that:
A very interesting fact has come to light about Guinea worm among prison 
warders who reside altogether in Accra. The disease was very prevalent 
amongst them before the inauguration of the water supply, but since then it has 
almost disappeared. It also appears to be diminishing in the “blue” policemen 
stationed in Accra, but still occurs frequently in the “escort” policeman, who are
continually leaving headquarters on duty.54
52 1910 MDAR, 54.
53 Ibid., 22.
54 1914 MDAR, 12.
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The number of treated cases in Accra fell by 67 percent between 1914 and 
1915, and fell to 30 times lower in the following four years.55 There were only four 
cases recorded at the town's native hospitals in 1918, and it was noted that ‘the 
progressive decline in the incidence of the disease is an obvious result of the 
introduction of the pipe-borne water supply’.56  Although this decline was most 
noticeable in Accra, where piped water was first installed, improved drinking water 
provision meant that fewer people became infected in many southern settlements. 
Between 1914 and 1915 the medical department recorded that ‘general improvement in
water supplies has had a marked effect in some places in checking the ravages of 
dracunculosis’.57 The Gold Coast's total number of treated cases dropped by 50 percent,
with falls of 82 percent in Winneba and 47 percent in Ashanti (part of the decline in 
Ashanti was attributed to the departure of encamped troops, mostly northerners, during 
the war).58 
This rapid reduction in guinea worm was most clearly linked to the provision 
of clean drinking water, but education and the increasing affluence of some African 
subjects also played a part. By 1913 the administration had included lessons on the 
guinea worm disease in the hygiene curriculum taught at government schools, teaching 
that infection could be prevented by cloth filtration or boiling drinking water – another 
indication of colonial concern with the disease's social and economic impacts.59 This 
educational programme appears to have been effective for those elites who had access 
to schooling. Reports observed that the southern colony's 'better class of inhabitants' 
had begun regular use of cloth filtration –  the measure which Moran-Thomas 
55 See the full record of ‘health achievements’ for 1915 in 1933-1934 MDAR, 5.
56 1914 MDAR, 7.
57 Ibid., 40.
58 1915 MDAR, 9.
59 1913 MDAR, 83, Appendix 4, ‘On the Teaching of Hygiene in the Schools’.
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considered a new technological 'magic bullet' for the northern Guinea Worm 
Eradication Program in 2008 – and that this had contributed to a decline in cases.60   
Large-scale provision of clean drinking water and piped supplies advanced 
unevenly across colonial Africa. The headquarters town of Buea in German Cameroon, 
for example, had installed piped water as early as 1903, supplying this to urban African 
subjects, while the populous Benin City in Nigeria only installed piped water in the late
1930s.61 The southern Gold Coast developed clean urban water supplies relatively early,
driven both by a general trend towards improvement, in part to appease expatriate 
Europeans in light of changing water standards in Europe, and by a concern to address 
diseases that were seen as a burden on the colonial economy. The stark decline in 
guinea worm cases did not mean that the disease was eliminated in the south, except 
perhaps in some urban centres were most drinking and washing water was piped by 
1930. But its prevalence was greatly reduced, along with the economic and social 
burden which a debilitating disease places upon an affected population.  From the early 
1920s, guinea worm simply disappeared from the main section of the annual medical 
reports for a number of years. 
Part 2. Advocacy, misplaced actions and stasis: guinea worm in the north before 
independence
Guinea Worm in the north before 1930 
In the successive reports that hailed the expansion of drinking water in the 
south, a common theme emerged in the reporting of guinea worm. The disease was 
increasingly seen as an affliction of people from the north, whose increasing presence 
60 1914 MDAR, 40, ‘Report: Guinea Worm’.
61 Charisma Acey, ‘Forbidden Waters: Colonial Intervention and the Evolution of Water Supply in 
Benin City, Nigeria’, Water History 4, no. 3 (2012): 215–29; Ben Page, ‘The History of Water 
Politics and the Politics of Water History: Cameroon’ (Unpublished Paper, 2012), 
http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/people/academic-staff/ben-page/files/AfricanWaterHistories.pdf.
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as migrant labourers, harbouring 'imported cases', confounded attempts to gain a sense 
of southern disease conditions: ‘Its true endemic distribution is not fully known, as 
many cases occur in persons who have acquired the parasite in the northern territories, 
and it may be months before its appearance at the sore on the patient's body’.62  The 
Accra government's concern with the problem of imported guinea worm disease was 
part of a deepening conception of the north as a zone of disease, from which the people 
and water supplies of 'the more important centres' of the colony needed protecting – the
region was also seen as a source of yaws and bilharzia, and later of sleeping sickness.63 
‘Imported cases' became a term which connoted more than just a carrier of disease, and 
was often used in reports which made broader criticisms of northern vagrancy and 
poverty and their impact on southern labour centres.64 The unusual persistence of 
guinea worm as a disease affecting prisoners in southern jails may have been because 
many of those imprisoned were from the north. This is speculative, but not without 
some foundation. In 1948, a survey found that more than half of all beggars in Sekondi-
Takoradi were destitute northerners, a condition which may have brought many into the
penal system.65
Observations about imported cases indicated the state of guinea worm disease
in the north itself. From 1904 onwards it was known that the disease posed a serious 
public health problem in the region and a burden on the economy. Guinea worm was 
among the principal diseases for which northerners applied for treatment at government
facilities, and the 1907 report by Graham, which considered that guinea worm caused 
‘a larger annual loss to Government than all other native diseases in the aggregate’, had
62 1921 MDAR, 18.
63 1919 MDAR, 16; 1936-1937 MDAR, 25.
64 See, for example, 1923-1924 MDAR, 12; 1924-1925 MDAR, 21; 1932-1933 MDAR, 9; 1937-1938 
MDAR, 25.
65 1936-1937 MDAR, 3; and K.A. Busia (1950), ‘Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi’, 
(London: Crown Agents, 1950), quoted in Destombes, ‘Long-Term Patterns of Seasonal Hunger’, 
42.
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partly been based on his observations of infection at Gambaga.66 By 1923, as the 
disease declined in the south, the annual medical report concluded that ‘Guinea Worm 
prevails mostly in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, or in persons who have 
come from these Territories’.67  
This became a standard, almost annual observation for the rest of the colonial
period. From 1910 to 1930, drinking water provision had advanced rapidly in the 
Colony and Ashanti, and the dangers of guinea worm as a social problem or cause of 
lost revenues had been greatly reduced. But there had been almost no similar water 
supply developments further north over the same period. The northern administration 
had to some extent handed off attempted control of the disease to local chiefs, simply 
requiring them to make sure that ‘guinea-worm patients must not go to the water 
place’.68 The intense focus and spending on southern water systems drew expertise and 
attention away from more basic expansion of clean water and wells elsewhere, and the 
north did not experience outbreaks of the internationally 'notifiable' diseases – yellow 
fever and plague – which had given an impetus to water provision outside the urban 
centres. Government education remained extremely limited in the protectorate, and 
there appears to have been no teaching of methods for preventing the disease. 
The worm remained a serious burden on northern communities, part of a 
growing divergence in the health prospects of the two regions, and before the mid-
1920s northern officials attempted little advocacy regarding either guinea worm or 
clean water.  The north had been an unpopular posting from its induction into the Gold 
Coast, and in the early decades it attracted few motivated medical or political officers. 
66 1903-1904 MDAR, 19, ‘Health Rpt on the Northern Territories’; 1904 MDAR, 12; 1907 NTAR, 21; 
1907 MDAR, 25–27, Appendix: Report on Guinea Worm; 1925-1926 NTAR, 11; 1926-1927 NTAR, 
19.
67 1923-1924 MDAR, 61.
68 PP 1922 [Cmd.1698] Report on the British mandated sphere of Togoland for 1920-1921 together 
with a despatch from the Governor of the Gold Coast, 31, ‘Duties and Rights of Chiefs’.
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As one assessment in 1902 recorded, ‘Officers leaving the Northern Territories are for 
the most part greatly run down. There is no doubt about the effect of a lonely life at an 
out-station... the temper and the temperament of the subject suffers in an unmistakable 
manner’.69 However, from the mid-1920, faced with an increasingly serious health 
situation, some officials did become advocates for improvements in the north, and 
guinea worm figured prominently in their criticism of the region's neglect by Accra.
 A period of advocacy – 1925-1940
While the provision of clean drinking water had been accomplished in many 
larger settlements in the south, little similar work had been done even in Tamale, the 
regional headquarters and largest urban centre of the north. In 1909, when plans for 
southern water provision were being developed, the government had sent an expert to 
assess the state of water supplies in the protectorate. But almost nothing happened from
1910 to the mid-1920s, during the south's drinking water boom. In 1921 it was 
observed that although there was a policy to gradually provide safe wells in villages 
across the protectorate, 'a few wells only have been dug'.70 In 1925, efforts remained 
focused on the improvement of drinking at the administration's headquarters in Tamale,
while it was planned that in coming years, water-related expenditures would be directed
at the installation of wells on the main trade route linking the south with French Upper 
Volta, a policy unlikely to improve the guinea worm situation elsewhere in the 
protectorate, and another example of the ancillary situation of the north in relation to 
southern economic interests.71 Little funding was available to build sealed wells or 
69 1902 MDAR, 33,  ’Report on health in the Northern Territories’.
70 1921 NTAR, 10.
71 1925-1926 NTAR, 22.
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tanks for use by northern communities, and problems with water supply were often 
blamed on population expansion rather than administrative inaction.72
As the 1920s progressed and the south's water situation improved, however, a
number of political and medical officers began to raise insistent complaints about the 
this disparate development, noting the relationship between Northern Territories water 
and diseases including guinea worm. The Chief Medical Officer reported in 1926 that 
‘there can be no doubt that the unsatisfactory and highly contaminated sources of water
supply in many localities, more especially in the Northern Territories, constitutes a 
cause of the high incidence of diseases in the Gold Coast’.73 Another section of the 
same report, concerned with guinea worm,  observed that ‘the position as regards water
supplies, more especially in the Northern Territories, is far from satisfactory, and 
money spent on the improvement and protection of public water supplies would 
undoubtedly result in a general improvement of health conditions’.74
72 1928-1929 NTAR, 10.
73 1926-27 MDAR, 23.
74 Ibid., 26, ‘Dracontiasis’.
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The same complaints were made the following year, when the medical report 
noted that ‘the want of good water supplies in the Northern Territories ... is a very 
serious handicap to the health of the inhabitants of these areas’.75 Local protectorate 
officers complained that the drinking water in their districts was unfit for human 
consumption, or ‘can only be compared to liquid mud’.76 In 1934, protectorate officials 
observed that ‘everywhere the villages are crying out for improved water supplies’,  
while the 1935 report argued that clean drinking water remained ‘the most pressing 
need of the people’.77 The northern administration was aware that its water advocacy 
was hindered by the region's political and economic peripherality, ‘an isolation which is
inevitable, so long as the Protectorate is separated from the seat of Government by so 
valuable a crop as cocoa’.78
Intensified advocacy continued into the 1930s, with successive reports 
continuing to observe that ‘much hardship results’ or ‘much hardship is experienced 
owing to shortage of potable water in many areas in the Northern Territories’.79 It was 
argued that ‘the debilitating effects of disease and lack of satisfactory water supplies 
result in an inability to farm extensively’.80 In 1937, a decade after northern officers and
the Gold Coast medical department had begun to increase pressure on Accra for 
drinking water expansion in the north, the medical department insisted that 
‘undoubtedly the most pressing need, generally, in the Northern Territories is an 
adequate supply of pure water. When provided the benefit to the public health will be 
incalculable’.81 The following year it similarly argued that ‘a supply of adequate water 
75 1928 MDAR, 14.
76 1929-1930 NTAR, 4, Report from Medical Officer, Bawku District; 1931-1932 NTAR, 3, Chief 
Commissioner’s Report.
77 1935-1936 NTAR, 59.
78 1937-1938 NTAR, 38.
79 1934-1935 MDAR, 3; 1935-1936 MDAR, 61, ‘Water Supplies’.
80 1934-1935 MDAR, 4, ‘Factors Affecting Public Health’.
81 1937-1938 MDAR, 37, ‘Water Supplies’.
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for [Northern Territories settlements] will mean a revolutionary improvement of a 
thrifty and industrious population’.82  
At the end of the 1930s this sustained advocacy finally appeared to be 
bringing results. A large-scale survey of the north had been commissioned, which 
compelled the Accra government to admit the extent of health and economic problems 
stemming from insufficient clean water, resulting in recommendations for the 
establishment of a dedicated Water Supply Section. The tone of northern officials 
became recriminative:
To all with a knowledge of the country it was obvious that until the serious 
shortage of water was remedied there could be little economic development and
no improvement in the social and health conditions of the people. They realised 
that little benefit could accrue to them from hospitals and dispensaries, from the
schemes for the development of the cattle industry and the introduction of 
mixed farming unless adequate supplies were provided for both man and 
beast ... It is no exaggeration to say that the establishment of the Water Supply 
Section marks the beginning of a new era in the history of the Protectorate. The 
health of the people has suffered and the economic development of the territory 
has been retarded by the lack of water supplies.83
As discussed in Chapter 2, the period from 1925-1938 was an unusually intense period
of advocacy on the part of some medical officers and northern officials. Arguments for 
the provision of clean drinking water were evidently related to a range of public health 
problems, and not just guinea worm. At one point, the cause was helped by the 
intervention of non-government health workers, posted in the north on behalf of the 
British Empire Leprosy Relief Administration. BELRA's privately-funded health 
workers raised a number of complaints about the provision of clean water across the 
region, arguing that this was responsible for the spread of diseases co-infective with 
leprosy. Their complaints met with a swift response, at least in the case of their own 
facilities: a pump and filtration system was ordered and sent north by the Accra 
82 1938-1939 MDAR, 27, Subsection D: ‘Water Supplies’.
83 1937-1938 NTAR, 82, ‘Water Supplies’.
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government.84 As with the British Empire Society for the Blind and onchocerciasis two
decades later, this was an example of the way that a non-governmental organisation, 
with influence in the metropole, could exert a pressure for change that was beyond the 
political reach of local officials.  
The criticism of government inaction on drinking water provision also 
reflected an early turn (on the part of some officials) towards the 'developmental' 
colonialism often associated with the post-war years. Calls for northern water 
improvements were sometimes couched in this language: ‘The improvement of public 
health is not merely a problem of treating diseases, but is bound up with the whole 
problem of raising the standard of living all round’.85 From the outset of this period of 
advocacy, guinea worm was consistently cited as a disease of central concern.  Calls 
for the extension of drinking water supply were most often contained in subsections of 
the annual reports dealing with the disease:
In the major portion of cases of guinea worm the infection was acquired owing 
to the poor quality of water supplies in many areas. The Medical Officer, 
Zuarungu, stated in his Annual Report that [10 percent] of all the patients he 
treated were cases of guinea worm infection. Preventive measures consist in the 
improvement of water supplies … The position as regards water supplies, more 
especially in the Northern Territories is far from satisfactory.86
[Guinea worm] is an important disease from the standpoint of labour efficiency 
– it is chiefly met with in the Northern Territories … In these areas the water 
supply is of extremely poor quality.87
Guinea-worm still remains a disabling factor of great importance in the 
Northern Territories where water supplies are usually inadequate as regards 
quantity and are polluted.88
84 1927-1928 MDAR, 83 Appendix D: ‘Report on the Leper Settlement’; 1928 MDAR, 127, Appendix 
E: ’Report on Leprosy by the Medical Secretary to the Gold Coast Branch of the British Empire 
Leprosy Relief Association, Navrongo, NTs’; 1929 MDAR, 191 Appendix C: ‘Report on the Leper 
Settlement’.
85 1929 MDAR, 10.
86 1926-27 MDAR, 27, ‘Dracontiasis’.
87 1929 MDAR, 14, ‘Dracontiasis’.
88 1933-1934 MDAR, 10.
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To recount the other diseases existing in the Protectorate would be unduly to 
burden this report with details which can be found elsewhere. Mention must, 
however, be made of the prevalence of helminthic diseases, the commonest 
being guinea-worm which if it develops in the legs, as it generally does, 
incapacitates the victims for work … Improved water supplies and sanitation 
will alone remedy the situation permanently.89
The socioeconomic effect of the disease on northern communities were 
consistently recognised.  It was known that ‘in certain areas, particularly in the 
Northern Territories, infestation is so common as to be almost universal. In the areas 
where it is rife it is a potent cause of labour inefficiency’.90 Couching their advocacy in 
economic terms (a method which had been successful in prompting the expansion of 
clean water in the south) medical officers argued that ‘the infestation is very rarely seen
in the larger centres except in the form of an imported case. It is however very common
in the NTs … it is one of the most important factors when labour efficiency is 
considered’.91 Seen as 'exceedingly common', guinea worm was shown to cause 
'prolonged disablement', and came to be seen as the principal 'disabling disease’ in 
many parts of the Northern Territories.92 Perhaps aware of the disparate attention paid 
to 'killing diseases' and death tolls by the political administration, in addition to 
diseases it considered of economic importance, the Medical Department insisted that 
the annual disease returns for guinea worm (which rarely showed any deaths), ‘give no 
real indication of the vast amount of invalidism caused’.93
Drinking water in the north
Advocacy was carried out both by medical and political officers in the north, 
and by officials in the headquarters of the Gold Coast Medical Department. One of its 
89 1937-1938 NTAR, 78.
90 1928 MDAR, 27, ‘Dracontiasis’.
91 1933-1934 MDAR, 28, ‘Dracunculiasis’.
92 1931-1932 MDAR, 24, ‘Dracontiasis’; 1929 MDAR, 14.
93 1931-1932 MDAR, 9.
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first results was the acceleration of a plan to install a piped water system in Tamale, 
previously not included in recommendations for future work. Construction of the 
system began in 1930, at the same time as work on the long-planned Kumasi 
waterworks (the town had previously installed a system of chlorinated wells and 
encased springs), and was opened in March 1932, a year ahead of Kumasi.94 The 
Medical Department listed this as the 'outstanding event of the year' in its report on 
guinea worm, anticipating that 'this very much needed improvement will have a far 
reaching effect upon public health in Tamale'.95  
Advocacy continued through the 1930s, as did problems in the northern water
supply. It became clear that the waterworks rapidly constructed at Tamale was not built 
to the same standard as those further south, and was unable to treat enough water to 
supply the African and European populations of the town. The lengthy reports of water 
quality assessments from the Accra Laboratory record no attempts to test the purity of 
treated Tamale water, although southern urban centres were annually tested.96 In 1940, 
the use of piped water was Tamale was restricted by order of the administration, and by
1950 Europeans visiting the city were advised to boil their water ‘owing to an 
interrupted supply’.97 Although its functions were impaired, the waterworks at Tamale 
was used to impress northern chiefs who travelled to the Protectorate's headquarters – 
the Chief of Sandema was reported to have said ‘This is wonderful, and now I see what
the white man has done for the country. I should like one myself but fear that I shall 
never have one’.98 The waterworks operated successfully for only a short period, 
however, before falling into disrepair.
94 1930-31 MDAR, 35, Subsection D: ‘Water Supplies’.
95 1931-1932 MDAR, 24, ‘Dracontiasis’, and 27, ‘Water Supplies’.
96 See, for example, this laboratory report, the year after the Tamale waterworks opened. 1933-1934 
MDAR, 35.
97 1940 MDAR, 6; NRG/8/13/4 (1945-55), Enc.34: Chief Medical Officer of Health, NTs, to Chief 
Commissioner, Tamale, 12 April 1950.
98 1935-1936 MDAR, 30.
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Northern officials and some medical officers continued to raise criticisms of 
Accra for failing to fund clean water supplies. But during the mid-1930s, some of the 
most rapid advances were made locally, when the newly-created Native Authorities 
were empowered to raise taxes for spending on local projects. In 1934 alone, thirty new
concreted wells were dug with Native Authority funding. This opened a new line of 
criticism from local officers, who could compare Native Authority action with neglect 
from Accra:
The villages are crying out for improved water supplies and the Native 
Administration is showing a commendable desire to answer appeals, even 
where the village concerned is far from its headquarters. This statement is 
equally true of other NAs ... it is to be hoped that the endeavours of the people 
to help themselves will be rewarded by the grant of generous assistance either 
by the central government or from the Colonial Development Fund.99 
In 1935, the Dagomba and Mamprusi Native Authorities allocated £600 to employ a 
European engineer with the brief of expanding drinking water supplies in their areas, 
prompting a district officer to report that ‘the progress made by the Dagombas has 
enabled them to obtain benefits which they would probably never have received if they 
had waited on Government generosity’.100 Perhaps goaded by this local activity, from 
1936 the Accra government devoted more attention to developing clean water supplies 
in rural districts away from Tamale. A Northern Territories Water Supply Party was 
created to survey the north in advance of making improvements, and local Native 
Authorities voted more than £1,700 to support the survey. Northern officials hailed ‘the
rather belated realization that from health point of view, as well as that of development 
of the country, the first and most important step is improvement of water supplies’.101
99 1934-1935 NTAR, 96–97.
100 1935-1936 NTAR, 30.
101 Ibid., 57.
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The Accra government's approval of the survey marked its first action 
towards a comprehensive solution for the north's water problems and related diseases. 
Once the survey was scheduled, however, local 'amateur' projects for improving water 
supply (run by Native Authorities or district administrators) were prohibited, as a way 
of restricting wasteful expenditure ahead of what was anticipated to be a 
comprehensive central solution.102 This had a similar effect to restrictions on the 
expansion of Native Authorities dispensaries (see Chapters 1 and 3), which stalled the 
development of what had been a successful local measure. ‘When the Water Supply 
Department starts serious activities in 1937-38, it is hoped that rapid advances will be 
made’, read the Northern Territories report in 1936, after the government's completed 
survey had accepted the severity of poor health caused by inadequate drinking water 
provision.103 The newly created Water Supply Department's plans were ambitious, and 
indicated the scale of the potable water problem which underpinned the high 
prevalence of guinea worm – the survey had concluded that in order to provide basic 
access to clean water it would be necessary to build 2,167 sealed wells and 28 large 
dams across the region. In areas where wells or dams were geologically impossible, or 
for small villages, it proposed building traditional biliga underground water tanks, used
elsewhere in West Africa.104  
Some problems became apparent immediately. The Gold Coast Medical 
Department was not kept informed about about the Water Supply Department's ongoing
work, and the department’s plans were constrained by a reluctance to allocate funds in 
Accra.105 Having secured a survey and the subsequent creation of a water supply 
department, local health officials now argued that the government should develop a 
102 1936-1937 NTAR, 95.
103 1935-1936 NTAR, 96–97.
104 1937-1938 NTAR, 82.
105 1936-1937 MDAR, 28; 1938-1939 MDAR, 27, ‘Water Supplies’.
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third scheme ‘for the provision of funds for water supplies in the Northern 
Territories’.106 But by 1941 these plans were overtaken by world events, and 
construction stalled during the war:  ‘In the Northern Territories the Geological Survey 
Water section continues its activities under difficulties. Materials, at present, are 
difficult to obtain, and any material advance will have to wait for the cessation of the 
present hostilities’.107 
The work of the north's Water Supply Department, which had offered the best
possibility of reducing the impacts of guinea worm disease on northern people, ground 
to a halt for almost a decade from the early 1940s. Two separate water supply projects 
continued, but in relation to guinea worm disease these alternative programmes may 
have increased the severity of the problem in the north. Instead of concreted wells, each
initiative concentrated on the building of small stillwater impoundments, potentially 
increasing the number of breeding sites for guinea worm larvae and their host 
copepods. First there was the work of the Tsetse Control Department from the late 
1930s to the early 1950s, as discussed in Chapter 2. Although the department's work 
began in response to an epidemic of sleeping sickness, and the search for a means to 
contain it, its remit became substantially broader. The department worked both to 
eliminate the tsetse fly from river valleys through the mass clearing of riverine bush, 
and then to attract northern people to move into these areas, settle, and begin mixed 
agriculture. As part of this plan it built a succession of small dams along the river and 
stream systems it cleared. These dams were later implicated in the onchocerciasis 
epidemic, which became an international scandal at independence – each dam created a
well-oxygenated spillway, in which the blackfly that transmits onchocerciasis can 
breed. Although no formal assessment was made, because the disease attracted little 
106 1937-1938 MDAR, 37.
107 1941 MDAR, 6, ‘Water Supplies’; 1943 MDAR, 6.
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attention in the north until the end of the colonial era, the effects of dam-building on 
guinea worm disease may have been equally serious. The department had 
unintentionally created a network of new copepod habitats in areas where infection had 
previously been less likely (the copepod cannot live in running water, and people who 
had previously obtained their drinking water from streams were not exposed to 
infection). When northern guinea worm eventually became the focus of a dedicated 
control programme, several decades after independence, the high number of small dams
in the north was shown to be a central factor in its prevalence, although researchers in 
the 1980s were unaware that much of this dam building took place during a public 
health campaign of the colonial era.108 
The Tsetse Control Department's programme was seen a way to realise the 
Accra administration's economic and developmental ambitions for the north, while 
helping to addressing a water supply crisis that had drawn complaints from local 
officials. Another group based within the Department of Agriculture was also engaged 
in the mass building of dams in the protectorate, as part of a policy to promote mixed 
agriculture. As Grischow and Weiss have discussed, this policy emerged from the work 
of the colonial agriculturalist Charles Lynn, who conducted research across the north 
from 1932 to 1937. Intent on addressing the region’s nutritional crisis, Lynn proposed a
system of mixed farming accompanied by the introduction of bullock ploughing, and 
the construction of multiple small ponds for irrigation.109 His proposals became 
Agricultural Department policy in 1940, driving a further expansion in the number of 
guinea worm transmission sites across the region.
108 For discussion of the Anti-Tsetse Department’s dam building, see Chapter 3. For data on the north’s 
small dams and guinea worm prevalence see Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 229.
109 Grischow and Weiss, ‘Colonial Famine Relief’, 80–85.
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In the context of sustained criticism regarding the provision of drinking water
supplies, and with additional ambitions for boosting agricultural production, the 
colonial government appears to have selected dam building as its method of choice for 
water expansion. As discussed in the chapter on onchocerciasis, this dam building 
proceeded without significant medical department supervision or consideration of its 
broader health impacts. Both Lynn and the Anti-Tsetse Department reported directly to 
the Department of Agriculture. In the case of the anti-tsetse programme, even local 
medical and political officers were often unaware of the extent of the department's 
work in remote areas. Although one or two local officials (notably B.B. Waddy) made a
late connection between dam building and increased onchocerciasis, the risks of 
increased guinea worm were not identified by any of those aware of the work.  During 
the war, general responsibility and oversight of water safety was removed from the 
Gold Coast Medical Department, and this remained the case after the war. As the 
medical department reported, it could only be involved if a department actively sought 
its advice:
It is now a matter of considerable difficulty commenting in detail on such 
matters as labour conditions ... and water supplies, when these activities are the 
proper functions of other Departments and Boards. In so far as this Department 
is concerned [regarding water supplies], progress has been slow. 110
The region's distance from the economic centre, and its lack of a political 
voice at Accra, meant that the problem of northern guinea worm had been a subject of 
concern only to the small number of officials who made it part of their advocacy 
efforts. The most vocal among these were officers of the Gold Coast Medical 
Department, both in the north and Accra. With supervision of drinking water supplies 
110 1946 MDAR, 10, ‘Hygiene and Sanitation’.
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removed from their oversight, this strand of advocacy subsided until shortly before 
independence.
Funding levels and expenditures on the north increased at the end of the 
1940s. The Northern Territories Water Supply Department resumed some of its 
schemes for building enclosed wells which (unlike dams) reduced rather than increased
the risk of guinea worm disease. Four hundred and forty wells had been sunk by 1949, 
and the government proposed the construction of a piped water supply for the heavily 
populated area around Bolgatanga.111 But this work was also overtaken by events, as it 
became clear that decolonisation was imminent. In the years leading up to 
independence many projects were shelved, including the extension of the northern 
water supply. In one of its final criticisms before it was dissolved, the north’s colonial 
administration wrote to the government at Accra, noting that local taxation would be 
unable to fund drinking water provision: ‘In the foreseeable future, Local Authorities 
with the utmost help that Government Agents can give, will not be able to provide 
sanitary works on the scale which your own representatives have indicated are essential
for the maintenance of a decent standard of health in this region’.112
As plans were formulated for the long-term development of public health in 
an independent Ghana, it became clear that responsibility for monitoring and control of 
diseases like guinea worm, in the peripheral north, would pass almost entirely to the 
recently created Medical Field Units.113 As discussed in Chapter 3, the mobile MFUs 
became the front line of public health work in the region, in part because they cost far 
less to operate than conventional facilities. The various mission clinics of the north 
111 1948 MDAR, 15,  ‘Hygiene and Sanitation’.
112 NRG/8/13/4 (1945-55), Enc.37: ‘General Sanitary Improvements’, CRO Tamale to DMS, Accra, 16 
August 1952.
113 NRG/8/13/11 (1949-57), Enc.7: Report from R.S. Cheverton-‘Observations on the Medical 
Department following a tour in the Gold Coast and Neighbouring French Territories Between 
November 1949 and April 1950’, 48-49.
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were seen as another line of state-supported medical provision against the disease.114 By
this time mission clinics were already providing treatment for guinea worm, and 
working to improve local water supplies, activities which must have helped to reinforce
their broader influence. In the 1950s the government also arranged for mobile cinema 
vans to tour the north, showing films on preventing infection by guinea worm and other
water-borne diseases.115 The value of educational interventions in limiting the disease 
had already been demonstrated in the south, where mass education on guinea worm 
prevention had been provided forty years earlier. 
Despite the evident reach and efficiency of the MFUs, their mode of 
operation meant that there was little they could achieve against a disease like guinea 
worm, apart from reactively treating affected people whom they encountered on visits 
to northern villages. Control of the disease depended on provision of safe drinking 
water supplies, and this had not been achieved by the end of colonial rule. Instead, in 
the 1950s there was a renewed insistence that water improvements should be funded 
from local revenues.116 The sanitation initiatives set in motion by the advocacy of some 
officers, from 1925 to 1938, had subsided by 1950. In the final years of colonial rule, 
the principal health focus of government (at least for the north) turned rapidly to the 
newly recognised onchocerciasis crisis, promoted by advocacy from another quarter: 
the influential British Empire Society for the Blind. 
Guinea worm was recognised by the new Ministry of Health as a serious 
problem which limited the economic potential of northern Ghana, a disease which 
114 Ibid., Enc.7: Report from R.S. Cheverton-‘Observations on the Medical Department following a tour
in the Gold Coast and Neighbouring French Territories Between November 1949 and April 1950’, 
27-35.
115 NRG/8/13/4 (1945-55), Enc.46: ‘Health Campaign’, Director of Information Services, Accra to 
CRO, Tamale, 5 July 1954.
116 NRG/8/7/9 (1949-1951), Enc.2: ’Ten Year Plan for Hospital, Health and Nutrition Services’, undated
(1949).
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caused 'great economic hardship' to the region's peoples.117 The same phrases had been 
used year after year by those medical officers aware of the extent to which guinea 
worm caused disability and lost production to northern communities. But the disease 
had been brought under control in the coastal cities and mining areas decades earlier, 
and this had reduced pressure for further action. In 1953 the government carried out a 
survey of guinea worm infection. This reflected the new attention given to diseases 
affecting African populations across the Gold Coast, and perhaps also the particular 
interests of the first Ghanaian Minister of Health, Imoru Egala, one of few northerners 
in the CPP government. The survey found that over a fifth of the population was 
infected in some northern village clusters, and observed that the limited well building 
programme of the late 1940s had failed to stop the disease. In some cases wells had 
been sunk into undrinkable salt water, while others had fallen into disuse when people 
could not obtain parts to keep them working.118 In 1955, when the population of the 
north was estimated at a little under one million people, the Ministry of Health reported
that:
Guinea worm is perhaps the most crippling of all the endemic diseases on the 
Gold Coast. Full recovery from a single guinea worm near the ankle or knee 
may take up to four years, and the eruption of symptoms causes 100 percent 
disability for months.  In the Northern Territories it is estimated that some 
10,000 adults are completely disabled throughout each farming season, and 
some 90,000 partly disabled. The total loss to the Gold Coast's labour effort is 
enormous.119
117 1953 MDAR, 22; 1954 MDAR, 55.
118 1953 MDAR, 9, ‘Guinea Worm’.
119 Ibid.
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Figure 30. A man shows scars from repeated guinea worm infections. Northern Ghana, July 2015.
Source: author
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Part 3. The eradication of guinea worm in northern Ghana, 1980-2010
From a historian's perspective, the postcolonial history of guinea worm is 
striking in that little data is available for the disease, for the north as a whole, between 
1957 and the late 1970s. The problem remained prevalent, although there is almost no 
accurate documentation for the period between 1966 and 1983, as with other aspects of 
Ghana’s public health. In community interviews, however, many individuals showed 
multiple scars where they had suffered single or repeated guinea worm infection, and 
would often be able to date each scar within a particular period ('Nkrumah’s time', for 
example, or to more recent decades). The pain and duration of guinea worm disease 
mean that it is not easily forgotten. The interviews suggest a persistently high rate of 
infection in many parts of the north from the late colonial period into the 1980s: when 
asked about which diseases had posed the most serious problem over the lifetime of 
participants, guinea worm and measles were more consistently cited than any others.120 
The long persistence of infection is also confirmed in interviews with retired northern 
health officials, who observed that guinea worm was 'everywhere', or that their own 
friends and relatives would be infected by the disease almost every year.121 
Chapter 4 discussed the problems in Ghana's health system during the period
of economic decline in the 1960s, and the failure to maintain public health systems in 
the north from 1966 to 1983. This suggests why guinea worm, principally a problem of
the north and of some rural areas in the south, lay beyond the capacity and the 
inclination of the state health service for several decades, even though local officials 
120 See all community interviews, and for example Group.01: Bongo Village (Guruni), Interview 27 July
2015; Group.05: Yorogo Village (Guruni), Interview 28 July 2015; Group.08: Dulugu Village 
(Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; Group.10: Muriwie Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 
August 2015; Group.11: Naachenyiri Village, Jirapa Area (Dagaare), Interview 7 August 2015; 
Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.17: Dagomba 
Community 2, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015.
121 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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continued to raise concerns about the disease. As the chapter also notes, this was the 
period when international bodies, most centrally the WHO, assumed an increasing 
share of authority and responsibility in the oversight of northern public health. Here 
again, however, guinea worm remained a neglected problem. The WHO operated local 
programmes for bilharzia and tuberculosis control in the north over this period, in 
addition to the global Smallpox Eradication Programme and the regional 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme.122  As noted in Chapter 3, onchocerciasis control 
drew in extensive local resources, and focused available health personnel on the 
surveillance and treatment of river systems and running water, rather than village 
ponds. 
Dr Bugri and guinea worm
The last section of this chapter moves forward several decades, to the years 
immediately preceding the Guinea Worm Eradication Program (GWEP) of the 1980s. 
Before discussing the programme itself, I turn briefly to the role played by one 
individual in the history of guinea worm control in northern Ghana. Born in 1943 in 
Bawku, in the north-east corner of Ghana, Dr Zanya 'Sam' Bugri's early career reflects 
the international public health linkages which tied Ghana to both the west and the 
eastern bloc in its early independence period. A member of the small northern educated 
elite, he attended Achimota College in Accra on a scholarship arranged by a local 
British official, followed by the University of Ghana, and he subsequently represented 
Ghana in the 400 meters event at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. In the early 1970s he
studied medicine in the former Yugoslavia, and was later awarded a scholarship to 
study a Masters in Public Health in Tehran. This was cancelled on the overthrow of the 
122 WHO/CPD67.4 (1968), 1–22.
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Shah in 1979, and Bugri eventually completed a public health degree through the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.123
Bugri proposed and carried out a study of guinea worm disease for his 
masters research, after he became aware that Ghana's national health system had ceased
to maintain any statistics on levels of infection. He visited villages across the Northern 
Region, developing a methodology which allowed him to estimate the prevalence of 
guinea worm disease in the north as a whole, and sent his findings to health authorities 
in Accra.124 In 1981, the United Nations designated the coming ten years as 'The 
International Drinking Water Decade', and UN agencies including the WHO began 
various programmes connected with this theme – one of the sub-goals was the 
eradication of guinea worm, now recognised as serious a problem in much of Africa 
and south Asia. This coincided with the overthrow of the Limann administration and 
accession of the second Rawlings government. Rawlings linked himself to the publicity
surrounding the International Water Decade, and to early discussions about a global 
guinea worm eradication programme, perhaps as one way to bolster the legitimacy of 
his new regime. Based in Tamale at this point, Bugri received a call saying that the new
president wanted to see a village with guinea worm – the Ministry of Health had 
mentioned his masters thesis. Rawlings appeared in the north at short notice, and Bugri 
accompanied him to the villages his survey had identified as worst affected, where the 
presidential party was shown emerging worms and infested drinking water. Rawlings 
adopted guinea worm control as a personal cause, and Bugri was assigned to complete 
a countrywide survey. He subsequently became the national coordinator of Ghana's 
guinea worm eradication efforts, from the inception of the international programme in 
123 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
124 Ibid.
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1987 to 1995, when he became Director of Public Health in Accra, one of few 
northerners to have held the position. 
Although 'single actor' versions of history are inherently elisive, Sam Bugri 
played an important part in sustaining knowledge of and interest in the disease during a 
period when the northern health system had largely collapsed, and in overseeing 
eradication efforts once they began. My account here relies partly on interviews with 
Bugri himself, cross-checked with additional interviews with former health officials in 
Accra and Tamale, and with village groups across the north.  His story suggests the 
extent to which an individual advocate, positioned within Ghana's cosmopolitan elite, 
could shape the extension of public health services in a remote region like the north. As
a former Olympian, schooled at Achimota College and trained at international 
universities, Bugri had an access and influence which lay beyond the reach of most 
other northern health workers. Beyond this privileged position, however, he was also 
remembered kindly by a number of village communities, as an individual who came to 
collect information about severe levels of guinea worm infestation long before the 
eradication programme had begun. He relayed this information to health authorities, 
who responded by arranging health visits and the treatment of water supplies. In one 
village discussion about various diseases, the participants recalled that ‘Dr Sam Bugri 
saved us from guinea worm’, and the extent of his work on the problem was 
corroborated by former colleagues and past Directors-General of the Ghana Health 
Service.125 Biographical material of this kind, derived from personal interviews, is 
difficult to integrate into an analysis which focuses on the overall health system over 
125 See Dr Sam Adjei, Interview, Accra, 26 June 2016; Dr Frank Nyonator, Interview, Accra, 15 July 
2015; Dr Moses Adibo, Interview, Accra, 17 June 2016; Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 
2015; Professor Fred Binka, Interview, Ho,  21 June 2016; Professor Fred Wurapa, Interview, Accra, 
25 June 2015; And see community groups Group.01: Bongo Village (Guruni), Interview 27 July 
2015; Group.16: Dagomba Community 1, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.17: 
Dagomba Community 2, Tamale Area, Interview 10 August 2015; Group.18: Dagomba Community 
3, Pong-Tamale, Interview 11 August 2015.
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decades. But individuals like Bugri, or B.B. Waddy in the 1940s, at times played an 
important and singular part in the evolution of northern public health work, in a region 
that was seen as a career backwater and avoided by many other government health-
workers.
The end of the worm: structural adjustment, foreign aid, and the eradication project
In the early 1980s, Bugri's 1970s survey was one of the only available 
sources of information on the state of guinea worm disease in Ghana. It was rapidly 
incorporated into the international eradication programme that began soon after 
Ghana's adoption of structural adjustment. The first proposals for global guinea worm 
eradication were made in 1980 by the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in the United States, although India had already started its own national 
programme that year. Ghana began national eradication work in 1985, in advance of the
global initiative. Under the Rawlings government, in 1987 it became the second 
country after Pakistan to join the newly formed Guinea Worm Eradication Program, led
by former US president Jimmy Carter's Carter Center, and supported by a range of 
western state donors, private companies, charities and the WHO.126  The GWEP 
deployed several different strategies against the disease: educational programmes, the 
distribution of individual water filters (donated by DuPont & Co.), and the treatment of 
infested water systems with the larvicide ABATE (donated by American Cyanamid 
Co.).127 In Ghana, the campaign also experimented with a novel worm-extraction 
method developed by Ayurvedic healers in India, which had been found effective in 
reducing the spread of the disease in Rajasthan. The Ayurvedic surgeon Bhanwar Lal 
126 See World Health Organization, Guinea-Worm Disease: Countdown to Eradication (Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2012); The Carter Center, ‘Guinea Worm Eradication Program’, accessed 27 
August 2017, https://www.cartercenter.org/health/guinea_worm/.
127 Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 232–33.
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Sharma was invited to northern Ghana in 1992, where he taught health workers a 
method for extracting the worm before it erupted through the skin: a small cut would be
made, and the now-exposed head of the worm would be treated with an irritating plant 
oil, in some cases prompting it to come out by itself. There were attempts to develop a 
northern Ghanaian analogue of the oil used in India, which was promoted in the north 
under the name 'Tamale Oil', but the method was not uniformly successful.128 
In the final stages of the campaign in Ghana, work became focused on 
village-by-village surveillance, and an extensive public information campaign. Posters 
were placed around the region, and jingles recorded for the radio, many based on a 
Dagomba song with the chorus 'guinea worm has no cure'. Printed cloths were made 
and distributed, showing the insignia of the campaign, a kind of heraldic crest that 
included a guinea worm. Substantial cash rewards (up to 100 cedis per worm) were 
offered for those who located and reported a case of the disease – stringent rules had to 
be applied when it was found that people were cutting worms into multiple sections and
submitting each section for the reward.129 In one of the more coercive aspects of the 
campaign, children were followed by medical staff to reveal which undiscovered water 
supplies they preferred swimming in. Guards were placed on some ponds and dams, 
and people were prevented from accessing the water.130 Eventually the extent of guinea 
worm disease in northern Ghana was narrowed down to a few dams and ponds, which 
were treated with larvicide.131 Despite some periods when infections were found to 
have increased, meaning that the deadline for elimination had extended, the programme
128 Some Dagomba communities remembered using this oil with some success. See Group.18: 
Dagomba Community 3, Pong-Tamale, Interview 11 August 2015; and Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, 
Tamale, 30 June 2015; ‘Ayurvedic Surgeon Hooks out Guinea Worms’, Vrishti, 31 March 1993.
129 Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
130 The Carter Centre, ‘Case Statement: Eradication of Guinea Worm Disease’ (Atlanta: The Carter 
Center, 2016), 7; World Health Organisation, ‘Countdown to Wipe out Guinea Worm in Ghana’, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87, no. 9 (September 2009): 645–732.
131 Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 237.
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as a whole was successful. In 2010, Ghana recorded its final case of the disease, which 
for years had been located only in the north, and in 2015 the WHO certified that all of 
Ghana is free from guinea worm.132
Figure 31. A village volunteer shows sketches and wall advertising, as part of the Guinea Worm
Eradication Program, 2004.
Source: CDC and Carter Center / E.Poyo / 8221
132 The Carter Centre, ‘Case Statement’.
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Figure 32. Savelugu, northern Ghana, 8 February 2007. In a publicity photograph for the eradication
programme, ex-US President Jimmy Carters asks people if they have previously had the disease.
Source: Carter Center Public Health Image Library / Hp-01 
Figure 33. A girl drinks from a pond in northern Ghana, using a filtered drinking straw provided under
the Guinea Worm Eradication Program, 2003.
Source: CDC and The Carter Center / E.Staub / 8219 
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Here it is interesting to consider the alignments between Ghana's adoption of 
structural adjustment, the start of the eradication programme, and a related influx of 
additional aid groups and bilateral development projects in the north. From the mid-
1980s there was a rapid proliferation in the number of aid programmes under way in 
the region, funded by groups including the World Bank, USAID, the government of 
Germany and the Canadian International Development Agency. Their projects included 
the development of commercial agriculture and forestry, and the provision of potable 
water supplies: the government of Canada funded a ten year initiative to increase 
drinking water provision in the Northern Region, including the drilling of seventy high 
capacity boreholes. It also funded a Primary Healthcare Program, intended to address 
the peripheral situation of the north in terms of Ghana's public health system, and to 
‘reverse the present situation of medical specialization and urban emphasis resulting in 
90 percent of health care expenditures benefiting approximately 10 percent of the 
population’.133  
On the one hand, this influx of state-funded aid projects, including the 
GWEP, reflected the view that Ghana was now a more hospitable environment for 
bilateral aid projects (and private investors), following its acceptance of structural 
adjustment reforms. On the other hand, however, the increase in aid to the north came 
in response to the region's accelerating impoverishment in the face of the adjustment 
programme itself.  Some of the countries and organisations involved in northern 
development work were also directly involved in the attempt to impose 'cost recovery' 
systems of healthcare – the hated 'cash and carry' system which reflected a turn away 
from the principal of free health care, and which put many forms of clinical medicine 
133 WHO/JCP Volumes/5-6 (1980-85), 5–9.
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beyond the reach of northern Ghanaians.134 The major disease control projects of the 
1980s and 1990s were hailed as a landmark for corporate responsibility, as DuPont and 
American Cyanamid Co donated filters and larvicides against guinea worm, and Merck 
& Co donated the drug Ivermectin to treat onchocerciasis. But the structural adjustment
of the same period meant that Ghana had been opened to a trade liberalisation in which 
foreign companies usually set the terms. Recent research has shown the decline or 
stasis of the north during these years. A report from the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) observed that ‘it is strikingly clear that Northern 
Ghana grew little during the 1990s ... while the rest of the country benefited from the 
growth of Accra and the forest region’.135 Access to electricity increased by only 2 
percent for rural northerners between 1990 and 1999, while it rose by 25 percent for 
rural communities in the southern regions, and by 18 percent in Ashanti.136 Over the 
same period, the percentage of Ghana's population with access to a government health 
facility (defined as a journey of 30 minutes or less) rose to more than 30 percent of the 
overall population, an average which was kept down by the three northern regions, 
where only 7 percent of people were able to reach a health facility in less than 30 
minutes.137 Crop production fell, rising costs decreased the attendance of northerners at 
clinical facilities, and extreme rural poverty was found to have increased. Jacob 
Songsore argues that in some villages, the SAP-mandated turn to charging for clean 
water provision – with village pumps dismantled by officials of the Ghana Water and 
134 See Chapter 5, and for a broader discussion of guinea worm control in the structural adjustment era, 
see Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities’.
135 DFID, ‘Economic Growth’, 10.
136 Ibid., 10–11.
137 Claus C. Portner and Sudharshan Canagarajah, ‘Evolution of Poverty and Welfare in Ghana in the 
1990s : Achievements and Challenges’ (The World Bank, 1 October 2003), 12.
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Sewerage Corporation if payment was not made – drove communities to drink from 
infested water sources that they had previously learned to avoid.138
These new economic conditions also shaped the eradication campaign. When 
states stalled in their commitments to support Ghana's overall health sector during the 
structural adjustment transition, money for the guinea worm campaign was abruptly cut
to focus on the provision of curative treatment at fixed government facilities, resulting 
in a doubling of guinea worm cases between 1998 and 1999.139  As Susan Watts 
observed in 1998, ‘in an era of Structural Adjustment Programs, when the IMF and 
World Bank demand that debt repayment to first world creditors has priority over local 
health and educational needs, dracunculiasis campaigners have to cut their clothes to 
suit their cloth ... most grass roots village health workers in the eradication programs 
are volunteers’.140 In northern Ghana, these volunteers were supposed to focus 
specifically on the Carter Center’s Guinea Worm Control Program, which resisted 
requests for them to participate in other public health activity. However, as with the 
Medical Field Units, which began as part of the colonial sleeping sickness campaign, 
the volunteers rapidly became an important part of the region’s broader rural health 
service, distributing minor treatments and monitoring the incidence of diseases, at a 
time when there were few other ways for village communities to make their basic 
health needs known.141   
138 Jacob Songsore, ‘The Economic Recovery Program/Structural Adjustment Program; Its Likely 
Impact on the “Distant” Rural Poor in Northern Ghana’, in Saaka, Regionalism and Public Policy, 
ch.10; Portner and Canagarajah, ‘Evolution of Poverty and Welfare in Ghana in the 1990s’, 15.
139 Cairncross, Muller, and Zagaria, ‘Dracunculiasis’, 242–43.
140 Watts, ‘Perceptions and Priorities’, 807.
141 Dr Sam Bugri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015; Dr Von Asigri, Interview, Tamale, 30 June 2015.
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Conclusion
For northern Ghana in the 1980s, much of the legwork for the eradication of a
long-standing and economically limiting disease was done by a network of unpaid 
villagers, as local poverty increased due to the affects of economic restructuring, while 
some of the bilateral donors who had imposed this restructuring heralded their own 
achievements in eliminating guinea worm. As Eileen Choffnes observes in her report 
on a symposium of public health engineers held in 2010, neglected tropical diseases 
characteristically affect those who lack a political voice, and this may be their principal 
defining feature. Choffnes notes that ‘in the past, their serious impact on health and 
productivity led to considerable knowledge about these diseases, and effective control 
tools were developed for many. As living conditions improved in many parts of the 
world, the opportunities for transmission were drastically reduced. As a result, these 
diseases are now rarely seen in populations that enjoy good access to health services 
and a reasonable standard of living’.142
In this way, the history of guinea worm in Ghana shows how a disease 
becomes marginalised within a state, rather than globally. What in the early 1900s had 
been a 'tropical disease' of great interest to Accra governments – one known to cause 
painful disability and economic hardship, which affected members of coastal 
communities and raised significant concerns about lost revenues – had by the end of the
century become a 'neglected tropical disease' occurring mostly in the north, requiring 
intervention by donors and non-governmental organisations. Although it remains 
impossible to calculate the impacts of almost a century of widespread (or absent) 
guinea worm disease on north-south divergence, the sources in this chapter suggest that
142 Choffnes et al., The Causes and Impacts of Neglected Tropical and Zoonotic Diseases, 28.
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these impacts were significant, and may not have been adequately accounted for in 
previous assessments of the regions' trajectories. 
This history also shows the decline of national health services capacity in 
Ghana, and to some extent the later decline of authority for transnational institutions 
like the WHO, which in earlier decades had enlisted state funding to achieve the 
eradication or control of diseases like smallpox and onchocerciasis in Ghana. By the 
1990s, with a changing economic order and post-Cold War political conditions, this 
role was being supplanted by private organisations like the Carter Center, backed by 
donor states and private philanthropists. Vernick and Webb argue that this period 
marked a shift in the political and ideological basis for global health:  ‘with the creation
of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [1994], the role of private philanthropy in 
global health surpassed that of bilateral foreign aid, the WHO, and other organizations. 
This has heralded a new world health order’.143 Organisations like the Gates Foundation
now occupy a comparable position to the Rockefeller Foundation in the 1920s, at the 
height of the gilded age and prior to the creation of transnational bodies like the WHO. 
Having been neglected for almost a century, despite periods of intense advocacy on the 
part of some officials, the disappearance of guinea worm in northern Ghana eventually 
played out against the backdrop of this change.
143 Giles-Vernick and Webb, Global Health in Africa, 11.
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CONCLUSION
A study of this kind has some evident limitations. Focused on changes in 
public health work over a long period of time, and on the relationship between two 
regions, the thesis has generally approached northern Ghana and its people in 
aggregate: a territory with a distinct climate, terrain and disease pattern, and a 
population speaking a distinct group of languages, located on the margins of Ghana’s 
economy and politics from 1902 to the present. As such, the thesis has not consistently 
accounted for the north’s varied internal life – the distinctions between ethnic 
communities, between the region’s administrative subdivisions, or between the 
experiences of people in different northern districts, perhaps with a better local hospital,
more rural health-workers, or a more activist political representative than others. The 
study has not addressed the experience of northerners in the southern health system, 
which many encountered as migrant workers from the early 1900s onwards; this would 
be an interesting area for further research.  It has not examined other areas or 
communities that were also persistently situated on the periphery of the Gold Coast and
Ghana, although these certainly existed, notably in parts of the Volta and Brong Ahafo 
regions bordering the north. Apart from the aggregate class divide between north and 
south, the thesis does not engage closely with either class or gender as organising 
principles for its analysis. Particular health needs, relative access to healthcare, and the 
possibilities for employment in and influence on the health system were different for 
northern men and woman – and for poor or wealthy northerners – across the century. 
These aspects of the region’s public health history open further avenues for research, as
does the relationship between local health services and the urban-rural divide. Although
the south was significantly more urbanised, the north had its urban centres too. Future 
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research might examine the extent to which northern urban populations, with their own 
relative concentrations of wealth and political influence, acted as barriers, gatekeepers, 
or enablers for the regional expansion of health services. 
More broadly, the study’s attention to the long-term history of public health 
means that the finer details of historical experience are necessarily elided at some 
points. Many of its sources were generated by colonial and postcolonial governments, 
or by transnational organisations like the WHO, focused on whole populations. There 
are regrettably few available documentary sources, particularly for the colonial period 
but also for much of the time after independence, which present the view of northern 
communities regarding the evolution of their health system. The thesis has therefore 
attempted to support the documentary sources with interview testimony from 
communities and individual health practitioners, making use of recollections from the 
late colonial period to the present. 
As far as possible, I have tried to integrate findings about the social history of
health work into a discussion of the region-wide evolution of public health services and
institutions. These include observations about disease control among northern 
communities: the panic and concealment that resulted from forced vaccination during 
the Smallpox Eradication Programme, for example; the similar trepidation when 
helicopters marked ‘ONCHO’ appeared over the horizon, spraying larvicide during the 
Onchocerciasis Control Programme; or how guinea worm control was facilitated by a 
publicity campaign which included radio jingles, wax-printed cloths, and rewards for 
those who handed in a full worm. The study has also examined the role of individual 
health workers, and the diffusion of particular medical theories, in shaping public 
health activity in a remote region. Local advocates, like B.B. Waddy in the colonial 
period, and Dr Sam Bugri after independence, at times played an important role in 
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calling attention to previously neglected northern diseases. At other points, the 
metropolitan focus of local medical science meant that serious public health problems 
were ignored, as in the case of onchocerciasis. Although the Gold Coast hosted several 
foundational studies regarding the disease, its serious health impacts in the north went 
unrecognised or ignored until the end of colonial rule. Another result of the region’s 
isolation was that individuals like K.R.S. Morris, head of the Tsetse Control 
Department, were able to act upon their medical theories with relatively little oversight.
Morris’s bush clearing and resettlement programme was successful in reducing the 
spread of sleeping sickness in the 1940s. But it was based on a flawed premise, and 
ignored local African knowledge about disease. By building dams and access roads on 
cleared rivers, and relocating communities into valleys which had supposedly been 
‘freed’ from sleeping sickness, the campaign appears to have inadvertently and 
significantly increased people’s exposure to onchocerciasis.
Over the transition to independence, northern Ghana was recognised as 
having the most serious burden of onchocerciasis in Africa, although systemic control 
work only began in the 1970s. The chapters on colonial sleeping sickness and post-
independence onchocerciasis control chart connections between public health activity 
in different periods, showing the unintended outcomes of past interventions driven by 
the state’s prevailing economic preferences. In the case of sleeping sickness, the bush 
clearing campaign was seen by the Gold Coast government as a way to boost local 
agricultural production and regional revenues, and of redistributing the northern 
frontier population towards the southern labour markets. Late colonial dam-building 
programmes may also have contributed to widespread guinea worm infection in the 
north, a disease which only received concerted attention in the 1980s. 
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The three chapters on particular disease control programmes, and the three 
chapters on the development of healthcare institutions, have each charted the 
involvement of international organisations in northern healthcare. These organisations 
included the British Empire Society for the Blind, now the international charity called 
Sightsavers. With influence in London, and relatively unconstrained by the local 
politics of the Gold Coast, the society was instrumental in drawing attention to the 
north’s onchocerciasis emergency. However, through its widely-emulated international 
fundraising work, which used northern Ghana’s ‘Valleys of the Blind’ as a central 
exemplar, the society also contributed to an enduring representation of rural African 
communities as inherently diseased and helpless. The thesis has discussed the growing 
involvement of the World Health Organisation in northern healthcare after 
independence, and its influence on Ghana’s national health policies. The WHO’s 
institutional knowledge of northern health problems was maintained across political 
transitions and local recessions, as were its local staff, during periods of rapid staff 
turnover in Ghana’s own health services – and a significant number of Ghanaian staff 
left the national service to take up work with the WHO. Perhaps as a result, the WHO 
assumed an increasing degree of authority over some aspects of Ghana’s health system 
from the mid-1960s, and particularly during the 1970s, as recession and political 
instability undermined what remained of the social-democratic developmental state 
envisioned by Nkrumah and independence-era voters. In the final two chapters I have 
also examined the proliferation of bilateral donor agencies, private philanthropic health 
organisations and NGOs in northern healthcare from the 1980s. This was a result of 
Ghana’s turn to structural adjustment: the increased presence of these organisations in 
the north was shaped by the premise that because Ghana had liberalised its economy 
through adjustment, it was now to be assisted with rural health and other development 
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projects, often brokered by the agencies of states that had insisted on economic 
liberalisation. But northern poverty increased sharply during the adjustment era, and 
instead of rectifying the health service problems of the past, these newly-arrived 
international organisations were often working to mitigate the negative public health 
effects of adjustment itself.
The thesis has also developed a historical account of the political economy of
northern Ghana’s public health institutions. This includes a discussion of the Native 
Authority health system, which developed rapidly in the 1930s after a sustained period 
of neglect by the central government. Native Authorities became the most efficient and 
far-reaching providers of healthcare to rural northern communities for much of the 
colonial period – showing the persistent importance of local initiative and agency in 
shaping healthcare on the economic margins, and a contradiction of the argument that 
indirect rule Native Authority necessarily devolved into a form of local despotism. 
Following the ‘Navrongo Experiment’ of the 1990s, some of the structures of Native 
Authority healthcare were recapitulated in Ghana’s current Community-Based Health 
Planning system, which once again recognised the value of traditional leaders and 
village social networks in the effective provision of health services.
As part of this long-term history of public health institutions, the thesis 
identifies key developments that accompanied the transition to independence, a period 
of northern health history which has not previously been studied in great detail. These 
developments included the gradual dissolution of Native Authority (or subsequently 
Local Authority) health services, as authority for healthcare was centralised in Accra, 
and the transfer of northern health facilities to mission control.  This created what many
communities perceived as a competing health provider, and potentially increased the 
religious and political influence of local churches, who are still the leading providers of
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healthcare in some districts. The study discusses how the mass departure of colonial 
medical personnel created an informational gulf at independence, undermining the 
state’s institutional memory of northern health problems. Attempts to expand health 
services under the first independent government were limited by significant shortfalls 
in available staff, a problem which became more acute as the economy faltered in the 
1960s. In the period from 1966 to 1981, successive overthrows of the central 
government further disrupted the provision of northern healthcare and politicised the 
staffing of health services, as Ghana’s overall health system faced critical problems 
with the supply of basic drugs and medical equipment. Despite these significant 
difficulties, some of the north’s public health institution continued to work effectively. 
Founded in the colonial era and largely staffed by northerners without formal medical 
qualifications, the Medical Field Units functioned as a crucial ark of local knowledge 
across the independence divide. From the 1940s to the early 1980s, the MFUs were the 
principal or only conduit for government health services to many rural communities.
Across all chapters, my analysis has been shaped by the recognition of 
northern Ghana’s enduringly peripheral relationship to the south, which to some extent 
replicated Ghana’s own peripheral situation in the world economy. In both the colonial 
and postcolonial state, when global or domestic events forced the government to cut 
spending on health services, the worst effects of austerity were consistently passed to 
northern communities. Over the early colonial period, as the region became a central 
source of cheap labour for the southern economy, it also became seen as a zone of 
contagion which posed a risk to the south’s centres of economic production, and 
northerners were sometimes depicted as inherently diseased or second-class citizens. 
From the 1920s onwards, many reports observed that northerners faced the heaviest 
disease burden of any population in the country, with lower life expectancies, higher 
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infant mortality, higher malnutrition, and fewer opportunities to access government 
healthcare. There were numerous episodes of advocacy over the century, when 
concerned local officials and northern leaders protested what they saw as an unjust 
allocation of public health services between north and south. But this advocacy brought
little change, for a region and people that remain geographically, culturally, politically 
and economically isolated from the main centres of power in Ghana.
Despite the difficulties and inequities discussed above, it must be emphasized
that while the history of public health in twentieth-century northern Ghana is evidently 
not a straightforward narrative of progress, neither is it a narrative of decline. There 
was no prelapsarian moment when northern communities were free from disease – 
many village groups considered that the region’s current health services are better than 
at any other time they can recall, and some infectious diseases no longer pose a 
significant risk.1 There is a relatively substantial body of historical research on health in
Ghana, but there has been little disaggregation of the north. By focusing on the region 
and its long-term relationship with the south, and by bringing new sources to bear on 
the subject – interviews, documents from the northern and Accra archives, and WHO 
files which have not been used in previous research on the country – it is hoped that 
this study makes some contribution to the broader literature on public health in Ghana, 
and to the particular historiography of the north.
1 See, for example, Group.14: Piisi Wala Community, Wa Area (Wala), Interview 8 August 2015; 
Group.08: Dulugu Village (Guruni), Interview 29 July 2015; Group.07: Zuarungu Village (Guruni), 
Interview 29 July 2015.
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